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Youth and the State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Extract

The three birth cohorts which have passed through the youth stage of their life course since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 have had radically different relations with the Party-state. This has brought serious consequences for the Party-state itself, the Party-state's relation with succeeding youth cohorts and for the integration of Chinese society.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1991

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References

1. “Cohort” refers to persons born in a given period who age together and have roughly similar experiences. “Generation” refers to genealogical categories such as parents and children. See Rosow, Irving, “What is a cohort and why?Human Development, 21 (2) (1978), pp. 6575CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ryder, Norman B., “The cohort as a concept in the study of social change,” American Sociological Review(hereafter ASR), 30(6) (12 1965), pp. 843861CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2.. Data come from published primary and secondary materials, as well as interviews conducted in China and abroad since the late 1970s.

3. On the life course approach, see Clausen, John A., The Life Course (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1986)Google Scholar; Elder, Glen H. Jr, “Perspectives on the life course,” in Elder, Glen H. Jr(ed.), Life Course Dynamics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 2349Google Scholar; and Mayer, Karl Ulrich and Tuma, Nancy Brandon, “Life course research and event history analysis: an overview,” in Mayer, Karl Ulrich and Tuma, Nancy Brandon (eds.), Event History Analysis in Life Course Research (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 320Google Scholar.

4. Elder, Glen H. Jr, “Adolescence in historical perspective,” in Adelson, Joseph (ed.), Handbook of Adolescent Psychology (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), pp. 346Google Scholar.

5. It also performs the latent function of keeping them out of the work force.

6. The life course literature, even when addressing the role of the state in structuring the life course, has neglected the special characteristics of Marxist-Leninist regimes. E.g. Mayer, Karl Ulrich and Schoepflin, Urs, “The State and the life course,” in Scott, W. Richard and Blake, Judith (eds.), Annual Review of Sociology, 1989, pp. 187209Google Scholar.

7. Sources on the traditional family include: Lang, Olga, Chinese Family and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946)Google Scholar; Shu-ching, Lee, “China's traditional family, its characteristics and disintegration”, ASR, 18(3) (06 1953), pp. 272–80Google Scholar; Levy, Marion Jr, The Family Revolution in Modern China (New York: Atheneum, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pye, Lucian, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Solomon, Richard H., Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar; and Yang, C. K., Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965)Google Scholar.

8. See Saari, Jon L., Legacies of Childhood: Growing up Chinese in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wasserstrom, Jeffrey, “Taking it to the streets: Shanghai students and political protests, 1919–1949,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989Google Scholar.

9. Stacey, Judith, Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

10. The Chinese popularly label cohorts by decades, based on common experience, even if their actual birthdate crosses decadal lines. I wish to thank Pan Wei for ft clarifying this. The Chinese officially also talk of the first (Long March era), second (received secondary education in the 1940–50s) and third (what is here called the '50s) cohorts (tidui commonly translated as “echelon”), using the communist movement as the time line. The '50s cohort is also called “Jiefang Pai” (“Liberation brand”), a pun on when they were born, and the name of a Chinese-made truck.

11. Chen, Theodore H. C., “Elementary Education in communist China”, The China Quarterly, No. 10, (1962), pp. 98122CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ridley, Charles Price, Godwin, Paul H. B. and Doolin, Dennis J., The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971)Google Scholar.

12. Linshan, Hua, Les Années Rouges (The Red Years), (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987), p. 27Google Scholar.

13. Vogel, Ezra, “From friendship to comradeship: The change in personal relations in communist China,” The China Quarterly, No. 21 (1965), pp. 4660Google Scholar.

14. The fierce competition to join the CYL, often with tragic consequences, is discussed in Yuan, Gao, Born Red (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 2021Google Scholar. Anita Chan argues that “league members tended to exhibit stronger traits of authoritarianism than non-members” due to “their watchdog role, the stringent organizational discipline they adhered to in the hierarchical climate of the league, and, their need to present themselves to others as role-models of an authoritarian belief system.” (Chan, Anita, Children of Mao (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), p. 215)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the CYL, see Townsend, James R., “Revolutionizing Chinese youth: a study of Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien,” in Barnett, A. Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 447476Google Scholar.

15. White, Lynn T. III, Careers in Shanghai (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978)Google Scholar; and Whyte, Martin King, “The politics of life chances in the People's Republic of China,” in Shaw, Yu-ming (ed.), Power and Politics in the PRC (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 244265Google Scholar.

16. Middle school life in the first half of the 1960s is well described by 4:2 and from 1960–1980 in Unger, Jonathan, Education Under Mao (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. Shirk distinguishes three principles for awarding life chances in any society: a meritocracy, where they depend on achievement; a feodocracy, where they depend on ascription; and a virtuocracy, where they depend on demonstration of virtue (p. 4). The third one characterized China.

17. Chan, Anita, “Images of China's social structure: the changing perspectives of Canton students,” World Politics, XXXIV (3) (04 1982), pp. 295323CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18. A memoir such as Lo, Fulang, Morning Breeze (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989)Google Scholar reveals a startling lack of self-reflection. Other memoirs covering the '50s cohort, in addition to the previously-noted Gao Yuan, Hua Linshan and Lo Fulang, include: Bennett, Gordon A. and Montaperto, Ronald N., Red Guard (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972)Google Scholar; Hunter, Neale, Shanghai Journal (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Heng, Liang and Shapiro, Judith, Son of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1983)Google Scholar; Ling, Ken, The Revenge of Heaven (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1972)Google Scholar; Lo, Ruth Earnshaw and Kinderman, Katherine, In The Eye of the Typhoon (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980)Google Scholar; Ziping, Luo, A Generation Lost (New York: Henry Holt, 1990)Google Scholar; Milton, David and Milton, Nancy Dall, The Wind Will Not Subside (New York: Pantheon, 1976)Google Scholar; Cheng, Nien, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Daiyun, Yue and Wakeman, Carolyn, To The Storm (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

19. A clear example is Chi-ping, Tung and Evans, Humphrey, The Thought Revolution (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1966)Google Scholar. Tung was born in 1940. In his extremely important 1957 speech, “On the correct handling of contradictions among the people,” Mao expressed concern that “quite a number of young people are unable to see the contrast between the old China and the new…,” therefore “lively and effective political education” had to be carried on constantly. (Tse-Tung, Mao, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966) pp. 289290Google Scholar.

20. Chan, Anita, Children of Mao. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), p. 190CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. These are, of course, gross generalizations. I personally know several youths of “bad class background” whose parents kept them home during the CR, refusing to let them out, compelling them to study. This paid off in 1977 when the university entrance exams were revived. Others encouraged their children to go along to protect themselves since it seemed to be the thing to do. Luo Ziping joined the Red Guards to avenge her parents but also embarked on a rigorous self-study regimen (Luo Ziping, A Generation Lost).

22. Luo Ziping and Fulang Lo present xiafang as almost entirely coerced, whereas in the early days many youths did go willingly. On rustication, see: Bernstein, Thomas, Up To The Mountains and Down To The Villages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Bonnin, Michel, “Le mouvement d'envoi des jeunes instruits à la campagne: Chine, 1968–1980” (“Chinese educated youth: The rustication movement, 1968–1980”) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1988)Google Scholar; Chao, Weiyang, “Rusticating Chinese educated youth: adaptation processes,” in Morgan, Scott and Colton, Elizabeth (eds.), People in Upheaval (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1987), pp. 159179Google Scholar; Madsen, Richard, Power and Morality in a Chinese Village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Xiaoyan, Shi, Beidahuang (The Great Northern Wilderness) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar. The three very popular novellas by A. Cheng, “Chess King,” “King of Trees” and “King of Children” provide an offbeat view of the rustication experience.

23. The genre of “wound” or “scar” (shangheri) literature is its anthem. For selected stories, see Barme, Geremie and Lee, Bennett, The Wounded and Other Stories of the Cultural Revolution (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1979)Google Scholar. In the late 1980s, this cohort led the search for the roots of Chinese culture in an effort to explain the country's continued failure to modernize and democratize. Some fictional examples of the search can be found in Spring Bamboo, Tai, Jeanne (trans, and ed.), (New York: Random House, 1989)Google Scholar. The most famous work is the 1988 television documentary, River Elegy.

24. Nathan, Andrew J., Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985)Google Scholar. See also Heng, Liang and Shapiro, Judith, After the Nightmare (New York: Knopf, 1986)Google Scholar.

25. Liu Xinwu's pathbreaking story, “Class counsellor” describes the type of children raised in the 1970s. At one extreme are unruly delinquents; at the other are I mindless slogan-shouters. Teachers faced a difficult challenge imposing order over them and motivating them to study. One of the better feature films on the subject, Juvenile Delinquents, made in the mid-1980s, emphasized the social origins of the problem.

26. This dilemma is well discussed in Rosen, Stanley, “Prosperity, privatization, and China's youth,” Problems of Communism, XXXIV(2) (0304 1985), pp. 128Google Scholar.

27. In Siu, Helen F. and Stern, Zelda (eds.), Mao's Harvest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 49Google Scholar. See also Liu Xinwu's story, “Awake, my brother” where a member of the '50s cohort uses official “logic” to reason with his cynical '60s cohort brother.

28. See a collection of revealing articles and responses in Burns, John P. and Rosen, Stanley (eds.), Policy Conflicts in Post-Mao China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), esp. pp. 5380Google Scholar.

29. Youths comprise a high proportion of the floating population of rural folk working in the cities.

30. Walder, Andrew G., Communist Neo-traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

31. A number of films and stories described in a positive light members of this cohort who turned from juvenile delinquents into law-abiding private entrepreneurs. One of the better works is 1990's Black Snow, the hero is destroyed by a decadent society.

32. Gold, Thomas B., “Urban private business and social change,” in Davis, Deborah and Vogel, Ezra F. (eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 157178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. For an official view for foreign consumption, see Yuwen, You, “China's youth today,” China Reconstructs, XXXII(10) (10 1983), pp. 2933Google Scholar. A CYL handbook from that time is Zhijian, Huang, Qingnian Tedian yu Gonggingtuan Gongzuo (The Special Characteristics of Youth and the Work of the CYL) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1983)Google Scholar. Orville Schell captured the mood of this cohort and the influence of Lizhi, Fang, Binyan, Liu and Ruowang, Wang over it in Discos and Democracy (New York: Pantheon, 1988)Google Scholar.

34. Tani Barlow and Donald Lowe found members of this cohort “inexperienced and kind of dull,” especially when compared to the members of the '50s cohort they taught in Shanghai in the early 1980s. Barlow, Tani E. and Lowe, Donald M., Teaching China's Lost Generation (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1987), p. 11Google Scholar.

35. Ibid. In an epilogue the authors stress the disillusionment their students felt when actually in the United States.

36. Kessen, William (ed.), Childhood in China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975)Google Scholar describes this period.

37. Of course, family background retained its importance. For instance, intellectual families encouraged their children to study hard, etc. Nepotism and what Walder calls “principled particularism,” that is, favouritism to Party members and activists, were also crucial. But increasingly the individual fell back on himself.

38. Qun, Bei, “Women ying youdi guoqingguan” (“The views we should have about the national situation”) Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese Youth) (03 1990), pp. 34Google Scholar; and Xiao Lin, “Jizhong liuxing ‘yishi’ di xishuo” (“Analysis of some kinds of popular ‘consciousness’”), ibid. pp. 5–6.

39. For instance Rosen, Stanley, “The impact of reform policies on youth attitudes,” in Davis, Deborah and Vogel, Ezra F. (eds.), Chinese Society on the Eve of Tiananmen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 283305CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. E.g. Yuejin, Liu, “Shinian gaigezhong jiazhiguan di shige zhuanbian” (“Ten changes in values during a decade of reform”), Xinhua Wenzhai, 2 (1989), pp. 1316Google Scholar(orig. in Gongren ribao); Ren, Lu, “Dui qingnian jiazhiguan duoyuanhua qingxiang di fenxi” (“Analysis of the trend of pluralization in the values of youth”), Shehui, 1 (1986), pp. 1315Google Scholar; Jieshan, Gu and Xiang, Zhang, “Shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan liyi quntilun” (“On interest groups during the primary stage of socialism), Guangming ribao, 29 02 1988, p. 3Google Scholar.

41. For instance Kwan, Michael David, Broken Portraits (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989)Google Scholar and Terrill, Richard, Saturday Night in Baoding (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

42. E.g. Xiaoming, Jin, “Fenpei: Yige naoren di guaiquan” (“Job assignments: an irritating odd circle”), Banyuetan, 21 (10 11 1988), pp. 1618Google Scholar. This frustration was a major motivation of the 1989 demonstrations.

43. Sihao, Xiong, “Expectations at odds with realities,” Beijing Review, 44 (29 10–4 11 1990), pp. 2729Google Scholar.

44. E.g. ‘Rengxia shubao di xiaoshangren” (“Little merchants drop their bookbags”), Renmin ribao (overseas edition), 25 02 1989, p. 4Google Scholar.

45. Zhijian, Huang, Qingnian tedian yu gongqingtuan gongzuo (Special Characteristics of Youth and the Work ofCYL) (Beijing: Qingnian chubanshe, 1983)Google Scholar.

46. Rosen, Stanley, “Value change among post-Mao youth: The evidence from survey data,” in Link, Perry, Madsen, Richard and Pickowicz, Paul (eds.), Unofficial China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 193216Google Scholar.

47. Ibid. p. 213.

48. Tong, Shen chronicles the process at Beijing University in Almost A Revolution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), pp. 135ffGoogle Scholar.

49. Throughout 1988 Zhongguo qingnian (Chinese Youth), the CYL's organ, ran a six-part series extolling this cohort's seeking truth from facts (and not falling for slogans), initiative, desire to get rich, diversity of beliefs, new attitude to love, etc.

50. In 1990 I interviewed cadres from the All-China Youth Federation. They staunchly defended the revival of the Lei Feng cult, asking what was wrong with the values he embodied. They did not seem to grasp his irrelevance to the lives of most Chinese youth. They also argued that part of their job is to inculcate correct values among youth.

51. For some typical statements soon after the events, see, “CYL's role at universities stressed,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 4 August 1989, pp. 21–22, (orig. Guangming ribao), and “Interview with CPC education director,” ibid, 5 August 1989, pp. 13–15 (orig. Liaowang).

52. A survey conducted at Beijing University in May 1990 by the Graduate Student Association revealed a sense of hopelessness, distrust of the state (especially as regarded forthcoming job assignments), and a desire to go abroad. Published in Kaifang, (September 1990), p. 55. According to some foreign observers interviewed in Beijing in May 1991, the year of military service seemed to have had some effect. Not only are the trained students at Beijing University segregated from upper classmen, they avoid contact with them. Authorities at one key university admitted in January 1991 that many of the best students are not taking the entrance exams for the top schools because they do not want to do the year's military training, and they do not want to subject themselves to job assignments that could send them anywhere in the country. They prefer to go to provincial or municipal universities.