1. This term is used to refer to Mao Tse-tung, Un Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng and Chiang Ch'ing, who collectively served as the directorate of Cultural Revolution policy initiatives.

2. See Bridgham, Philip, “Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power,” The China Quarterly, No. 34 (05–06 1968), pp. 27–29.Google Scholar

3. A fourth reason for studying the Wuhan Incident in detail is that the source material is much richer than in other cases. Although we could wish for testimony and documentary material from the losing side (Ch'en Tsai-tao and the “One Million Warrior” organization in particular), there are available not only the usual newspaper and radio reports from Peking, but also Nationalist Chinese, Japanese correspondent and Red Guard materials in sufficient abundance to enable us to make an approximate reconstruction of the actual events.

4. The official Eight-Point Directive to this end was issued on 28 January, but wall-posters reported that Mao had instructed Lin on 21 January to command the PLA to intervene. See “Order of the Military Commission of the Central Committee,” 28 January 1967 (included in Collection of Documents Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 05 1967Google Scholar, issued by the “Propagandists of Mao Tse-tung's Thought Peking College of Chemical Engineering,” and translated in Current Background (Hong Kong), No. 852 (6 05 1968), pp. 54–55)Google Scholar; and Sofia BTA International Service, 23 January 1967, reporting on a revolutionary rebel poster of 22 January. The poster repeated a conversation purportedly taking place between Mao and Lin on the night of 21 January. The poster was reputed to have been put up by the “Revolutionary Rebel Red Flag Regiment 1226,” presumably the detachment inside the New China News Agency (NCNA) (Radio Tokyo, 23 January 1967), and is included in the Collection of Documents, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar The Chinese rendition can be viewed in Hsing-huo liao-yüan (One Spark Ignites the Plain), 27 01 1967, p. 4Google Scholar (copy on deposit at Center for Chinese Studies; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

5. This is true, for instance, of the aforementioned Eight-Point Directive; the army was enjoined from using violence and yet was told to remove anti-Maoists from power at all costs. It was to side with the leftists, who were creating the disorders, but at the same time it was supposed to restore order.

6. For further analysis and exposition of the “January Revolution” and its sequel, see Bridgham, , in The China Quarterly, No. 34, pp. 7–15Google Scholar; Neuhauser, Charles, “The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Party Machine: Some Observations on a Revolution in Progress,” Asian Survey (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol. 8, No. 6 (06 1968), pp. 465–488Google Scholar; Johnson, Chalmers, “China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspectives,” Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 1 (01 1968), pp. 5–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hunter, Neale, Shanghai Journal (New York: Praeger, 1969)Google Scholar; and Anderson, Evelyn, “Shanghai: The Masses Unleashed,” Problems of Communism (Washington), Vol. 17, No. 1 (01–02 1968), pp. 12–21.Google Scholar

7. “Order of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee,” 6 04 1967Google Scholar, in Collection of Documents, Current Background, No. 852 (6 05 1968). pp. 115–116.Google Scholar

8. Party work conferences were reported to have been held on 14–18 March to discuss the “February adverse current” and on 27–28 March to consider the new movement to denounce Liu and Teng. See Nikon Keizai (Tokyo), 6 04 1967Google Scholar, and Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 04 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, 8–10 04 1967, p. 11, and 11 April 1967, p. 13.Google Scholar

9. The Party Centre on 6 June issued an obviously unenforceable order prohibit ing “armed struggle, assaults, destruction, pillage, house raids, and unauthorized arrest” (Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 06 1967Google Scholar, translation in Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, 8 06 1967, p. 29).Google Scholar Although reports of bloody struggles mounted in every province, and although industrial (if not agricultural) production reportedly began to show significant declines, the army continued to be enjoined from using force to restore order (Chieh-fang-chün pao (Liberation Army Daily), editorial of 27 June 1967).

10. There was, to be sure, some degree of disorder in almost all Chinese provinces.

11. Radio Honan, 26 05 and 1 June 1967Google Scholar; Honan jih-pao, 27 05 1967Google Scholar; Erhchi fung-hsün (7 February Bulletin), 5 06 1967.Google Scholar

12. Radio Kunming, 29 07 1967Google Scholar; Yunnan jih-pao, 11 and 12 08 1967.Google Scholar

13. Radio Kweiyang, 13 07 1967Google Scholar; Radio Kunming, 13 07 and 23 August 1967.Google Scholar

14. Radio Urumchi, 4, 10, 12 01Google Scholar; 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19 and 25 February; Prague Domestic Radio, 2 March; and Prague CTK International Service, 9 March; Belgrade Tanyug International Service, 23 February 1967.

15. Radio Urumchi, 9, 13, 19, 22, 30 March; 2, 3, 5, 12, 13, 17, 19, 22, 23, 25, 28 April; 2, 4, 5, 14, 20, 24 May; and 6, 10, 16, 24 and 25 June 1970.

16. Radio Kweiyang, 4 06 1967Google Scholar; and “Stalemate in Szechwan,” Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. 6, No. 11 (1 07 1968).Google Scholar

17. “Decision of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Concerning the Question of Szechwan,” 7 05 1967Google Scholar, in Collection of Documents, in Current Background, No. 852 (6 05 1968), pp. 128–130.Google Scholar

18. Thus, from February to mid-April, 300 persons were said to have been assassinated; from 19 April–3 June, there were reportedly more than 120 armed incidents in which over 700 were killed, wounded or disappeared; from 4–15 June, more than 500 suffered the same sorts of fates in more than 80 armed incidents; from 16–24 June, over 50 such incidents allegedly occurred, with 350 killed and 1,500 injured, while from 26–30 June, eight were killed and 25 seriously injured in six armed incidents. See Sankei (correspondent Shibata reporting), 29 09 1967Google Scholar, and Mainichi Shimbun, 24 and 30 07.Google Scholar Wuhan was one of the cities report edly in turmoil during the “January Revolution” period.

19. Shibata reports that from 29 April to 3 June alone, over 2,400 factories and mines in the Wuhan area suspended production or dropped to less than half capacity, and that 50,000 workers were involved in armed incidents of one sort or another. Chinese Communist Affairs (Taipei), Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 8Google Scholar, reports the figure as 500,000 workers. Mainichi Shimbun on 24 July stated that Peking wall-posters said the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation had suspended production in mid-June and that “appeal teams” had been dispatched to Peking to explain the situation.

20. Ch'en Tsai-tao, Head of the Wuhan Military Region and the villain in the July events, was said to be suppressing and arresting revolutionary rebel organizations as early as January. More than 300 such organizations in Hupei Province (of which Wuhan is the major city) were termed counter-revolutionary between February and mid-April, and more than 10,000 people were arrested. In March, the One Million Warriors (Ch'en's) organization arrested more than 3,000 of its opponents and disbanded their organizations on the ground that they were being manipulated by counter-revolutionaries. Not all the punishment was being meted out by the “conservative” (as later judged by Peking) organizations, however: on 12 July, revolutionary rebels (later judged by Peking to be pro-Maoist) were said to have captured the heads of the Department of Military Operations, the Political Department and the General Staff of the Wuhan Military Region and confiscated their “secret codebooks” for maintaining contacts between Ch'en Tsai-tao and the One Million Warriors. In early June (possibly on the 12th), the One Million Warriors reportedly seized control of two large membership organizations, the “San hsin” (“Three News”), a Red Guard college student composite organization, and the “San kang” (“Three Steels”), a steelworkers' composite organization. As a result, the displaced leadership appealed to the Wuhan Military District and, when this was apparently rebuffed, to the central Military Affairs Committee and the Cultural Revolution Small Group. Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar; Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5Google Scholar; Facts and Features (Taipei), Vol. 1, No. 14 (11 05 1968)Google Scholar; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 06 1967Google Scholar; and Union Research Service, “The Wuhan Incident,” Vol. 48, p. 141, a translation of parts of two Red Guard newspapers, the Wuhan Iron and Steel Works Second Command News and the Chuchiang (Pearl River) Motion Picture Studio East-is-Red News for 1 August 1967. These newspapers in turn report testimony of eyewitnesses and publish relevant documents. From 12 June onwards, the local army 8201 Unit sided openly with the One Million Warriors.

21. Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar; Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5Google Scholar; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 07 1967.Google Scholar

22. The Red Guard pamphlet translated by Union Research Service, Vol. 48, lists Yu Li-chin of the army Cultural Revolution group as a member of the delegation. The group was accompanied by personal secretaries of the principal members and bodyguards.

23. These speculations are derived from the following: Chun-kuei, Fang, “Realities of the Wuhan ‘Anti-Party Revolt,’” Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5 (10 1967), pp. 7–16Google Scholar; “The Conspicuous Wuhan Incident,” Facts and Features, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1 05 1961), pp. 25–28Google Scholar; “The Wuhan Military Incident,” Chungyang jih-pao (Central Daily News) (Taipei), 29 01 1968, p. 1Google Scholar; “The Wuhan Incident,” Union Research Service, Vol. 48, pp. 138–150Google Scholar; Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar; “Public Notice of the Wuhan Military Region of the People's Liberation Army,” 26 07 1967Google Scholar, and “Criticism of the Report on the Wuhan Cadre Question of the Central Cultural Revolution Central-South Group,” August 1967, both included in Collection of Important Documents on the Communist Bandit Great Cultural Revolution (in Chinese) (Intelligence Section of the Ministry of National Defence, Taipei), September 1968, pp. 165–169; “Heroes Rescue Kinsman from Tiger's Mouth,” Wuhan K'ang erh-szu (Wuhan Steel Second Headquarters) (Canton), 8 09 1967Google Scholar, in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4095 (9 01 1968), pp. 6–19Google Scholar; and other sources noted below.

24. Thus, Ch'en Tsai-tao had held positions in the Central-South area for over a decade, while his deputies, Yang Hsiu-shan, Yao Che, Tang Chin-lung and Niu Hai-lung, had been there since the early 1960s, as had Chung Han-hua, Second Political Commissar of the Wuhan Military Region. Wan Jen-chung, the leading political figure in the area and, according to Peking's later allegations, one of those behind Ch'en Tsai-tao, was not only a native of the region (although not of Wuhan itself) but also had held posts in the Central-South area since 1949.

25. For an elaboration of this thesis, long held to be true by Nationalist Chinese military scholars, see Whitson, William, “he Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics,” The China Quarterly, No. 37 (01–03 1969), pp. 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. Chun-kuei, Fang, “Realities,” Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

27. Ch'en later became a Regiment Commander of Lin Piao's 115th Division, which marked him as a Lin Piao man. Since then he generally was regarded as one of Lin's entourage. This variant of the conspiratorial thesis is discussed below.

28. The Peking correspondent of Yomiuri Shimbun copied a Red Guard poster of 20 January 1967, of the Tsing Hua University, purporting to list the organization chart of the Ho Lung Group.

29. As for Niu Hai-lung, the Unit 8201 Commander who reacted so emotionally to Hsieh Fu-chih's and Wang Li's presence, no information seems to be available.

30. While Ch'en's earlier career had been spent largely in the military precursors of the Second Field Army, after 1950 he was a member of the Central-South Military Administrative Committee, under Lin Piao's chairmanship, and commanded troops within the Fourth (Lin's) Field Army area as the Army's third deputy commander. From 1955, he was Commander of the Wuhan Military District. See Chen-hsia, Huang, Chung-kuo chün-jen chih (Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968), pp. 343–344.Google Scholar

31. Mainichi Shimbun, 30 07 1967.Google Scholar This report had than arriving on the 16th. However, all other sources agree that it was the 14th. The Japanese correspondents' reports are based on their reading of usually unidentified Red Guard posters in Peking. Where possible, confirmation has been made by reference to available Red Guard publications.

32. Sankei, 29 09 1967.Google Scholar Shibata's report is derived from a reading of Peking wall-posters and newspapers during the July–August period. Unfortunately, with the exception of Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), he does not cite his sources precisely.

33. Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar, and Union Research Institute, Vol. 48, p. 142Google Scholar The latter source reports that Yang Ch'eng-wu, then acting Chief of the General Staff of the Army and other leading Central officials also delivered reports at the Regional Headquarters. Ch'en confronted with this array of authority, was reported to have said, “We will cany out your instructions [as] if they were signed by Chairman Mao personally.”

34. Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar; Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 7Google Scholar; and Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 6.Google Scholar

35. Sankei, 18 07 1967.Google Scholar

36. Thus, on the 15th, they met representatives of the Central China Technica College, presenting arm bands and badges; paid three separate visits to the Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Second Command on the 15th, 16th and 17th; met on the 17th with leaders of the Workers General Council and the 13 September Red Guard group; and on the 18th met “until night” with various rebel organizations. They also participated in street demonstrations by the rebel organizations and witnessed a swim in the Yangtse of several thousand Red Guards celebrating the first anniversary of Mao's own natatory feat.

37. Sankei, 29 09 1967.Google Scholar

38. Sankei, 20 07 and 29 SeptemberGoogle Scholar; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 July 1967Google Scholar; Union Research Service, Vol. 48Google Scholar; Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 4Google Scholar; and Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5.Google Scholar

39. Reportedly Ch'en had at his disposal in the local area more than 400 trucks, 30 fire engines and many motorcycles and armoured cars. The men of the 8201 Unit put on the armbands of the One Million Warriors to show their solidarity.

40. This is a summary of the principal sources noted above, with the addition of “The Appalling July Mutiny,” Wuhan Kang-erh-szu, Huichow edition, No. 38 (22 August 1967) translated in Joint Publications Research Service, No. 44, 241 (Washington) 5 02 1968Google Scholar (Communist China Digest, No. 194), p. 124.Google Scholar

41. Facts and Features, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 27Google Scholar, and Union Research Service, Vol. 48, p. 147.Google Scholar The latter source claims that the declaration was issued on 21 July and, in fact, there may have been more than one such statement. We have treated them as if they were, only one document, since we lack further information.

42. Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 9Google Scholar; Union Research Service, Vol. 48, p. 148Google Scholar; Sankei, 29 09 1967.Google Scholar

43. Sankei, 29 09 1967Google Scholar, and Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 9.Google Scholar It is not clear whether at this time Ch'en also returned to Peking. He was definitely in the city from the 26th onwards, and there is no report of his presence in Wuhan after 20 July.

44. Union Research Service, Vol. 48, p. 149Google Scholar; Mainichi Shimbun, 20 07 1967.Google Scholar The Mainichi Shimbun, quoting unspecified Red Guard posters in Peking, reported on 23 September 1967 that both Lin and Mao Tse-tung had gone to Wuhan on 21 July.

45. Union Research Service, Vol. 48, p. 148Google Scholar; Mainichi Shimbun, 30 07 1967Google Scholar; Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 9Google Scholar; Sankei, 29 09 1967.Google Scholar It is not clear whether one or two airborne divisions were used: some sources may have confused the 8199 and the 8190.

46. Peking wall-posters on the 21st were quoted as saying that the 19th Army Division rescued Wang Li on that day.

47. Including the Headquarters of the Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Second Command, the Wuhan Academy of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, the New Wuhan University, the Red Wuhan Academy of Surveying and Cartography, the New Wuhan Academy of Technology and the New Central China Academy of Technology, in addition to the two institutions already noted, Union Research Service, Vol. 48, p. 148.Google Scholar

48. The Public Notice was essentially the Military Headquarters' assent to Chou's four points enunciated on the 14th and, through Wang Li, again on the 19th. It said, in part:

(1) We are resolutely determined to draw a clear line between Ch'en Tsai-tao and ourselves and to beat him down; (2) Our cadres have committed mistakes in orientation and line; (3) We shall allow the Workers' General Headquarters to restore its name and reputation, support its revolutionary activities, and actively help it restore its great revolutionary column;

(4) We will resolutely support the proletarian Revolutionary Rebels of the Headquarters of Steelworkers, the Second Command of the Steelworkers, the 13 September Group of Steelworkers, the Revolutionary United Command of the Third Command, the New China Engineering College, New Hupeh University, and the New China Agricultural College (NCNA, 28 July 1967).

49. NCNA, 25 07 1967.Google Scholar

50. Chinese Communist Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 13.Google Scholar Essentially the same message was contained in two editorials in Liberation Army Daily of the same day (as reported by NCNA), the second of which stated, in part, that “the proletarian revolutionaries will be able to win victory in Wuhan. The hoodwinked masses will surely come to their senses. …” (my italics).

51. Tokyo Shimbun, 4 08 1967.Google Scholar

52. Substantially the same set of comments was contained in an NCNA dispatch the same day.

53. For instance, the Liberation Army Daily, cited above, said: “For some who have taken the wrong path because of an inadequate understanding of the struggle, it will be difficult to about-face suddenly. Others may worry about the masses not trusting them. We should carry out penetrating and delicate political and ideological work among the hoodwinked masses. The enemies are not yet completely destroyed; they are still putting up a desperate struggle. The proletarian revolutionaries should be united more properly in order to concentrate their efforts in hitting hard at the enemy.”

54. People's Daily editorial; and Liberation Army Daily editorial, for that day.

55. People's Daily editorial, 30 07 1967.Google Scholar

56. People's Daily editorial, 2 08 1967.Google Scholar

57. This slogan, which was generally associated with Chou En-lai, is the first in dication that Chou was still involved with the local situation (aside from the fad that he signed the State Council letters to Wuhan). A further indication, however comes from the wording of one of the sentences of the Wuhan, “Urgent Notice.”Google Scholar If the insurgent leaders would not return of their own volition to the fold, then they were to be punished “according to law and with the active assistance of the departments concerned.” The relative moderation in tone of this phrase, together with the obscurity of language, seems to indicate Chou's hand.

58. Liberation Army Daily, 2 08 1967.Google Scholar The same source stressed the emerging unity between army and people.

59. Wuhan City Radio, 5 08 1967.Google Scholar At the rally were Tseng Szu-yü, newly appointed Commander of the People's Liberation Army in the Wuhan Military Region, replacing Ch'en Tsai-tao; Liu Feng, Political Commissar of the PLA in Wuhan, another new appointee, and Chang Ching, Commander of the 8199 Unit.

60. That article, by Jen Li-hsin, contained the most complete catalogue of methods alleged to be used by the Wuhan insurgents: beating, smashing, looting, confiscating, making arrests, attacking revolutionaries, assaulting mass revolutionary organizations, sabotaging the proletarian dictatorship and extensive democracy under the proletarian dictatorship, sabotaging production, fabricating rumours, hoodwinking the masses, stepping “out before the masses collectively” and “stepping out before the masses with signatures.” Although this list was set out for the purpose of vilifying the now-defeated insurgent leadership, its contents reveal both the mass character and the popular nature of the uprising against Peking.

The same article revealed that at least half of the problem in Wuhan concerned dissension within the revolutionary ranks themselves. The following sins were listed: running counter to the will of the masses, over-enthusiasm about fighting “civil war,” diverting “serious political struggle onto the path of sectarian struggle,” small-group mentality, devotion to petty-bourgeois ideas, mountain strongholdism, individualism, refusal to conduct self-criticism and disrespect of the merits of others.

61. Sankei, 22 08 1967Google Scholar, quoting a wall-poster in Peking.

62. Sankei, 29 09 1967.Google Scholar

63. People's Daily, 23–27 07 1967.Google ScholarYomiuri Shimbun, 24 07 1967.Google Scholar Interest ingly, Japanese correspondents claimed that the slogans denouncing the insurgent leaders (Ch'en Tsai-tao, Wang Jen-chung, and Chung Han-hua) included Ho Lung among their number, although the latter was not mentioned by the People's Daily.

64. Aside from Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Ch'en Po-ta, K'ang Sheng, and Chiang Ch'ing, were: Li Hsien-nien, Li Fu-ch'un, Nieh Jung-chen, Hsieh Fu-chih, Liu Ning-i, Hsiao Hua, Yang Ch'eng-wu, Su Yü, Teng Ying-ch'ao, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Ch'i Pen-yü, Yao Wen-yüan, Wang Tung-hsing, Liu Chien-hsün, Wu Te, Chao I-men, Yeh Ch'ün, command personnel from the Peking Military District, responsible persons from some of the other military districts, “others who had returned with Hsieh and Wang from Wuhan,” Peking Red Guard representatives, leading members of the Peking municipal Revolutionary Committee, and representatives of workers' and peasants' congresses. Also at the rally were the staff of the Central Committee, the State Council, Red Flag, People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and the NCNA. This was obviously designed to be an impressive assembly. One person who apparently was impressed was Wang Li. Later, in the documents published after he had been ousted, he was accused of becoming headstrong and conceited as a result of the demonstrations celebrating his safe return to Peking, a set of emotions that were said to contribute to his desire to better his political standing.

65. Sankei, 28 07 1967.Google Scholar One can surmise that Ch'en may have returned on the same plane as Hsieh and Wang.

66. Sankei, 3 08 and 29 September 1967.Google Scholar The meeting was attended, aside from the normal (and not yet purged) members of the Central Committee, by members of the Cultural Revolution Small Group and military district commanders, and members of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Committee.

67. Wang is a very shadowy figure in the entire Wuhan dispute. Although he was sometimes said to be the power behind Ch'en, he never came into the open, nor did he seem to share the guilt, in Peking's eyes, with Ch'en.

68. Tokyo Shimbun, 4 08 1967Google Scholar; Wuhan Radio, 5 08 1967.Google Scholar These appointments were confirmed later at the mass leadership appearance at the 1 October National Day celebrations. Of these, at least Tseng Szu-yü is regarded as a Lin Piao man.

69. See, for instance, the Hung-ch'i editorial, “The Proletariat Must Take a Firm Hold of the Gun,” No. 12 (1 08 1967), pp. 43–47Google Scholar, (translation in Peking Review, No. 32 (4 08 1967), pp. 36–39)Google Scholar, in which the call was made to “over throw and discredit” the “handful of people” in authority “in the Party and the army” (emphasis added). Man, Chang, “The Suspension and Republication of Hung-ch'i,” Tsu kou (Fatherland) (Hong Kong), No. 54 (09 1968), pp. 2–7Google Scholar, claims (p. 4) that Lin Chieh, one of the members of Chiang Ch'ing's Cultural Revolution group and later (along with Wang Li and others) one of the “May 16 Group” purged for anti-Party activities, wrote this editorial.

70. It is not clear whether, aside from Ch'en Tsai-tao and his associates in Wuhan, there were actual purges of army leaders at that time as a result of the Hung-ch'i editorial. It may be that Hsiao Hua and others members of the General Political Department of the army were purged in mid-August. At this time he was not seen again publicly, Red Guard posters against him appeared again and he was rumoured to have played a role in regard to Wuhan not to Lin Piao's liking (Lin conspicuously referred to mistakes of the General Political Department in his 9 August speech referred to below). But the purge did not extend to other central military departments nor, more importantly, to regional commands other than Wuhan.

71. These include Chinghai, Fukien, Heilungkiang, Honan, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Kansu, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Liaoning, Sinkiang, Szechwan, Tibet and Yunnan. For details, see Yu-shen, Chien, China's Fading Revolution: Army Dissent and Military Division, 1967–68 (Hong Kong: Centre of Contemporary Chinese Studies, 1969), pp. 12–17, 21, 23–25, 28, 30–57.Google Scholar

72. A good analysis is by Tretiak, Daniel, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Foreign Policy,”Google Scholar Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studies Group Monograph No. 2 (February 1970).

73. The Chieh-fang-chün pao (Liberation Army Daily) editorial of 30 July (reprinted on the same day in Jen-nun jih pao (People's Daily)) set the question of the “handful in the army” clearly in the specific context of the Wuhan Incident and called for “exposure and criticism” but not “dragging out.” The Chieh-fang-chün, pao editorial of 31 July celebrating the 40th anniversary of the founding of the army seemed to attempt to divert the issue to historic questions concerning the “bourgeoise military line.” (For a translation, see Peking Review, No. 32 ((08), pp. 42–45.)Google Scholar

74. Lin Piao made an important speech on 9 August 1967, at a conference of high military cadres in Peking. This conference was probably convened to decide how to prevent repetitions of the Wuhan Incident and how to deal with the Cultural Revolution Group's offensive. Admitting that Wuhan had caused great concern (Lin: “Of all the military districts in the whole country, we were worried about two in the past. One was Peking and the other was Wuhan. There was simply nc way to get at them”), he went on to express optimism for the future and to exhort his listeners on the necessity to rectify their mistakes and to deal carefully with the “rightists.” The entire tenure of his speech is one of moderation and even conciliation and on avoidance of mistakes and learning from mistakes. It certainly cannot be termed a vindictive or threatening speech.

By stressing intra-army unity, Lin's speech ushers in the second phase of army involvement in the Cultural Revolution; once that unity was assured (at least in the relative sense), the army could undertake the tasks which Mao set for it in September and after. The Wuhan Incident symbolized – and punctuated – the end of the first phase of army involvement. Having solved the Wuhan problem by force and – through Lin's efforts at conciliation and resistance to the Cultural Revolution Group's attacks – preserved its own power, the army was now ready tc play a more direct role in the second phase of more direct rule and construction of new political organs of power.

For Lin's speech, see Chu-ying tung fang-hung (Pearl [River] Film Studio East is-Red, a Canton Red Guard newspaper), 13 September 1967. An incomplete translation is in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4036 (6 10 1967) pp. 1–6.Google Scholar A more complete Nationalist Chinese rendition is in Tien-min, Li (ed.), Chronology of Chinese Communist Leaders (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 05 1969), pp. 19–25.Google Scholar

75. Kuan Feng, Lin Chieh and Mu Hsin.

76. The four did not appear in public from 8 August 1967, and later it was revealed that they had been purged in late August They were also accused in 1968 of having formed the nucleus of the “May 16 Group” allegedly having as one of its purposes the overthrow of Chou En-lai. Since the four purged officials were members of the Cultural Revolution Group and since it seems that the army was responsible – in as yet an unclear manner – for their removal, it is possible to regard the conflict as between the two institutions. While it may be going too far to argue that this merely symbolized opposition between Chiang Ch'ing and Lin Piao it may not be stretching a point to assert that the Wuhan Incident served to bring into the open a dispute between the two institutions that had been smouldering for some time.

77. See The Case of P'eng Teh-huai, 1959–1966 (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 153Google Scholaret seq., for details. Other explanations for the timing of the belated release of the anti-P'eng documents may exist, but that renewal of the campaign at that particular time served as a diversion from attacks against the army leaders then in office should probably be regarded as a major element.

78. Later, in early 1968, Yang Ch'eng-wu, the Army Chief of Staff, was purged in a manner that sought to link him to the May 16 Group, while, as we have noted, Hsiao Hua was purged in August 1967. The point to note here is that by turning against their Cultural Revolution Group detractors, Lin and his associates postponed the date of coping with internal policy disputes to a time when they could better deal with the matter. They needed a six-month period to fulfil their emerging duty before returning to the charges raised by Chiang Ch'ing's group.

79. The relevant date is 5 September, the day that Chiang Ch'ing gave her important speech advocating cessation of “clashes” and attacks against the army and generally preaching moderation, rectification of mistakes and harmony. On the same day, the Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Affairs Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group issued a joint directive re-emphasizing its call of 25 August prohibiting attacks against the army and seizure of military equipment by Red Guards and threatening direct use of force against anyone who violated the directive's provisions. For Chiang Ch'ing's speech, see Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4069 (29 November 1967) pp. 1–9. The joint directive is translated in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 4026 (22 09 1967) pp. 1–2.Google Scholar The directive gave impetus to a new drive to “support the army and cherish the people” that had been underway since last August

80. For instance, Red Guards were to be sent to schools that would (finally) be reopened, while revolutionary rebels could no longer receive wages for conducting revolution outside their enterprises.

81. See, for example, the convincing example of Dai Hsiao-ai, as transcribed by Bennett, Gordon and Montaperto, Ronald N., Red Guard (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970).Google Scholar