Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
China's year of upheaval, 1989, was full of incongruities. For example, students invoked the historic struggle of intellectuals to “revive China,” while at the same time erecting statues modelled after the symbol of a foreign power with a long history of objectionable conduct toward their country. One of the most interesting incongruities, however, emerged not in the streets, but in the pages of Chinese journals. Highly-placed intellectuals debated the theory of neo-authoritarianism, a doctrine new to the People's Republic, but one which reflects the policy prescriptions of pre-revolutionary Chinese leaders and contemporary Third World strongmen. Advocates of the doctrine were ideologically and, in some cases, organizationally, close to Zhao Ziyang, then the general secretary of the world's largest Communist Party, but their theory was classically conservative. The debate, moreover, was waged without reference to Marxism by either proponents or opponents.
1. See Kristof, Nicholas D., “‘New Authoritarianism’ seen in Chinese actions,” New York Times (NYT), 28 02 1989, p. A13Google Scholar, in which reference is made to “Some foreign diplomats and many Chinese [who] believe that Mr Zhao shares the idea of new authoritarianism, but it almost certainly is not his alone,” implying that the concept was also endorsed by Deng Xiaoping. A Hong Kong newspaper also associated neo-authoritarianism with “Zhao Ziyang's old brain trust.” Kesi, Ai, “Controversial ‘new authoritarianism’,” Zhengming (Contending) (Hong Kong) No. 137, 1 03 1989, pp. 55–56Google Scholar, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)–CAR–89–047) 17 May 1989, p. 12. In 1991, two and a half years after his fall from power, Zhao was accused by a senior adviser to the CCP's Organization Department of having attempted to set up a personal dictatorship under the banner of neo-authoritarianism. Yeping, Chen, “Consciously uphold the Party's authority,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 16 10 1991, pp. 11–16.Google Scholar
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6. An economist, Su became director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' Institute for Research on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought in 1983, where he promoted theories derived from western social science and European Marxist circles. He was criticized during the regime's campaign against “spiritual pollution” in 1983–84, criticized again during the campaign against “bourgeois liberalization” in 1987, and removed from his position as Institute director. Su successfully appealed against an attempt to revoke his Party membership and left China shortly after June 1989 to spend a year teaching in the United States. Hamrin, Carol Lee, China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 235, 240.Google Scholar In an interview with the Hong Kong periodical Bai xing (The People), 1 09 1989, pp. 20–23Google Scholar, in JPRS–CAR–89–121, 22 December 1989, pp. 10–15, Su outlined his views in the wake of the suppression of the student movement, stating, inter alia, that “proletarian dictatorship is only slightly different from fascist dictatorship,” “revisionism is not a bad thing,” and “the Swedish model is I don't know how many times closer to socialism than the Chinese model.”
7. Sullivan, Lawrence R., “Leadership and authority in the Chinese Communist Party,” in Goodman, David and Segal, Gerald (eds.), China at Forty: Midlife Crisis? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 62 (emphasis supplied by Sullivan).Google Scholar Sullivan argues that “Rather than concentrating on restricting the central leader's authority and prohibiting leadership cults, perhaps Deng Xiaoping should encourage a ‘liberal authoritarianism’ to sweep away entrenched opponents of reform.” Ibid. pp. 62–63. This argument expresses the essence of the neo-authoritarian idea.
8. Wu was born in 1955 and admitted to Beijing University (Beida) in 1977, and in 1989 was a member of the Beida Department of Economics, on secondment as deputy director of the Investigative and Research Department of the General Office of the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC), where he specialized in research on the modernization of property rights. A self-described “marginalist,” Wu's position doubtless allowed him to draft policy statements for top Party leaders. The New York Times identified Wu as “a Communist Party official and protégé of the party's General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang” and a Hong Kong journal described him as “a man in a key position in the CPC” and “Deng Xiaoping's policy intepreter.” Jiaxiang, Wu, “Between the happy ant and the despairing suicide-my experience,” Zhongguo qingnian (China Youth), No. 6, 9 06 1989, pp. 10–11Google Scholar, in JPRS–89–101, 5 October 1989, pp. 8–9; Po, Wen, “The People's University Congress outside the Great Hall-big debate between ‘neo-authoritarians’ and ‘democrats’,” Xin wan bao (New Evening News) (Hong Kong), 5 04 1989, p. 4Google Scholar, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)–CHI–89–065, 6 04 1989, p. 29Google Scholar; Kristof, , NYT, 28 02 1989, p. A13Google Scholar; Yu, Luo, “Star of the CPC's think tank, Wu Jiaxiang-Deng Xiaoping's policy interpreter,” Guang jiao jing (Wide Angle), No. 196, 16 01 1989, pp. 22–24Google Scholar, in JPRS–CAR–89–028, 31 March 1989, pp. 9–11. Prior to his participation in the neo-authoritarianism debate, Wu published a book Deng Xiaoping: His Thoughts and Practices. This devoted a chapter to an approving discussion of Deng's famed 1962 theory that it does not matter whether a cat is black or white; if it can catch mice it is a good cat (“mao lun”), which Wu interpreted as “no matter what kind of system or thought, as long as it can solve China's problems, it should be adopted.” Wu has written articles whose titles include “Conversion to the shareholding system: one way to further the reform process,” “Choices in the reform of product rights,” “Creditor's rights, stock ownership rights and property rights,” “A tradition of incomplete social and individual property rights,” and “Germination and transplant: the historic course of maturity of personal property rights.” See Yu, Luo, “Star of the CCP's think tank.”Google Scholar Wu also co-wrote two articles advocating the adoption of shareholding in Chinese industry, the first with Jin Lizuo, “The needs for a new strategic concept to reform the state's economic functions,” which appeared in March 1985 in Shijie jingji daobao (World Economic Herald). In a later article, Wu and his coauthor characterized shareholding as a Marxist form of public ownership because it is “property right distribution based on the principle of each according to his ability to each according to his need.” Jiaxiang, Wu and Pengrong, Zhong, “The shareholding system is a practical form of public ownership,” Jingji ribao (Economics Daily), 17 02 1989, p. 3Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–043, 7 March 1989, pp. 36–39.
9. Jiaxiang, Wu, “Commenting on neo-authoritarianism,” Shijie jingji daobao (Shanghai), 16 01 1989, p. 12Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–020, 1 February 1989, pp. 33–35. The following discussion of the early development of neo-authoritarian theories in 1986–88 relies upon the account in Wu's article and Ai Kesi, JPRS–CAR–89–047, pp. 12–14. According to a report of Gao. Yu, , “Neo-authoritarianism: does it representa ‘spirit’ or a ‘rat’?” Jingjixue zhoubao (Economics Weekly), 12 03 1989, p. 1Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–058, p. 30, the first proponent of neo-authoritarianism was Qing Ping in 1986.
10. See Huntington, Samuel, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).Google Scholar On the influence of Huntington and other western social scientists on Chinese neo-authoritarian thought, see also Petrasen, Mark and Xiang, Mung, “The concept of Chinese neo-authoritarianism: an exploration and a democratic critique,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 11 (11 1990), pp. 1101, 1105Google Scholar; Yun, Ma Shu, “The rise and fall of neo-authoritarianism in China,” China Information, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1990–1991), pp. 3–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Minxin, Pei, “A discussion on authoritarianism with Samuel Huntington, the pioneer of the theory of authoritarianism,” Shijie jingji daobao, 27 03 1984, p. 13Google Scholar, in Chinese Sociology and Anthropology (CSA), Vol. 23, No. 4 (Summer 1991), pp. 67–85.Google Scholar
11. Wang, born in 1955 and a 1981 graduate of Fudan, was in 1989 the director of the Institute of Politics and Administration of the International Politics Department of Fudan. In 1988, Wang argued that the decentralization of the Chinese economy and politics had led to local interests overwhelming national interests, noting that some observers regard China's provinces and counties as “split into about 30 dukedoms, with some 2,000 rival principalities.” As procedural democracy develops, local constituents could be expected to vote from local interests, an outcome that may result in separatist rule. “Non-economic reflection on problems of reform in China,” Shijie jingji daobao, 29 08 1988, p. 11Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–88–201, 18 October 1988, pp. 20–22 (an abbreviated version of this article and an interview with Wang on the development of political science in China appears in the CCP's theoretical organ, Qiushi, No. 7, 1 10 1988, pp. 35–36Google Scholar, in JPRS–CAR–88–074, 21 November 1988, pp. 30–31.
12. Tzu, Yan, “What kind of power system does China need?-the connotations of Wang Huning's ideas on a ‘new power structure’,” Guang jiao jing, No. 200, (16 05 1989), pp. 38–40Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–103, 31 May 1989, pp. 81–83. Wang maintained that a “new power structure” was needed because the separation of economic and political functions had gradually weakened the political power which had been based on the old economic structure, while a new structure had not yet been established. A new power structure could make “super-economic and advanced transformations” by “extending the representative nature of the structure, greatly raising the positions of the democratic [satellite] parties and other social groups in the political system, and allowing non-Party personages to participate in government affairs at various levels.” Democracy would be able to thrive only after this new power structure became fully developed. Wang abstained from participation in the 1989 debate on neo-authoritarianism, but expressed appreciation of the “deep understanding of China's current social conditions on the part of advocates of ‘neo-authoritarianism’” and affirmed the correctness of the views that he had expressed three years earlier. Zhang Bingjiu's 1986 seminar paper, “The progress and co-ordination between economic and political system reform,” in Jin, Liu and Lin, Li (eds.), Xin quanweizhuyi (The New Authoritarianism) (Beijing: Beijing College of Economics Press, 1989), pp. 1–26Google Scholar, translated in CSA Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1990–1991), pp. 8–35.Google Scholar See also interviews with Jiaxiang, Wu and Bingjiu, Zhang, “Radical democracy or stable democracy,” CSA, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 7–15.Google Scholar
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15. Qing, Dai, “a prominent writer in her mid-40s,”Google Scholar was arrested shortly after thr crackdown of June 1989. She had “apparently offended the leadership with a speech n Tiananmen Square in which she praised the student demonstrators but also called 01 them to leave the square.” She was released after 10 months detention on 10 May 1990 Sheryl WuDunn, “China announces release from jail of 211 dissidents,” NYT, 11 05 1990, p. A1.Google Scholar
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17. Citing a Guangming ribao article published that day, a Xinhua broadcast of 24 March 1989, 1040 GMT, in FBIS–CHI–89–056, 24 March 1989, p. 40, stated that the symposium on modernization theories began the discussion of neo-authoritarianism, which it defined as a theory holding that in the absence of a developed middle class and market economy in China, a western democratic system would only produce representatives who would avoid the market or place it under the control of “like iiterests.”
18. The State Council Commission, established in 1982 and first headed by Zhao Ziyang, planned the programme for comprehensive reform and Chen Yizi and other economists are said to have “served as its brain and its legs.” Chen and other Institute officials “had direct access to Zhao through his secretary Bao Tong as well as through normal channels.” Chen was also head of the Society of Young Economists, a leading radical reform organization. In June 1989, Chen fled to Paris and became the deputy head of the Democratic Alliance, an exile organization. Hamrin, , China and the Challenge of the Future, pp. 229–230, 238.Google Scholar
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21. Jian, Kong, “Is ‘neo-authoritarianism’ possible in China?” Shijie jingji daobao, 16 01 1989, p. 12Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–020, 1 February 1989, p. 32. An extended: version of this article appears in CSA, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1990–1991), pp. 46–68.Google Scholar
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23. For an argument along similar lines, see Wei, Li, “‘New authority’ going astray,” Jingjixue zhoubao, 26 03 1989, p. 7Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–066, 7 April 1989. Li contended that China had never experienced authoritarianism, in the sense of control of political power by a leader who eschews the monopolization of the economy and culture. Rather, China has historically been ruled by “totalitarians,” who put all aspects of social life under strict control using coercive means, opposed the constitutional separation of powers, required absolute obedience of individuals to the state and propagated absolute collectivism. Therefore, any view that claims to be “authoritarian” is really “totalitarian.” Li also contended that neo-authoritarians confused power and authority. The Chinese government has great power, but insufficient authority; it lacks authority because of its inadequate effectiveness, not because of inadequate power. By neglecting the reform of the existing power structure, while favouring an increase in the power of the government and of individuals, the neo-authoritarians would only produce more power struggles, while political stability will be lost.
24. Haocheng, Yu, “Does China need neo-authoritarianism?” Shijie jingji daobao, 6 02 1989, p. 14Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–036, 24 February 1989, pp. 18–19. Yu's article also appears in CSA, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Summer 1991), pp. 44–55.Google Scholar See also Jianming, Wen “Debates over ‘neo-authoritarianism’,” Nanfang ribao (Southern Daily), 5 04 1989, p. 3Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–069, 12 April 1989, p. 16, in which Yu's argument is listed as one of four “diversified concepts among the theoretical circles on neo-authoritarianism.”
25. Wenzhang, Zhou, “Neo-authoritarianism: an impractical ‘panacea’,” Gongren ribao (Workers' Daily), 3 02 1989, p. 3Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–038, 28 February 1989, pp. 25–26.
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29. For additional comments by opponents of neo-authoritarianism, see Ziqiang, Deng, “Concerning controversial views on neo-authoritarianism, Part II,”Google ScholarShenzhen tequ boo, reprinted in Da gong bao, 18 04 1989, p. 2Google Scholar, in FBIS–CHI–89–074, pp. 27–28, and Yun, Xie, “On the ‘flirtation’ between autocracy and freedom,” Xin Guaricha (New Observer), No. 7, 10 04 1989, pp. 18–19Google Scholar, in JPRS–CAR–89–070, 6 July 1989, pp. 11–12. Xie argued that China had never experienced capitalist or socialist democracy and that democracy does not reject legitimate authority.
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32. In the “Tiananmen Incident” of 5 04 1976Google Scholar, some 100,000 Beijing residents gathered in the square to honour the recently-deceased premier Zhou Enlai and, in many cases, to denounce Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four. The protestors were dispersed by police and the incident precipitated the second fall of Deng Xiaoping.
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38. Contrasting the “monistic authority” of traditional systems and neo-authoritarianism to the coexistence of “plural authorities,” Shoujin, Hu, in “Authority: monistic or pluralistic?-what is our choice?” Shijie jingji daobao, 20 03 1989, p. 13Google Scholar in FBIS–CHI–89–058, 28 March 1989, pp. 34–35, argued that checks and balances between plural authorities would compel officials to obey laws, constrain the power of each system, force authorities to restrain their own powers, prevent power abuses, and guarantee citizens' rights and freedoms. Hu remarked that “People still remember that today's old authority was also a new authority on which many people pin[ned] their hopes when it was established.”
39. Ironically, opponents of neo-authoritarianism often attributed the advocacy of the doctrine to fear among intellectuals of another Cultural Revolution and their simultaneous discouragement with the depth of the present regime's reform efforts. See the interviews with Wang Yizhou, a researcher at the Research Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and Xianxing, Jiang, a “young theoretician”Google Scholar of the Institute of Sociology, in Zhang Weiguo, FBIS–CHI–89–059, p. 41.
40. These are the principles of upholding the rule of the Party, the people's democratic dictatorship, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the socialist road. In practice, the four principles reduce to the first principle.
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