Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T16:01:31.907Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

John Bradbury
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Victimised by its strategic location throughout history, North Korea appears once again to be the scene of competition for dominant influence between its powerful neighbours. As the recent statement by Chairman Kim Il-sung quoted above suggests, the Communist régime in North Korea was apprehensive about the mounting crisis in Sino-Soviet relations in the summer and autumn of 1960. What it did not reveal is that the issues involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute had already exercised a profound effect on the domestic and foreign policies of this Asian satellite for a period of several years.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 6 , June 1961 , pp. 15 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1961

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 08 14, 1960.Google Scholar

2 Although this article focuses on developments since 1958, it is reasonable to assume that Sino-Soviet friction over North Korea dates back at least as far as the Korean War. Limitations of space as well as lack of data, preclude treatment of this earlier period.

3 For a comprehensive discussion of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Zagoria, Donald S., “Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance, Problems of Communism, 05–06 1960.Google Scholar

4 The claim of ideological pre-eminence for Mao first appeared in Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), 09 13, 1958.Google Scholar For a recent instance, see Chung, Fu, “Great Victory for Mao Tse-tung's Military Dialectics,”Google Scholaribid., October 6–7, 1960.

5 Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), Peking, 07 16, 1958.Google Scholar

6 Lenin's remarks were addressed to Communist organisations of Eastern Russia, not of Asia. The Hung Ch'i article admitted this, but held that the tasks presented by Lenin were “likewise placed before the Communists of Eastern countries.”

7 For a good discussion of the economic and ideological significance of China's communes, see the articles by Rich, S., Rousset, D. and Lowenthal, Richard in Problems of Communism, 01-02 1959.Google Scholar

8 This significant development attracted relatively little attention in the West. For a rare article dealing with this period, see Rudolph, P., “North Korea and the Path to Socialism,” Pacific Affairs, 06 1959.Google Scholar

9 Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 11, 1958.Google Scholar

10 Pyongyang radio broadcast, North Korean Home Service (hereafter referred to as NKHS), December 9, 1958.

11 Jen-min Jih-pao, 11 28, 1958.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., November 27, 1958.

13 KCNA, 12 10, 1958.Google Scholar

14 Most of these pointed, if oblique, criticisms appeared in Khrushchev's report to the 21st CPSU Congress, 01 28, 1959.Google Scholar

15 Jen-min Jih-pao, 11 7, 1958.Google Scholar

16 Pravda, 11 14, 1958.Google Scholar

17 KCNA, 01 30, 1959.Google Scholar

18 Pyongyang radio broadcast, NKHS, 08 14, 1959.Google Scholar

19 New China News Agency (NCNA), 10 2 and 3, 1959.Google Scholar

20 KCNA, 09 28, 1959.Google Scholar

21 Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 7, 1959.Google Scholar

22 Pravda, 12 2, 1959.Google Scholar

23 Pyongyang radio broadcast, NKHS, 12 6, 1959.Google Scholar

24 Attracted by Communist China's claim to have doubled grain production in 1958 by means of a revolutionary high-yield agricultural technology, the North Korean régime had followed Peking's lead by reducing planted grain acreage in 1959. Instead of the anticipated increase of 35 per cent., however, grain output in that year dropped nearly 10 per cent.

25 NCNA, 09 30, 1960.Google Scholar

26 Ibid., October 13, 1960.

27 Ibid., Pyongyang, October 24, 1960.

28 Jen-min Jih-pao, 12 12, 1960.Google Scholar

29 The new seven-year plan unveiled by Kim Il-sung in August 1960 signalled the resumption of North Korea's forced draft development programme conducted at “flying horse” speed. The goals of more than tripling industrial output and increasing grain production (which has remained stationary for three years) by over 50 per cent, still appear highly unrealistic.

30 Pyongyang radio broadcast, NKHS, 04 15, 1960.Google Scholar

31 KCNA, 11 23, 1960.Google Scholar

32 Zagoria, loc. cit.

33 NCNA, Pyongyang, 09 12, 1959.Google Scholar

34 KCNA, 01 9, 1960.Google Scholar

35 See, for example, the article “Long Live Leninism!” in Hung Ch'i, 04 16, 1960.Google Scholar

36 For an apparently authentic account of the bitter exchanges at the Bucharest Conference, see the article by Crankshaw, Edward in the Observer, London, 02 11, 1961.Google Scholar

37 KCNA, 08 12, 1960.Google Scholar

38 Ibid., August 14, 1960.

39 Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 24, 1960.Google Scholar

40 Pravda, 11 1, 1959.Google Scholar

41 NCNA, 12 2, 1960.Google Scholar

42 Pyongyang radio broadcast of speech by Vice-Premier Chong Il-yong, NKHS, 11 6, 1960.Google Scholar

43 Ibid.

44 KCNA, 11 29, 1960.Google Scholar

45 See, for example, the Korean Workers Party resolution on the Moscow Statement in KCNA, 12 24, 1960.Google Scholar

46 Pyongyang radio broadcast, NKHS, 12 11, 1960.Google Scholar