1 World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Finance for Developing Countries, 1994–95 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 16.Google Scholar

2 Ibid. p. 159.

3 On a scale in which 100 is the riskiest rating, China rated 15 in 1988, one of the EIU's lowest risk ratings. This jumped to 35 in 1989 but by 1992 had fallen back to 25. The Economist, 21 May 1994, p. 120.

4 Lardy, Nicholas R., China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), pp. 63–71.Google Scholar

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6 Severely indebted countries are those for which either the ratio of the present value of debt service to GNP exceeds 80% or the ratio of the present value of debt service to exports of goods and services exceeds 220%. For moderately indebted countries the ranges of the values of these variables is from 48 to 80% and from 132 to 220% respectively.

7 World Bank, World Debt Tables 1994–95, Vol. 1, pp. 55–56.

8 Moody's rates China's long-term sovereign debt at A3 while Standard and Poor's gives a rating of BBB. Both are investment grade ratings. Other transition economies that have rated sovereign debt, but which have been assigned below investment grade ratings, are Hungary and Slovakia. Transition, Vol. 5, No. 9 (November-December) 1994, p. 13. Both agencies initially assigned ratings to the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank, the People's Construction Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC), and the Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC) that were identical to those they gave to China's sovereign debt. However, in April 1995 Moody's downgraded the first four of these to Baa.Prior to that it had watchlisted CITIC for a potential downgrade. Although Baa is still an investment grade rating, the downgrade led the Bank of China to cancel a HK$5 billion floating rate certificate of deposit issue.

9 Technically the fee is still set annually by the Executive Directors of the World Bank. But it has been set at zero from fiscal year 1989 to fiscal year 1995.

10 Technically China Brilliance Automotive Holdings Limited is a Bermuda-based holding company, not a Chinese company. However, since the holding company's only asset is a 51% ownership in the Shenyang Jinbei Passenger Vehicle Manufacturing Company, Ltd., for practical purposes it may be regarded as a Chinese company. The holding company was established in 1992, only a few months before the initial public offering of the stock on the New York Stock Exchange. According to some sources the Bermuda holding company was created simply to escape the approvals required by China's Securities Regulatory Commission for overseas listings of Chinese firms.

11 Baihua, Zhu and Yangwei, Ou, “Zhongguo waihui chubei yu wubai yi meiyuan” (“China's foreign exchange reserves exceed $US50 billion”), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 28 January 1995, p. 1.Google Scholar

12 Personal savings in foreign exchange denominated accounts amounted to some $20 billion at the end of 1994. “BOC says $20b saved in foreign currency,” China Daily, 11 January 1995, p. 7.

13 State Statistical Bureaul, , 1979–1991 Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Tongji Daquan (1979–1991 China Foreign Economic Statistics) (Beijing: Chinese Statistical Publishing House, 1993), pp. 9–11.Google Scholar

14 New China News Agency, Hong Kong Branch quoted in Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Hong Kong Digest Issue No. 1/95, pp. 5–6.

15 World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994), p. 14.Google Scholar

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17 World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy, p. 14. Even this calculation, since it utilizes the official exchange rate to convert China's GNP in yuan into U.S. dollars, overstates the magnitude of the surplus. Taking into account the real purchasing power of the Chinese currency, China's estimated GNP would be at least three times higher and the current account surplus as a percentage of GNP only one-third, or even less, than the 3.7% estimate.

18 Based on estimated total reserves of $49 billion at year-end 1993 and the official figure of $4,773 billion for year-end 1981. Chinese Finance and Banking Society, 1993 Zhongguo jinrong nianjian (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong nianjian bianjibu (Chinese Finance and Banking Compilation Department), 1993), p. 368.

19 Lardy, China in the World Economy, p. 15.

20 “Wo jiagong maoyi jinchukou qunian tupo qianyi meiyuan” (“China's import and export processing trade broke through the level of US$ 100 billion last year”), Renmin ribao, 23 January 1995, p. 1.

21 “Processed goods lead exports to new high,” China Daily, 24 January 1995, p. 5.

22 Lardy, Nicholas R., Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 61.Google ScholarBaihua, Zhu, “Wo waihui tizhi gaige qujian chengxiao” (“A preliminary view of the results of China's foreign exchange system reform”), Renmin ribao, 20 January 1995, p. 1.Google Scholar

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25 Rawski, Thomas G., “Export performance of China's state industries,” unpublished manuscript, March 1994Google Scholar, Table 3.

26 State Statistical Bureau, , Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1993 (Statistical Yearbook of China 1993) (Beijing: 1993), p. 409.Google Scholar The note denning the scope of the category “other” is at p. 471.

27 Based on the estimate that they account for 2% of manufactured goods output.

28 World Bank, China: Foreign Trade Reform (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1994), pp. 55–56.Google Scholar

29 Ibid. p. 67.

30 Ibid. p. 75.

31 Ibid. p. 75.

32 Ibid. p. 74.

33 State Planning Commission Economics Research Institute Task Force, “Dui huifu guanmao zongxieding diwei hou de xiaoyi fenxi he duice” (“An effective analysis and countermeasures after China resumes its place in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”), Guoji maoyi (International Trade), No. 2 (1993), p. 10.

34 Matejka, Harriet, “Post-CMEA trade and payments arrangements in the East,” in Van Brabant, Jozef M. (ed.), The New Eastern Europe and the World Economy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), p. 63.Google Scholar

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36 China's borrowing in the pre-reform period was limited to short-term trade financing.

37 Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy, p. 49.

38 Ibid. p. 50.

39 Thornhill, John and Fisher, Andrew, “Russia pleads for easier payment of Soviet debts,” The Financial Times, 6 July 1995, p. 2.Google Scholar

40 Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform, pp. 39–41.

41 “The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade quickens the approval of foreign trading rights of production enterprises,” Guoji shangbao (International Business), 9 February 1993, p. 1. At the end of 1992 China had 8.61 million industrial enterprises of which 1.03 million were state-owned.

42 Aslund, How Russia Became a Market Economy, p. 147.

43 McKinnon, Ronald I., The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 217–225.Google Scholar

44 Broadman, Harry, Meeting the Challenge of Chinese Enterprise Reform, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 283 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1995), pp. 15–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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49 Ibid. pp. 60–62.