Discussions of China's rising domestic security expenditure often present this spending as evidence of the Chinese Communist Party's strong coercive capacity. This article argues that a lack of theoretical clarity about domestic security has resulted in flawed conclusions about these expenditures and their implications for China's coercive capacity. Challenging the conventional wisdom, the article analyses China's domestic security spending from 1992 through 2012 and argues that it is important to consider not only the total amount that China spends but also how it spends these resources and the magnitude of the threats that this expenditure must address. It finds that China's domestic security spending is not historically unprecedented, is not expanding as a proportion of national expenditure, and is not necessarily high (or producing high coercive capacity) when compared to other countries. The article also shows that certain locations struggle more to fund their coercive capacity than others, and that these locations overlap with areas where internal security threats may be particularly acute. The challenges that the coercive apparatus must address have also grown over the same period during which domestic security spending has risen. Finally, attempts to improve the political position of China's coercive agents cannot be equated with improvements in their capacity to manage Chinese society. Cumulatively, this reassessment provides more evidence of the limitations on China's coercive capacity than of its strength.

谈到中国国内安全开支增加的时候, 分析人士经常会假设开支的增加是共产党强制能力提高的证据。这片文章的论点是, 因为理论基础不够明晰, 所以关于中国国内安全开支的结论经常有缺点。在这篇文章, 笔者用中国从 1992 年到 2012 年的国内安全开支的分析来挑战一般常识。笔者认为, 除了开支的数量以外, 中国怎么利用这样的资源以及需要应对什么样的威胁也值得注意。根据笔者的统计分析, 中国国内安全开支: 1) 并不算史无前例, 2) 在国家预算占的比例不在扩大, 3) 跟别的国家相比不算高, 而且产生的强制能力也不算大。笔者还进一步表明在征收国内安全财政收入的方面, 一部分省市会更困难, 而且这些省市平常是有更严重的国内威胁的地方。随着国内安全开支的提高, 国内安全机关面对的挑战也加剧了很多。最后, 国内安全机关政治地位的改善并不意味着他们比较容易控制中国社会。总之, 笔者认为这项分析显示的不是中国国内安全机关的实力, 而是国内安全机关的局限。