In my view, the fundamental disagreement between Garver and me i, the estimation of the nature of the CCP-Moscow relationship, personalized in the relations between Mao and Stalin. Garver believe, that Stalin regarded Mao as a “dissident communist” who frustrated Stalin's intention to sacrifice the CCP's revolutionary interest; in order to meet the need for Soviet security. In the decade after 1935, Garver continues to argue in his comment, Mao “repeatedly deviate[d] from Comintern line and ultimately emancipate[d] the CCP from Moscow's control.” Therefore, Stalin had good reason to distrust Mao. If the CCP-Moscow radio communication had not been disrupted, Stalin could have prevented Mao from launching a successful coup at the Zunyi Conference, Garver says in his China Quarterly article. After finding some evidence of Stalin's willingness to supply the CCP with weapons, Garver states that “our estimates of Mao's willingness to antagonize Stalin must be adjusted.” To Garver, the Mao-Stalin relations were utilitarian in nature, just like those between Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek – they were all each other's “fishes.” Given the discrepancy between the Soviet security need and the CCP's revolutionary interests, Garver's depiction of the relationship between Mao and Stalin leaves the impression that they were adversaries, rather than comrades.