1. For a precise statement of the objectives of the PLA, see Mao Zedong's remarks to the Central Committee as reported by New China News Agency, 6 June 1950.

2. A list of depositions by defectors held by the Military History Institute of the Republic of Korea in Seoul includes a number of former senior and middle-ranking staff officers of the North Korean People's Army testifying to the preparation of operational concepts for the invasion of the south which were prepared as submissions to the Soviet Union. For other sources of submissions by Kim, consideration by Stalin and consultation with Mao in this context, see also Les Maréchaux sovietiques vous parlent (Paris: 1967)Google Scholar, by a Russian defector, Lt. Col. Kyril Dimitrievitch Kalinov. A section of the book, reproduced in magazine articles in the west, is concerned with his part in building up the North Korean People's Army; “Russians in Korea,” Life Magazine, 27 June 1960 by a Polish defector, Colonel Pawel Monat, military attaché in Beijing and, later, in Pyongyang; and Khruschev Remembers (London: 1971)Google Scholar (reprint of United States publication, Boston, 1970), which contains a section on the Korean war.

3. China did not send an ambassador to Pyongyang until 13 August 1950, possibly in consonance with the mission of “comfort and solidarity“ by a Chinese delegation on 11 August (Guo Moruo and Li Lisan). He withdrew at the time of the North Korean defeat. During the remainder of the war diplomatic as well as military relations were maintained through the military liaison commission with the North Korean Government.

4. The “army,” translated from the Chinese word jun, corresponded to the corps in the United Nations “Armies,” were organized in “army groups“ under the Fourth Field Army.

5. These movements were confirmed later by Chinese prisoners-of-war in Korea. Some of their accounts are included in George, Alexander L., The Chinese Communist Army in Action (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 5–7Google Scholar.

6. This line was established by Liu Ningyi in his capacity as vice-chairman of the Chinese Committee to Protect World Peace. See People's Daily, 21 July 1950. References to American invasion of Taiwan related to the interpolation of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait from 27 June 1950.

7. There were also numerous items of Czech, Russian, British and Danish origin, though American and Japanese predominated.

8. In the “Report on the investigation of the counter-revolutionary crimes of the Lin Biao anti-Party clique,” issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 8 September 1983, Lin is accused with Liu Shaoqi of opposing “Mao's decision to resist America and aid Korea and (he) refused to be assigned to the Korean battlefield.” Kau, Michael Y. M. (ed.), the Lin Piao Affair (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975), p. 114Google Scholar.

9. See Kau, , The Lin Piao Affair, p. 1Google Scholar.

10. Peng Dehuai zishu (Peng Dehuai-His Own Story) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981)Google Scholar.

11. This was a formation in being in Fourth Field Army.

12. First Motorized Artillery Division and two of the three regiments of 2nd Motorized Artillery. In addition to the weapons in those formations each infantry division had three batteries of pack howitzers, 70mm (Japanese), 75mm (United States) or 76.2mm (Russian).

13. Major-General William F. Dean, as a prisoner-of-war, saw what he took to be Chinese soldiers 20 miles north of Huichon on 13 October. These were probably advanced parties. See, General Dean's Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954), p. 138Google Scholar.

14. The Third and Capitol ROK Divisions had marched and fought their way up the east coast ahead of the amphibious landing force.

15. This is more familiarly known by the Japanese title of Chosin.

16. Most of these simple precepts were drawn from the classical treatise, The Art of War, by Sun Zi and developments of his ideas by Mao Zedong, as for example in his “Strategic problems of revolutionary war“ written in 1936.

17. The First Cavalry was not an armoured or reconnaissance force but a mechanized infantry division.

18. These were from Russian BM21 (Katyusha) multi-barrelled launchers mounted on trucks – equipment of the motorized artillery.

19. At this time, field operations were still being controlled from Shenyang – the site of Fourth Field Army headquarters. The joint liaison group, Chinese and Korean, established in North Korea in October had grown and was later to be transformed into a full headquarters. Orders were formally issued by this body as a manifestation of unity and a recognition of the continued existence of the North Korean state. Effective operational control remained with the Chinese, notwithstanding attempts by Russian officers with the North Koreans to influence policy.

20. The PLA term for this disposition.

21. General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur when the latter was removed from hit post early in April 1951. However, his successor as Eighth Army Commander, Lt-Gen James van Fleet III, had only been in office a matter of days when the new offensive opened and so Ridgway's policies were, initially, at least, maintained.

22. About 17,000 Chinese prisoners were taken during the last fortnight of May 1951.

23. Because it took some time to train Chinese and North Korean aircrew – mostly the Chinese, whose pilots outnumbered the North Koreans by 3:1 – to advanced combat standards of proficiency, it may be that the communist forces were constrained in their options for offensive action, particularly in their options for raiding UN air bases in Korea, by determination that they should not lose Russian pilots over UN territory. Russian leadership in the air would certainly have been required until at least the latter part of 1952 to offer a high chance of success.

24. See The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–53 (New York: Futtrell, Moseley and Simpson, 1961), p. 645Google Scholar.