* William Parish, Andrew Walder, Yeung Sai-cheung and Michel Oksenberg provided helpful suggestions and criticisms of an earlier draft. They are not, of course, responsible for any remaining defects in the present version.

1. The subtitle of the volume is “Wages, welfare and labour insurance” (“ Gongzi, fuli, laodong baoxian”). A second volume, subtitled” Planning, allocation and labour protection” (“Jihua, diaopei, laodong baohu”) is unfortunately not available. In the present volume, documents are organized under the following topical headings: wage standards and becoming a formal staff member and setting ranks; wage treatment in work transfers; wage treatment of graduates of various kinds of schools; treatment of transferred, demobilized and retired military personnel; wage payments under special circumstances; wage (and livelihood) treatment of people who have been sanctioned; supplemental wages; subsidies; livelihood assistance for employees and workers; vacations to visit families; labour insurance; treatment during convalescence from illness; retirement; severance; calculation of seniority; labour insurance and welfare treatment of staff dependents, apprentices, seasonal workers and public project labourers; treatment of former private enterprise persons; documents relevant to wage reform and readjustment; wage treatment of transferred military personnel; and relevant decisions on the severance and retirement of employees and workers in collective enterprises.

2. The volume was given to Michel Korzec in Hong Kong by a former cadre. We are convinced that there is no doubt as to its authenticity, as are others who have inspected it. The documents included are, in some cases, the same as those available in previously published sources and, when not, consistent with details of the wage system that have been derived from press accounts, interviews and other sources. Furthermore, the extraordinary detail and multiple cross-references would make a volume like this almost impossible to forge, even if one had.the motive for doing so. But we invite others to inspect the volume and judge for themselves. The original is now on deposit in the Sinological Institute at the University of Leiden. Reproductions are on deposit at the Asia Library of the University of Michigan, and in the Center for Chinese Research Materials in Washington, D.C., and copies can be obtained from the latter institution.

3. Important collections of previously published regulations include 1956 Zhongyang Caizheng Fagui Huibian (Collection of Central Financial Laws and Regulations) (Peking: Financial Publishing House, 1957);Google Scholar and Siying gongshangye di shehuizhuyi gaizao zhengci faling xuanbian 1953–1957 (Selected Collection of Policy Statements and Laws Concerning the Socialist Reform of Private Industry and Commerce, 1953–1957) (Peking: Law Publishing House, 1960).Google Scholar The best analysis of the Chinese wage system to date is Howe, Christopher, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China 1919–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).Google Scholar

4. This document dates from shortly after Mao’s third ritual swim in the Yangtze River. Presumably these provisions would also cover those who followed the example of his most famous swim, a year later in 1966.

5. Some details on the wage adjustments of 1977 and 1979 have been openly published in China. See, for instance, Peking Review, 5 May 1978, p. 13; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People’s Republic of China (hereafter FBIS), 25 January 1980, pp. L-16-L-19; Ibid.. 31 January 1980, pp. L-4-L-5.

6. Similar tables, based on modifications of those found in the 1956 wage documents, have been published in a number of previous studies. See, for example, Hoffman, Charles, The Chinese Worker (Albany: SUNY Press, 1974), App. A;Google ScholarTing-chung, Chen, ”An analysis of wage adjustment implemented by the Chinese Communist regime,” Studies on Chinese Communism No. 7 (1973), pp. 1–16. The exact wage ranges are only roughly approximated in this table. For many occupations we know how many ranks there are, and which rank corresponds to that of a rank one industrial worker (from LGWX, pp. 603–605), but we do not know the exact figure for the maximum wage.Google Scholar

7. Some details are provided in Hoffman, The Chinese Worker, pp. 104–108. There are occasional references to people receiving piece rate wages in the post-Cultural Revolution period in these documents, so we know that this practice was not completely done away with. There are also comparable payments mentioned, such as a mile fee paid to bus and limousine drivers. But still other important categories of payments of this sort are not mentioned at all in the LGWX documents. For instance, royalty payments to authors and journalists supplemented basic salaries, and had enabled the most famous writers, such as Ba Jin, to earn more than 100,000–200,000 yuan or more in royalty payments. These royalty payments were eliminated in the Cultural Revolution but subsequently restored, although perhaps in modified form. But they receive no mention in the LGWX documents. See Paul Bady, “Best sellers and writers’ incomes,” unpublished paper. The same trend occurred in regard to innovation prizes, which can pay a person up to 10,000 yuan. See Hoffman, The Chinese Worker, pp. 108–109 and Beijing Review, No. 5, 2 February 1979, p. 8.

8. Notice of the restoration of the jobs and salaries of former capitalists can be found in FBIS, 25 January 1979, pp. E-17-E-18;Ibid.. 26 January 1979, E-2-E-5. Even before 1956 military officers could receive high, retained wages when transferred out to civilian jobs.

9. To be more precise, the supplement is to be 5 yuan in most areas, but 8yuan in pastoral areas, and with rates for Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet) to be set separately. And collective enterprises can pay out less than this if they are not able to meet the 5 yuan figure. See People's Daily, 1 November 1979, p. 1.

10. Some information on these kinds of perquisites comes from the research Whyte has been conducting in collaboration with William Parish on social life in urban China, and will be discussed in publications from that project. See also Hua, Jiang, “Zhonggong ganbu teshuhua baitai” (“The manyfold kinds of special treatment for Chinese Communist cadres”), Guanchajia, No. 24 (October 1979);Google Scholar and, by the same author, “Zhonggong ganbu di tequan he chouwen” (“ The special privileges and ugly smell of Chinese Communist cadres”), Guanchajia, No. 25 (November 1979).Google Scholar

11. The 1953 Labour Insurance Regulations specified that their implementation was mandatory only in work units employing more than 100 people (LGWX: 1953: 275). It is not clear from these documents how fully enterprises of various types and sizes implement these regulations today.

12. Some surprisingly low figures on retirement pensioneers in China into the 1960s are given in Davis-Friedmann, Deborah, Old People and Their Families in the People's Republic of China, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1979. She cites official figures stating that in 1957 there were only 67,000 pensioned retirees nationwide. By 1974 the number of people living off pensions in China's largest city, Shanghai, was only 200,000 (citations from pp. 47 and 66–68).Google Scholar

13. See Uzakoneniji, SobranieRasporjaženij Rabocegoi Krest’janskogo Pravitel'stva (Collection of Laws and Regulations of Workers’ and Peasants’ Government) Moscow: 7 May 1919.Google Scholar

14. See 1956 Zhongyang Caizheng Fagui Huibian (Collection of Central Financial Laws and Regulations) (Beijing: Financial Publishers, 1957), p. 247. The minimum used in these calculations involves service personnel in state organs, and not cadres. See Table 1.Google Scholar

15. See, in particular, Christopher Howe, Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China: 1919–1972, Chap. 6.

16. If we assume that a senior marshal such as Zhu De received a salary of 579–5 yuan, equivalent to a grade 1 state administrative cadre in Beijing, plus a 30% military seniority supplement for his more than 25 years of service, the total would come to 753 • 35 yuan a month in the period before the 1965 reductions.

17. A 1968 Red Guard document claims that the salaries of high state and Party cadres were reduced, making the maximum 404 yuan, the same as that published in LGWX as the maximum for military officers after 1965. See Shuang chenyue (Dawn frost monthly), No. 1, 10 January 1968), p. 11. However, this Red Guard document claims that this reduction occurred in 1960, which seems most improbable. It seems more likely that such a change occurred in 1965 simultaneous with the change in the military, but this has yet to be confirmed from other sources. Of course, the effects of any such wage reduction on the standard of living of leading state cadres is marginal, since they are the ones who have the most access to a variety of privileges mentioned earlier. Many of their expenses, in other words, are met out of official budgets, rather than out of their own pockets.

18. See Whyte, Martin, “Destratification and restratification in China,” in Berreman, G. (ed.), Social Inequality: Comparative and Developmental Approaches (New York: Academic Press, 1981); also Michel Korzec, China trip notes, May-June 1978.Google Scholar

19. FBIS, 31 January 1980, p. L-5.

20. There is a further category of people suspended from the regular staff for disciplinary or political errors, which will be discussed in a later section. There is another distinction in state units which will not be discussed here, between those on the organizational roster (biannei) and those outside of it (bianwai). Apparently at some early stage units were able to take on more formal staff members than listed on their original rosters, so that this distinction became an empty one; both biannei and bianwai personnel are part of the formal staff, and are distinct from temporary and trial personnel.

21. It should be noted that there are special regulations regarding the city of Shanghai for the treatment of apprentices which differ from the rest of the country. See LGWX: 1971:595.

22. A case study of a public project labourer is discussed in Whyte, Martin King, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: University of California Press), Chap. 8.Google Scholar

23. There is reference in LGWX, p. 294, to a 30 November 1971 State Council circular on the reform of the temporary and rotating worker systems, but unfortunately this 1971 document is not itself included in LGWX. Some estimates claim that up to 30–40% of the non-agricultural employment in the early 1960s was made up of various kinds of temporary personnel. For the Cultural Revolution attacks, see Howe, Chistopher, “Labour organization and incentives in industry, before and after the Cultural Revolution,” in Schram, S. (ed.), Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973);Google Scholar also “Sources of labor discontent in China: the worker-peasant system,” Current Scene, Vol. 6, No. 5, 15 March 1968.Google Scholar

24. Interviews with former workers in Hong Kong indicate that a portion of new temporary workers taken on in recent years have been members of the families of current employees. This became a device to supplement family incomes as well as a way for some young people to escape being sent down to the countryside. Andrew Walder, personal communication.

25. Resentment at the post-Cultural Revolution promotion of young radicals into the leadership is clear from the sneering references to “helicopter cadres.” And more recently the Chinese media have been having some difficulty persuading people that contributions are more important than seniority. See FBIS, 14 January 1980, p. L-7.

26. There are variations. People who have been doing especially hazardous or heavy work can retire earlier (at 55 and 45); as can people who have severe health problems and the permission of a doctor and their work unit.

27. Revised retirement regulations issued in 1978 liberalized these benefits, providing pensions of from 60 to 90% of the final wage, with a minimum monthly stipend of 25 yuan. The number of years of continuous seniority needed for eligibility for a pension was also lowered to 10, and other minor modifications were included. See Culture and Education Administration and Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Shehui wenjiao xingzheng caiwu zhidu zhaibian (Excerpts on the System of Social, Cultural, and Educational Administration and Finance), (Beijing: Chinese Finance and Economics Publishing House, 1979), pp. 432–437.Google Scholar

28. Seniority also makes a difference in the wage of those demoted to lighter work within the same enterprise, as we shall detail below.

29. There is a puzzle about these provisions. The 1962 document had a section 3 which apparently stated the criterion of revolutionary work undertaken overseas. In the LGWX volume (p. 520) this section has been omitted, and one may suppose that there is a connection with China's sensitivity to charges that she is fostering revolutionary activities in other countries. However, the next document printed in the volume, from 1972 (p. 521), concerns the fact that the required proof of revolutionary work overseas stipulated in the 1962 document, section 3, must be submitted to subordinate office of the Foreign Ministry, since the Overseas Affairs Commission, which used to receive such evidence, did not exist in 1972. Perhaps this case of omission and non-omission is evidence of the defects of collective editorial work.

30. There are gradations to political labelling in China. Rightists were usually subject to more lenient regulations in the wage system than are counter-revolutionaries and other bad elements. And, as we will note below, it also matters whether you confess your errors and are repentant, or are exposed by others.

31. The evidence in the LGWX has led us to modify an earlier judgment that pay reductions and economic sanctions were not usually applied to people who committed political errors. This was the view stated in Whyte, Martin King, “Inequality and stratification in China,” CQ, No. 64 (December 1975), pp. 691–92.Google Scholar

32. In some of the situations to be discussed people can end up receiving higher income than before. Since this would not lead to resentment or problems, we will not be concerned with this situation here, and will only deal with situations that lead to income reductions. We will also not deal here with temporary “loans” of individuals to take up other jobs within the same unit or bureaucratic system. This sort of temporary loaning, which Andrew Walder terms “tetherball mobility,” is probably more common than the permanent transfers discussed here. Since in such cases the formal unit membership, wages, and so forth remain unchanged, these temporary moves are not covered by the LGWX. regulations.

33. There are some exceptions, to be noted below; particularly in regard to skilled personnel from Shanghai or cadres who go to less developed areas to aid in their development, and are allowed to keep their original wage levels. We understand from Yeung Sai-cheung that until the 1960s cadres transferred into a lower price region were able W keep receiving pay based on iheir former region, but that subsequently this was changed, i and all had to be shifted to the rates of their local region.

34. In 1965–66 regulations were adopted by the Second Light Industry Ministry to implement a plan of retirement pensions and severance pay for staff members in collective enterprises under this ministry's supervision (see LGWX: 1965–66: 637–50). It is apparent from these regulations that the pensions people could expect to receive might be considerably less than those received by people retiring from state enterprises.

35. See, in particular, FBIS, 23 July 1979, pp. L-12-L-13. The notion of the security of an “iron rice bowl” has also found its defenders, however. See FBIS, 4 October 1979, p. L-10.

36. Unfortunately, this is one of the cases in which we don’t know how frequently Stipulations were actually applied and how many people have been affected. Interviews in Hong Kong suggest that, for ordinary workers and employees with no serious political problems, the danger in the mid 1970s of being demoted or fired was slim indeed. See the discussion in Parish, William, “The view from the factory,” in Terrill, Ross (ed.), The China Difference (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).Google Scholar

37. Limited distributional data are available for the 1950s, but only for selected segments of industrial workers. Some efforts to assemble distributional data to make conclusions about inequality, by using a technique based on a census of the former neighbours of people interviewed in Hong Kong, are presented in Parish, William and Whyte, Martin King, Village and Family in Contemporary China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), s. 2. Similar analysis of data collected from an urban sample is presented in William L. Parish, “Destratification in China,” paper for the conference on Class and Social Stratification in Post-revolution China, London, July 1980.Google Scholar

38. A different survey of social stratification in China based in large part on the LGWX documents has been published in Dutch. See Dirk Bergvelt and Michel Korzec; “Sociale ongelykheden in de Chinese Volksrepubliek” (“ Social inequalities in the PRC” ), Amsterdams Sociologisch Tydschrift, February 1980; May 1980. See also Korzec, M. “Het klassenloze non-egalitarisme in China” (“The classless nonegalitarianism in China”) in Fokkema, Douwe and Tromp, Bart (eds.), China op het breukvlak (China on the Brink)(Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1981).Google Scholar