Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T16:16:32.206Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Punishing Corrupt Officials in China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2015

Lin Zhu
Lin Zhu*
Affiliation:
Lin Zhu is assistant professor at the School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou. Email: [email protected].
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

China presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China's record of curbing corruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities. Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials. However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compromises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are not guaranteed exemption.

摘要

中国在打击腐败上呈现出两面性。一方面, 腐败仍然是党和国家面临的严重挑战, 这不仅是因为腐败导致国家资产的流失, 更是由于其对政权合法性的腐蚀。另一方面, 相比较其他一些国家, 中国的腐败问题并没有显得极其严重。本研究试图通过考察中央惩治腐败的策略以解释上述问题。反腐败的有效性取决于惩治腐败的确定性和予以相应的惩罚。在中国, 中央政府无法也不愿意对大多数的官员, 特别是高级官员, 进行调查, 而是选择对已经认罪的高级官员予以严厉的惩罚。尽管这一选择性的惩戒策略损害了国家在反腐问题上的威信, 但这仍意味着腐败官员面临不确定性, 即使高级官员也并不必然逃脱惩罚。

Keywords

Chinadiscipliningcorruptionofficialspunishment中国惩治腐败官员严厉性
Type
Articles
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 223 , September 2015 , pp. 595 - 617
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Research for this article was supported with funding provided by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, the National Social Science Fund of China (funding grant 13&ZD011), and the “985 Project” at Sun Yat-sen University. The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and helpful suggestions of Yongshun Cai and the anonymous reviewers. The author is responsible for any remaining errors.

References

Anderson, C. J., and Tverdova, Y. V.. 2003. “Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 47(1), 91–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arvey, Richard D., and Ivancevich, John M.. 1980. “Punishment in organizations: a review, propositions, and research suggestions.” The Academy of Management Review 5(1), 123–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bailey, William C. 1990. “Murder, capital punishment, and television: execution publicity and homicide rates.” American Sociological Review 55(5), 628–633.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bailey, William C., and Peterson, Ruth D.. 1989. “Murder and capital punishment: a monthly time-series analysis of execution publicity.” American Sociological Review 54(5), 722–743.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and punishment: an economic approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76, 169–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cai, Yongshun. 2008. “Local governments and the suppression of popular resistance in China.” The China Quarterly 193, 24–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cai, Yongshun, and Zhu, Lin. 2013. “Disciplining local officials in China: the case of conflict management.” The China Journal 70, 98–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calhoun, C. 1994. Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carlsmith, Kevin M. 2006. “The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42, 437–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carlsmith, Kevin M., and Darley, John M.. 2002. “Why do we punish? Deterrence and just desserts as motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83(2), 284–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Shuo. n.d. “Accountability from cyberspace? Scandals exposure in internet and official government in China.”Google Scholar
Cochran, John K., and Chamlin, Mitchell B.. 2000. “Deterrence and brutalization: the dual effects of executions.” Justice Quarterly 17(4), 685–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deng, Xiaoping. 1994. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan di er juan (Selected Writings of Deng Xiaoping Vol. 2). Beijing: People's Press.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1994. Inside Bureaucracy. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.Google Scholar
Gong, Ting. 1997. “Forms and characteristics of China's corruption in the 1980s: change with continuity.” Communist and Post-communist Studies 30(4), 277–78.Google Scholar
Groenendijk, Nico. 1997. “A principal-agent model of corruption.” Crime, Law & Social Change 27, 207–229.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guo, Yong. 2008. “Corruption in transitional China: an empirical analysis.” The China Quarterly 194, 349–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hollander, Edwin. 1958. “Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit.” Psychological Review 65(2), 117–127.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hsu, Carolyn L. 2001. “Political narratives and the production of legitimacy: the case of corruption in post-Mao China.” Qualitative Sociology 24(1), 25–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
King, David R. 1978. “The brutalization effect: execution publicity and the incidence of homicide in South Carolina.” Social Forces 57(2), 683–687.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Li, Zhilun. 2000. “Congyan zhidang zhizheng, qieshi zhuahao fanfubai renwu de luoshi” (Strictly disciplining Party members and doing a good job of anti-corruption). Zhongguo jiancha 4, 5–7.Google Scholar
Liaoning Discipline Inspection Committee and the Supervision Bureau (eds.). 2005. Liaoning jijian jiancha zhi (A Record of Discipline Inspection and Supervision in Liaoning). Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe.Google Scholar
Lü, Xiaobo. 2000. Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Communist Party. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Manion, Melanie. 2004. Corruption by Design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mishler, W., and Rose, R.. 2001. “What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies.” Comparative Political Studies 34(1), 30–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe. 1986. “Explaining China's recent political corruption.” Corruption and Reform 1(1), 209–233.Google Scholar
Østergaard, Clemens Stubbe, and Persen, Christina. 1991. “Official profiteering and the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in China.” Corruption and Reform 6(2), 87–107.Google Scholar
Phillips, David P. 1980. “The deterrent effect of capital punishment: new evidence on an old controversy.” American Journal of Sociology 86(1), 139–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, David P., and Hensley, John E.. 1984. “When violence is rewarded or punished: the impact of mass media stories on homicide.” Journal of Communication 34(3), 101–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pogarsky, Greg. 2009. “Deterrence and decision making: research questions and theoretical refinements.” In Krohn, Marvin D., Lizotte, Alan J. and Hall, Gina Penly (eds.), Handbook on Crime and Deviance. Dordrecht: Springer, 241–255.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Procuratorial Yearbook of China. Various years. Beijing: Chinese Procuratorate Press.Google Scholar
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. “The measurement and impact of corruption victimization: survey evidence from Latin America.” World Development 34(2), 381–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stack, Steven. 1987. “Publicized executions and homicide, 1950–1980.”American Sociological Review 52(4), 532–540.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sun, Yan. 2001. “The politics of conceptualizing corruption in reform China.” Crime, Law & Social Change 35, 245–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sun, Yan. 2004. Corruption and Market in Contemporary China. Cornell University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trevino, Linda Klebe. 1992. “The social effects of punishment in organizations: a justice perspective.” The Academy of Management Review 17(4), 647–676.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1997. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Lanham: University Press of America.Google Scholar
Wedeman, Andrew. 2008. “Win, lose, or draw? China's quarter century war on corruption.” Crime, Law and Social Change 49, 7–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wedeman, Andrew. 2012. Double Paradox: Rapid Growth and Rising Corruption in China. Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Xinhua tongxun she (eds.). 1997. Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo nianjian (The People's Republic of China Yearbook). Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe.Google Scholar