Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
In February 1985, Hui Tong Urban Co-operative Bank, China's first new private bank since 1949, opened for business in Chengdu City in Sichuan Province. The bank was set up by a group of young economists from the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences and university teachers in Chengdu City.
1. China Daily, 5 04 1985Google Scholar; 1988 Sichuan Statistical Yearbook, p. 801.Google Scholar
2. For the growth of such enterprises, see Gold, Thomas B., “Urban private business in China,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXII, No. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1989), pp. 187–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bohnet, Armin and Jaehne, Gunter, “The private sector in the Soviet Union and China,” Intereconomics (03/04 1989), pp. 88–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Young, Susan, “Policy, practice and the private sector in China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 21 (01 1989), pp. 57–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3. See Tam, On Kit, “Capital market development in China,” World Development, Vol. 19, No. 5 (05 1991).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4. Rudai, Yang, “On the formulation of development strategy for the Sichuan economy” (mimeograph, Chengdu City, 1984)Google Scholar. For discussion on China's financial reform, see, for example, Tam, On Kit, “Reform of China's banking system,” World Economy (12 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tam, On Kit, “The development of China's financial system,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 17 (01 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5. Interview notes, Sichuan Investment and Trust Corporation, Chengdu, 9 12 1987Google Scholar; Jingji ribao (Economic Daily, Beijing), 30 12 1988, p. 1.Google Scholar
6. Without a bank account, an individual enterprise could not obtain bank loans or other banking services. The owners of such enterprises could still open personal accounts as individuals in the savings departments of the state-owned banks. However, personal finance was underdeveloped. It was not until 1987 that state banks slowly began to provide conventional banking services to some individual private enterprises.
7. Gold, , “Urban private business,” p. 199.Google Scholar
8. Interview notes, Beijing City Branch, Industrial Commercial Bank of China, 14 11 1987Google Scholar; Chengdu City Branch, People's Bank of China, 10 12 1987.Google Scholar
9. Questionnaire survey of 200 bank account holders in Chengdu City, conducted by the author in December 1987.
10. See Tam, On Kit, “Reform of China's banking system”Google Scholar; Bowles, Paul and White, Gordon, “Contradictions in China's financial reforms: the relationship between banks and enterprises,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11. China Daily, 5 04 1985Google Scholar; Caimao jingji yanjiu tongxin (Bulletin of Finance and Economic Research), No. 1 (08 1985).Google Scholar
12. 1986 Sichuan Provincial Economic Almanac, p. 230.Google Scholar
13. For discussion on such activities, see Cleverley, John F., “The concept of enterprise and the Chinese university: a cautionary tale of profit and loss,” Comparative Education, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
14. 1986 Sichuan Provincial Economic Almanac, p. 231.Google Scholar
15. Gold, , “Urban private business.”Google Scholar The managers of Hui Tong agreed that many “collective enterprises” were in fact owned by individuals but registered as collectives for ideological and taxation considerations. Unfortunately, no accurate estimate of the breakdown was provided.
16. Interview notes. Some of them were seconded from the ICBC and many were retired ICBC employees. Economic Daily, 30 12 1988, p. 1.Google Scholar
17. Hui Tong Urban Co-operative Bank; Zhongguo jinrong nianjian 1989 (Chinese Financial Yearbook 1989), pp. 151–53Google Scholar. This limited flexibility seemed to have disappeared since 1988 when the Chinese monetary authority began to exercise more stringent controls over the operations of financial institutions outside the state bank system.
18. Bhatt, V. V., “On financial innovations and credit market evolution,” World Development, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1988), pp. 281–292CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Most UCCs in China were reported to have poorly-trained staff with inadequate systems of management and accounting. Jinrong shibao (Financial News), 7 09 1988, p. 2.Google Scholar
19. For analysis of China's banking system, see Tam, On Kit, “Reform of China's banking system”Google Scholar; Bowles, and White, , “Contradictions in China's financial reforms.”Google Scholar The high incidence of non-performing loans is indicative of the problems in the Chinese banking system; for estimates of the magnitude, see Tam, On Kit, “Capital market development.”Google Scholar
20. Under the Chinese system of credit and cash controls, each state and collective enterprise must open one account with the assigned bank and not operate any other account even with another branch of the same bank. However, this rule has now been gradually eroded by the competitive pressure exerted by the emergence of financial institutions outside the state bank system and by the profit-seeking behaviour of the state banks. For a report on this issue see Xiangguo, Jia and Youqing, Xu, “Survey of enterprises with multiple bank accounts and multiple sources of bank credits,” Zhongguo chengshi jinrong (Chinese Urban Finance), No. 2 (1989), pp. 52–53.Google Scholar
21. Chengdu City Branch of the People's Bank of China, The Establishment of Urban Credit Institution has Enhanced Economic and Financial Reform (mimeograph, 08 1987).Google Scholar
22. Ibid. Of the total 6,583 account holders, Hui Tong had 1,235 (19%).
23. The Vice-President of the Academy, Professor Lin Ling, was an influential adviser to the provincial and Central governments, and was one of the key strategists and advocates for more liberal economic reform. Professor Lin had pledged both the Academy's and his personal support to the continuation of the Hui Tong experiment.
24. Neican is written by senior reporters of the New China News Agency exclusively for upper-level Party and government officials (at provincial Party secretary level and above). Often, comments annotated by officials on such reports became de facto directives or rulings and were translated into decisions for action or non-action. Such decisions could then be incorporated into the formal or informal rules and regulations.
25. Dashu, Wang, Tan hezuo yinhang zhidu (On the Co-operative Bank System) (mimeograph, Beijing, Research Centre for Economic, Social and Technological Development of The State Council of China, 1988)Google Scholar. One university based in Beijing attempted unsuccessfully to establish a similar co-operative bank in a suburb of the city between 1987 and 1988. It has apparently faced similar difficulties and opposition from various quarters, including a more organized and established monetary authority. Interview notes.