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Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to “Rule of Law” in China*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2007

Murray Scot Tanner  and
Eric Green
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Abstract

This article extends the enduring debate over the balance of central versus local government control to China's cornerstone of state coercive control: the public security (civilian police) system. A recent series of studies argues that during the 1990s central authorities made terrific progress in regaining influence over local officials across a wide variety of issue-areas. This study, by contrast, argues that each policy sector in China has developed its own historical and institutional set of “lessons” that help structure power in that sector. Likewise, the particular issues in each policy sector create unique challenges for “principals” trying to monitor their “agents.” Regarding internal security, the historical lessons the Party has derived from past security crises combine with the uniquely difficult challenges of monitoring police activities to create a system in which local Party and government officials have tremendous power over policing. The many institutions intended to help central authorities control, oversee and monitor local policing actually provide weak control and oversight. These obstacles to central leadership create tremendous additional challenges to building rule by law in China.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 191 , September 2007 , pp. 644 - 670
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 2007

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References

* The views and analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Western Michigan University, the RAND Corporation, or RAND's management or corporate clients. After the final changes to this article were made, Dr Tanner accepted a position as Deputy Staff Director of the United States Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Needless to say, the views in this article also do not necessarily reflect those of the CECC, its staff or membership, or its leadership. The authors are grateful for comments from Donald Clarke, Pitman Potter, Benjamin Liebman, Kenneth Lieberthal and Melanie Manion for comments on earlier versions. Dr Tanner dedicates this article to the late Michel Oksenberg, who inspired his interest in this topic.