Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
That Chinese policy since 1949 has been characterized by a pattern of left-right oscillations is one of the most widespread, but least examined, assumptions among analysts of Chinese politics. In the popular press, we often read of a “return to a moderate phase” or a “resurgence of radicalism,” while in academic writing, we frequently find contemporary Chinese history set in periods according to the alternate ascendancy of “bureaucratic” or “mobilizational” “models” or of “realist” and “visionary” groups of leaders. Of course, to some extent the policy oscillations model is only a kind of shorthand, convenient for summarizing the content of policy and its changes. We all understand that there have been secular changes in China both in what has been accomplished and in the terms of policy debate. Thus, it has become increasingly common to describe the pattern of policy change in China in terms of a combination of cyclical and secular patterns, to refer to policy oscillations in passing while presenting a chronology which actually indicates secular change, to offer the oscillations model explicitly as just a convenient simplification; or to ignore oscillations entirely in discussing the development of policy.
* I gratefully acknowledge the comments on earlier drafts of this paper of Thomas P. Bernstein, Steven I. Levine, Sharon G. Nathan, Michel C. Oksenberg, Thomas G. Rawski, Thomas W. Robinson, Lynn T. White, III, and Roxane Witke.
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