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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
In September 1956, Ochab, then the First Secretary of the Polish C.P., visited Peking to attend the Congress of the Chinese C.P. When the Soviet delegate, the “liberal” Mikoyan, reproached him abusively for tolerating “anti-Soviet ideas,” the Pole received words of support from his host, Mao Tse-tung. According to Warsaw sources, this was later confirmed in a special letter from Mao and is supposed to have played an important part in inducing Ochab to switch to Gomulka. Thus, the Chinese attitude helped to stiffen Polish resistance when in October 1956 the Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev landed in Warsaw and threatened to intervene militarily. It is also said that some Chinese leaders in Moscow had argued against the use of force in Poland even before this.
1 Taking into account all the differences in the background there were some parallels in Polish history: during the Russo-Japanese war, Pilsudski, then the leader of the Polish Socialist Party, established contact with the Japanese government to receive support for the Polish struggle for independence.
2 Not only the press but also the leaders. At the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party (May 15, 1957) Gomulka said: “Our Party is watching with profound sympathy the activity of the Communist Party of China, which with greatest boldness is developing the creative teachings of Marxism-Leninism. An expression of the great strength of the Communist Party of China and its close unity with the nation is the introduction in this country of new methods in solving non-antagonistic contradictions. Similarly, the thesis about the hundred blossoming flowers is a bold step forward, so far unknown in the practice of socialist construction in other countries.”
3 Cf. the author's “Dialogue on the East,” Soviet Survey, No. 25, 07–09 1958.Google Scholar
4 But later, in contrast to the Soviet case, there were explicit official pronouncements on the communes. Jedrychowski acknowledged their successes but deplored their extremisms at the National Day Rally in Warsaw. After the Lushan Resolution the Polish press quoted approvingly the action taken against the “hotheads” among the commune cadres.
5 See the article “Communist China and Peaceful Coexistence” in this issue.