1. The overwhelming emphasis on the achievement of grain self-sufficiency during the Cultural Revolution decade (1966–76) is a good example of such tension. This policy, which was implemented at a local level throughout China and ignored the dictates of the principle of comparative advantage, compelled farmers to engage in unprofitable activities. Thus, data suggest that the cultivation of cereals was not only less profitable than that of other food and cash crops, but often yielded a negative return per unit of sown area (Planning Department of Ministry of Agriculture, Nongye jingji ziliao, 1949–83 (Materials on the Agricultural Economy, 1949–83), hereafter NYJJZL (1983), pp. 456–471)Google Scholar.

2. The trend is reflected in the following data, which show the average number of member households at each level of organization:

3. See, for example, Kueh, Y.Y. and Ash, R.F. (eds.), Economic Trends in Chinese Agriculture: The Impact of Post-Mao Reforms (Oxford University Press (forthcoming))Google Scholar.

4. Hetong dinggou.

5. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3: The Far East, hereafter SWB, Weekly Economic Report, FE/W0155, A/2, citing Xinhua (New China) News Agency, Beijing, 10 11 1990Google Scholar.

6. Shuangceng jingying tizhi.

7. One argument is that the new structure seeks to bring the household level of operations under the guidance of the collective tier and so reimpose government control over households' farming activities. See Ji, You and Yuesheng, Wang, “China's agricultural development and reform in 1990” in Hsin-chi, Kuan and Brosseau, Maurice, China Review (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1991), pp. 12.15–12.17Google Scholar.

8. The reluctance of the government to de-regulate retail prices of basic foodstuffs is another factor which has limited the scope of rural price reform and severely drained budgetary resources. As this article goes to press, it has been announced that urban subsidies for basic rationed foodstuffs are to be reduced from 1 May 1991 (SWB, FE/1058, 29 April, B2/1).

9. The most notable recent addition to this literature is Oi, Jean C., State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (University of California Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

10. For example, between 1978 and 1984 the savings ratio out of per capita net income increased from 13.1 to 22.9 per cent. See Kueh, Y.Y., “Food consumption and peasant incomes in the post-Mao era” in The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988) (Special Issue on Food and Agriculture in China During the Post-Mao Era), p. 641CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11. That is, nongye jiben jianshe touzi. This provides a measure of the volume of work accomplished in capital construction, expressed in monetary terms, and is a comprehensive indicator which reflects the scale and progress of construction within a certain period of time. It is calculated on the basis of actual progress made and the original budget price. “Accomplished investment in basic capital construction” is to be distinguished from “financial expenditure on capital construction” (caiwu zhichu)–the latter reflecting the amount of money spent on capital construction projects. See State Statistical Bureau (SSB), Zhongguo tongji nianjian, 1989 (China Statistical Yearbook, 1989), hereafter TJNJ (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990), p. 564Google Scholar.

12. See Appendix A, Table Al.

13. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiakuai nongye fazhan ruogan wenti de jueding” (“Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on some questions concerning the acceleration of agricultural development”), Kang, He (General Editor), Zhongguo nongye nianjian, 1980 (Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, 1980), hereafter NYNJ (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1981), pp. 56–62Google Scholar.

14. Two representative articles are: Liu Qiusheng, “Woguo nongye touzi wenti he duice” (“Problems of agricultural investment in China and remedial measures”); and Lei Xiaoming, “Nongye touzi: weiji, yuanyin, chulu” (“Agricultural investment: Crisis, causes and solutions”) in Kang, He and Yuzhao, Wang (eds.), Zhongguo nongcun gaige shinian (Ten Years of Rural Reform in China), hereafter ZGNCGGSN (Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1990), pp. 473–77 and 484–491Google Scholar.

15. These figures are available in ZGGD, pp. 43 and 97; and TJNJ 1990, p. 166. Other comparative indicators can be found in “Tigao nongye zonghe shengchan nengli; wujia nongye chixu wending fazhan” (“Raise the comprehensive production capacity of agriculture; promote the continued stable development of agriculture”) in Nongye jingji wenti (Agricultural Economic Problems), hereafter NYJJWT, No. 3 (1990) p. 9Google Scholar.

16. Only in 1963–65 did the allocation of capital construction funds to irrigation fall significantly below two-thirds. See NYJJZL, p. 303.

17. “Yindao nongcun zijin; zengjia nongye touru” (“Give direction to rural capital and increase allocations to agriculture”), NYJJWT, No. 4 (1990), p. 22Google Scholar.

18. During 1981–85 88.6% of agriculture-support industrial investment was allocated to chemical fertilizers and pesticides (85% for fertilizers alone). The corresponding figure for the previous (Fifth) FYP period was 77.7%. See ZGGD, p. 103. The decline in the rate of agricultural mechanization in China in recent years is highlighted in the finding that in 1988 the mechanically-cultivated area was more than 1.25 million hectares less than in 1979. In many areas, practices of ploughing and digging by hand, and even slash-and-burn cultivation, had reappeared. See Liu Qiusheng in ZGNCGGSN, p. 476.

19. The activities subsumed under “basic capital construction” are the same in the two tables. The slightly different measures of these activities merely reflect the conceptual distinction rehearsed in n. 11.

20. For full details see TJNJ 1990, p. 246.

21. As a proportion of total budgetary expenditure (for all purposes), agriculture-support spending was just about maintained during the Sixth and Seventh FYPs (1.32% and 1.26% respectively) and during 1986–87 it rose to 5.41%.

22. The ratio fell from 1.03:1 (1953–78) to 0.41:1 (1979–87).

23. Such disaggregative data are available in NYJJZL, pp. 308–311, but unfortunately only up to 1982.

24. Ibid.

25. Zhongfa, Zhang et al. , “Woguo nongye fazhanzhong de zichan wenti” (“Problems of capital in China's agricultural development”), Zhongguo shehui kexue (Social Sciences in China), No. 1 (1991) pp. 37–38Google Scholar.

26. NYJJWT, No. 4 (1990), pp. 20–21Google Scholar.

27. Ibid. Also see Liu Qiusheng in ZGNCGGSN, p. 474.

28. Estimates of rural deposits in the People's Bank for every year from 1953 can, however, be found in NYJJZL, p. 321. And Lardy, Nicholas R. has data on the volume of agricultural loans going back to 1950 in his Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 141CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Note, however, that before 1979 the Agricultural Bank operated as a separate administrative entity during 1951, 1953–57 and 1963–65 (ibid.).

29. The relationship – indeed rivalry – between the Agricultural Bank and credit co-operatives is explored in Jianxiang, Lu, “Tan nongcun xinyongshe gaige” (“A discussion of the reform of rural credit co-operatives”), NYJJWT, No. 8 (1986), pp. 38–40Google Scholar.

30. Zhongfa, Zhang et al. , “Problems of capital,” p. 38Google Scholar.

31. NYNJ 1989, p. 113. See also Song Zuanming, “Tanlun muqian woguo nongye zijin touru de niuquxiao ying ji duice” (“Trying out the idea that the present vagaries of capital allocations to China's agriculture are in need of urgent counter-measures”) in ZGNCGGSN, p. 480.

32. Liu Qiusheng in ZGNCGGSN, p. 473. Fur further supporting evidence see Qiaoming, Lei; and Ming, Tian, “Gongxu zhiyue: nongye xindai touru de kunjing yu chulu” (“The interaction of supply and requirements: the difficult circumstance of agricultural credit and possible solutions,” both in ZGNCGGSN, pp. 484–491 and pp. 536–542Google Scholar.

33. Official data for the period of 1958–78 indicate that only during the first half of the 1970s was this relationship reversed. See NYJJZL, p. 321.

34. NYJJZL, p. 104. Most of the benefit from this source derived from the subsidized provision of grain and oil crops. Between 1978 and 1983 the ratio of production to consumption subsidies to peasants fell from 1.81:1 to 0.45:1.

35. TJNJ 1989, p. 673.

36. The case is rehearsed and developed in an unpublished paper, “The analysis of agricultural economic reform in China,” by Chen Qiguang. I am indebted to Dr Chen for showing me a copy of this article. Claude Aubert takes a more complicated view: see his “The agricultural crisis in China at the end of the 1980s” in Delman, Jorgen et al. , (eds.), Remaking Peasant China (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), p.18Google Scholar.

37. NYJJWT, No. 4 (1990), p. 21Google Scholar.

38. Ibid. Between 1984 and 1986 there was a decline of almost 50%. Notice that during 1984–88 peasant income rose on average by over 53% (TJNJ 1989, p. 743 and TJNJ 1990, p. 313.

39. Zhongfa, Zhang et al. in Zhongguo shehui kexue, No. 1 (1991), p. 38Google Scholar.

40. For supporting evidence see NYJJWT, No. 4 (1990), p. 21Google Scholar.

41. At least until 1985, when the state moved from an agricultural tax collected in kind to one collected in cash. See Bingkun, Li and Renjian, Tang, “Gaige nongyeshui zhidu de shexiang” (“Some thoughts on reforming the agricultural tax system”), in NYJJWT, No. 3 (1986), pp. 22–26Google Scholar.

42. Agricultural GVO estimates can be found in TJNJ 1990, p. 335.

43. Bingkun, Li and Renjian, Tang in NYJJWT, No. 3 (1986) p. 22Google Scholar. The burden of taxation is also unbalanced between different regions and different crops and activities.

44. That is, in addition to local surtaxes, which have traditionally–and legally–been a means of funding public welfare facilities (e.g. the construction of schools and transportation).

45. Bingkun, Li and Renjian, Tang in NYJJWT, No. 3 (1986) p. 22Google Scholar.

46. The impact of early reforms is brought out in the following comparison of the composition of total grain requisitions between 1974–78 and 1979–82:

47. Between 1963 and 1965 yigou sales accounted for almost 5% of total grain requisitions. Thereafter they declined rapidly and between 1967 and 1978 they never exceeded 1% of the total. NYJJZL, p. 339.

48. Field, Robert Michael, “Trends in the value of agricultural output,” The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1981), pp. 564–65Google Scholar.

49. The figure is derived from data in NYJJZL, p. 348.

50. Zhongguo maoyi wujia tongji ziliao, 1952–83, p. 112.

51. See also Lardy, , Agriculture in China's Modern Economic Development, pp. 192–99Google Scholar.

52. For a detailed analysis of the policy initiatives of 1985, see Sicular, Terry, “Agricultural planning and policy in the post-Mao period” and Ash, Robert F., “The evolution of agricultural policy,” both in The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988), pp. 693–702 and pp. 545–551CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

53. Aubert, Claude, “The agricultural crisis” in Delman, et al. (eds.), Remaking Peasant China, p. 21Google Scholar.

54. The relevant data can be found in NYJJZL, pp. 456–473.

55. See Aubert, , “The agricultural crisis,” p. 22Google Scholar. Also Ash, , “The evolution of agricultural policy,” p. 548Google Scholar.

56. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu 1984 nian nongcun gongzuo de tongzhi” (“Circular of the Central Committee of the CCP on rural work in 1984”), NYNJ 1984, pp. 1–4.