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Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Ellis Joffe
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Extract

It is axiomatic among observers that in the transition to the post-Deng era, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will play a pivotal role. This is understandable. Until now, the army has been a central force in Chinese politics owing to the unique Party-army relationship that has existed since the founding of the Communist regime. Although this relationship will change in the near future, the importance of the military will not: they will remain indispensable backers of the new leadership. This is because they command the forces which may be used to determine the outcome of an elite power struggle, displace rebellious local figures, put down a mass uprising or even carry out a coup.

Type
Management of the PLA
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 146 , June 1996 , pp. 299 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

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References

1. For a discussion of Party-army relations see Latham, Richard J., “China's Party-army relations after June 1989: a case for Miles′ Law?” in Yang, Richard H. (ed.), China's Military: The PLA in 1990/1991(SCPS Yearbook, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, distributed by Westview Press), pp. 104–110.Google Scholar

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4. Gittings, John, The Role of the Chinese Army(London: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar; Joffe, Ellis, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964(Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1967)Google Scholar; Jencks, Harlan W., From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982)Google Scholar; Segal, Gerald, “The military as a group in Chinese politics,” in Goodman, David S.G. (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 83–101Google Scholar; Godwin, Paul H.B., The Chinese Communist Armed Forces(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), pp. 11–21.Google Scholar

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7. On the critical role of the PLA see the memoirs of Rongzhen, Marshal Nie, Inside the Red Star(Beijing: New World Press, 1988), pp. 751–752.Google Scholar

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10. See n. 8.

11. For the latest confirmation of the personal nature of Lin Biao's actions see the recollections of Mao's physician, Zhisui, Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao(New York: Random House, 1994), pp. 528–543.Google Scholar

12. Swaine, The Military and Political Succession,chs. 3,4,5.

13. On the first wave see Gittings, The Role;on the second see Joffe, Ellis, The Chinese Army After Mao(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987Google Scholar) and Lee, Ngok, China's Defense Modernization and Military Leadership(Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

14. See Joffe, “The Chinese army in the Cultural Revolution.”Google Scholar

15. See Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao,ch. 7.Google Scholar

16. Swaine, The Military and Political Succession,ch. 7.Google Scholar

17. China News Analysis(Hong Kong), No. 1511 (1 June 1994).

18. See n. 4.

19. See Byrnes, “The death.” See also Yang, Richard H. (ed.), PLA and the Tiananmen Crisis(SCPS Papers, No. 1, Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan, October 1989)Google Scholar; and Swaine, The Military and Political Succession,pp. 160–168.Google Scholar

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22. See Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao.Google Scholar

23. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, China After Deng Xiaoping(Hong Kong: Professional Consultants Ltd., 1995), pp. 211–216.Google Scholar

24. See Joffe, “Coping with the consequences.”Google Scholar

25. Swaine, The Military and Political Succession,ch. 6.Google Scholar

26. See n. 19.

27. Yang, Richard H. (ed.), Chinese Regionalism: The Security Dimension(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).Google Scholar

28. Nordlinger, Eric A., Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977) pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

29. See n. 15.

30. See n. 19.

31. See, for example, Wortzl, Larry M., “China pursues traditional great power status,” Orbis,Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 157–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32. Cheung, Tai Ming, “Profits over professionalism: the PLA's economic activities and their impact on military unity,” in Yang, Chinese Regionalism,pp. 85–110Google Scholar; Lin, Chong-Pin, “Limits to professionalism: the extramilitary roles of the People's Liberation Army in modernization,” Security Studies,Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer 1992), pp. 659–689CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bickford, Thomas J., “The Chinese military and its business operations: the PLA as entrepreneur,” Asian Survey,Vol. 34, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 460–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Joffe, Ellis, “The Chinese army and the economy: the effect of involvement,” Survival(Summer 1995), pp. 24–43.Google Scholar