1. For example, Robert North found no discrepancies between the Comintern and CCP over the united front during 1935 and 1936. North, Robert C., Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, second edition, 1963), pp. 176–77.Google Scholar Charles McLane argued that Soviet and CCP attitudes towards the inclusion of the KMT in the united front both changed at about the same time after February 1936. McLane, Charles B., Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 74.Google Scholar Lyman Van Slyke likewise found no discrepancies between the Comintern and CCP during 1935 and “closely parallel policies” between them in 1936–with the exception of the Guangxi-Guangdong revolt of mid 1936 and the Xian Incident in December. Mao must have generally agreed, Van Slyke concluded, with what the Comintern wanted the CCP to do. Van Slyke, Lyman P., Enemies and Friends, The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

2. Kataoka, Tetsuya, Resistance and Revolution in China, the Communist Party and the Second United Front (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).Google ScholarBenton, Gregor “The ‘Second Wang Ming Line’ (1935–1938),” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 61 (03 1975), pp. 61–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. Kwong, Shum Kui, “Comment ‘The Second Wang Ming Line’ (1935–38),” CQ, No. 69 (03 1977), pp. 136–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Friedman, Edward, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 420 (07 1975), pp. 195–98.Google Scholar

5. McLane, , Soviet Policy, p. 77.Google ScholarNorth, , Moscow, p. 177.Google ScholarVan Slyke, , Enemies, p. 60.Google Scholar

6. Benton, , “Second Wang Ming Line,” p. 69.Google Scholar

7. As early as January 1933 the Comintern began pressing the CCP organization in Manchuria to broaden the anti-Japanese united front in that region by dropping radical programmes in favour of patriotic appeals. Interestingly enough, the CCP Centre then not yet led by Mao Zedong also resisted this prompting. These early conflicts over the breadth of the anti-Japanese united front were, however, confined to Manchuria, which was, after all, under direct Japanese occupation. Lee, Chong-Sik, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria, Chinese Communism and Soviet Interests, 1922–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 320, 230–31.Google Scholar

8. Harrison, James P., The Long March to Power (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 261.Google Scholar Regarding North, McLane and Van Slyke see supra, fn. 1.

9. Kataoka, , Resistance, pp. 22–23.Google Scholar

10. Benton, , “Second Wang Ming Line,” pp. 63–64.Google Scholar

11. See, Tokushiro, Ohata, “The anti-Comintern pact, 1936–1939,” in Morley, James W. (ed.), Deterrent Diplomacy, Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935–1940 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 23–25.Google Scholar

12. Qing, Xiang, “Bayi xuanyan xingcheng lishi guocheng” (“The historical process of the appearance of the 8–1 manifesto”), Dangshi ziliao congkan (Compendium of Materials on Party History), No. 3 (1982), p. 101.Google Scholar Xiang Qing is a member of the Institute of Modern History of the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.

13. Qing, Xiang, “Gongchan Guoji he Zhongguo Gongchandang guanyu jianli kang Ri minzu tongyi zhanxian de celue” (“The Communist International and the CCP regarding the tactic of establishing an anti-Japanese national united front”), Dangshi tongxun (Bulletin of Party History), Nos. 11–12 (1983), pp. 16–25.Google Scholar

14. Yuzhang, Wu, “Wu Yuzhang zizhuan” (“Autobiography of Wu Yuzhang”), Lishi yanjiu (Historical Research), No. 4 (1981), pp. 13–14.Google Scholar See also Guisong, Yang, “Zhongguo Gongchandang kang Ri minzu tongyi zhanxian zhengce de xingcheng yu Gongchan Guoji” (“The development of the Chinese Communist Party's policy of a national anti-Japanese united front and the Communist International”), Jindaishi yanjiu (Research on Modern History), No. 4 (1982), p. 77.Google Scholar

15. Yixun, Liu, “Gongchan Guoji he Sidalin dui Zhongguo kang Ri zhanzheng de taidu he fangzhen” (“The attitude and direction of the Communist International and Stalin towards China's war of resistance against Japan”), Dangshi ziliao congkan (Compendium of Materials on Party History), No. 2 (1983), p. 139.Google Scholar See also Yanhu, Yao and Shengqing, Yang in Dangshi yanjiu (Research on Party History), No. 2 (1983), pp. 47–52.Google Scholar

16. Qing, Xiang, “8–1 Manifesto,” p. 99.Google Scholar

17. Yixun, Liu, “Attitude of Stalin,” p. 139.Google Scholar

18. Documents of the Seventh Congress related to the CCP are in, Gongchan Guoji youguan Zhongguo geming de wenxian ziliao (Documents of the Communist International Regarding the Chinese Revolution), Vol. II (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 06 1982), pp. 394, 392.Google Scholar It is possible that even the words attributed to Wang Ming on 7 August were not uttered at the congress itself but subsequently inserted into the transcript of Wang's speech on that day. See, Carr, E. H., Twilight of the Comintern, 1930–1935 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), pp. 403–427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19. Qing, Xiang “8–1 Manifesto,” p. 104.Google Scholar

20. Ibid. p. 106.

21. This explains the grandiose claims about CCP strength made by various speakers during the Seventh Comintern Congress. See, Documents of the Communist International, pp. 363, 367, 373, 378.Google Scholar

22. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” pp. 18–19.Google ScholarQing, Xiang, “8–1 Manifesto,” p. 106.Google ScholarXiaoping, Gu, “Kang Ri minzu tongyi zhanxian celue fangzhen yu di er ci Guo Gong hezuo de xingcheng yanjiu zong shu” (“Review of research on the materialization of the second KMT-CCP united front and the line of a national united front of resistance to Japan”), Dangshi yanjiu (Research on Party History), No. 2 (1984), p. 80.Google Scholar Also, Kukushkin, K. V., “The Comintern and the united national anti-Japanese front in China,” in Ulyanovsky, R. A., The Comintern and the East, The Struggle for the Communist Strategy and Tactics in the National Liberation Movements (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), pp. 391–95.Google Scholar

23. Van Slyke, , Enemies, pp. 57–58.Google Scholar

24. Wulu, Sun, “Gongchan Guoji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi dashiji” (“Record of major events in the relations between the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party”), in Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials on Party History), No. 21 (1980), p. 30.Google ScholarQing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” p. 20.Google ScholarBraun, Otto, Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939 (London: C. Hurst, 1982), p. 170.Google ScholarReznikov, A. B. and Grigoriev, A. M., “Georgi Dimitrov and the problems of the anti-imperialist front,” in Georgi Dimitrov, An Outstanding Militant of the Comintern (Sofia, 1972), p. 203Google Scholar; cited in Benton, , “Second Wang Ming Line,” p. 65.Google Scholar

25. E.g., the citation by Lyman Van Slyke regarding the 7 November 1935 issue of Jiuguo bao, supra fn. 24.

26. Yuzhang, Wu “Autobiography,” p. 19.Google Scholar The Jiangsu Provincial Library in Nanjing has a nearly complete run of Jiuguo shibao. The extent of Comintern control over Jiuguo bao was indicated by an incident which occurred in November 1935 when the Comintern secretly dispatched Wu Yuzhang to Paris to oversee the operation of the paper. When the French Government prohibited publication of the paper shortly after Wu's arrival, Wu found it necessary to cable the Comintern and request permission to change the name of the paper and begin publication anew under the name Jiuguo shibao (National Salvation Times). Moscow authorized the new name and the paper resumed publication on 9 December 1935.

27. Qing, Xiang, “8–1 Manifesto,” pp. 105–106.Google Scholar

28. Xiaoping, Gu, “Review of research,” p. 78.Google Scholar One source, however, claims that the manifesto arrived in China substantially earlier. Chen Lou, who was active at that time in the communist underground organization at Qinghua University, says that his organization received a copy of the 8–1 manifesto in mid August, reproduced it, and distributed it on the Qinghua campus. “Guanyu 8–1 xuanyan chuxian yu Zhongguo nei de shijian” (“Regarding the appearance of the 8–1 manifesto within China”), Dangshi ziliao congkan (Compendium of Materials on Party History), No. 4 (1981), p. 116.Google Scholar

29. Guoxiang, Zhang, “Hongjun dongcheng yu Shanxi kang Ri minzu tongyi zhanxian de xingcheng” (“The Red Army's Eastern Expedition and the emergence of the anti-Japanese national united front in Shanxi”), Jinnan xuekan (Southern Shanxi Journal), No. 5 (1982), pp. 57–65.Google Scholar

30. Guotao, Zhang, Wo de huiyi (My Memoir), Vol. III (Hong Kong: Ming bao chubanshe, 1972), pp. 1151–67.Google Scholar Also, Guisong, Yang, “Development of united front,” p. 80.Google Scholar According to Gu Xiaoping, Lin travelled overland via Inner Mongolia. Otto Braun says that he was parachuted into the CCP's base area, presumably from a Soviet aircraft. Xiaoping, Gu, “Review of research,” p. 78.Google ScholarBraun, , Agent, p. 153.Google Scholar

31. Kwong, Shum Kui, “Comment on ‘The Second Wang Ming Line.’”Google Scholar

32. Zhongguo gongchandang lici zhongyao huiyi ji (Materials on Historically important Meetings of the Chinese Communist Party), Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), pp. 151–55.Google Scholar

33. Beishen, Zhang, “Lun Zhang Wentian tongzhi Zunyi huiyi de zhuanbian” (“On comrade Zhang Wentian's change at the Zunyi conference”), Dangshi yanjiu (Research on Party History), No. 3 (1983), pp. 13–22.Google Scholar

34. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” p. 17.Google Scholar

35. Pei, Zhong, Kang Sheng pingzhuan (Critical Biography of Kang Sheng) (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1982), p. 52.Google Scholar

36. The original polemic is in Wang Ming xuanji (Selected Works of Wang Ming), Vol. III (Tokyo: Ji Gu Shuyuan, 1973), p. 174.Google Scholar

37. Xuejia, Zheng, Di san guoji shi (History of the Third International), Vol. II (Taibei, Taiwan: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1977), p. 1453.Google Scholar

38. See, Nollau, Gunther, International Communism and World Revolution, History and Methods (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 159–61.Google ScholarConquest, Robert, The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 587–88.Google Scholar

39. Historically Important Meetings of the CCP, pp. 153–55.Google Scholar

40. Hua, Hu (ed.), “Chen Tanqiu,” in Zhonggong dangshi renwuzhuan (Biographies of Chinese Communist Personalities), Vol. 9 (Xian, Shaanxi: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 30.Google Scholar According to Otto Braun, Chen Yun was sent to Moscow after the First Red Army arrived at Wayaobao in Shaanxi on 20 October 1935. Braun, , Agent, p. 173.Google Scholar If Hu Hua's statement about Chen's delegation arriving in Moscow the day the Seventh Congress ended is accurate, as it seems to be, then Braun's recollection as to the date of Chen's departure cannot be.

41. Huiyi Chen Tanqiu (Remembering Chen Tanqiu) (Wuhan, Hubei: Huazhong gongcheng xueyuan, July 1981), p. 118.Google Scholar

42. Yang Zhihua and Zheng Tongquan were among those attacked. Kong Yuan, who was not a member of Chen Yun's group, but had been one of the regular Comintern delegation, was also criticized by this investigating committee. Kong Yuan, “Tanqiu tongzhi zai Mosike de rizili” (“Comrade Tanqiu's days in Moscow”), in Remembering Chen Tanqiu, p. 121.Google Scholar

43. See, Historically Important Meetings of the CCP, pp. 178–85.Google Scholar

44. Kukushkin, , “Comintern and the United Front,” pp. 394–95.Google Scholar

45. The Wayaobao resolution is in Huabei shibian xuanbian (Selection of Materials on the North China Incident), edited by the Committee on CCP History of the Marxist-Leninist Institute of Nankai University (Nankai: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pp. 21–44.

46. Kukushkin, , “Comintern and the United Front,” p. 398.Google Scholar

47. Braun, , Agent, p. 170.Google Scholar

48. E.g., the studies by Kataoka and Benton.

49. Materials on North China Incident, pp. 24–25. [Emphasis in the original.]Google Scholar

50. The Jiangsu Provincial Library has a nearly complete run of Hongse zhonghua.

51. The term hanjian is usually translated into English as simply “traitor.” Such a rendering overlooks, I believe, the strong racial overtones which the character han has carried in modern Chinese history, racial connotations which have frequently played an important role in China's politics, for instance in the efforts to overthrow the Qing dynasty. To use an English word, “traitor” which is more narrowly political and which lacks such racial overtones, fails to convey the emotionally powerful qualities of the word hanjian.

52. Hongse zhonghua, 29 01 1936.Google Scholar Wu Sangui was the general in command of the Ming forces resisting Manchu inroads at the end of the Ming dynasty who switched loyalties in 1643, after Li Zicheng's forces had occupied Beijing, and let the Manchu armies enter China in exchange for high office and honours. Zhang Bangchang was one of the last prime ministers of the Northern Song dynasty. In 1126 when the Jin “barbarians” took the capital of Kaifeng they put Zhang on the throne as an emperor through whom they ruled. Li Wan was a high civil official who helped the Jin consolidate their rule. Chin Kwei was a prime minister of the Song dynasty who helped bring about the execution of the able general Yue Fei.

53. Tingfu, Jiang, Jiang Tingfu huiyilu (Memoir of Jiang Tingfu), Zhuanji wenxue congkan, No. 48 (Taibei, 03 1979), pp. 95–96.Google Scholar See also Jiang's letters to Shi, Hu in, Hu Shi laiwang shuxin xuan (Selected Correspondence of Hu Shi), Vol. II (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 05 1979), pp. 261–62.Google Scholar

54. Regarding the He-Umetsu agreement see, Materials on the North China Incident, pp. 151–53.Google Scholar Regarding Zhang Zuobin's peace plan, see pp. 272–73.

55. Qun, Zhang, “Ren waijiaobuchang de huiyi” (“Memoir of my duty as foreign minister”), Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Literature), Vol. 31, No. 6 (12 1977), p. 51.Google Scholar

56. Shengqing, Yang, “Xian shibian qian Guo Gong liangdang de chongxin jiechu” (“Renewed KMT-CCP contacts prior to the Xian Incident”), Dangshi tongxun (Bulletin of Party History), No. 2 (1983), pp. 9–14.Google Scholar

57. Regarding Chen's 1934 appointment see, Kai-shek, Chiang, Soviet Russia in China (Taibei: China Publishing Co., 1969), p. 77.Google Scholar

58. Kitts, Charles R., An Inside View of the Kuomintang, Chen Li-fu, 1926–1949, St. Johns University Ph.D. dissertation, 1978, pp. 63–65.Google Scholar

59. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” pp. 20–21.Google Scholar

60. Shengqing, Yang, “Renewed contacts,” p. 11.Google Scholar

61. See, Kai-shek, Chiang, Soviet Russia, p. 73.Google Scholar

62. Guisong, Yang, “Development of United Front,” p. 84.Google Scholar

63. Kitts, , Inside View, pp. 63–65.Google Scholar

64. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” p. 22.Google Scholar

65. Kai-shek, Chiang, Soviet Russia, p. 72.Google Scholar

66. Xiaoceng, Chen, “Xian shibian qian yi nian Guo Gong liangdang guanyu lianhe kang Ri wenti de yi duan jiechu”Google Scholar (“Contacts between the KMT and the CCP regarding the question of anti-Japanese unity in the year before the Xian Incident”), Wenshi ziliao xuanbian (Selection of Literary and Historical Materials), national ed., No. 71. Xiaoceng, Chen, “Xian shibian qian Guo Gong liangdang tanpan de pianduan huiyi” (“Partial recollection of the talks between the KMT and CCP before the Xian Incident”), Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials on Party History), No. 3 (1981), pp. 14–19.Google Scholar Chen Xiaoceng himself believed that Song Ziwen was Ceng's key backer and the main figure pushing talks with the CCP. The evidence that he himself presents, however, points towards Chen Lifu as the eminence grise behind the 1935–1936Google Scholar negotiations–as do many other sources. According to Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou Enlai also sent a letter to Chen Lifu on 1 September 1935 after his meeting with Ceng in Hong Kong. Chen Lifu gave a copy of this letter to Kitts who provides a full translation of its text.

67. Regarding the Eastern Expedition, see, Junshi huodong daji (Record of Military Activities) (Beijing: Zhanshi chubanshe, 1983), pp. 44–45.Google ScholarDehuai, Peng, Peng Dehuai zishu (Autobiography of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), p. 211.Google ScholarXinghua, Zhu, “Hongjun dongcheng shi wei jianji” (“Brief account of the beginning and end of the Red Army's eastern expedition”), Yan'an daxue xuebao (Yan'an University Journal), No. 1 (1983).Google Scholar The order of 15 January 1936 launching the offensive is in Vol. 7 of Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao (Reference Materials on CCP History), pp. 354–55.Google Scholar This compendium is published by the Party History Instruction Office of the Political College of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. No date or place of publication given.

68. Writing in 1964, Don Gillen incorrectly concluded that the CCP expected to unite with, rather than overthrow, Yan Xishan when it launched the Eastern Expedition. His basis for reaching this conclusion, however, were statements from the Comintern's International Press Correspondence. Gillen did not have access to the CCP's own orders regarding the Eastern Expedition and could not, therefore, have been aware of the discrepancy between those orders and the Comintern's line. See, Gillen, Donald G., “‘Peasant nationalism’ in the history of Chinese Communism,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (03 1964), p. 273.Google Scholar

69. Reference Materials on CCP History, Vol. 7, pp. 356–58.Google Scholar

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71. Guoxiang, Zhang, “The Eastern Expedition,” pp. 57–65.Google Scholar

72. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” p. 20.Google Scholar

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74. Tokushiro, Ohata, “Anti-Comintern pact,” p. 18.Google Scholar

75. Ibid. p. 37.

76. See the Politburo resolution of 23 December 1935 which laid out the political rationale for the Eastern Expedition in, Reference Materials on CCP History, Vol. 7, pp. 359–60.Google Scholar Also Xinghua, Zhu, “Brief account,” pp. 346–48.Google Scholar In his Autobiography Peng Dehuai also says that one objective of the expedition was to expand the base areas in order to “prepare for war directly with Japan,” p. 72.Google Scholar

77. Kataoka, , Resistance, p. 36.Google Scholar

78. Reference Materials on CCP History, Vol. 7, pp. 359–60.Google Scholar

79. See, Riben digito zhuyi duiwai qinlue shiliao xuanbian (Collection of Materials on the Foreign Aggression of Japanese Imperialism). This is a collection of materials from the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives translated and edited by the Department of History of Fudan University (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), pp. 170, 210.

80. Mingdong, Shang, “Song Qingling yu di er ci Quo Gong hezuo de shixian” (“Song Qingling and the realization of the second period of KMT-CCP co-operation”), Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 24 01 1983, p. 7.Google Scholar

81. Van Slyke, , Enemies, p. 60.Google Scholar Van Slyke's citation is from International Press Correspondence of 14 03 1936.Google Scholar

82. Braun, , Agent, pp. 168–69.Google ScholarDelyusin, L. P., Comintern i Vostok (Moscow, 1969)Google Scholar; cited in Benton, , “Second Wang Ming line,” p. 67.Google Scholar

83. Shengqing, Yang, “Renewed contacts,” p. 10.Google Scholar

84. Xiaoceng, Chen, “Partial recollection,” p. 15.Google Scholar Zhou also brought letters addressed to Song Ziwen, Feng Yuxiang, Sun Ke, and Tan Zhen.

85. Shengqing, Yang, “Renewed contacts,” pp. 10–11.Google Scholar According to Chen Xiaoceng, Lu's plan consisted of four points. The contents of this four point plan were, however, the same as Yang Shengqing's six-point proposal–with the significant exception that Chen's plan includes a provision for the CCP's suspension of the policy of confiscating landlord's property. See, Xiaoceng, Chen, “Partial recollection,” pp. 13–14.Google Scholar

86. Chen Xiaoceng, ibid.

87. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and the CCP,” p. 20.Google Scholar

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92. Pan was purged and imprisoned in 1955 when charged with being associated with Shushi, Rou's and Gang, Gao's “counterrevolutionary attempt to seize state power.”Google Scholar See Klein, Donald W. and Clark, Anne B., Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1929–1965 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 75.Google Scholar

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96. Braun, , Agent, p. 181.Google ScholarGuisong, Yang, “Development of united front,” p. 83.Google Scholar

97. Communist International, Vol. XIII, No. 9, p. 590.Google Scholar Cited in Kukushkin, , “Comintern and the United Front,” p. 404.Google Scholar Regarding Moscow's reaction see also, McLane, , Soviet Policy, pp. 74–75, 78Google Scholar, and Van Slyke, , Enemies, pp. 64, 70.Google Scholar

98. “CC CPC Resolution on the Contemporary Political Situation”; cited in Kukushkin, , “Comintern and the United Front,” p. 400.Google Scholar

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100. This was from a “programme article” by Wang Ming carried by Communist International, Vol. XIII, No. 9 (1936), p. 588.Google Scholar Cited in Kukushkin, , “Comintern and the United Front,” p. 403.Google Scholar

101. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” pp. 21–22.Google ScholarShengqing, Yang, “Renewed contacts,” pp. 11–12.Google Scholar

102. Qing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” p. 22.Google Scholar

103. Shengqing, Yang, “Renewed contacts,” pp. 11–12.Google ScholarQing, Xiang, “Comintern and CCP,” pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

104. The 25 August statement is in Reference Materials on CCP History, Vol. 7, 423–27.Google Scholar

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109. According to Otto Braun, the Politburo sent Deng Fa to Moscow in April 1936 to negotiate the terms of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Red Army. Agent, pp. 170–71.Google Scholar

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