Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2019
Immediately following the Battle of Chamdo in October 1950, during the period between November 1950 and April 1951, the leaders of the new People's Republic of China (PRC) had two priorities in regard to Tibet. The first was to persuade the Tibetan government to send delegates to Beijing as soon as possible in order to start “negotiations,” and the second was to prevent the Dalai Lama from fleeing Tibet. Using Chinese documents that offer a new version of the process that led to these “negotiations,” this study, without addressing the international issues in detail, illustrates how the leaders of the PRC, either with promises, threats or even by bluff, were able to attain their goals.
昌都之战(1950 年 10 月)之后,1950 年 11 月至 1951 年 4 月期间,中国领导人的主要目标之一是试图说服西藏政府尽快派代表去北京开始 “谈判,” 同时,尽一切努力防止达赖喇嘛离开西藏。 在本研究中,我们使用为这一“谈判”过程提供新视角的中文文档。不需详细解读国际形势,我们将了解到中国领导人是怎样或通过许诺或通过威胁甚至虚张声势来实现他们的目标的。