1 Using “neoconservatism” to label the arguments discussed in this article may cause terminological confusion, because it is a precise term used in the United States for a political position that combines a definite dedication to personal freedom, civil rights and a free market econony, with a stress on limited social welfare policies. Neoconservatism shares with the older variety of conservatism a high respect for tradition and a view of human nature that some would call pessimistic. However, in the past few years the term has acquired its specified connotation in the Chinese context, which has been accepted by students of Chinese politics both in China and in the West. Indeed, just as liberalism and conservatism mean different things in the U.S. and Europe, a contextual interpretation of neoconservatism in the Chinese political society should not be viewed as improper.

2 Some Chinese authors prefer the term neorealism.“ See Xiao Gongqing, ”Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo zhishifenzi de xintai bianhua” (“Changes in Chinese intellectual mentality during the period of transition”), in Tansuo yu zhengming (Exploration and Contention), No. 3 (1995), pp.

3 On the connection between neoconservative and neo-authoritarian ideas, see Joseph Fewsmith, “Neoconservatism and the end of the Dengist era,” Asian Survey, Vol.35, No.7 (1995), pp. 635–651.Google Scholar

4 For a detailed analysis of neo-authoritarin thought in the mid and late 1980s, see Barry Sautman, “Sirens of the strongman: neo-authoritarianism in recent Chinese political theory,” The China Quarterly, No. 129 (1992), pp.72 Gong Ting and Chen Feng, “Neo-authoritarian theory in Mainland China,” Issues and Studies, No. 1 (1991), pp. 84

5 I borrow this term from Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1994).

6 However, in the eyes of Party orthodox conservatives, it is out of question that those intellectuals who advocated “bourgeois liberalism” had formed their ideology. As Wang Renzi, the former head of the Party′s propaganda department, stated in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, “during the past ten years, from the Theory Conference in the spring of 1979 to the incident of 1989, the trend of liberal thought increasingly intensified. They raised one after another wrong and reactionary viewpoint, until forming a rather complete (xiangdang wanzheng) system of thought in the domain of ideology.” Wang Renzi, “Xuexi shehuizhuyi, zhengqiang shehuizhuyi xinnian” (“Studying socialism, strengthening the faith iftsocialism”), in Guangming ribao chubanshe (ed.), Fandui zichanjieji ziyouhua (Opposing Bourgeois Liberalization) (Beijing: Guangming ribao chubanshe, 1990), p.304

7 Almost all those newspapers and periodicals that provided the forums for liberal democratic ideas were forced to close. The most famous were Shijie jingji daobao (World Economic Herald), Jingjixue zhoubao (Economic Weekly), Sixiangjia (Thinkers), Shulin (Book Forest), Xinguancha (New Observer). It was said that over a hundred newspapers and periodicals were closed nation-wide. Chao Jinqing, “Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (disanjuan) de chuban he dalu yishixingtai” (“The publication of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (volume HI) and the ideology in the mainland”), unpublished paper.

8 Deng Xiaoping,“Zai Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai dengdi de tanhua yaodian” (“The key points of the talk in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai”), Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing:Renmin chubanshe,1993), pp.372–73.

9 Wang Desheng, “‘Minjian de’ xueshuguan-jiushi niandai dalu ‘xuekan’ xianxiang” (“Non-official academic views-the phenomena of ‘learned periodicals’ in the 90s′ mainland”), in Dongfang (Orient), No. 5 (1994), p. 57.

10 Sun Liping, “Pingminzhuyi yu Zhongguo geming” (“Populism and the Chinese Revolution”), in Zhanliie yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 5 (1995).

11 In his Evening Chats in Beijing Perry Link provides a vivid account of Chinese intellectuals′ financial squeeze and plight in daily life.Google Scholar

12 Sun Liping, “Pingminzhuyi yu Zhongguo geming.”

13 For example, Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn tell a story of how Sunjin transformed himself from a dissident to a millionaire. China Wakes (New York Random House, 1994), pp.340.

14 For example, in reflecting on the Tiananmen incident of 1989, a former student who participated in the demonstration wrote: “Initially, many people, including myself, did not understand the action referring to the military crackdown taken by the government. But the time has gradually diluted everything ... After all, China has avoided the dissolution, as happened in the Soviet Union since then. Moreover, the Chinese economy is getting better day by day. We can freely choose our careers and go abroad for study. What we are more concerned with is personal career prospect. Everybody becomes realistic: housing, money, children, and careers matter more than empty democracy and freedom.” Zhen Yan, “Jiuqi kan bajiu” (“Looking at 1989 in 1997”), Minbao (Minbao Daily News), 3 April 1997, p. D4.

15 Cited from Wang Shan, Disizhi yanjing kan Zhongguo (Looking at China through the Fourth Eye) (Hong Kong Minbao chubanshe 1996), p.85

16 Wang Desheng, “ ‘Minjian de’ xueshuguan,” p. 56.

17 According to Chao Jinqing′s study, in the late 1980s some intellectuals who were dissatisfied with empty talks on democracy had called for their counterparts “going back to history, to the national conditions, to empirical studies, and to authentic scholarly inquiries.” Unpublished paper, p. 42.

18 Gongqing, Xiao , “Yishi xingtai chuangxin yu zhengzhi wending” (“Ideological innovation and political stability”), Shanghai lilun neikan (Shanghai Theory), Vol.20, No.2 (1995), pp. 7–8.Google Scholar

19 See, for example, J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Mercury Books, 1961). In a sense, Xiao′s definition of “rationalist radicalism” is very similar to Talmon′s concept of political Messianism. Their difference is that, while Talmon directs his criticism to totalitarianism (totalitarian democracy, in his terms), Xiao attacks radical blueprints for liberal democracy.

20 Xiao Gongqing, “Yishi xingtai chuangxin yu zhengzhi wending,” p. 9.

21 One very provocative article on this subject is(“Radicalism in the 20th century′s cultural movement”) by Chen Lai, a professor of philosophy in Beijing University, in Dongfang, No. 1 (1994), pp. 38–40.Google Scholar

22 Li Zehou and Wang Desheng, “Guanyu wenhua xianzhuang he daode chongjian de duihua” (“The dialogue on the cultural status quo and moral rebuilding”), Dongfang, No. 5 (1994), pp.70

23 This book was originally attributed to a German scholar and “translated” into Chinese, but is the work of Wang Shan, the putative translator.

24 Luo yi ning ge er, Disanzhi yanjing lean Zhongguo (Looking at China Through a Third Eye), translated by Wang Shan (Shanxi People′s Publishing House 1994), pp. 137.

25 Ibid

26 Wang Shan, Disizhi yanjing kan Zhongguo (Looking at China Through a Fourth Eye), (Hong Kong: Minbao chubanshe, 1996), p. 147

27 Ibid p. 157

28 Ibid p. 144

29 Deng Xiaoping, “Lun dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige” (“On the reform of the system of party and state leadership”), in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan II (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping IT) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 302-325.

30 Ibid p. 90.

31 Ibid. pp. 146–-48.

32 Chao Jinqing, “Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (disanjuan),” p. 29.

33 Xiao Gongqing, “Yishi xingtai chuangxin yu zhengzhi wending,” p. 7.

34 Wang was a professor of political science at Fudan University at that time and took the post of the Head of Political Section, the Policy Research Office of the CCP Central Committee in 1994.

35 See Wang Huning, “Shichang fayu he quanwei jichu: baohu he kaifa zhengzhi ziyuan” (“The growth of market and the basis of authority: the maintenance and exploitation of political resources”), Fudan xuebao (The Journal of Fudan), No. 2 (1995), p. 4.Google Scholar

36 Wang Huning emphasizes that institutional reform should aim at enhancing the capacity of governmental institutions to balance the ten relationships that stand out in economic reform. See “Zhongguo jiushi niandai de zhanliie jueze: tizhi qudong” (“China's strategic choices in the 1990s: the institutional driving”), in Fudan xuebao, No. 1 (1992), pp.2–10

37 Xiao, Gongqing, “Dongya weiquan zhengzhi yu xiandaihua” (“East Asian authoritarian politics and modernization”), in Zhanliie yuyanjiu (Strategy and Management), No.3(1994), p.28.Google Scholar

38 Ibid. p. 31

39 Wang Shan, Disizhi yanjing kan Zhongguo, pp. 30–34, 49–50, 96.

40 Ibid. p. 36.

41 The report has been published annually by the Fudan Development Institute since 1993, Wang is one of the major initiators for the project.

42 It is generally agreed that the report on the importance of political power in the process of modernization, presented by Wang Huning to the Party leadership in 1986, was the earlier formal expression of neo-authoritarianism. See Sautman, “Sirens of the strongman,” p. 73.

43 Wang Huning,“Zhengzhi pian” (“On China's political development”), in Fudan fazhan yanjiuyuan (Fudan Development Institute), 1993 Zhongguo fazhan baogao (China Development Report: 1993) (Shanghai: Fudan Development Institute, 1993), pp. 68–70.Google Scholar

44 Ibid. p. 85.

45 SeeWang, Huning ,“Shichang fayu he quanwei jichu: baohu he kaifa zhengzhi ziyuan” (“The growth of market and the basis of authority: the maintenance and exploitation of political resources”), Fudan xuebao. No. 2 (1995), pp.2–9; “Zhengzhi ziyuan de kaifa he weihu” (“The exploitation and maintenance of political resources”), Tansuo yu zhengming (Exploration and Contest), No. 3 (1995), p. 35.Google Scholar

46 Wang, Shaoguangand Hu Angang, Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao (A Report on China's State Capacity)(Shenyang:Liaoning renmin chubanshe,1993), p.28.Google Scholar

47 Ibid pp. 28–29.

48 Ibid pp. 38–39.

49 Ibid. pp. 40–41.

50 The book is especially notable because it is sponsored by one of Jiang Zemin's major j advisors, Liu Ji, the deputy president of Chinese Academy of Social Science, who wrote the j preface.

51 Weng, Jiemin, et al., Yu zongshuji tanxin (A Heart-to-Heart Talk to the General Secretary)(Beijing:Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan chubanshe,1996), pp. 215–19.Google Scholar

52 Ibid. p. 213.

53 Ibid. pp. 43–44.

54 Wang Shan, A Third Eye, p. 168.

55 Wang Shan, A Fourth Eye, p. 47

56 Ibid. p. 49.

57 Ibid. p. 61.

58 Xiao, Gongqing, “Gaige zhongqi de shehui maodun yu zhengzhi wending” (“Social contradictions and social stability in the mid-reform”), Zhanliie yu guanli, Vol.8, No. 1 (1995), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

59 The term Xiao uses here is zhengquan ruanhua, whose literal translation should be the “regime being softened”.

60 The term Xiao uses here is youlixing shehui dongyuan, which can literally be translated into “disassociating mobilization.”

61 Xiao, Gongqing, “Zhongqi gaige maodun, weiji yu zhengzhi chongtu de kenengxing” (“Contradictions, crisis, and the possibility of political conflict in the middle phase of the reform”), No. 1 (1995), p.67.Google Scholar

62 Ibid p. 68.

63 Xiao, Gongqing, “Dongya quanwei zhengzhi yu xiandaihua” (“East Asian authoritarian politics and modernization”), Zhanliie yu guanli, No.3(1994), p.32.Google Scholar

64 Weng Jiemin, A Heart-to-Heart Talk, pp. 33–34.

65 Ibid. p. 36.

66 On this subject, see Feng, Chen, “The dilemmas of eudaemonic legitimacy in post-Mao China,” Polity, Vol.29, No. 3 (1997), pp.421–440.Google Scholar

67 Wang Shan's view on this issue is ambivalent and even contradictory. On the one hand, he maintains that an increase in productivity is the only way to solve the daunting social problems without an interruption of the existing order (A Fourth Eye, p. 47). On the other hand, he criticizes as an illusion the view that a fast economic growth is the key to solving all social tensions (A Third Eye, p. 229).

68 Tao, Dongfeng, “Zhongxin yu bianyuan de weiyi” (“Changes of location between centre and periphery”), in Dongfang, No.4(1994), p.20.Google Scholar

69 Xiao Gongqing, “Yishi xingtai chuangxin yu zhengzhi wending,” p. 8.

70 Ibid. pp. 5, 9.

71 Wang, Huning, ‘Zhengzhi ziyuan de kaifa he weihu’ (‘The exploitation and maintenance of political resources’), in Tansuo yu zhengming, No. 3 (1995), pp. 35–36.Google Scholar

72 Wang Shan,A Fourth Eye, pp. 50–52.

73 Weng Jiemin,A Heart-to-Heart Talk, pp. 253 and 266.

74 Xiao Gongqing, ‘Cong minzuzhuyi zhong jiequ guojia ningjuli de xinziyuan’ (‘Deriving from nationalism a new resource that congeals the state’), Zhanlue yu guanli, No. 4 (1994), p. 21.Google Scholar

75 Ibid p. 22.

76 Ibid p. 24.

77 It is rumoured that the article was the work of a team headed by Chen Yuan, Chen Yun's son, and Deng Yingtao, Deng Liqun's son.

78 Zhongguo zhi chun (China Spring), No. 104 (1991), pp. 35–39.

79 Weng Jiemin, A Heart-to-Heart Talk, pp. 274–75

80 Wang Shan, A Fourth Eye, p. 55.

81 Jiang Liu et al. (eds.), 1994–1995 nian Zhongguo shehui xingshi fengxi yu yuce (An Analysis and Forecasting of 1994–1995 Chinese Social Conditions) (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press 1995), p. 272.

82 Renmin ribao (haiwaiban) (People's Daily, overseas edition), 11 May 1995.Google Scholar

83 Cited from Xiao Gongqing; see n. 37.

84 Cited from Chao Jinqing, ‘Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (disanjuan),’ p. 36.

85 Ibid, and Xiao Gongqing, ‘Cong minzuzhuyi zhong jiequ guojia ningjuli de xinziyuan’ (‘Deriving from nationalism a new resource that congeals the state’), Zhanliie yu guanli, No. 4 (1994).

86 Wang Shan, A Third Eye, pp. 211–13, 217.

87 Ibid. p. 221.

88 Ibid p. 218.

89 Xiao Gongqing, ‘Yishi xingtai chuangxin yu zhengzhi wending,’ p. 5.

90 Weng Jiemin, A Heart-to-Heart Talk, p. 272.

91 Ibid. p. 273.

92 Some overseas Chinese dissidents even criticize neoconservatism as a ‘fascist theory.’ SeeZhongguo shidai (China Times Magazine), No. 7 (1996), p. 20.Google Scholar

93 At the Sixth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee, for example, Jiang asserted that the core of West's conspiracy to ‘Westernize’ (xihuan) China was to replace China's political system with a Western multi-party and parliamentary system. See the Bureau of Old Cadres, Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, Laoganbu xuexi ziliao (Study Materials for Old Cadres), No. 11 (1996), p. 3.

94 For example, in his famous ‘Talking about Politics’ speech made on 3 March 1996 to the Party's leading cadres participating in both the National People's Congress and the Political Consultive Conference. Jiang Zemin criticized the Western democratic system and held that China's People's Congress system was far more democratic. Ibid p. 5.

95 See Jin Chong et al., ‘Zhengque rengshi Zhongguo jindaishi shang de geming yu gailiang’ (‘Correctly understanding revolution and reform in Chinese modern history’), Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), 12 March 1996.Google Scholar

96 Xing Bensi, ‘Jianchi makesizhuyi budongyao - huaqing makesizhuyi yu fanmakesizhuyi de jiexian’ (‘Upholding Marxism unwaveringly - making a clear distinction between Marxism and anti-Marxism’), Renmin ribao, 6 June 1996.

97 Baokan wenzhai (Newspapers Digest), 2 May 1996.

98 In terms of its intellectual origins, neoconservatism seems to draw much from Western political development theory that deals with the crisis of Third World modernization, but it translates the latter from a research perspective into a political doctrine and statecraft.