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New Light on Mao: 3. Quemoy 1958: Mao's Miscalculations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Allen S. Whiting
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Extract

Not since the acquisition of the classified military periodical Kung-tso t'ung-hsün has the outside world been given so rich a store of material on the inner rationale behind Chinese foreign policy as is provided by the two volumes of Cultural Revolution compilations, Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui. Although these documents cannot be authenticated as to accuracy of transcription and are obviously selective as well as edited, they nonetheless provide a wealth of insight into Mao's views on China's external affairs. In particular they throw new light on the 1958 Quemoy crisis with surprisingly frank admissions of miscalculation on Mao's part, both in terms of his objective in the bombardment and his underestimation of the American response thereto.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 62 , June 1975 , pp. 263 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1975

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References

1. 29 issues of Kung-tso t'ung-hsün were translated in Cheng, J. Chester (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1966).Google Scholar The two volumes of Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui will be referred to hereafter as Wan-sui (1967)Google Scholar and Wan-sui (1969).Google Scholar

2. For a more complete survey of this material see John Gittings's contribution to this series in CQ, No. 60 (1974), pp. 750–66.Google Scholar

3. Regrettably three of these documents were omitted from the two-volume translation issued as Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949–1968) (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publications Research Service, 1974), No. 61269.Google Scholar Although the prefatory note claims that “items in these two volumes [the Chinese originals] which are already generally available in English-language translation in various publications were not selected for translation and publication in this report,” I am not aware of the Quemoy material being “generally available” elsewhere, and indeed other items, unavailable elsewhere, containing substantive comment about the United States were also omitted, thereby leaving scholars without access to the Chinese edition badly misinformed on this aspect of Mao's thinking.

4. Strong, Anna Louise, “Chinese strategy in the Taiwan Strait,” New Times, No. 46 (Moscow, 11 1958)Google Scholar; cited in Hinton, Harold C., Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), p. 269.Google Scholar

5. This detail as well as others cited subsequently came to my attention at the time while a member of The Rand Corporation. An excellent summary of developments, including these broadcasts, is given by Hinton, , Communist China, pp. 265–70.Google Scholar

6. The shelling figure appears in Mao's speech to the 16th meeting of the Supreme State Conference, 14 April 1959, Wan-sui (1969), p. 290.Google Scholar

7. Speech to the Supreme State Conference, 8 September 1968, ibid. pp. 238–39.

8. Speech to the Supreme State Conference, 5 September 1958, ibid. p. 233, hereafter referred to as the “Eight Points.” My translation differs somewhat from that of Gittings, John, CQ, No. 60 (1974), p. 755Google Scholar, although I agree with his basic interpretation of Mao's attitude as one of confidence that the American reaction would hurt the United States more than China.

9. Ibid. p. 233.

10. The problem of signalling and testing enemy responses is examined at length in my book, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).Google Scholar

11. In ibid. Chap. VIII, I examine the key Chinese moves which occurred at monthly intervals in the Korean and Indian conflicts. The “liberate Taiwan” campaign began on 22 July 1958 and the shelling on 23 August. Chou En-lai proposed ambassadorial talks with the United States on 6 September and on 6 October the minister of defence announced a one-week suspension of the bombardment, virtually ending the attack.

12. Wan-sui (1969), p. 289.Google Scholar

13. In a single Chinese broadcast the “liberate Taiwan” theme appeared to tie up with the Offshore Islands crisis. This was utilized by Washington as public evidence of the larger threat to justify the dispatch of U.S. military force, although the reference was almost certainly inadvertent.

14. Speech to co-operative heads, 30 November 1958, Wan-sui (1969), p. 255.Google Scholar

15. Speech of 14 April 1959, ibid. p. 289.

16. See Hinton, , Communist ChinaGoogle Scholar, for citations from the New York Times on the deployments.

17. “Eight Points,” Wan-sui (1969), pp. 231–32.Google Scholar I have reversed the sequence of the two separate quotations for clarity, since the first phrase sums up the argument expanded in the second, longer excerpt.

18. 8 September 1958, ibid. pp. 239 and 241.

19. “Eight Points,” ibid. p. 231.

20. 15 April 1959, ibid. p. 289.

21. The only other treatment of comparable length is his second speech to the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, 17 May 1958, ibid. p. 208.

22. “Eight Points,” ibid. pp. 236–37.

23. 30 November 1958, ibid. p. 255.

24. Prince Sihanouk revealed Mao's remarks in a speech delivered in Cambodia after Mao's changed position had been made public by Peking. The text was carried in a local Chinese newspaper but as far as I know was not distributed officially. However, while visiting Phnom Penh in 1960 I was informed of the speech by Mr William W. Thomas, Jr, a Foreign Service officer with a knowledge of Chinese, who had noted the item as unique and plausible. Unfortunately I did not keep the original citation.

25. Wan-sui (1969), p. 254.Google Scholar

26. The Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's “support” was made on 1 September 1963; for quotation and analysis see Gittings, John, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1963–1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), Chap. X, pp. 89–92.Google Scholar

27. Wan-sui (1969), p. 254Google Scholar for the first two quotations and p. 290 for the third. The references to “laughter” during Mao's recounting of a ghost story are atypical.