1. The New Democracy was to be an alliance of four classes: the national bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry. This categorization left only the bureaucratic capitalists, landlords and “remnant feudal elements” (mostly secret society members, gangsters and other criminals) beyond the pale of the new society.

2. Taken from Mao's report to the second session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Tse-tung, Mao, Selected Works (hereafter SW), Vol. IV, pp. 367–368.Google Scholar

3. “Jen-min jih-pao Denounces Tientsin Activities of China's Khrushchev,” People's Daily (Jen-min jih-pao), 7 11, 1967Google Scholar, as translated in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 4059 (14 11 1967), pp. 22–27Google Scholar; “Struggle Between Two Lines in the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce,” People's Daily, 15 04 1968Google Scholar, as translated in SCMP, No. 4159 (17 04 1968), pp. 13–21Google Scholar; and “A Hundred Examples of Liu Shao-ch'i's Speeches Opposing the Thought of Mao Tse-tung,” Ching-kang Mountains (Ching-kang-shan) (Peking) (publisher unknown), 1 and 8 02 1967.Google Scholar

4. See ibid, and “History Stands Iron-clad Witness,” Chieh-fang-chün pao (Liberation Army Daily), 15 04 1967Google Scholar, translated in SCMP, No. 3930 (2 05 1967).Google Scholar

5. SCMP, No. 4059, op. cit.

6. SCMP, No. 3930, op. cit.

7. Ibid, and “Li Li-san is a Downright Counter-revolutionary Revisionist,” The East Is Red News (Tung fang hung pao), published by the Editorial Department of Tung fang hung pao, Peking Geology College, 27 06 1967.Google Scholar

8. “Looking at Liu Shao-ch'i's Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Face Through His Crimes Tientsin Tung-ya Woollen Textile Mill,” Ching-kang Mountains, No. 17, published by a Red Guard Group of Tsinghua University, Peking, 15 02 1967Google Scholar, translated in SCMP, No. 3898 (14 03 1967), pp. 11–14.Google Scholar

9. “Dig Out the Economic Black Line of the Thirties and Its Backstage Boss—Liu Shao-ch'i, China's Khrushchov,” published by Ch'i wei tung, Branch of Tientsin, Nankai University's Wei-tung Economic Research Institute, 15 06 1967.Google Scholar

10. “Li Li-san is a Downright Counter-revolutionary Revisionist,” op. cit.

11. SCMP, No. 3930, op. cit.

12. SCMP, No. 4159, op. cit.

13. “Thoroughly Criticize China's Khrushchov's ‘Three Union One Group’ Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Line in the Workers' Movement,” “Ch'e-ti p'i-p'an Chung-kuo Ho-lu-hsiao-fu ‘san-hui-i-t'i’ fan-ko-ming hsiu-cheng-chu-i kung-yün lu-hsien,” published by the Ta lien wei (Great Alliance Committee) of the All China Federation of Labour, 27 05 1968.Google Scholar

14. For the sake of brevity, “CCP” will be used to indicate the entire autho ritative apparatus of the Chinese Communists, which, of course, also included the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Government apparatus.

15. According to an article written in July 1948, between mid-1946 and mid-1947 the CCP lost control over a net sum of 45 cities: “A Summary of Two Years of the People's Liberation War and the Tasks of the Third Year” (“Jen-min chieh-fang, chan-cheng liang-chou-nien-te tsung-chieh ho ti-san-nien-te jen-wu”), in Collection of Important Documents of the CCP since 1947 (l-chiu-szu-chiu-nien l-lai Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yao wen-chien chi) (Hong Kong: New Democratic Publishing Company, 06 1949), p. 155Google Scholar. This article originally appeared as a New China News Agency (NCNA) editorial.

16. “Directive of the Northeast Bureau on Safe-guarding the Newly Taken-over Cities” (“Tung-pei-chü kuan-yü pao-hu hsin shou-fu ch'eng-shih chih-shin”), issued on 10 06 1948Google Scholar and contained in Shao-ch'i, Liu et al. , The New Democratic City Policy (Hsin Min-chu-chu-i ch'eng-shih cheng-ts'e) (08 1949), pp. 37–43Google Scholar. The section cited in the text appears on p. 37 of this book. In fact, this modification in policy (if not in practice) occurred about six months prior to the issuance of this directive – i.e., at the end of 1947. The following discussion of policy towards various groups on the cities should be read against this background.

17. Report by Ch'en Pao-yü, head of the Central Hopeh General Trade Union, to the First Industrial Conference of the Central Hopeh District, “Critically Review the Left Adventurism of the Staff and Workers' Movement”Google Scholar (“Chien-t'ao chih-kung yün-tung-chung-te tso-ch'ing mao-hsien-chu-i”), in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy (Kuan-yü kung-shang-yeh-te cheng-ts'e) (Hong Kong Bureau of New China News Agency, 10 1949), pp. 65–67Google Scholar. This report was delivered on 28 March 1948.

18. Ibid. p. 65.

19. In Ho-chiang Province in the North-East a directive calling for the safe guarding of private industry and commerce notes that many cadres believe that because the North-East has experienced 14 years of enemy rule with the attendant establishment of monopolies, “there is now no need for private capital,” since publicly run industry and co-ops will be sufficient (“Directive (to the CCP Ho chiang Provincial Committee) with Regard to Safeguarding Municipal Industry and Commerce” (“Kuan-yü pao-hu ch'eng-shih kung-shang-yeh-te chih-shih”; in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 69–70)Google Scholar. Ch'en Po-ta complains about the excessively high and egalitarian wage system “in some of the old liberated areas” Po-ta, Ch'en, “The Labour Policy and Tan Policy for the Development of Industry”Google Scholar (“Fa-chan kung-yeh-te lao-tung cheng ts'e yü shui-shou cheng-ts'e”), in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commereiai Policy, pp. 19–29Google Scholar (see esp. pp. 22–23)). For recognition of the existence of similar problems in North China, see: “The Improvement in the Management of North China's Industry and Commerce After the Industrial and Commercia Conference” (“Kung-shang hui-i hou Hua-pei kung-shang kuan-li-te kai-chin”) in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy (Hsin min-chu-chu-i kung-shang cheng-ts'e) (Hong Kong: New Democratic Publishing Company, 01 1949), pp. 63–65.Google Scholar

20. “North China Liberated Areas Conference on Industry and Commerce’ (“Hua-pei chieh-fang-ch'ü kung-shang-yeh hui-i”), in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , op. cit. pp. 55–62Google Scholar (see esp. pp. 56–58). This conference was held on 17 May–27 June 1948.

21. See, for instance: Pi-shih, Jen, “Industrial and Commercial Policy” (“Kung shang-yeh cheng-ts'e”), in The Chinese People's Liberation Army's Policy for Entering the Cities (Chung-kuo Jen-min chieh-fang-chün ju-ch'eng cheng-ts'e) (New China Book Store, 08 1949), pp. 34–36Google Scholar (see esp. p. 36); Po-ta, Ch'en, “The Labour Policy and Tax Policy for the Development of Industry,”Google Scholar in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 22Google Scholar; and “Directive of the Chinese Communist Shansi-Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Central Bureau on the Development of Industry and Commerce” (Chung-kung chin-chi-hi-yü chung-yang-chü fa-chan kung-shang-yeh-te chih-shih), in ibid. pp. 74–76 (see esp. p. 75).

22. This campaign was inaugurated by the OCP Central Committee's 7 May 1946 “Directive on the Land Question,” referred to in Mao Tse-tung, SW, Vol. IV, p. 118Google Scholar, n. 4. It was translated into action by the “Outline Land Law of China,” published by the OCP Central Committee on 10 October 1947 and described briefly in Tse-tung, Mao, SW, Vol. IV, p. 174, n. 4.Google Scholar

23. Tse-tung, Mao, SW, Vol. IV, pp. 157–176.Google Scholar

24. ibid. pp. 168–169.

25. Ibid. p. 164.

26. Several examples are: Pi-shih, Jen, “Industrial and Commercial Policy,” in Chinese People's Liberation Army Policy, p. 34Google Scholar; “Directive (to the CCP Ho-chiang Provincial Committee) with Regard to Safeguarding Municipal Industry and Com merce,” in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 69Google Scholar; and Ti-hsin, Hsü, The Way Out for Industrialists and Merchants (Kung-shang-yeh-chia-te ch'u-lu) (Hong Kong: New Democratic Publishing Company, 03, 1949), p. 40Google Scholar – this particular chapter in Hsü's book was originally published on 9 August 1948.

27. See, for instance: “North China Liberated Areas Conference on Industry and Commerce,” in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 56 and 60Google Scholar; Po-ta, Ch'en, “The Labour Policy and Tax Policy for the Development of Industry,”Google Scholar in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 22–24Google Scholar (unfortunately, no date is given for Ch'en's article, although in ternal evidence strongly suggests that it was written in the spring of 1948); and Tse-tung, Mao, “Telegram to the Headquarters of the Loyang Front after the Recapture of the City (on April 18, 1948),” SW, Vol. IV, pp. 247–249Google Scholar (see esp. p. 248). Many of the articles of that time, including the first two cited here, advocated establishing labour-capital management committees in the enterprises. The factory head (ch'ang- chang) would have an effective veto over all decisions made by such a committee. See: “Firmly Support the Correct Line of the Staff and Workers' Campaign. Oppose ‘Left’ Adventurism” (“Chien-ch'ih chih-kung yun-tang cheng-ch'ueli lu-hsien fan-tui ‘tso’ ch'ing mao-hsien-chu-i”) NCNA, 27 02 1948Google Scholar, in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 30–36 (see esp. p. 35)Google Scholar; and “Draft Decision (passed by the Sixth All-China Conference of Labourers on 1 August 1948) on the Present Tasks of the Chinese Staff and Workers' Movement” (“Kuan-yü chung-kuo chih-kung yün-tung tang-ch'ien jen-wu-te chüeh-i-an”), ir Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 69–86.Google Scholar

28. See: “The Improvement in the Management of North China's Industry and Commerce After the North China Industrial and Commercial Conference,” in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial PolicyGoogle Scholar, which approvingly comments (p. 64) that the average number of hours per day in the factories of Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan had recently increased by 18 per cent.; and the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Union's “Explanation of Several Questions in the Draft Resolution on the Present Tasks of the Staff and Workers' Movement” (“Kuan-yü chih-kung yün-tung tang-ch'ien jen-wu chüeh-i-an-chung chi-ko wen-t'i-te shuo-ming”), in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic, Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 99–109 (esp. pp. 99–103)Google Scholar. This “explanation” was published in September 1948.

29. “North China Liberated Areas Conference of Industry and Commerce,” in ibid. p. 61.

30. ibid. p. 61.

31. See, for instance: “Draft Decision (passed by the Sixth All-China Conference of Labourers on 1 August 1948) on the Present Tasks of the Chinese Staff and Workers' Movement,” in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 79.Google Scholar

32. On tax policy, see point eight of the “Directive from the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government on Safeguarding Industry and Commerce” (“Chin-ch'a-chi pien-fu pao-hu kung-shang-yeh chih-shih”), originally published by the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei NCNA on 8 April 1948 and contained in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 71–72Google Scholar. The extent to which the policy favouring private industry was pushed is indicated in a very interesting undated article by Liu Ning-i in which the author describes, among other things, how many former publicly run enterprises in a number of the border regions have been or are being converted into privately run enterprises or joint public-private enterprises. Liu asserts that the investment climate in the liberated areas is now better than that in the Kuomintang-controlled areas for private enterprise: Liu Ning-i, “Industrial Policy of the Liberated Areas” (“Chieh-fang-ch'u-te kung-yeh cheng-ts'e”), in ibid. pp. 37–58, passim. Liu makes it clear (p. 54) that the liberated areas now welcome investments made from either the “white” areas or from abroad. See also Po-ta, Ch'en, “The Labour Policy and Tax Policy for the Development of Industry,”Google Scholaribid. p. 22.

33. All information on this conference is taken from “North Liberated Areas Conference of Industry and Commerce,” in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy; and People's Daily (Hantan), 29 07 1948.Google Scholar

34. A more complete listing of the conference's conclusions can be found in ibid. pp. 56–61.

35. The conference also advocated improvements of the working conditions where necessary, but the real import of the conference decisions in this respect can be seen from a later follow-up report. See note 28 above.

36. “Firmly Support the Correct Line of the Staff and Workers' Movement, Oppose ‘Left’ Adventurism,” in Po-ta, Ch'en et al. , On Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 36.Google Scholar

37. Po-ta, Ch'en, “The Labour and Tax Policy for the Development of Industry,”Google Scholar and Ning-i, Liu, “Industrial Policy of the Liberated Areas,”Google Scholar in ibid.

38. Po-ta, Ch'en, On Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 24.Google Scholar

39. Ibid. p. 25.

40. Ibid. p. 22.

41. Ibid. pp. 23–24.

42. Ibid. p. 24.

43. Ibid. p. 25.

44. Ibid. p. 26.

45. Ibid. p. 24. For a brief summary of Liu Ning-i's article, see note 32 above.

46. “Correctly Carry Out the Policy of Benefit to Both Labour and Capital” (“Cheng-ch'ueh chih-hsing lao-tzu liang-li fang-chen”), in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , New Democratic Industrial and Commercial Policy, pp. 110–112.Google Scholar

47. “North China Liberated Areas Financial Conference Discusses the Principles of Agricultural, Industrial, and Commercial Taxation” (“Hua-pei chieh-fang-ch'ü ts'ai-cheng hui-i t'ao-lun nung-kung-shang-yeh shui-ts'e”), in ibid. pp. 39–41 (quotation is from p. 40).

48. For an excellent analysis of Mao's concept of his role in the Chinese revolu tion and his implementation of this concept since 1949, see Michel Oksenberg's paper on Mao in Lindbeck, J. M. H. (ed.), China: The Management of a Revolutionary Society (University of Washington Press, 1971).Google Scholar

49. See, for instance, Schwartz, Benjamin, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).Google Scholar

50. Sodalist Upsurge in China's Countryside (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957).Google Scholar

51. Oksenberg, Michel, Policy Formulation in Communist China: The Case of the Mass Irrigation Campaign, 1957–1958 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1969), especially Chapters XIII and XV.Google Scholar

52. Much of the Cultural Revolution material has attacked other leaders for sabotaging “Mao's” Three Red Banners, of which two are the Great Leap For ward and the people's communes. See, for instance, Wang, Ting, “On the Causes of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ Campaign” (“Lun ‘wen-hua ta-ko-ming’ yun-tung-te ch'i-yin”), Ming Pao Monthly (Ming-pao yüeh-k'an), No. 56 (08 1970), pp. 7–18, passim.Google Scholar

53. It should also be noted that Mao throughout his life has consistently placed great emphasis on having personal experience in a given type of work, which can then be combined with theory to produce an understanding of the real nature of a situation – which in turn comprises the only basis upon which policy can be made. Mao's own personal experience for 20 years prior to 1948 was, of course, wholly in the rural areas of China. On the need for investigation of the real conditions in an area, see: Tse-tung, Mao, “‘Investigation of Rural Villages,’ Preface (2),” in Documents of the [1942–1944 Party] Rectification Campaign (Cheng-feng wen-hsien) (Canton: New China Book Store, 05 1950), pp. 44–47Google Scholar; the theory and techniques of “summing up” experience are amply “summed up” themselves in Yen-lin, Hung, How to Make Work Summaries (Tsen-yang tso kung-tso tsung-chieh) (Hong Kong: New Democratic Book Store, 06 1949)Google Scholar, passim; the entire subject of combining theory with practice to produce policy is discussed in Lewis, John, Leadership in Communist China (New York, 1963), passim.Google Scholar

54. Tse-tung, Mao, SW, Vol. IV, pp. 71–73.Google Scholar

55. “Policy for work in the Liberated Areas for 1946,” ibid. pp. 75–79.

56. “Build Stable Base Areas in the Northeast,” ibid. pp. 81–85.

57. “Manifesto of the China People's Liberation Army,” ibid. p. 147.

58. Ibid. pp. 157–176. This article consists of a report by Mao to a CCP Central Committee meeting held on 25–28 December 1947, at Yangchiakou, Michih Country, northern Shensi.

59. In ibid. p. 167 Mao states that bureaucratic capital in China amounts to VS. $10–$20 billion. On the following page he comments “After the victory of the revolution all over the country, the new-democratic state will possess huge state enterprises taken over from the bureaucratic capitalist class and controlling the economic lifelines of the country… In these circumstances the existence and development of [the] small and middle capitalist sectors will present no danger.”

60. Ibid. pp. 167–168.

61. Ibid. pp. 203–205.

62. Ibid. p. 203. Feudal exploitation is that which is practised by landlords and rich peasants (in the cities, “feudal exploitation” was practised by the secret societies and other “remnant feudal forces”). Capitalist exploitation is that which is practised in urban commercial and industrial enterprises. Even when the owners of these capitalist enterprises are themselves landlords, this type of exploitation must be permitted to continue to exist. The basic rationale behind this policy is that, once the workers are the “masters” of society, they should be willing to be exploited, as this is in the long-term interests of the society of which they are masters. See: “Firmly Support the Correct Line of the Staff and Workers' Movement,” in Mao Tse-tung, et al. , New Democratic, Industrial and Commercial Policy, p. 33.Google Scholar

63. Tse-tung, Mao, SW, pp. 207–210.Google Scholar

64. Ibid. pp. 208–209. Mao had made a similar analysis of the political attitudes of the national bourgeoisie nine years earlier in his December 1939 “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,” SW, Vol. II, pp. 305–334 – see esp. p. 320.Google Scholar

65. The pertinent articles are “Telegram to the Headquarters of the Loyang Front After the Recapture of the City,” SW, Vol. IVGoogle Scholar; and “On the September Meeting – Circular of the Central Committee of the CCP,” ibid. pp. 269–278 (esp. pp. 274–275).

66. As was illustrated above, increasing production and promoting class struggle in the enterprises were antithetical policies – one could be pursued only at the expense of the other.

67. Chia-chü, Ch'ien, “Respectful Warning to Peking's and Tientsin's Industrial and Commercial Circles” (“Ching-kao p'ing-chin kung-shang-chieh”), Progressive Daily (Chin-pu jih-pao) (hereafter CPJP), 13 03 1949, pp. 1 and 4.Google Scholar

68. On the KMT discrimination against Tientsin, see Barnett, A. Doak, China on the Eve of the Communist Takeover (New York, 1966), pp. 53–54Google Scholar. The declining position of Tientsin as a major port for foreign trade can clearly be seen from the successive statistics on port activity published by the Far Eastern Economic Review (PEEK) for 1947–1948Google Scholar. See PEER, Vol. II, 26 03 1947, p. 156Google Scholar; Vol. III, 30 July 1947, p. 247; Vol. IV, 7 April 1948, p. 347; and Vol. VI, 19 January 1949, p. 69.

69. Chin, Wei, “Tientsin Industry in 1949” (“I-chiu-szu-chiu-nien-te T'ien-chin kung-yeh”), New China Monthly (Hsin-hua yüeh-pao) 7 02 1950, p. 907Google Scholar. This article originally appeared in People's Daily, 1 January 1950.

70. Ching, Mayor Huang, “Tientsin's Work During the Over Seven Months Since Liberation,” (“T'ien-chin chieh-fang-hou ch'i-ko to yüeh lai-te kung-tso”), CPJP, 6 09 1949, p. 2 and 7 September 1949, pp. 1 and 4 (see especially p. 1).Google Scholar

71. Chin, Wei, in New China Monthly, 7 02 1950, p. 907.Google Scholar

72. It was later lamented that during this initial period too much emphasis was laid on placing orders with firms and insufficient use was made of granting cash loans to the various enterprises: Ching, Huang, in CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 4.Google Scholar

73. Collection of Policies, Laws, and Decrees [of Tientsin] (Cheng-ts'e fa-ling hui-pien), edited by the Tiensin MCC (1949), pp. 36–37.Google Scholar

74. Ching, Huang, in CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 1.Google Scholar

75. Chia-chü, Ch'ien, in CPJP, 13 03 1949, pp. 1 and 4.Google Scholar

76. If the cost of living for the average worker on 11 January 1949 in Tientsin = 100, then the index for 25 January = 69, 22 February = 119, 22 March = 141, 26 April = 188, and 14 May = 376. Calculated from: Index of Cost of Living of Tientsin's Workers (Tien-chin kung-jen sheng-huo-fei chih-shu) (Tientsin: Nankai University Economic Research Institute, 02 1950), p. 17.Google Scholar

77. Ching, Huang, CPJP, 3 07 1949, p. 2Google Scholar: and Chia-chü, Ch'ien, in CPJP, 13 03 1949, pp. 1 and 4Google Scholar. On the municipal government structure, see Shao-ch'i, Liu et al. , The New Democratic City Policy, pp. 47–50Google Scholar (consisting of two articles, both published on 22 June 1949).

78. CPJP, 14 06 1949, p. 1.Google Scholar

79. Tse-tung, Mao, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,” SW, Vol. IV, pp. 361–375Google Scholar (see especially p. 363).

80. “Brief Chart of Liu Shao-chi's Post-Liberation Activities in Tientsin” (“Chieh-fang huo Liu Shao-ch'i tsai T'ien-chin huo-tung ch'ing-k'uang chien-piao”), published by the Tientsin Investigation Team (T'ien-chin tiao-ch'a tsu). This chart was released during the Cultural Revolution. No other information on its origin is available.

81. CPJP, 29 04 1949, p. 3.Google Scholar

82. After this manuscript was completed, the (unverified) texts of two important speeches which Liu delivered in May 1949 were called to my attention. The first of these speeches was delivered in Tientsin to a North China Staff and Workers' Representative Conference on 5 May, while the second was delivered to a cadre conference (in Peking?) on 19 May. Both speeches present in detail Liu's analysis of the situation in Tientsin and his suggestions for remedying the problems which he saw. Because these texts became available only during the Cultural Revolution and a major goal of this article is to evaluate the accuracy of the Cultural Revolution charges concerning Liu, it is methodically untenable to adduce these texts as evidence in the argument presented here. It is worth mentioning, however, that these texts do in every way support the statements, based solely on contemporary evidence, which are made in the body of this article. See Liu Shao-ch'i wen-t'i ts'ai-liao chuan-chi (A Special Collection of Materials on Liu Shao-ch'i) (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1970), pp. 200–220Google Scholar – no original publication information available. I wish to thank Michel Oksenberg and Richard Sorich for bringing this source to my attention.

83. “Huang Huo-ch'ing Explains the Draft ‘On The Temporary Method of Handling Labour-Capital Relations’,” CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 2Google Scholar. This draft was originally presented by Liu to the Tientsin MCC during his April visit.

84. Ching, Huang, in CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 1.Google Scholar

85. CPJP, 30 04 1949, p. 3.Google Scholar

86. Li-san, Li, “An Explanation of Several Points on the Policies of Developing Production and Benefit to Both Labour and Capital,” CPJP, 1 05 1949, pp. 2–3Google Scholar The fact that this major article was published in the local paper in the middle ol Liu's visit and addressed itself directly to the issues which Liu was discussing indicates that Liu in all probability agreed completely with Li's points.

87. CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar

88. Po-ta, Ch'en, in On Industrial and Commercial PolicyGoogle Scholar, and Li-san, Li, in CPJP, 1 05 1949.Google Scholar

89. CPJP, 8 05 1949, p. 3.Google Scholar

90. CPJP, 13 06 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar

91. References to the formation of these groups can be found respectively in the CPJP on the following dates: 7 June, 18 June, 28 June, 4 July, 10 June, 30 May, 22 June, 5 June, 19 August, 21 June, 28 June. All references can be found on p. 3 of the respective papers.

92. CPJP, 13 06 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar

93. See, for instance, CPJP, 4 07 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar

94. Shao-ch'i, Liu et al. , The New Democratic City Policy, pp. 47–50.Google Scholar

95. CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar

96. CPJP, 17 05 1949, p. 3.Google Scholar

97. Ching, Huang, CPJP, 7 09 1949, p. 4.Google Scholar

98. With the price index for the cost of living for a worker on 11 January 1949 = 100, that for the third week in each month for May-December 1949 is: May = 376; June = 360; July = 510; August = 1370; September = 1340; October = 1530; November = 5740; December = 5440. See: Price Index, pp. 17–18Google Scholar. This is not to argue that labour-capital relations were the only factor influencing inflation. However, the handling of these relations obviously had to exert some influence on the climate which was breeding inflation in Tientsin.

99. As quoted in Post-Liberation Tientsin Industry (Chieh-fang-hou-te T'ien-chin kung-yeh), NCNA, 11 1949, p. 99.Google Scholar

100. Indeed, Liu conceived of the trade unions as organizations for actively dampening down the class struggle. It goes without saying, however, that the trade union organizations were later used to good advantage by the OCP in bringing about a revolution in the sphere of industry and commerce. Proof of this was provided in abundance in January–June 1952, when Tientsin economic circles were involved in the Five-anti Campaign.

101. Li Li-san made this distinction in his 1 May article in CPJP.

102. Tse-tung, Mao, SW, Vol. IV, pp. 361–375.Google Scholar

103. Ibid. p. 365.

104. Ibid. p. 364.

105. Ibid. p. 367.

106. Ibid. esp. pp. 364–368.

107. See CPJP, 24 06 1949, p. 1Google Scholar and CPJP, 18 08 1949, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

108. CPJP, 1 09 1949, p. 2.Google Scholar