Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 March 2010
China's leading state-owned banks have undergone radical transformation in recent years, with six of the country's top seven players listed in both Hong Kong and Shanghai. We first consider how the banks were reorganized for initial public offering, in terms of the removal of non-performing loans and the massive recapitalization of their balance sheets. Second, and more importantly, we consider whether they have been able to retain market share, further commercialize and enhance overall financial positions post-listing. Through in-depth case analysis of the six state-owned banks, we show that post-initial public offering they have significantly improved profitability, loan book size, loan book quality and capital reserve protection. However, we caution that the debilitating effects of the global credit crunch may slow or even arrest further progress across these dimensions in the near term. We conclude that China's leading banks have benefited materially from their transition, and have accordingly developed a range of competitive and co-operative strategies not only to sustain domestic market advantage but also to penetrate overseas markets.
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