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19. Hao, Chen, “Sixty years of factional strife in the KMT,” part 2, Times Magazine, No. 229 (18 04 1984), pp. 27–30Google Scholar. Factional strife has also flourished at the local level, but these conflicts have had little or no influence on central policy.

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22. Xinsheng bao, 6 August 1950.

23. Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (New York, Wiley, 1959)Google Scholar. In fact, the organizational structure of the main opposition party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party, looks remarkably like the KMT's. However, describing the DPP as a Leninist party stretches the definition to breaking point; cf. Xin xinwen (The New Journalist), No. 246 (25 11 1991), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

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30. “Gaoji ganbu tongzhi yingyou de zeren” (“The proper responsibilities of high-level cadres”), Gaizao, No. 14 (16 03 1951), pp. 1–7Google Scholar.

31. Gaizao, No. 25 (1 09 1951), pp. 10–20Google Scholar.

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35. Dangyuan de jiben renshi (Basic Knowledge for Party Members) (Taipei: Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1950), p. 55Google Scholar.

36. Stinchcombe, “Social structure and organizations”; Duverger, Political Parties.

37. An earlier incarnation of the KMT briefly served as a party in parliament during 1912–14. Before and after, it was a revolutionary party seeking political power primarily through military action. See Yu, Party Politics in Republican China.

38. Eastman, “Who lost China?”; Jun, Shen, Contemporary Taiwan, pp. 76–77Google Scholar.

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41. Ibid. p. 54.

42. Resolution on Reorganization, p. 8.

43. Tien, Hung-mao, The Great Transition, p. 67Google Scholar.

44. Biographical information taken from Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, pp. 59–62Google Scholar.

45. Gaizao, No. 5 (1 11 1950), p. 22Google Scholar; Bendang dangwu gaizao fagui jianbian (A Collection of Regulations on the Reform of Party Work) (Yangmingshan, n.p.: 01 1951), p. 15Google Scholar; Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, p. 89Google Scholar.

46. Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, pp. 86–87, 95–98Google Scholar, and interview data.

47. Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, p. 71Google Scholar, and interview data.

48. Weisi, Shen, “Party factions on Taiwan,” pp. 77–78Google Scholar.

49. Zhongguo Guomindang liushinian lai zuzhi zhi fazhan (60 Years of the KMT's Organizational Development) (Taipei: KMT Central Committee, 1954), p. 15Google Scholar. The Party still maintains this label, although its propriety has become a matter of internal debate following the democratic reforms of the mid-1980s. See Ya-li, Lu, “Political modernization in the ROC: the Kuomintang and the inhibited Party center,” in Myers, Ramon H. (ed.), Two Societies in Opposition: The Republic of China and the People's Republic of China after Forty Years (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1991), pp. 117–18Google Scholar.

50. Ch'i-yun, Chang, The Rebirth ofthe Kuomintang (Taipei: China Cultural Service, n.d.), pp. 84–85Google Scholar. According to Fuming, Xu, the methods were revolutionary, but the goal was democracy, cf. Reorganization of the KMT, p. 81Google Scholar.

51. Ch'i-yun, Chang, Rebirth, p. 83Google Scholar.

52. Yumei, Hao, Guomindang timing zhidu zhi yanjiu (The KMT's Nomination System) (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co., 1981)Google Scholar.

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54. Ibid. p. 3.

55. Ch'i-yun, Chang, Rebirth, p. 12Google Scholar; emphasis added.

56. Both cases cited in Gaizao, No. 34 (12 01 1952), pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

57. Gaizao, No. 25 (1 09 1951), pp. 46–47Google Scholar.

58. Zhongguo Guomindang gaizao qijian gongzuo gaikuang tukaji (A Pictorial Survey of General Working Conditions of the KMT during the Reorganization Period) (n.p.: 02 1953), p. 51Google Scholar.

59. Resolution on Reorganization, article 30.

60. According to my interviews, these small groups continue to exist today, but are inactive.

61. Gaizao, No. 5 (1 11 1950), p. 20Google Scholar; Jiqun, Zheng, “Zhongguo Guomindang dangzheng xietiao zhidu de yanbian” (“The evolution of the KMT's Party-government co-ordination system”), Renwen xuebao, No. 2 (07 1976), p. 47Google Scholar; Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, p. 103Google Scholar. As mentioned above, reorganization commissions typically became the permanent Party organ of that level.

62. Chen Hao, “Sixty years of factional strife”; see also Jiqun, Zeng, “The evolution of the KMT's Party-government co-ordination system,” pp. 47–48Google Scholar; Qihua, Ma, “Dangzheng guanxi yu juece licheng” (“Party-government relations and the decision-making process”), Zhengzhi Wenhua (04 1985), p. 127Google Scholar.

63. For a discussion of American influence on KMT policy in the early 1950s, see Richard Barrett, E., “Autonomy and Diversity in the American State on Taiwan,” and Simon, Denis Fred, “External incorporation and internal reform,” in Winckler, Edwin A. and Greenhalgh, Susan (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), pp. 121–137 and 138–150Google Scholar.

64. Guipu, Lin, “Analysis of China's Party-government relations,” pp. 68–70Google Scholar.

65. Gaizao, No. 18 (16 05 1951), pp. 78–79Google Scholar.

66. See “Zhongguo Guomindang dangzheng guanxi dagang” (“Outline of Party-government relations”), and “Zhongguo Guomindang dangzheng guanxi dagang shuoming” (“Explanation of the outline of Party-government relations”), in Gaizao, No. 17 (1 05 1951), pp. 69–75Google Scholar. Later, these groups were enlarged to nine members, three each from the Party, government, and legislature.

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68. “Explanation of the outline of Party-government relations.”

69. Gaizao, No. 49 (1 09 1952), p. 5Google Scholar.

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71. Yangde, Chen, Taiwan difang minxuan lingdao renwu zhi biandong (Changes in Locally-Elected Leaders) (Taipei: Siji chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1981), p. 123Google Scholar.

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73. Jiqun, Zeng, “The evolution of the KMT's Party-government co-ordination system,” p. 52Google Scholar.

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76. Wenwu, Zhu-Ge, “Zhengzhan xitong zai Taiwan” (“The political warfare system on Taiwan”) in Investigating Party Factions, pp. 118–123Google Scholar.

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78. Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, p. 110Google Scholar. In the KMT cadre system, ganbu referred to cadres in a collective sense, and ganbu fenzi to individual cadres. This is thus more similar to the Soviet practice, which also emphasized the collective, than the CCP, which emphasized the individual. See Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 163, n. 75Google Scholar.

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80. Gaizao, No. 49 (1 09 1952), p. 3Google Scholar; Fuming, Xu, Reorganization of the KMT, pp. 130–131Google Scholar; Pictorial Survey, p. 41; and interview data.

81. Gaizao, No. 5 (1 11 1950), pp. 57–60Google Scholar.

82. Gaizao, No. 14 (16 03 1951), pp. 8–11Google Scholar.

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86. Mingshan, Jiang, “Dang de jiben gongzuo zhi yanjiu,” (“Some aspects of the basic work of the Party”) Zuzhi yu Xunlian, (Organization and Training), No. 14 (11 1973), p. 88Google Scholar.

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88. Gaizao, No. 14 (16 03 1951), pp. 8–11Google Scholar; No. 21 (1 July 1951), pp. 66–70; and No. 36, (16 February 1952), p. 5.

89. Kai-shek, Chiang, “The proper responsibilities of high-level cadres,” pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

90. Basic Knowledge for Party Members, pp. 72–73.

91. Gaizao, No. 19 (1 06 1951), p. 65Google Scholar.

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94. In addition, the KMT claimed to have another 257,000 members in foreign countries; see Pictorial Survey, p. 33.

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96. Gaizao, No. 36 (16 02 1952), pp. 3–5Google Scholar.

97. In 1952, Taiwan's population was 8.128 million, of which 7.478 million (92%) were born on Taiwan and 650,000 were born on the mainland; see Jacoby, , U.S. Aid to Taiwan, p. 295, table D.2Google Scholar.

98. Shijie sizhong quanhui yilai Zhongyang Weiyuanhui ge danwei zhongyao gongzuo gaikuang baogao (Report on the Overall Work Conditions of all Units of the Central Committee since the Fourth Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee) (Taipei: Central Inspection and Discipline Commission, 1974), p. 18Google Scholar.

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103. Wade, Robert, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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