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Implementation of Pollution Control Targets in China: Has a Centralized Enforcement Approach Worked?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 August 2017

Xuehua Zhang
Xuehua Zhang*
Affiliation:
Sichuan University. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

The scholarly work on China's environmental regulations in the context of “central–local” relations is dominated by the preference for a centralized approach. This article examines a centrally imposed and executed verification programme of locally reported pollution data, a rare and sustained central effort to enforce an environmental policy, namely the national pollution reduction target system. The programme was established in 2007 to curtail perceived widespread data falsification and to enhance the quality of emission data, the basis for assessing local compliance with targets. Based on an analysis of official documents and interviews with environmental officials and industry representatives, this article found that the verification programme appears to have reduced the overreporting problem with emission data, enhanced local monitoring and enforcement capacity, and to a certain degree deterred violations due to the increased frequency of national and local inspections. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Verification is highly resource intensive, it has involved little external oversight and public participation, the central authority has exerted significant yet unchecked discretionary powers, and poor data quality has remained an issue. Over time, the verification programme appears to have turned into essentially a “numbers game.” All those challenges indicate that a centralized enforcement approach is arguably ineffective in addressing China's long-standing problem of weak environmental policy implementation. This study also sheds lights on the classical “principal-agent” theory in the study of public bureaucracy. Not only does the principal distrust the agent, which is the main concern of the theory, but the agent also distrusts the principal.

摘要

现有的从“中央-地方”关系的角度探讨中国环境规制的研究中, 多数倾向于采用中央集中式管理模式。这篇论文以污染减排制度为切入点, 分析中央自 2007 年以来采纳的”自上而下“的中央集中式减排核查机制。该机制的设置是为了有效遏制遍及全国的数据造假, 提高作为评估减排效果基础的排放达标数据质量, 正好为深入研究中央集中式规制模式提供了一个很好的实践范本。该研究收集相关的官方资料, 走访中央和地方环保官员以及企业管理层, 在分析相关数据的基础上发现, 中央集中式核查机制减少了虚报 (报高) 排放数据的问题, 提高了地方环境监测和执法能力, 并在一定程度上减少了企业违法排污行为, 这是由中央和地方现场监察频率的增加带来的威慑作用所致。尽管如此, 该中央集中式核查机制存在不少问题: 核查机制耗费大量资源, 核查过程缺乏外在的监督机制和公众参与, 中央部门行使了显著的、同时也缺乏约束的自由裁量权, 环境数据质量仍然是一个问题。长期而言, 核查机制已逐步演变成 “数据游戏”。这些问题意味着中央集中式模式不是解决中国长期存在的环境执法弱的有效办法。这项研究还对广泛适用于研究公共政府机构的经典的“委托 - 代理”理论有重要的启示作用, 分析结果不仅展示了传统理论主要关注的委托人不信任代理人这一状况的存在, 也发现存在代理不信任委托人的情况。

Keywords

Central–local relationsprincipal-agentenvironmental regulationdata falsificationpollution reductionverificationenforcementcompliance中央-地方关系委托-代理环境规制数据造假污染减排核查执法守法
Type
Special Section on Central–Local Relations and Environmental Governance in China
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 231 , September 2017 , pp. 749 - 774
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Copyright
Copyright © SOAS University of London 2017 

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