1. Ming pao, 26 October 1976. For the importance of this source see note 5.Google Scholar

2. On 10 October a Chinese spokesman leaked the news of the arrests to some embassies in Peking. As Georges Biannic of the Agence France Presse told me, the phone rang all day with tantalizing snippets of information. A young Peking intellectual whom I interviewed in Hong Kong corroborated the date when the first rumours of the arrests began to circulate in Peking. He first learned of the arrests on the 10th from a well-informed friend who worked for one of Peking's leading newspapers.Google Scholar

3. Chiang Ch'ing is accused of “distorting” Mao's famous poem, “Reply to Li Shu-yi,” in which he immortalizes his wife, Yang K'ai-hui. The September 1976 publication of Mao's poetry does leave out the footnote explaining the circumstances which led Mao to write the poem. The remaining poems in this particular volume include the footnotes.Google Scholar

4. We are told that Mao and Chiang Ch'ing had not lived together since 1973, shortly after Mao had read the transcript of the interview Chiang Ch'ing granted an American professor in preparation for Chiang Ch'ing's biography (Roxanne Witke's, Comrade Chiang Ch'ing [Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977]). Chiang Ch'ing is also pictured as a nagging wife, constantly badgering Mao for more money, which he raised from the royalties of his books (Ming pao, 28 October, 1976).Google Scholar

5. Between 26 October and 1 November, Ming pao, a Hong Kong newspaper, ran a seven-part series on the arrest of the “gang of four” based ostensibly on the five reports which Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Chien-ying and Wang Tung-hsing read to the Politburo hours after the “four” were arrested on 6–7 October. The reports circulated in China from 10 October onwards. According to Ming pao, a middle-ranking cadre from Kwangtung province personally heard the report from a tape and relayed its contents to his son, who in turn told a friend, Ming pao's source. I personally translated the entire series, with the assistance of Henry T'ien of the New Asia College in Kowloon. The series (hereafter MPS) was authenticated by four well-informed sources in Hong Kong. In addition, on 17 December 1976, People's Daily ran a 9,000-character article, “Frantic last stage attempt,” which provided additional information on the arrests. This article and MPS constitute the two most valuable sources on the arrests.Google Scholar

6. I am particularly indebted to John Dolfin, Director of the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong for his advice and assistance in preparing this paper. He read the first draft and offered sound advice and criticisms. Others who also gave of their time included David Bonavia (Far Eastern Economic Review), Sidney Liu (Newsweek), Tiziano Terzani (Der Speigel), Fox Butterfield (New York Times), Georges Biannic (Agence France Presse), Father L. LaDany (China News Analysis), and Leo Goodstadt. Professors Allen Whiting and Lowell Dittmer read the second draft and offered sound advice as well, as did Professor Kent Morrison. An ACLS/SSRC grant made a sabbatical to Hong Kong possible.Google Scholar

7. MPS, 29 October 1976.Google Scholar

8. MPS, 27 October 1976.Google Scholar

9. China News Analysis, No. 872 (4 March 1972), p. 3.Google Scholar

10. MPS, 31 October 1976.Google Scholar

11. Ibid.

12. On 25 March 1977, People's Daily listed 12 photographs which had allegedly been manipulated by the “four” since 1973, including the photographs taken at the First Tachai Conference and the National Day celebrations.Google Scholar

13. See China News Analysis, No. 1055 (1 October 1976).Google Scholar

14. During the denunciation of the “four” this inscription was used to prove that Chiang Ch'ing had falsely portrayed herself as a “student” of Mao's teachings.Google Scholar

15. People's Daily, 16 September 1976.Google Scholar

16. Ibid. 19 September 1976.

17. MPS, 26 October 1976.Google Scholar

18. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

19. The NCNA consistently translates “wei-tsao” as “fabrication” although its related meanings include counterfeit or forgery.Google Scholar

20. For excerpts of “Mao's last instructions,” see Survey of World Broadcasts: Far East (SWB/FE), No. 5335, 12 October 1976.Google Scholar

21. Ibid. and MPS, 29 October 1976.

22. People's Daily, 3 June 1976.Google Scholar

23. People's Daily carried a photograph of the two on 3 June. The same photograph was reproduced in Peking Review (11 June 1976, p. 3). On the evening of the 3rd, Hua and the King attended a soirée in Ch'engtu.Google Scholar

24. That such a meeting was held is substantiated by a photograph in Peking Review, No. 19 (7 May 1976), p. 5.Google Scholar

25. This instruction differs in the MPS (huan-huan-pan, pu-pi chao-chi) and the authoritative article in People's Daily, 17 December 1976 (man-man-lai, pu-yao chao-chi). Both, however, mean the same thing.Google Scholar

26. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

27. Ibid.

28. MPS, 26 October 1976.Google Scholar

29. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

30. MPS, 26 October 1976.Google Scholar

31. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

32. Ibid.

33. MPS, 29 October 1976.Google Scholar

34. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

35 . MPS, 29 October 1976.Google Scholar

36. Reported by Tanjug, the Yugoslav news agency in South China Morning Post, 17 October 1976.Google Scholar

37. MPS, 31 October 1976.Google Scholar

38. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

39. China Record, No. 1/12 (December 1976), p. 2.Google Scholar

40. MPS, 26 October 1976 and People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

41 People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. MPS, 31 October 1976.Google Scholar

46. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 20 October 1976.Google Scholar

47. Ibid.

48. While Mao Yuan-hsin's relationship to the “four” is mentioned in MPS, there is no mention of his plan to raise an army.Google Scholar

49 . MPS, 30 October 1976.Google Scholar

50. Peking Review, No. 6 (4 February 1977), pp. 5–10, esp. pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

51. Ibid.

52. Hsinhua News Bulletin (Hong Kong), 17 May 1977, pp. 12–15.Google Scholar

53. Ibid.

54. Interview with Sidney Liu of Newsweek magazine.Google Scholar

55. FBIS, 27 October 1976.Google Scholar

56. Interview with Father L. LaDany, publisher of the authoritative newsletter, China News Analysis.Google Scholar

57. Hsinhua News Bulletin (Hong Kong), 17 May 1977.Google Scholar

58. The following account of Shanghai was provided in an interview with Tiziano Terzani of Der Speigel, who was in Shanghai from 17 to 21 October. In addition to his own diary, Terzani also received information from a well-informed source in Shanghai. This source related the atmosphere in the city from the day of the arrests until Terzani's arrival in Shanghai.Google Scholar

59. For a superb collection of the caricatures and posters see Current Background, No. 1055, 10 December 1976.Google Scholar

60. MPS, 1 November 1976.Google Scholar

61. Bonavia, David, “Peking's year of change,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 17 (29 April 1977), pp. 16–18. Bonavia was briefed on the events in Shanghai between 6 and 13 October by a local cadre during a week's visit to China. The briefing was held on 12 April 1977, in Shanghai (interview with Bonavia). Since the people of Shanghai did not learn of the arrests until 10 October at the earliest, the 6–12 October date appears to be too early for Ma to be involved in the conspiracy. Ma was in Peking between 7 and 14 October, learning about the arrests. However, if the week is pushed from the 6th–13th to the week of the 14th, after Ma returned from Peking, then what Bonavia was told corresponds precisely to what Terzani learned in Shanghai from his source.Google Scholar

62. Hsinhua News Bulletin, 19 October 1976, pp. 9–12.Google Scholar

63. Between 21 and 23 October, more than 6·5 million demonstrators “registered” in Shanghai to support Hua's promotion and to approve the arrests. On 27 October, Su Chen-hua was named first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, Ni Chih-fu was named second secretary, while P'eng Ch'ung was named third secretary. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-yuan were dismissed from all posts both inside and outside the Party in Shanghai. In mid-December, Ma T'ien-shui, Hsu Ching-hsien and Wang Hsiu-chen, the three leading administrators in Shanghai, disappeared as did Chin Tsu-min, a “responsible person” in charge of the preparatory committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Su Chen-hua, Ni Chih-fu and P'eng Ch'ung were all promoted to the Politburo by the 11th Party Congress.Google Scholar

64. MPS, 29 October 1976. A news dispatch by Nigel Wade from Peking corroborates the attempt to use the navy, but does not mention Su's name (FBIS, 18 October 1976).Google Scholar

65 . MPS, 29 October 1976.Google Scholar

66. FBIS, 18 October 1976.Google Scholar

67. According to one story circulating in Peking, Ch'en was offered the position of chairman of the Military Commission in return for his support of Chiang Ch'ing. Ch'en became particularly concerned about Chiang Ch'ing's plans because they included the assassination of Hua, Yeh and other Politburo members. According to another document circulating in China, Chiang Ch'ing requested a meeting with Hua shortly after her arrest, but Hua made it clear that no such meeting would take place until she accounted for three particular deaths since 1970 (Ming pao, 28 March 1977). One of the victims, General Pi Ting-chun, died a “martyr's death” on 7 July 1975, “while on duty in an accident.” General Pi was Chu Teh's son-in-law. Even Chu Teh's death has been tied to the “four.” Finally, Han Su-yin, who had spent three months in China, told a Hong Kong press conference on 14 February 1977, that she had personally seen the assassination list prepared by the “four.” She did not elaborate further.Google Scholar

68. On 3 February, the day on which the Politburo unanimously appointed Hua acting premier on Mao's recommendation, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao wrote his ‘Thoughts of 3 February 1976” on the matter. One entry is ominous: “Moving up so fast and so menacingly spells a downfall that will be just as rapid.” For the text of Chang's “Thoughts,” see Peking Review, No. 5 (28 January 1977), pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

69. “Use revolutionary public opinion to smash counter-revolutionary public opinion,” Red Flag, No. 5 (1976), transl. in FBIS, 6 May 1976.Google Scholar

70. Ibid.

71. People's Daily, 17 December 1976.Google Scholar

72. Ibid.

73. MPS, 1 November 1976.Google Scholar

74. “Speech at the Second National Conference on learning from Tachai in agriculture,” Peking Review, No. 1, 1 January 1977, p. 34.Google Scholar

75. This story was related to me by a young intellectual who lived in Peking for 18 years, including the crucial period of the arrests.Google Scholar

76. The two meetings, but not the times, were also reported by Tanjug correspondent, Aleksandr Novacic (FBIS, 18 October 1976).Google Scholar

77. This story was related to me by Sidney Liu of Newsweek, providing I did not reveal his source. His source, however, is well-connected with Peking's first generation Party leaders. This source's father is a very well-known Party cadre with an illustrious Party history.Google Scholar

78. Ming pao, 29 May 1977. I am grateful to Fox Butterfield of the New York Times for bringing this article to my attention.Google Scholar

79. Ibid.