^1. Manchester Guardian, 19 01 1961.Google Scholar

^2. Soon Sung, Cho, Korea in World Politics (1940–1950) (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), p. 270.Google Scholar

^3. In authorizing military operations the Security Council acts as a quasi-judicial organ. But in June 1950 the Security Council called for military sanctions without affording an opportunity to the North Korean Government to present its own case.Google Scholar

^4. John, Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), p. 163.Google Scholar

^5. Ibid. p. 172.

^6. Even this report was received not in full but in a summary form prepared by the U.S. State Department. See Stone, I. F., The Hidden History of the Korean War (London: Turnstile Press, 1952), pp. 46–7.Google Scholar

^7. UN Document S/1505/Rev. 1.Google Scholar

^8. The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part V, The Far East, dated 4 07 1950Google Scholar, reported that “A communiqué on the situation at 8 a.m. on 26 June (Seoul 09.00 – FBIS) stated that South Korean forces in the Ongjin area had entered Haeju.” This report was based, as indicated, on a broadcast monitored by the official U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Professor Glenn D. Paige has noted in his well-documented book that “… American military advisers had confirmed the capture by troops of Brigadier-General Paik Sun Yup's First R.O.K. Division of Haeju, capital city of Hwanghae province.…” (The Korean Decision, June 24–30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar, p. 130. It should be stressed that according to this and other reports, the South Korean claim of a counter-attack against Haeju was supported by the U.S. military advisers in Seoul. It is very surprising, therefore, to find no mention of the alleged capture of Haeju in the two official American publications on the Korean War, Appleman, Roy E., South to the Naktang North to the Yalu (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961)Google Scholar, and Major Robert K., Sawyer, Military Advisers in Korea, KMAG in Peace and War (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962).Google Scholar

^9. The Columbia-Lippincott Gazetteer of the World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), pp. 743, 972.Google Scholar

^10. The Times (London), 20 06 1950.Google ScholarPubMed

^11. South to the Naktang North to the Yalu, p. 22.Google Scholar

^12. Ibid.

^13. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Defence in the Cold War (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 110.Google ScholarPubMed

^14. New York Herald Tribune, 27 06 1950.Google Scholar

^15. John, Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, pp. 150–1.Google Scholar

^16. UN Document S/1626.Google Scholar

^17. Military Situation in the Far East, Part 1, p. 231.Google Scholar

^18. Willoughby, and Chamberlin, , MacArthur, 1941–1951, (London: Heinemann, 1956), pp. 332–4.Google Scholar

^19. Ridgway, , The Korean War, (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 12.Google Scholar

^20. UN Document S/1507.Google Scholar

^21. UN Document A/1350.Google Scholar

^22. Trygve, Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 329.Google Scholar

^23. Chester, Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London: Victor Gollancz, 1954), pp. 238–9.Google Scholar

^24. For a discussion of the conduct of the Indian members of UNCOK, see my Indian Foreign Policy – In Defence of National Interest (Calcutta: World Press, 1956), pp. xi-xii.Google Scholar

^25. Berkes, R. S. and Bedi, M. S., The Diplomacy of India (Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 94.Google Scholar

^26. Nehru's Press Conferences 1950 (New Delhi, Information Services of India, 1950), pp. 105–7.Google Scholar However one source suggests that Mr Nehru's opinion had undergone radical change by the end of 1955. Dr F. F. Aschinger of Neue Zurcher Zeitung wrote after an interview with Prime Minister Nehru that “Nehru does not interpret the North Korean aggression of 1950 as a manifestation of Moscow's imperialist world-revolutionary policy. A thorough study of the documents has convinced him, he said, that the real causes for the Korean conflict must be sought in the policy of Syngman Rhee.” (Swiss Review of World Affairs, 03 1956).Google Scholar

^27. The Other Side of the River (London: Gollancz, 1963), p. 654.Google Scholar

^28. “North Korea Jumps the Gun,” Current History, 03 1951.Google Scholar

^29. McCune, George M., Korea Today, 1950, p. 244.Google Scholar

^30. Allen, Richard C., Korea's Syngman Rhee (Tokyo: Charles E. Cuttle Co., 1960), p. 117.Google Scholar

^31. UN Document S/1505.Google Scholar

^32. Neu Zurcher Zeitung, 20 06 1950.Google Scholar

^33. John, Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur, pp. 154–5.Google Scholar

^34. UN Document S/1350, p. 10.Google Scholar

^35. For further reports on Rhee's advocacy of invasion of the North, see the report by Walter, Sullivan in the New York Times, 14 03 1950Google Scholar, and by Richard Johnston, of the same newspaper, quoted in Pritt, D. N., New Light on Korea (London, 1951), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

^36. On inter- and intra-party dissensions, see further Stebbins, Richard P., The United States in World Affairs, 1950 (New York: Council for Foreign Relations, 1951), pp. 51–2Google Scholar; Spanier, John W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 56–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paige, , The Korean Decision, pp. 29, 33–42, 62–3.Google Scholar