⁵¹ “Resolution on Development of the Guerrilla Movement and Creation of a New Wei Pei Soviet Area.”

⁵² Eto, II, 156. Similar efforts to induce active participation in the peasant movement by limiting its benefits to members were made in the Hai-Lu-Feng area during the rent reduction campaign of 1925. Only participants in the peasant association profited.

⁵³ Fu, Chih, “San Yuan Mu-ch'ien Hsing-shih yüTang Ling-tao ti Chien-ch'a”(“Investigation of the Present Situation and Party Leadership in San Yuan”), Tou-cheng yii Hsü-hsi (Struggle and Study), 10 1, 1932, pp. 6–13Google Scholar. This is an organ of the Northern Bureau. This article is subsequently abbreviated “Investigation in San Yuan”.

⁵⁴ “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 41. The practice of carrying out night raids with secret seizure and redistribution of grain to the poor (after the partisans secured their own supplies) was one reason for the peasants' often reported difficulty in sharply distinguishing the Reds from roving robber bands. Confiscation of grain and material was the partisans' single source of supplies in the absence of a tax structure.

⁵⁵ “My errrors”; “Wu Ch'ing Yuan Tzu Fen T'u-ti ti Yi-yi yü Ts'o-wu” (“The Significance and Errors in Land Redistribution in Wu Ch'ing Yuan Tzu”), Struggle and Study, October 1, 1932, pp. 15–20. Abbreviated as “Land Redistribution.”

⁵⁶ “Land Redistribution,” pp. 14–17.

⁵⁷ “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 41.

⁵⁸ Hsiao, pp. 7–8, 161, 178–180; Mao, IV, pp. 171–218, “Resolution on Some Questions in the History of our Party,” especially pp. 191–192, and I, 71–104, “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains,” pp. 87–91.

⁵⁹ “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 41; Bur. Inv., Liang-nien lai chih Chung-kuo Kung-ch‘an-tang (Two years of the Chinese Communist Party), mimeograph (1933), p. 100. Abbreviated as Two Years.

⁶⁰ Meng, pp. 63–69.

⁶¹ Two Years, p. 100; “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” p. 42.

⁶² “Defeat of the 2nd Regiment,” pp. 42–45; Kao, pp. 15–16; Hatano, V, pp. 667–701, “Sen Kan Kosaku ni Kansuru Bunken” (“Documents concerning Shensi Kansu Work”), pp. 677–679. Kao Kang also singles out Tu Heng for attack, but on grounds of left adventurism.

⁶³ Two Years, pp. 98–101; Bur. Inv., Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang chih T'ou-shih (Penetration of the Chinese Communist Party), April 1, 1935, mimeograph. Among the defectors were Yuan Yueh-tung, secretary-general of the provincial committee, Chin Li-k'o the leading Party official in the Wei Pei area, Ning Shen-yan, Sian Party secretary, and Tu Heng, concurrently political commissar of the 26th Red Army and head of the organisation department of the Shensi Party: Meng, p. 120. Meng points out that in 1933 the KMT adopted its much-vaunted “seven parts political, three parts military” policy, intensifying efforts to get communists to defect with promises of safety, jobs, etc.

⁶⁴ Hatano, V, pp. 680–681; Kao, p. 17.

⁶⁵ Kao, ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 18. Huang is said to have proposed that the new committee be composed of Li Chieh-fu, Chang Wen-hua, Wang Lin, P'u Chien-sheng, Kao Kang and Huang Tzu-wen. While many guerrilla policies were “rightist” in the eyes of the Central Committee, there were apparently also other “rightist” proponents of educational, organisational and political work, especially in the cities, Shensi Party members who felt that the time was not ripe for rural insurrection.

⁶⁷ Ibid. It seems rather dubious that the appellation “Hitlerism” had gained currency in Shensi Party circles as early as 1933.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 19. The term “north Shensi” refers to An Ting, Ch'ing Chien and adjacent hsien which came to be known as the north Shensi base or soviet area as distinguished from the Shensi-Kansu border area. Both of these guerrilla regions are located in loessial hills of the northern part of Shensi.

⁶⁹ “North Shensi Development,” pp. 1–21. I think it may be said with assurance that this report was written by Kuo Hung-t'ao. In his polemic on Party history, Kao Kang charges that in North Shensi Party History (Shen-pei Tang-shih) Kuo Hungt'ao deliberately distorted the facts of the guerrilla movement in that area. While the two titles differ slightly, the author of the work in question describes a situation of near chaos prior to the dispatch of Kuo Hung-t'ao, who proceeds to develop the movement in accord with the correct line of the Northern Bureau. Other internal evidence confirms this conclusion.

⁷⁰ Hatano, V, pp. 682–686. Hsi Chung-hsiin was elected chairman of the Revolutionary and Liu Chih-tan chairman of the Military Committee.

⁷¹ “North Shensi Development,” pp. 20–26.

⁷² Hatano, V, pp. 682–687.

⁷³ “North Shensi Development,” pp. 21–22. Hsieh Hao-ju served as political commissar of the 42nd division with Yang Sen commander and Liu Chih-tan chief-ofstaff. The 42 division's 3rd regiment was combined with North Shensi guerrilla forces and Wang Shih-t'ai became regimental commander, with Yang Ch'i chief-of-staff. Kao Kang soon replaced Yang Ch'i, who was wounded.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 23–24. The two new areas were in the vicinity of Heng Shan, Ching Pien and An Sai hsien and in the Wu Pao, Chia hsien region.

⁷⁵ Ibid.; Special Investigation, p. 2. The intelligence report notes that Yen Hsi-shan's campaign against opium went into full swing at this time with the result that many engaged in the opium traffic between Shansi and Shensi turned to banditry and were eventually assimilated into the guerrilla forces. It should be pointed out that available Kuomintang sources concerning the decade of guerrilla activity invariably ascribe Red successes either to (1) defection of government troops or bandits or to (2) violations or errors on the part of troops engaged in communist suppression.

⁷⁶ “North Shensi Development,” pp. 23–24; Kao, p. 22. “North Shensi Development” describes this as the second annihilation campaign.

⁷⁷ Special Investigation, p. 2.

⁷⁸ “North Shensi Development” PP. 25–26. Kao, pp. 23–24. Ma Ming-fang was chairman Wang-ta-ch'eng and Ts'ui Tien-ming vice-chairmen of the Shensi-Kansu Provisional Soviet government. In the Northwest Work Committee, Ts'ui T'ien-fu served as secretary, Kuo Hung-t'ao as head of the organisation department and Ma Ming-fang as head of the propaganda department. Hsieh Hao-ju was chairman of the Military Committee with Kao Kang and Lin chih-tan as vice-chairmen.

⁷⁹ “North Shensi Development,” p.26. Hatano, V, P. 485. Kao Kuei-tzu later complained that the communists had chosen identical numbers for their three major divisions as their attackers. Thus a Red 84th, 86+th and 42nd division faced the national government‘s 84th, 86th and 42nd division, presumably compounding confusion among soldiers and peasants alike.

⁸⁰ Kao, pp. 23–24.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 25; Special Investigation, p. 2. The latter does not include Yen Ch'ang among the hsien capitals captured by the guerrillas. From May 1935 bandit suppression in north Shensi was directed from Peking with Ho Ying-ch'in the responsible military official. Chü, Kuo-fang Pu Shih-cheng (Department of History and Government, Ministry of National Defence), Chiao-fei Chan-shih (History of Bandit Extermination Wars) (1962), XI, p. 990Google Scholar.

⁸² Special Investigation, p. 2.

⁸³ Snow, p. 222. The guerrillas did not yet control the hsien capitals and larger towns in many of these 22 hsien. Cf. History of Bandit Extermination Wars, XI, p. 990Google Scholar. The latter estimates 20,000 troops under Liu Chih-tan's command by July 1935. Mr. Snow's estimate seems much more plausible on this point.

⁸⁴ Inv., Bur., Shen-Kan-Ning T'e-ch'ii Tiao-ch'a Chuan-pao (Special Report of an Investigation of the Shen-Kan-Ning Special Area) (1938)Google Scholar. The seven hsien in which redistribution of land was most advanced were Fu She (Yenan), An Sai, Pao An, Yen Ch'ang, Yen Ch'uan, Kan Ch'uan and Huan Hsien.

⁸⁵ Kao, pp. 22, 24, 33; Bur. Inv., Tiao-ch'a Chuan-pao (Special Investigation Report), No. 5, 1938, p. 20Google Scholar. Kao charges Kuo Hung-t'ao and later Chu Li-chih with initiating a leftist policy of attempting to eliminate all landlords and rich peasants and attack middle peasants (including many communists) in connection with land policy. Kao further asserts that Kuo Hung-t'ao proposed establishment of collective farms. I am aware of no contemporary evidence of attempts to form collectives in north Shensi at this time. The Conference of Delegates from Soviet Areas convened by the Li Li-san Central Committee on May 30, 1930, had made such proposals, but Li was subsequently criticised by the Comintern for this policy. See Schwartz, pp. 138–141; Hsiao, p. 21.

⁸⁶ Kao, pp. 28–29. Kao Kang's is the only account available of the policy debate in the summer of 1935.

⁸⁷ Mao's “Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War” which includes a critique of the “Third Left Line” was delivered in lectures to the Red Army College in the latter half of 1936 and published in 1941. Mao, I, pp. 175–253, especially pp. 193, 240, 251–252.

⁸⁸ “North Shensi Development,” especially pp. 23–25; Mao, IV, “Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party,” pp. 196, 201–204. Mao charges the Central Committee with promulgating the slogan “Do not yield a single inch of territory of the bases.”

⁸⁹ Hai-tung, Hsü, Shen-pei Hui-shih” (“Junction in north Shensi”), Red Memoirs, III, pp. 174–186, pp. 181–182Google Scholar. The widely quoted meeting date of July 25 given in Red Star Over China, p. 223, is incorrect. See History of Bandit Extermination Wars, XI, p. 990.

⁹⁰ Hsü, ibid., pp. 174–181; Meng, p. 136. Ch‘eng and Nieh came to north Shensi with Hsii Hai-tung. Ch'eng, the leading Party functionary with the 25th Army, became political commissar in the new 15th Army Corps.

⁹¹ Kao, p. 29; Snow, Red Star, p. 223; Liu Biography, p. 150. The latter two sources state that Liu headed the Committee at this time.

⁹² Kao, ibid., p. 33; Hsu, pp. 182–184. The official KMT military history of the northwest campaigns indicates that the blockhouse strategy which had proved decisive in forcing the Reds out of Kiangsi was also applied in north Shensi. Communist accounts of this period do not, so far as I know, make any mention of these fortifications. History of Bandit Extermination Wars, XI, p. 991.

⁹³ Kao, ibid., pp. 32–33; Mao, IV, p. 341 note, presents an identical interpretation, listing Central Committee Representative Chu Li-chih as perpetrating the incident in collaboration with Kuo Hung-t'ao. They are described as carrying out “the line of ‘left’ opportunism in political, military and organizational work. …”

⁹⁴ Inv., Bur., Pan-nien lai Shen-Kan-Ning chi Ch'uan-K'ang Pien-ching Ch'ih-fei Shuchiao, chi-k'uang (Red Bandit Disturbance During the Past Half Year in the Shen-Kan-Ning and Szechuan-Hsik'ang Borders), p. 9Google Scholar. This dispatch dated March 1937 lists Tai Li-ying as head of the political department in the northwest soviet government; Liberation Daily, December 10, 1941; Kasumigaseki-kai, , Gendai Chugoku Jinmei Jiten (Dictionary of Modern Chinese Names) (Tokyo: Gaiko Jihosha, 1962), p. 96Google Scholar. Chu Li-chih in late 1941 was director of the board of trade and president of the Border Region Bank in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Government. Kuo Hung-t'ao had been transferred to the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, where, by 1941, he was secretary of the Border Region Committee. Both Chu and Kuo held responsible positions in the sphere of economic planning after 1949.

⁹⁵ Meng, pp. 136–137.

⁹⁶ Snow, , Red Star, pp. 223–224Google Scholar; cf. Jerome Ch'en, p. 2. Mr. Snow's version was based on an account by a former staff officer of Liu Chih-tan.

⁹⁷ Hsü Hai-tung as a general of the Fourth Front Army was long associated with Chang Kuo-t'ao in the Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Soviet Area of which Chang was Chairman. Evidence may eventually come to light pointing to a fuller understanding of the arrest of north Shensi guerrilla leaders in terms of the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-t'ao. Available documentation, however, points to the incident as primarily an extension of the struggle between local guerrillas and the Central Committee. These facts confirm this interpretation:

1. Neither Mao nor Kao in their accounts of the purge hint at any involvement by Chang, who would have been an obvious target had there been reason to suspect him.

2. While Edgar Snow relates that the Shensi guerrillas were in radio contact with the main force of the Red Army, the evidence suggests that the arrests were made without consultation with the Central Committee or any outside leader.

3. Kao Kang's account of the arrest makes no mention of Hsu or Ch'eng Tzu-hua (Chang Kuo-t'ao's former subordinates). While the incident could not have occurred in the face of their active opposition, there is at present no reason to doubt that Chu Li-chih and Kuo Hung-t'ao (Central Committee representatives), with long-standing grievances against the local leaders and with a mandate to curb their “rightism,” took the lead in the arrests.

4. Though Hsu Hai-tung was a subordinate of Chang Kuo-t'ao, he had been separated from Chang for over a year, and apparently came to north Shensi independent of any orders from Chang. Concrete information concerning Hsu's relations with Chang is lacking.

5. A plot by Chang to seize control of the north Shensi movement might appear more plausible had Chang rather than Mao advocated the move to Shensi. Chang of course chose not to lead his armies to Shensi in defiance of the decisions of the Central Committee.

⁹⁸ Griffith, Samuel (trans.), Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger 1961), p. 55Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ Liu has subsequently been honoured by the Party as a martyr and model Bolshevik. His birthplace Pao An was renamed Chih Tan hsien. Campaigns in the Shen-Kan-Ning border region during the resistance war and nationally after 1949 have lauded Liu as a model for communist youth and his exploits have been recorded in numerous reminiscences and tales.

¹⁰⁰ Meng, pp. 151–163. Meng describes the frustration of many local leaders who were deprived of power after Mao's arrival in northern Shensi; True Situation, p. 5, also notes continued friction and defection of local communist forces after the junction with the Long Marchers. Tensions between local guerrilla leaders and cadres arriving from the south were a source of concern throughout the subsequent decade of united front policy and after. Though Kao Kang eventually clashed with the Mao Tse-tung leadership, it was apparently Mao who was the central figure both in the rehabilitation of local guerrilla leaders in November 1935, and Kao's subsequent rise to power. None of the individuals purged with Kao Kang in 1954 were involved in the Shensi guerrilla movement, though several worked closely with Kao during the Resistance War.

¹⁰¹ Tse-tung, Mao, “The Composition and Training of the Red Army in Earliest Days.” From a report to the Central Committee of 11 25, 1928Google Scholar. Quoted in Stuart Schram, pp. 195–196. Italics in original.

¹⁰² Mao, , Selected Works, I, p. 102Google Scholar. This is the same item (revised) as in note 101. In the Selected Works it is entitled “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains.” Cf. Jerome Ch'en's sensitive analysis of this incident, pp. 142–143.

¹⁰³ Mao, I, pp. 90–100.

¹⁰⁴ Eto.

¹⁰⁵ In the following discussion I use Mao and Liu as a convenient shorthand for the leadership of the respective guerrilla movements. In each case creative innovation was the product of group experience and group leadership, though it was of course Mao who articulated and elucidated the principles developed most clearly

¹⁰⁶ Liu and many of his men in northern Shensi, however, unlike the soldiers in the Chingkang mountains, were natives of their guerrilla base area and profited from an intimate knowledge of local conditions as well as personalities.

¹⁰⁷ Snow, , Red Star, p. 300Google Scholar. Cf. Mao, I, pp. 147–152, “Take Care of the Living Conditions of the Masses and Attend to the Methods of Work.”

¹⁰⁸ Snow, , Red Star, pp. 253–254Google Scholar; cf. Snow, , Random Notes on Red China (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 49, 60–61Google Scholar.