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The Foreign Policy of North Korea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Robert A. Scalapino
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Extract

On October 23, 1962, Premier Kim Il-song outlined the foreign policy of his government before the Supreme People's Assembly, meeting in Pyongyang. His lengthy speech, entitled “Immediate Tasks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” ranged over both domestic and foreign policy issues. To set forth the major themes of that speech is a convenient method of introducing the foreign policy of North Korea.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 14 , June 1963 , pp. 30 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1963

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References

1 For an English translation of portions of this speech, see “Premier Kim Il-song Makes Speech on Immediate Tasks of DPRK Government,” The People's Korea, No. 88, 10 31, 1962, pp. 1–7.Google Scholar

2 Ibid. p. 6.

3 Ibid. p. 6.

4 Ibid. p. 6.

5 Ibid. pp. 6–7

6 Ibid. p. 7.

7 Ibid. p. 7.

8 Ibid. p. 7.

9 Ibid. p. 7.

10 Ibid. p. 7.

11 Ibid. p. 7.

12 Rodong Sinmun (Labour News), 07 2, 1961, p. 1.Google Scholar

13 There has been no Communist proposal for the neutralisation of South Korea, as in the case of South Vietnam, but the insistence upon the removal of American forces aims towards the same basic objective.

14 An article in the Minju Choson, 07 24, 1962Google Scholar, as reported by Radio, Pyongyang07 26, 1962.Google Scholar

15 Khrushchev's speech as reported in The People's Korea, No. 24, 07 12, 1961, p. 2.Google Scholar

16 Ibid. No. 25, July 19, 1961, p. 1; see also Peking Review, No. 28, 07 14, 1961, pp. 5–7.Google Scholar

17 Premier Chou En-lai's speech as reported in The People's Korea, No. 25, op. cit., p. 2.Google Scholar

18 Rodong Sinmun, 11 8, 1961, p. 1.Google Scholar

19 For some details, see my article, “Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 01 1963, pp. 323–343Google Scholar

20 Rodong Sinmun carried the full text of this speech on pp. 1–2 of its 11 28, 1961, issue.Google Scholar

21 See Rodong Sinmun, 11 29, 1961, p. 1Google Scholar, for the official message.

22 The People's Korea, No. 63, 05 9, 1962, p. 1.Google Scholar

23 Radio, Pyongyang, 09 26, 1962.Google Scholar

24 See the significant Rodong Sinmun editorial, “Let's hold aloft the Revolutionary Banner of Marxism-Leninism,” 11 17, 1962Google Scholar, an abridged translation of which is carried in The People's Korea, No. 92, 11 28, 1962, p. 2.Google Scholar

25 See the statement issued November 23, 1962, by the DPRK government, partly translated in ibid. p. 1.

26 See speeches made at the Pyongyang rally of October 26, 1962, as reported in ibid. No. 89, November 7, 1962, p. 2.

27 Events taking place since this essay was written further confirm this thesis. At the 12th Congress of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, held December 4–8, 1962, the Korean Workers' Party was openly attacked for the first time by pro-Moscow elements after its spokesman had protested against the continuing criticisms of the Chinese Communists.

At the 6th Congress of the German Socialist Unity Party, January 15–21, 1963, Li Hyo-soon, leader of the KWP delegation, was prevented from delivering his prepared speech orally (although a Tito representative was allowed to speak) and, according to Korean sources, only an abridged version of the speech was released to the delegates in printed form.

Indeed, according to an angry editorial published in the January 30, 1963, issue of Nodong Sinmun, the Korean delegation was confronted in East Berlin with open hostility, and the question, “On which side are you?” Chinese Communist organs of this period make it clear that the Chinese regarded North Korea as firmly on their side, along with most other Asian Parties. So did Thorez and other Western Communist leaders. The North Koreans did nothing to deny this assumption. On the contrary, throughout the spring of 1963. Nodong Sinmun and other organs of the KWP took positions on all of the burning issues within the bloc virtually identical to those being taken by the Chinese. Pyongyang was now the boldest, most open ally of Peking in Asia.