1. The majority of the current literature on China and arms control is devoted to documenting and characterizing the shifts in China's arms control and nonproliferation practices. A small number of sources explicitly discuss the various institutions involved in arms control and nonproliferation policy-making and the influences on their decisions. See Gill, Bates and Stephenson, Mathew, “Search for common ground: breaking the Sino-U.S. non-proliferation stalemate,” Arms Control Today, 09 1996Google Scholar; Johnson, Alastair lain, “Learning versus adaptation: explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s,” The China Journal, 01 1996Google Scholar; Individuals, Institutions, and Policies in the Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Community, Conference Report, East Asia Nonproliferation Project (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1997)Google Scholar; Medeiros, Evan S. and Gill, Bates, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players and Process, unpublished manuscript, 2000Google Scholar; Lewis, John W., Di, Hua, and Litai, Xue, “Beijing's defense establishment: solving the arms-export enigma,” International Security, Spring 1991.Google Scholar

2. Some key Chinese sources include: Xiaogong, Chen (ed.), Junbei kongzhi yu guoji anquan shouce (Arms Control and International Security Handbook)Google Scholar; Zhenqiang, Pan et al. (eds.), Guoji caijun yu junbei kongzhi (International Disarmament and Arms Control) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1996)Google Scholar; Xiangwan, Du (ed.), Hejunbei kongzhi de kexue jishu (Foundations of Nuclear Arms Control Science and Technology) (Beijing: Guofang gongye chubanshe, 1996)Google Scholar; Deli, Wang et al. (eds.), Junbei kongzhi lunwen xuanji (Arms Control Collected Works) (Beijing: Kexue yu guojia anquan yanjiu jihua, 1995)Google Scholar; Mingquan, Zhu, Hekuosan: weixian yu fangzhi (Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Prevention) (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 1995)Google Scholar; Mingquan, Zhu, “The evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy,” The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997)Google Scholar; Hu, Weixing, “Nuclear nonproliferation,” in Deng, Yong and Wang, Fe-Ling (eds.), In the Eyes of the Dragon (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999)Google Scholar; Yun, Wu, “China's policies towards arms control and disarmament: from passive responding to active leading,” Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ning, Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 113–17.Google Scholar

3. In fact, since the early 1980s, China has changed its position on when it would enter into strategic arms control discussions with the other nuclear powers. In the early 1980s, China initially stated that it would consider such a step when the U.S. and Soviet Union achieved a 50% reduction in their nuclear arsenals. However, by 1988 China stated that the United States and Soviet Union would have to achieve “drastic” or “substantial” reductions in their nuclear arsenals before China would be willing to enter multilateral arms reduction negotiations. It now appears China may place qualitative as well quantitative conditions on any future decision to join multilateral strategic reductions talks.

4. The Soviet Union last tested in October 1990; Russia has not since tested; the last U.S. test was in September 1992; the last UK test was in November 1991. France had participated in the moratorium for nearly four years, from late 1991 until late 1995, when it resumed its final series of six tests which ran from September 1995 to January 1996. Also during this period, the international community reached the decision to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (in May 1995), which was achieved in large measure by a commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to engage earnestly in meaningful disarmament efforts, such as the CTBT.

5. Littlejohns, Michael, “UN votes against N-testing,” The Financial Times, 14 12 1995, p. 6.Google Scholar

6. “Sources indicate plans for nuclear test halted,” Itar-Tass, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FB1S-CHI-95–211, 31 10 1995Google Scholar; “Intention to grant yen loans to PRC firms up,” Yomiuri ShimbunGoogle Scholar, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, FBIS-EAS-95–208, 26 10 1995.Google Scholar

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8. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 07 1996Google Scholar; Conference on Disarmament document CD/1410, 29 July 1996.

9. Zukang, Sha quoted in the Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), 16 11 1996, p. 4Google Scholar, and reprinted by the NAPSNet Daily Report, Nautilus Institute, 21 11 1996.Google Scholar

10. The UNROCA was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36L in December 1991. The register first began recording submissions from United Nations members in 1993 for their imports and exports of major conventional weapons in calendar year 1992. China's 1998 defence white paper compiles and presents all of its UNROCA submissions. The register can be accessed via the internet at: http://domino.un.org/REGISTER.nsf.

11. Wei, Gao, “Military shines in civilian sector,” China Daily, 19 01 1998.Google Scholar According to this source, “exports by 1,400 military firms and research institutes in 1997 are expected to add up to US$7 billion, half of which were civilian products.” The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that China exported US$1 billion in 1997 to developing countries and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the volume of Chinese arms exports in 1997 approximated US$338 million.

12. China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 11 1995).Google Scholar

13. See Choi, Kang and Wattanayagorn, Panitan, “Development of defence white papers in the Asia-Pacific Region,” in Gill, Bates and Mak, J. N. (eds.), Armi, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 79–92.Google Scholar

14. Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 08 1995Google Scholar, reprinted by NAPSNet, Nautilus Institute, 11 09 1995.Google Scholar

15. China's National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 07 1998).Google Scholar For an English version see: www.chinanews.org; for a Chinese version see www.peopledaily.com.cn/9807/28/current/newfiles/a1010.html.

16. Interviews with Foreign Ministry officials, Beijing, 09 1998Google Scholar; Monterey, CA, April 1999.

17. Itokawa, Noriyoshi, “Sino-Japanese security talks discussed,” Asahi ShimbunGoogle Scholar, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CH1–96–013, 16 01 1996.Google Scholar

18. Interviews, Beijing, November 1996.

19. Conversations with current and former PLA officials, Beijing, September 1998.

20. Gill, Bates, Silkworms and Summitry: Chinese Arms Exports to Iran and U.S.-China Relations (Washington, D.C.: Asia Pacific Rim Institute, 12, 1997.)Google Scholar

21. On U.S.-China relations and the silkworm missile deal see Gill, R. Bates, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns and Prospects in the New World Order (Wesport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 99–100, 110Google Scholar; see also Chanda, Nayan, “Technology cocooned: U.S. retaliates against China's sale of Silkworm missiles,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 1987, p. 27.Google Scholar

22. This act, also known as the Gore-McCain Act, is targeted at countries that transfer “destabilizing numbers and types” of conventional weapons to either Iran or Iraq.

23. Lim, Benjamin, “Beijing defends selling Iran arms,” The Washington Times, 4 06 1997, p. A4.Google Scholar

24. Strobel, Warren P. and Gertz, Bill, “Chinese general hits arms reports,” The Washington Times, 10 12 1996, p. A1Google Scholar; “Perry tells Chinese that sales of arms to Iran could backfire,” Associated Press, 10 12 1996Google Scholar; “Chi says Chinese arms proliferation ‘exaggerated’,” Reuters, 9 12 1996.Google Scholar

25. Gertz, Bill, “Senate asks for sanctions on China,” The Washington Times, 18 06 1997, p. 13.Google Scholar

26. Gellman, Barton, “Reappraisal led to new China policy,” The Washington Post, 22 06 1988, p. 1Google Scholar; Gellman, Barton, “U.S. and China nearly came to blows in 1996,” The Washington Post, 21 06 1998, p. 1.Google Scholar

27. Erlanger, Steve, “U.S. says Chinese will stop sending missiles to Iran,” The New York Times, 11 10 1997, p. 1.Google Scholar

28. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact sheet: accomplishments of the U.S.-China summit,” 30 10 1997.Google Scholar

29. Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 07 1998).Google Scholar This report was submitted by the CIA Director to Congress as required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. This report is unclassified and can be found on the internet at http://www.cia.goy/cia/publications/acq1997.html.

30. Gertz, Bill, “China agrees to deal with Iran on missiles,” The Washington Times, 19 08 1999, p. 1.Google Scholar

31. McCarthy, Timothy V., A Chronology of PRC Missile Trade and Developments (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 02 1992).Google Scholar

32. On Chinese ballistic missile-related assistance to Iran, see Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions – July–December 1996, 06 1997.Google Scholar A more detailed account is in Gill, , Silkworms and Summitry.Google Scholar

33. China only agreed to adhere to the original 1987 guidelines and parameters of the MTCR which ban the export of missiles which are inherently capable of delivering a 300 km pay load over 500 km. If China agrees to the 1993 revisions of the MTCR, which ban the exports of any delivery vehicles intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, then China's exports of the 8610 may no longer be permissible.

34. See Kan, Shirley A., Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1996).Google Scholar

35. Testimony of Dr Gordon Oehler, Hearing on Proliferation of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 11 June 1998; Gertz, Bill, “China assists Iran, Libya on missile,” The Washington Times, 16 06 1998, pp. 1–3.Google Scholar

36. The largest MTCR loophole for China is the fact that Beijing has not agreed to accept the MTCR's annex which outlines all the missile sub-systems and related missile technologies controlled by the MTCR. Chinese officials claim to have an internal control list but have refused to show it to U.S. officials during negotiations. Without acceptance of the MTCR annex, Chinese companies can export certain missile technologies – especially dual-use ones like titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel – while maintaining that China is in compliance with the MTCR.

37. A comprehensive discussion of Iran's nuclear-related imports is found in Koch, Andrew and Wolf, Jeanette, “Iran's nuclear procurement program: how close to the bomb?” Nonproliferalion Review, Fall 1997, pp. 123–135.Google Scholar

38. Hibbs, Mark, “IAEA explores Iran's intentions, minus evidence of weapons drive,” Nucleonics Week, 13 02 1992, p. 12Google Scholar; Hibbs, Mark, “IAEA says it found no non-peaceful activity during recent Iran visit,” Nucleonics Week, 16 12 1993, p. 11.Google Scholar

39. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he chukou guanzhi tiaoli (Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Exports) (Beijing: Guowuyuan, 09 1997.)Google Scholar Also see “Regulations on nuclear export control,” Xinhua, in FBIS-CHI-97–256, 11 September 1997; Wandi, Jiang, “Tighter export controls on nuclear exports,” Beijing Review, 1–7 12 1997, pp. 21–23.Google Scholar

40. “Nuclear product controls issued,” Xinhua, in FBIS-CHI-98–170, 19 06 1998.Google Scholar

41. Hibbs, Mark, “Sensitive Iran reactor deal may hinge on MFN for China,” Nucleonics Week, 1 10 1992, pp. 5–6Google Scholar; Coll, Steve, “U.S. halted nuclear bid by Iran,” The Washington Post, 17 11 1992, p. A1.Google Scholar

42. Sciolino, Elaine, “China cancels deal for selling Iran two reactors,” The New York Times, 28 09 1995, p. A1.Google Scholar

43. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger,” 29 10 1997Google Scholar; Smith, R. Jeffrey, “China's pledge to end Iran nuclear aid yields U.S. help,” The Washington Post, 30 10 1997, p. 1.Google Scholar

44. “China agrees to end nuclear trade with Iran when two projects completed,” Nuclear Fuel, 3 11 1997, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

45. Interviews, Beijing, September 1999.

46. Guang, Xie et al. (eds.), Dangdai Zhongguo de guotang keji shiye (Contemporary China's Defence Science and Technology Undertakings) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1992), pp. 73–81.Google Scholar On Chinese cruise missile-related assistance to Iran, see Jacobs, Gordon and McCarthy, Tim, “China's missile sales – few changes for the future,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 12 1992, p. 561.Google Scholar

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48. Interview, Beijing, December 1997.

49. The Chinese translation of the General Armaments Department is Zong zhuangbei bu. Although the term “zhuangbei” is often translated as “equipment,” Chinese officials and scholars normally refer to this new organization as the General Armaments Department and not the General Equipment Department.

50. Draft version of Cupitt, Richard T. and Murayama, Yuzo, Export Controls of the People's Republic of China 1998, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, p. 17.Google Scholar

51. Interviews and discussions with Chinese officials and nonproliferation specialists, Beijing, April and May 1998.

52. Sun, Xiangli, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban for China's Security PolicyGoogle Scholar, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, June 1997, p. 8. Dr Sun is a physicist working for the Arms Control Research Division of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics within the Chinese strategic weapons research and development complex.

53. “China still balks at total test ban,” The Washington Times, 12 01 1996, p. A13.Google Scholar

54. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 07 1996Google Scholar; Conference on Disarmament document CD/1410, 29 July 1996.

55. With 45 tests over a period of 381 months (October 1964 to July 1996), China averaged about 0.118 tests every month, or 2.95 tests over a 25-month period. Comparably intensive testing occurred over the period October 1975 to December 1978, when China tested nine times over a 38-month period, and four times in 1976 alone.

56. Thirty-two of China's 45 tests – more than 70% – took place in either May–June or September–October.

57. This statement was made in a report released by Zhao Qizheng, Minister of Information of the State Council. “Facts speak louder than words and lies will collapse by themselves – further refutation of the Cox Report,” Information Office of the State Council, 15 July 1999. This report can be found on the internet at http://www.china.org.cn/.

58. Yunhua, Zou in Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies), No. 1 (01 1994).Google Scholar Sr. Col. Zou is posted to the Arms Control Group of the GAD (formerly COSTIND) and served in Geneva with the Chinese delegation to the CD during the CTBT negotiations.

59. These points are made by Sun, “Implications of a comprehensive test ban,” p. 11.Google Scholar Sha Zukang, who served as the Chinese ambassador to the CD during CTBT talks, was especially active in presenting the Ministry's case to the military leadership. Interviews, Beijing, April 1997.

60. Lewis, et al. , “Beijing's defense establishment,” p. 95.Google Scholar

61. Ning, Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, pp. 113–17.Google Scholar

62. Ibid.

63. Lewis, et al. , “Beijing's defense establishment” p. 95.Google Scholar

64. China: Anns Control and Disarmament, section 5.

65. “Regulations on nuclear export control,” Xinhua, FBIS-CHI-97–256, 11 09 1997.Google Scholar

66. “Nuclear product controls issued,” Xinhua, FBIS-CHI-98–170, 19 06 1998.Google Scholar

67. Medeiros, and Gill, , Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Process and Players, pp. 33–41.Google Scholar

68. Ning, Lu, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, pp. 113–17.Google Scholar

69. 1989 interview with COSTINO official as cited in Lewis, et al. , “Beijing's defense establishment,” p. 95.Google Scholar

70. These missiles' names are derived from the English word “missile,” indicating their explicit export orientation. Once the M-9 and M-11 were completed and tested, the PLA purchased some and gave them the designations DF-15 and DF-11 respectively.

71. Lardy, Nicholas R., Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China 1978–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 16–36Google Scholar; Lardy, Nicholas R., “Chinese foreign trade,” in Ash, Robert et al. (eds.), The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), pp. 217–246.Google Scholar