1. Micro-level management concerns management within a factory; macro-level management concerns co-ordinating and planning inter-enterprise relationships.

2. Franz Schumann has called this “functional dualism.” See Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966)Google Scholar, ch.4.

3. See Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, ch. 4.

4. For a fuller explanation of this development, see my Ph.D. dissertation, “Factory Management in China: The Politics of Modernization in a Revolutionary Society,” Columbia University, 1974Google Scholar.

5. Ching, Shih, “The negation that negates everything,” Jen-min jih-pao (JMJP) (Peking), 30 08 1959Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2093, pp. 2–5. See also, “Communique of the 8th plenary session of the 8th Central Committee,” NCNA, English (Peking), 26 08 1959Google ScholarPubMed, in Current Background (CB), No. 589, pp. 1–4.

6. I-po, Po, “For new victories in industrial production and construction in our country,' Hung-ch'i (Red Flag), Nos. 3–4, 1 02 1961Google Scholar, in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), No. 250, pp. 9–18.

7. JMJP editorial, “All enterprises should establish and perfect the responsibility system,” NCNA (Peking), 22 02 1961Google ScholarPubMed.

8. “Perfecting responsibility systems,” Chieh-fang jih-pao, No. 7 (Shanghai), 5 06 1961Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 312, pp. 16–20. For other articles which stress the same themes in great detail, see Po, Hai, “On the question of authority in socialist economic work: after reading Engels' On Authority,” Hung-ch'i, No. 1, 1 01 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 298, pp. 24–30; “An important problem in strengthening enterprise leadership work” (“Chia-ch'iang ch'i-yeh ling-tao kung-tso ti yi-ko chung-yao wen-t'i”), JMJP, 4 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2561, pp. 7–10Google Scholar. This article was originally carried in the magazine, Vanguard (Ch'ien-hsien) in Peking, and according to a former Party member now in Hong Kong, was attacked during the Cultural Revolution as a source of revisionist ideas. For other articles, see “Mobilize the masses; construct and perfect strict responsibility systems” (“Fa-tung ch'un-chung; chien-li ho chien ch'uan yen-ko ti tse-jen-chih ”), JMJP, 17 12 1961, in SCMP, No. 2654, pp. 3–6Google Scholar; “Everything has someone to manage it and everyone knows his responsibility” (“Shih-shih yu jen kuan; jenjen ming chih tse”), Nan-fang jih-pao (NFJP), 3 May 1962. See also Wu-wen, Fei, Shih-yung, Kuei, and Fu-yung, Liu, “On the responsibility system of the socialist state owned industrial enterprises,” in Ching-chi yen-chiu, No. 7, 3 08 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 333, pp. 29–41. This latter reference is a rather good, comprehensive argument in favour of specialists, with some interesting comments on the relation-ship between class and the division of labour.

9. Fei Wu-wen, et al, “On the responsibility system,” ibid.

10. Ibid. See also Hsü Hsin-hsueh, “Further strengthen the responsibility system in industrial enterprises,” Hung-ch'i, No. 20, 16 10 1961, in SCMM, No. 298, pp. 25–30. Also, see Chekiang Daily editorial, “On role of Party Committees,” Hangchow Domestic Radio, 8 April 1962, and Nanking Domestic Radio, 15 April 1962, for further evidence of the Party's function. An article by Kuang-chao, Yueh, “Fixed personnel and labour norms of industrial enterprises,” JMJP, 18 11 1961, in SCMP, No. 2634, pp. 1–7, especially p. 2Google Scholar, shows the importance of quotas and norms in the planning process above the enterprise, and thus terms their calculation a major task of the Party.

11. I-po, Po, “For new victories,” Hung-ch'i, No. 5Google Scholar.

12. See Barnett, A. Doak, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 18–37 and 203Google Scholar.

13. “Permanent supply relations between factories established in a number of factories in Shanghai through intensification of co-operation,” JMJP, 18 01 1962, in SCMP, No. 2673, pp. 2–4Google Scholar; “Thoroughly develop rationalization work for material utilization” (“Shen-ju k'ai-chan wu-tzu ho-li-yung kung-tso ”), Kung-jen jih-pao (KJJP), 20 January 1961, for the situation in Shanghai. For a report on the role of the Shenyang Municipal Party Committee, see Ch'un, Chi, “In the midst of confusion, grasp firmly material supplies” (“Jang-san-kuan-ch'i-hsia, ta kua yuan-liao ts'ai-liao”), JMJP, 19 01 1961Google Scholar. See also JMJP editorial, “Strengthen economic co-ordination,” JMJP, 2 04 1963, in SCMP, No. 2696, pp. 4–6Google Scholar. Formally, economic planning and co-ordination was a government, not a Party, role, just as within the enterprise, operations was a task for the director and his organization, not the Party. But the Party's involvement on an individual as well as organizational basis was constant.

14. For a discussion, though an inadequate one, of this controversy and the issues involved, see “The short lived liberal phase in economic thinking in Communist China,” Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA/RR ER 63–14.

15. JMJP editorial, “Further promote diversified undertakings and multiple utilization,” NCNA (Peking), 19 01 1961Google Scholar. Permission to do this had to be granted from higher levels of economic authority.

16. For a fairly clear statement of the position, see Ta-kung Pao (TKP) editorial, “Unfolding economic co-operation in a well planned manner,” TKP, 30 01 1962, in SCMP, No. 2689, pp. 8–10Google Scholar. Also, JMJP editorial, “Step up economic co-ordination,” NCNA (Peking), 15 12 1961Google ScholarPubMed. See also, Nan-fang jih-pao editorial, “Correctly handle the relationship between the state and enterprises,” NFJP, 7 04 1962, in SCMP, No. 2750, pp. 4–7Google Scholar, and Ch'eng, Ouyang, “On socialist economic co-operation, TKP, 9 02 1962, SCMP, No. 2689, pp. 1–6Google Scholar.

17. JMJP editorial, “Develop the revolutionary spirit of running enterprises with industry and thrift and carry out a strict system of business accounting,” JMJP, 7 07 1963, in SCMP, No. 3031, pp. 1–4Google Scholar.

18. “Correctly handle the relationship,” NFJP, 7 April 1962; also, Ch'eng, Ouyang, “On socialist economic co-operation,” TKP, 9 02 1962Google Scholar. See also a good discussion of contracts in Ling, Wang, “Handle economic contracts correctly,” KJJP, 26 11 1961, in SCMP, No. 2639, pp. 3–5Google Scholar. The question of “fault” in contract breaking was, it seems, handled by local governmental or Party authority, not by courts, even though contracts were “legally” binding on both parties. See Li, Victor, “The role of law in Communist China,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 44 (1970), pp. 100–101Google Scholar. Also, Pfeffer, Richard M., “The institution of contracts in the People's Republic of China,” in two parts, CQ Nos. 14 and 15 (1963), pp. 153–77, 115–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19. These arguments are developed in the following sources: Chin, Wen, “Problems concerning fixing targets in the management of industrial enterprises,” TKP, 26 11 1962, in SCMP, No. 2921, pp. 15–20Google Scholar. See also Ta, Chih and Cheng, Ho, “The profits of socialist enterprises; their significance and the way to earn them,” Ching-chi yen-chiu, No. 10, 17 10 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 341, pp. 38–45. Also Hsin-chung, Sung, “Acquire a correct idea of the profit problem of a socialist enterprise,” TKP, 13 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2792, pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

20. Retained profits existed in both of these systems. But only in the second did it play a role in incentives, since retained profits were a fixed percentage of total profit, and total profit was the criteria for evaluating the enterprise's contribution to the economy. In the first system retained profits were to be used to meet local needs determined politically. In the second system, there was nothing else but administrative control to prevent their anti-social use. See Hsin-chung, Sung, “The system of retaining a percentage of profits by our enterprises,” TKP, 12 05 1961, in SCMP, No. 2543, pp. 7–8Google Scholar. The retained profits made up a portion of the enterprise's “circulating funds”; the other portion being the enterprise's “finance funds,” an amount given to the enterprise as part of the annual plan for capital construction, technical revolution, and the purchase of fixed assets (machinery, office equipment, etc.). The banks were to play a major role in regulating management's use of these funds. A decision to use these funds was the province of the Party Committee of the enterprise, while another portion of the enterprise's finances, the credit fund, was to be loaned less rigorously by the banks for short term emergencies. Presumably, the factory director had control over use of these funds, with the bank's support or permission or the support or permission of a higher level economic body or Party organization. It is possible that many Party secretaries and directors used their power over these funds for self-enrichment or for special privileges (cars, expense accounts, etc.). An early attack on such practices came indirectly in mid-1961. See “Exposing the truth about so-called ‘self-management of enterprises’ in Yugoslavia,” Hung-ch'i, No. 11,1 07 1961Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 266, pp. 25–31. For a discussion of this system see TKP editorial, “Satisfactorily control and use the circulating funds of industry,” TKP, 20 06 1961Google Scholar, in SCMP, No. 2543, pp. 5–7. Also Richman, Barry, Industrial Society in Communist China (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 61–62, 107–110 and 476 ffGoogle Scholar. In short, both retained pro-fits and “credit funds” were open to fairly easy misuse by a management so disposed, and if the Party Secretary was also a manager, or at least close friends with one, the potential for trouble increased greatly.

21. The issue of “trusts” and the use of price as a mechanism of economic co-ordination came out more clearly during the Cultural Revolution. See, for example, the series of articles in Shanghai's, Chieh-fang jih-pao for 06 and 07, 1967Google Scholar. Also see “Down with ‘three anti’ element and ‘big renegade Po I-po,’ sinister despot on the industrial and communications front,” and “Forty charges against Po I-po” in CB No. 878, pp. 1–15, 16–20. Also, see Li, Ho and Chia-chen, Chu, “Refuting the production price theory formulated by Comrade Yang Chienp'ai and others,” Wen-hui-pao (Shanghai), 11 12 1964Google Scholar. After October 1961, the First Ministry of Machine Building began to move in a direction that seemed to be in harmony with the idea of trusts. Economic relationships between enterprises in the machine industry, rather than handled through governmental departments at various levels, were handled it seems by signing contracts directly between enterprises with no governmental planning other than price fixing. Moreover, specialization in the machine tool enterprises, another characteristic of “trusts,” began to be advocated to replace multiple undertakings and comprehensiveness. See “First Ministry of Machine Building adjusts factory relationships,” JMJP, 30 01 1962, in SCMP, No. 2681, pp. 14–15Google Scholar, and also articles on specialization in the machine industry beginning late in 1963, e.g. Mu-han, Fan, “On specialization in industrial production,” Ching-chi yen-chiu (CCYC), No. 10, 17 10 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 392, pp. 32–39.

22. Ch'eng, Ouyang, “On socialist economic co-operation,” TKP, 9 02 1962Google Scholar.

23. See note 20 above for more on the role of banks as supervisory organs.

24. For a discussion of these functions of finance and accounting in China's industrial enterprises, see Yeh-ch'ing, Wen, “Why is it necessary to carry out team and section business accounting?” KJJP, 5 09 1961, in CB, No. 673, pp. 1–2Google Scholar; Ch'un-t'ai, Tso, “The establishment and development of an economic accounting system in China,” 04 1962, in SCMP, No. 2767, pp. 1–9Google Scholar, and Jun-jui, Yang and Hsun, Li, “A tentative discussion on economic accounting of industrial enterprises,” JMJP, 19 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2817, pp. 13–20Google Scholar.

25. See Yeh-ch'ing, Wen, “The contents and methods of team and section business accounting,” KJJP, 7 09 1961, in CB, No. 673, pp. 3–4Google Scholar.

26. Ch'un-t'ai, Tso, “The establishment and development of an economic accounting system,” 04 1962Google Scholar.

27. Hai, Tso, “Mass accounting must be correctly combined with specialized accounting,” TKP, 12 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2551, pp. 5–9Google Scholar.

28. Ch'eng-jui, Li and Ch'un-t'ai, Tso, “Several problems concerning economic accounting in socialist enterprises,” Hung-ch'i, No. 9, 1 10 1961Google Scholar. See also JMJP editorial, “Each and every enterprise must strengthen economic accounting,” JMJP,24 12 1961, in SCMP, No. 2660, pp. 1–4Google Scholar.

29. See “Tentative regulations governing duties and powers of accounting personnel,” JMJP, 9 01 1963, in SCMP, No. 2909, pp. 2–8Google Scholar. These regulations were first adopted by the State Council on 24 November 1962. They were not as insistent on the need to set up a separate or independent financial department in the enterprise, as were articles on the subject appearing in late 1961.

30. Hsin-hsueh, Hsu, “Strengthen further economic accounting in enterprises,” Hung-ch'i, No. 18, 16 09 1961Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 282, pp. 18–22. Also, Ch'eng-jui, Li, “On socialist economic accounting,” TKP, 10 12 1962Google Scholar.

31. Yeh-ch'ing, Wen, “Why is it necessary to carry out team and section business accounting?” KJJP, 5 09 1961Google Scholar. The following description of accounting at the basic level is taken from this rather detailed study of basic level accounting in the machine building industry.

32. These men were elected (for part-time duty usually), by the workers and had direct contact with higher level financial authority in the plant who checked on their work, or did the calculations. In the second instance, work team personnel served more as communications links than accountants.

33. See Jih-an, K'uang et al. , “Tentative views on the question of practice of strict economic accounting by state owned industrial enterprises,” CCYC, No. 8, 17 08 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 388, pp. 30–42.

34. JMJP editorial, “Strengthen the technical management of industrial enterprises,” JMJP, 8 04 1963, SCMP, No. 2967, pp. 12–14Google Scholar.

35. Kuang, Han, “Several problems concerning technical work in industry,” Hung-ch'i, No. 24, 16 12 1961Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 295, pp. 1–8.

36. Ibid.

37. K'ai, Wang, “Preliminary understanding of several points,” KJJP, 19 06 1962, in SCMP, No. 2787, pp. 3–5Google Scholar.

38. Kuang, Han, “Several problems concerning technical work,” Hung-ch'i, 16 12 1961Google Scholar. See also JMJP editorial, “Technical innovations must be repeatedly tested,” JMJP, 25 November 1961.

39. Jun-chih, Kao, “How to bring up and use technical personnel,” KJJP, 3 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2789, pp. 11–13Google Scholar.

40. Between 1957 and 1958, “23,500 spare time universities and part-work part-study universities were established,” cited from NCNA, 1 September 1959, by Orleans, Leo, Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 23Google Scholar.

41. For a clear diagram of the “two track” nature of the Chinese educational system in 1960, see ibid. p. 11.

42. Pin, Jao, “Correctly train and use engineers and technicians,” KJJP, 30 08 1962, in SCMP, No. 2823, pp. 9–13Google Scholar. An example of how the graduates of the full-time track began moving into positions of authority can be seen in a report on the Shipyards, Hsin-chiang, JMJP, 9 09 1961, in SCMP, No. 2584, pp. 18–19Google Scholar. Here, over 70 engineering and technical personnel had graduated from secondary specialized schools or higher level colleges. Eight of these men were made vice-directors of the yard, and the rest were in charge of technology, and were section chiefs, section vice-chiefs, workshop foremen and deputy workshop foremen.

43. JMJP editorial, “Further develop the role of technical personnel in indus-trial enterprises,” JMJP, 17 11 1961, in SCMP, No. 2635, pp. 4–7Google Scholar. See also, K'o-chien, Shih, “Bringing the strength of technical personnel in full play,” Hung-ch'i, No. 8–9, 25 04 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 314, pp. 47–50.

44. Richman, , Industrial Society in Communist China, p. 298Google Scholar; Also, Nee, Victor, The Cultural Revolution in Peking University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 13Google Scholar note, citing higher education in 1965.

45. For an interesting discussion of these phenomena, see Ch'ung-lin, Wang, “Make friends with engineers and technicians,” KJJP, 19 06 1962, in SCMP, No. 2787, pp. 6–7Google Scholar. That many of the “bourgeois” technicians did not have the proper “political” or ideological attitudes towards life and work in general was implicitly admitted and clearly accepted in late 1961 and 1962. See, e.g. the JMJP editorial of 17 November 1961. But this did not mean that all technicians and engineers had politically and ideologically identical views of themselves and the world. The significance of the difference in views was to be crucial during the Cultural Revolution. Nor did it mean that technicians and engineers from other backgrounds were ignored. For example, see “The ranks of technicians at Anshan Steel Plant grow continuously,” KJJP, 27 September 1963.

46. Ta-chih, Feng, “Handle well the relationship among the four parties,” KJJP, 14 08 1962, in SCMP, No. 2809, pp. 8–10Google Scholar.

47. Mao-li, Ch'en, “Fulfilment of duties and authority,” KJJP, 19 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2792, pp. 6–8Google Scholar. Also, An-hsi, Chou, “How to protect the authority of technical personnel,” KJJP, 13 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2789, pp. 13–14Google Scholar. Ch'en was a vice-director and engineer at Wuhan Iron and Steel Works.

48. See Richman, , Industrial Society in Communist China, p. 296Google Scholar.

49. K'o-chien, Shih, “Bringing the strength of technical personnel in full play,” Hung-chi,25 04 1962Google Scholar.

50. Ch'ao-po, Li, “Unite and contribute greater strength to socialist construction,” KJJP, 25 08 1962, in SCMP, No. 2823, pp. 7–9Google Scholar.

51. She Shu-tseng, , “Management of warehouses in industrial enterprises” (“Kung-yeh ch'i-yeh ling-k'u kuan-li”), TKP, 28 05 1962Google Scholar.

52. JMJP editorial, “Strictly enforce the inspection system,” JMJP, 6 09 1961, in SCMP, No. 2582, pp. 14–17Google Scholar.

53. JMJP editorial, “Carry out inspection and repairs in a planned manner,” JMJP,8 06 1961, in SCMP, No. 2521, pp. 17–19Google Scholar. Also, JMJP editorial, “Thoroughly perfect maintenance and repair of metallurgical equipment,” JMJP, 29 03 1961, in SCMP, No. 2476, pp. 20–22Google Scholar.

54. For detailed descriptions of very different developments during this period, see the following sources: (a) CCP Committee, Yao Hua Glass Factory, Shanghai, “Firmly grasp and go deep into the first line of production” (“Chin-ch'ih shen-ju sheng-ch'an ti-yi hsien”), JMJP, 11 01 1961Google Scholar. (b) CCP Committee, Yutienpao Coal Mine, “Improve work style, strengthen and perfect systems” (“Kai-chin tsofeng, chien-ch'uan chih-tu”), KJJP, 30 05 1961Google Scholar. (c) “Yutienpao Coal Mine mobilizes the masses to manage modernized enterprises well” (“Yu-tien-pao meik'uang fa-tung ch'un-chung kuan-hao hsim-tai-hua ch'i-yeh”), JMJP, 22 February 1961. (d) “Consolidate the work system of cadres moving their offices down to the shafts” (“Kung-ku kan-bu hsia-ching pen-kung ti kung-tso chih-tu”), JMJP,21 January 1961. (e) CCP Committee, Shanghai Smelting Plant, “Take production as central; beat the drums” (“I sheng-ch'an wei chung-hsin; Chi-hsi lo-ku”), JMJP, 1 02 1961Google Scholar. (f) Cheng, Wang, “Experience of the Chinghsi coal mines in continued leaps forward of production,” Hung-ch'i, Nos. 3–4, 1 02 1961Google Scholar, in SCMM Committee, Yutienpao Coal Mine, Chungking, “What we have learned from our experiment with the ‘four fixings, three guarantees, and one reward’ system,” JMJP, 4 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2539, pp. 3–7Google Scholar. See also “All leadership cadres in the Yutienpao Coal Mine go down deep on the spot to make investigations and do research” (“Yü tien-pao mei-k'uang yi ch'ieh ling-tao kan-pu shen-ju hsien-ch'ang tiao-ch'a yen-chiu”), in KJJP,18 April 1962. See also SCMP, No. 2687, pp. 8–12, article on the South China Sewing Machine Factory, and JMJP, 18 March 1962, on Shanghai Sanlien Shoe Factory, for two examples.

55. NCNA, 17 December 1961.

56. “A Shanghai factory raises the work level of basic level cadres” (“Shang-hai i-ch'an t'i-kao chi-tseng kan-pu kung-tso shui-p'ing”), JMJP, 26 June 1961.

57. NCNA, 11 January 1961; NCNA, 19 September 1962. See also, “Anshan steel promotes a batch of management cadres”(“An-kang t'i-keng yi-p'i kuan-li jen-yuan”), Kuang-ming jih-pao (KMJP), 5 February 1963, and “Anshan steel's technical ranks grow continuously” (“An-kang chi-shu tui-wu pu-tuan ch'eng-chang chuang-ta”), KJJP, 27 September 1963.

58. “Chungking steel workers push deeply into technical research to promote production” (“Ch'ung-kang kung-jen k'o-k'u-tsuan yen-chiu chi-shu t'ui-chin sheng-ch'an”), JMJP, 15 October 1963.

59. “Leading cadres of worker and peasant background in Peking industrial and mining enterprises conclude one-year's cultural study” (“Pei-ching yi-p'i kungnung ch'u-shen ti ch'ang-k'uang kan-pu chieh-su wei ch'i-yi-nien ti wen-hua hsiiehhsi”), KJJP, 8 August 1963.

60. “Shensi cadres in machine bureaux and departments go to factories and are tempered on the shifts” (“Shen-hsi chi-hsieh-chü ho pu-fen kung-ch'ang chu-pan hsün-lien-pan”), JMJP, 11 August 1961.

61. This, of course, does not mean that all cadres from worker backgrounds had these values and attitudes.

62. See Riskin, Carl, “Local industry and the Chinese model of development,” CQ, No. 46 (1971), p. 250Google Scholar.

63. Ibid. See table on p. 252. A good deal of local industry in communes and hsien was devoted to processing agricultural products, or for consumer goods.

64. For examples of the demands put on skilled labour in chemical industry enterprises during the Great Leap, particularly in those manufacturing fertilizer, see “Shanghai Chemical Research Institute trains fertilizer technicians for all localities” (“Shang-hai hsu-kung yen-chiu-yüan wei ko-ti p'ei-hsün ch'uch'eng hui hua-fei chi-shu jen-ts'ai”), KMJP, 10 April 1961: “Tientsin Chemical Plants develop worker spare-time technical education” (“T'ien-chien hua-kung ch'ang k'ai-chan chih-kung yeh-yü chi-shu chiao-yü”), KMJP, 1 March 1963; “Shanghai Chemical Research Institutes train technicians for small-scale fertilizer plants in every locality” (“Shang-hai hua-hsüleh kung-yeh yen-chiu-yuan weiko-ti chi-chi p'ei-hsün hsiao-hsing hua-fei-ch'ang chi-shu jen-ts'ai”), NCNA, 14 04 1961Google Scholar.

65. For the process of norm and quota management, during this period, see above, notes 30 and 32. Also, see Kang-chao, Yüeh, “Fixed personnel and labour norms of industrial enterprises,” JMJP, 18 11 1961, in SCMP, No. 2634, pp. 1–7Google Scholar; and Jih-an, K'uang, “Tentative views on the question of practice of strict economic accounting by state-owned industrial enterprises,” Ching-chi yen-chiu, No. 8,17 08 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 388, pp. 30–42, especially pp. 37–39.

66. For examples of the Party's defining the role of political and ideological leader in terms of morale builder, organizer of trade union welfare activities, and one who encourages socialist construction, see Hua, Chou, “Attend to living conditions of workers and call at their families,” in CB, No. 672, pp. 4–7Google Scholar; Ting-fu, Lo, “Investigate and study, master the laws, put out more coal,” JMJP, 7 03 1961, in SCMP, No. 2464, pp. 8–12Google Scholar; “Leading cadres of Chungking No. 502 Factory effectively improve their work style,” JMJP, 26 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2555, pp. 4–6Google Scholar; also Cheng, Wang, “Experience of Chinghsi Coal Mines,” Hung-ch'i,1 02 1961Google Scholar; and Jun-chih, Li, “On the systems of workers' congresses in state operated enterprises,” Hung-ch'i, No. 2, 16 01 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 30, pp. 20–24. Also, Yu, Ching, “How incentive work can be carried out well in factory and mining enterprises,” JMJP, 4 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2539, pp. 7–9Google Scholar.

67. See Lung, Yang, “It is not right to do too many jobs concurrently,” KJJP, 7 07 1962, in SCMP, No. 2789, pp. 14–15Google Scholar for a mild attack on technicians in machine building enterprises who spent “a lot of time” giving reports to workshop leaders, going to meetings with work-group leaders, investigating conditions in the teams, holding talks with workers, explaining results of research and development to workshop leaders, etc.; in short, seemingly carrying out “triple combination” activities.

68. See “Concerning the question of socialist distribution according to work,” TKP,15 12 1961, in SCMP, No. 2656, pp. 1–14Google Scholar.

69. Sometimes workers' congresses were referred to as “workers' representative congresses.” The latter were simply larger, or were held at higher levels of a large factory. Workers' congresses were more direct forms of participation.

70. “Give full play to the role of workers' representative conferences,” JMJP, 11 10 1961, in SCMP, No. 2604, pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

71. Ibid.

72. Jun-chih, Li, “On the system of workers' representative congresses in state operated industrial enterprises” (“Kuan-yü kuo-ying ch'i-yeh chung ti chih-kung tai-piao ta-hui chih-tu”), Hung-ch'i, No. 2, 16 01 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 300, pp. 20–24.

73. Ibid.

74. For examples of different schedules for these congresses, see “Resolutely convene workers' representative congresses” (“Chin-ch'ih chao-k'ai chih-kung taipiao ta-hui”), KJJP, 20 August 1961; also, “Really and thoroughly implement the system of workers' representative congresses” (“Jen-chen kuan-ch'e chih-kung tai-piao ta-hui chih-tu”), NFJP, 16 June 1961; also, “Tayeh Mine persists in holding workers' representative conferences regularly,” JMJP, 20 06 1961, in SCMP, No. 2530, pp. 19–20Google Scholar.

75. “How Hsiao-heng-shan Colliery develops the role of the workers' representatives,” JMJP, 14 08 1961, in SCMP, No. 2564, pp. 6–7Google Scholar. Also, “Help advanced producers better develop their functions” (“Pang-chu hsien-chin sheng-ch'an-che keng-hao-ti fa-hui tso-yung”), KJJP, 7 December 1962.

76. “Really and thoroughly implement,” NFJP, 16 June 1961; also, “Rely on the masses to perfect enterprise management and improve the livelihood of mining workers in order to boost production,” JMJP, 20 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2551, pp. 20–21Google Scholar, which concerns the Waag Feng Mines, Chiao Tso Mining Bureau.

77. “Rely on the masses to perfect enterprise management,” JMJP, 20 July 1961.

78. “Resolutely and regularly do a good job on workers' representative congresses” (“Chin-ch'ih ching-ch'ang k'ai-hao chih-kung tai-piao ta-hui”), KJJP, 11 November 1961.

79. Ibid. Also “Resolutely convene,” KJIP, 20 August 1961.

80. “A suggestion” (“I chien t'i-an”), KJJP, 15 October 1961.

81. “Resolutely and regularly,” KJJP, 11 November 1961.

82. “Shih Ku Coal Mine, Kwangtung, persists in workers' congress system,” JMJP,14 06 1961, in SCMP, No. 2525, pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

83. “Really and thoroughly implement,” NFJP, 16 June 1961. Also, “Yu-men Oil Refinery calls representative conferences of workers quarterly, thus developing democracy and promoting production,” NCNA, Lanchow, 24 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2550, p. 15Google Scholar.

84. “How Hsiao-heng-shan Colliery develops,” JMJP, 14 August 1961.

85. “Help advanced producers,” KJJP, 7 December 1962. Also, “Yu-men Oil Refinery calls representative conferences,” NCNA, 24 07 1961Google Scholar.

86. “Resolutely convene workers' representative congresses,” KJJP, 20 August 1961.

87. Richman, , Industrial Society in Communist China, p. 315Google Scholar. Hoffman, C., Work Incentives, Practices and Policies in the PRC (Albany: State University of New York, 1967), pp. 103–104Google Scholar, points out that the elimination of piece wages was often based on “telling technical criticisms.” For a post-Leap example of the discussion of rational incentives of this kind, see Yu, Ching, “How incentive work can be carried out well in factories and mining enterprises,” JMJP, 4 07 1961, in SCMP, No. 2539, pp. 7–9Google Scholar. See also Howe, C., Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China 1919–1972 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

88. Hoffman, , Work Incentives, pp. 105–106Google Scholar and references cited therein.

89. Richman, , Industrial Society in Communist China, p. 316Google Scholar, and sources cited therein.

90. Ibid. Also NCNA, 1 December 1963, gives a text of regulations for awards for technical innovations.

91. Hoffman, , Work Incentives, p. 109Google Scholar.

92. See “A communist education supplement,” KJJP, 22 08 1961, in CB, No. 671, pp. 1–29Google Scholar.

93. Keng-mo, Lo, “On the two-fold character of the principle of distribution according to work,” TKP, 4 04 1962, in SCMP, No. 2742, pp. 1–14Google Scholar.

94. Wei, Ho, “The question of relations between distribution according to labour and bourgeois lawful rights,” Ching-chi yen-chiu, No. 4, 14 04 1962Google Scholar.

95. Hoffman, , Work Incentives, p. 26Google Scholar.

96. Ibid. pp. 105–106.

97. Ibid. p. 106.

98. For some concrete examples of the multifaceted nature of incentive systems being used at this time, see the following: “The Yangchun Coal Mine strengthens shift and group management work” (“Yang-ch'un mei-k'uang chia-ch'iang pan-tsu kuan-li kung-tso”), NFJP, 7 October 1961; “Strengthen enterprise management” (“Chia-ch'iang ch'i-yeh kuan-li”), Kiangsi People's Radio, 5 December 1961; “Kunming Match Factory reforms wage work” (“K'un-ming huo-tsai-ch'ang kai-chin kung-tzu chih-tu”), TKP (Peking), 27 09 1961Google ScholarPubMed; “How to do incentive work well in industrial and mining enterprises” (“Tsem-yang tsai ch'an k'uang ch'iyeh chung tso-hao chiang-kung kung-tso”), JMJP, 4 July 1961; Here, the importance of “rational and accurate” labour quotas was noted as the key link in the incentive system, thus implying the need for some authority other than the workers to set their own quotas when these quotas were the basis of calculating material rewards, rather than a means by which workers measured their contribution to the collective goal of increased production. For other examples of incentive systems, see “Leading cadres go down deep to basic levels and into mines” (“Lingtao kan-pu shen-ju chi-tseng, shen-ju ching-hsia”), KJJP, 28 May 1963; “Shanghai Steel Plant builds level by level responsibility and shift by shift accounting system of management” (“Shang-hai-shih kang-ch'ang chien-li tseng-tseng fu-tse, pan-pan ho-suan yung-mei kuan-li chih-tu”), JMJP, 14 June 1961; “T'aiyuan Rolling Stock Factory manages production with tests and competitions” (“T'ai-yuan ch'e-liangch'an k'o-tung k'o-chien ching-ying sheng-ch'an”), JMJP, 7 May 1962.

99. Chang, Parris H., “Research notes on the changing loci of decision in the Chinese Communist Party,” CQ, No. 44 (1970), pp. 169–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It is significant that the impetus to implement the “70 Articles” seems to have come from Party members above the enterprise level who were concerned with problems of economic co-ordination and hence might have wanted “technical” measurements for their investment decisions and planning priorities. A text of the “70 Articles” from a Nationalist Chinese intelligence source is available through the Director of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University.

100. NCNA, International Service, 25 August 1967. The date given in this source for the “Anshan Constitution” was 1960. Later, a more precise date, 22 March 1960, was given in “Constitution of Anshan Iron and Steel Company spurs revolution and production,” Peking Review, No. 16, 17 04 1970, pp. 3–5Google Scholar. There were no known Party meetings at the central level at this time. See Chang, , CQ, No. 44, pp. 189–90Google Scholar.

101. Ibid. p. 191. Actually, the dispute over how to manage the economy and its individual enterprises, implicit all the while in the course that readjustments tended to take, became an open split in the August-September 1962 Central Work Conference held at Peitaiho and Peking prior to the 10th Plenum.

102. “Why is the steeling in proletarian consciousness more important after winning political power?” KJJP, 5 09 1962, in SCMP, No. 2382, pp. 11–12Google Scholar. P'o, Chu and Hui, Cheng, “Lenin on class struggle in the transition period,” Hungch'i, No. 23–24, 5 12 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 345, pp. 5–15.

103. For examples of this discussion, see Tzu, Mu, “Class struggle during the transition period, and the self-remoulding of industrialists and merchants,” Hsin kung-shang, No. 4, 18 04 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 365, pp. 1–8; Fu-ling, Chuang, “Criticizing the fallacy of bourgeois sociology on the question of class and class struggle,” Hung-ch'i, No. 9, 1 05 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 266, pp. 12–18; and Lin, Chao, “Some problems related to class struggle during the period of transition,” Hsin chien-she, No. 11, 20 11 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 399, pp. 5–15. Compare these articles to one in May 1962 which argued a much more mechanistic relationship between “relations of production” and “productive forces.” Shup'ing, Sun, “The law that the relations of production must suit the character of the productive forces,” Che-hsüeh yen-chiu, No. 3, 25 05 1962Google Scholar.

104. JMJP editorial, “The great revolutionary significance of participation in labour by cadres,” JMJP, 2 06 1963, in SCMP, No. 3006, pp. 14–18Google Scholar; Hung-ch'i editorial, “Participation in collective productive labour by cadres is of fundamental importance under the socialist system,” Hung-ch'i, Nos. 13–14, 10 07 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 376, pp. 1–13.

105. The question of geographic scope of economic calculations of efficient use of resources (both human and natural) is a crucial one, for quite clearly what is efficient allocation on a national level is not identical to efficient allocation on a local level. Co-ordination based on horizontally integrated localities would not, it should be noted, require the same type of data, nor would it have to go through the same type of communications system. For more on this, see my forthcoming book, Factory Management.

106. The relationship between organizational demands and daily routine was clearly recognized in a JMJP editorial, “Cadres of factories must also do manual labour seriously,” JMJP, 7 08 1963, in SCMP, No. 3040, pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

107. For examples of Party involvement with management at the enterprise level and below, see the following: Po, Hai, “Effectively raise labour productivity in industrial enterprises,” Hung-ch'i, No. 17, 1 09 1962Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 332, pp. 6–15. Also note the position of the Party Committee of the Shanghai Smelting Plant: CCP Committee, Shanghai Smelting Plant, “Take production as central; beat the drums,” JMJP, 1 01 1961Google Scholar. See also a report on a workshop in Shihchingshan Iron and Steel Corporation, “Party branch of coal dressing workshop of coking plant of Shihchingshan Iron and Steel Corporation pays attention to the role of those members who take part in production,” JMJP, 21 02 1962, in SCMP, No. 2695, pp. 1–2Google Scholar. Of nine CP members in the branch, six were full-time or part-time production workers – either work supervisors, or foremen, or ordinary workers.

108. JMJP editorial, “Apply the ‘triple combination’ method of leadership more properly,” JMJP, 11 02 1963, in SCMP, No. 2926, pp. 1–5Google Scholar.

109. JMJP editorial, “Develop the revolutionary spirit of running enterprises with industry and thrift and carry out a strict system of business accounting,” JMJP,7 07 1963, in SCMP, No. 3031, pp. 1–4Google Scholar. See also, “Secretaries of Party branches of mining enterprises should take part in labour,” JMJP, 17 08 1963, in SCMP, No. 3040, pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

110. Chang, , CQ, No. 44, p. 191Google Scholar.

111. NCNA, 7 March 1963; also, Tso-pin, Miao, “Ordinary work and great ambition,” Hung-ch'i, Nos. 7–8, 16 04 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 364, pp. 20–22.

112. KJJP editorial, “Factory histories – good teaching material for class education,” KJJP, 21 06 1963, in SCMP, No. 3022, pp. 7–10Google Scholar. Also Ching-fu, Chang, “Study Lei Feng's spirit and correctly handle the relations between the individual and the collective,” Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien, No. 8, 16 04 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 369, pp. 22–28. The campaign to increase the study of politics and “Learn from the PLA” began in enterprises and mines of the Ministry of Metallurgy in mid-1963. Major steel centres were affected. See KJJP, 12 February 1964.

113. JMJP editorial, “Intensify activities to compare with, learn from and catch up with the advanced and help the backward, and strive to become ‘5 good’ workers,” JMJP, 2 02 1964, in SCMP, No. 3164, pp. 10–13Google Scholar.

114. Hoffman, , Work Incentives, p. 109Google Scholar.

115. General Pharmaceutical Plant of North-east China, “The mass line is a fundamental guarantee for the proper management of enterprises,” Hua-hsueh kung-yeh, No. 15, 6 08 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 384, pp. 17–24. Also, Shao-ch'uan, Wang and Hsiao-p'eng, Chou, “Class education must be conducted firmly during the production increase and economy campaigns,” Chung-kuo nung-yeh chi-hsieh, No. 7, 10 07 1963Google Scholar, in SCMM, No. 382, pp. 14–18.