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The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 February 2002

Abstract

A clearer consensus on China's basic foreign policy line began to emerge among party leaders in 1996. This consensus, tantamount to the country's grand strategy, has provided a relatively coherent framework for China's subsequent international behavior and the expected contribution of diplomacy to the country's security. Concerned about the adverse international reaction to its expanding, yet still limited, power, Beijing has forged a diplomatic strategy with two broad purposes: (1) to maintain the international conditions that will make it feasible for China to focus on the domestic development necessary if it is to increase its relative (and not just absolute) capabilities; and (2) to reduce the likelihood that the U.S. or others with its backing will exploit their current material advantage to abort China's ascent. These considerations have resulted in efforts to reassure potential adversaries who had grown increasingly worried about China's rise and also efforts to encourage the world's major powers to view China as an indispensable, or at least attractive, international partner. The author examines the principal reasons for adopting this diplomatic strategy, describes its key elements, and considers its durability and implications for international security in the coming decades.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The China Quarterly, 2001

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Footnotes

In addition to cited publications, this article draws on approximately 105 hours of interviews the author conducted in Beijing (65 hours in June–July 1998, March–April and October 2000), Shanghai (15 hours in June–July 2001), Washington, D.C. (10 hours in February 2000), Tokyo (15 hours in March 1999). The interview subjects (promised confidentiality) were civilian officials and military officers, as well as advisers and independent analysts. Their institutional affiliations are available upon request from the author. I thank Tang Wei and Chen Cheng for their research assistance. Research support for this project has been provided by the Smith Richardson Foundation as well as the University of Pennsylvania's Research Foundation and Center for East Asian Studies.