1. First quotation from “late 1974” as cited in Department for Research on Party Literature of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Xinhua News Agency (eds.), Deng Xiaoping (Beijing: Central Party Literature Publishers, 1988), p. 93Google Scholar; second quotation, undated, cited in Salisbury, Harrison, The New Emperors (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), p. 328Google Scholar.

2. Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, , Engels, , Lenin, and Stalin, Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984 )Google Scholar; and Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (1938–1965) (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Xiaoping, Deng, Lun dang de jianshe (Theory of Party Building) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar.

3. Many of these sources are primary data, but use has also been made of the existing biographies of Deng. In English these include Franz, Uli, Deng Xiaoping: China's Reformer (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1989)Google Scholar; Bonavia, David, Deng (Hong Kong: Longman, 1989)Google Scholar; Goodman, David, Deng Xiaoping (London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1990)Google Scholar; Salisbury, The New Emperors; Lee, Chung Hua, Deng Xiaoping: The Marxist Road to the Forbidden City (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Hsin, Chi, Teng Hsiao-ping: A Political Biography (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1978)Google Scholar. Biographies in Chinese include: Department for Research on Party Literature of the Central Committee of the CCP and Xinhua News Agency, Deng Xiaoping; Department for Research on Party Literature of the Central Committee of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping zhanlue (The Strategy of Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988)Google Scholar; Shanbi, Han, Deng Xiaoping pingzhuan (A Critical Biography of Deng Xiaoping), Vols. 1–3 (Hong Kong: East and West Culture Company, 1984, 1987, 1988)Google Scholar; Daineishi, Balike, Deng Xiaoping (translated from Hungarian) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988)Google Scholar; Xun, Zhou, Deng Xiaoping (Hong Kong: Guangjiaojing chubanshe, 1983)Google Scholar; Qingshan, Lin, Fengyun shinian yu Deng Xiaoping (A Stormy Ten Years with Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Guoya, Yang et al. , Ershibanian qian: cong shi zhengwei dao zongshuji (Twenty-Eight Years: From City Government Committee to General Secretary) (Shanghai: Wenyi chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Pengyu, Yang, Weidade gaigejia Deng Xiaoping (The Great Revolutionary Deng Xiaoping) (Beijing: Zhongguo xinwen chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Chuanwang, Yao et al. , Deng Xiaoping zhuzuo zhuanti yanjiu (Specialized Research Topics on Deng Xiaoping's Writings) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chunchang, Yang, Deng Xiaoping xin shiqi jianjun sixiang yanjiu (Research on Deng Xiaoping's Army-Building Thought During the New Period) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Zhiyu, Gao and Yanqi, Li (eds.), Deng Xiaoping yu dangdai Zhongguo gaige (Deng Xiaoping and Contemporary Chinese Reforms) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar; Ping, Yao (ed.), Xin shiqi Deng Xiaoping zhanlue sixiang yanjiu (Research on Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thinking During the New Period) (Shaanxi: Renmin chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Yu, Jin and Xiankui, Chen, Dangdai Zhongguo dasilu (The Great Theoretical Road of Contemporary China) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar; Ye, Qing and Lei, Fang, Deng Xiaoping zai 1976 (Deng Xiaoping in 1976) (Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1993)Google Scholar.

4. For two extremely useful chronologies of Deng's life and career see: Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Weidade shixian, guanghui de sixiang: Deng Xiaoping geming huodong dashiji (Great Achievements, Brilliant Thought: Chronology of Deng Xiaoping's Revolutionary Activities) (Beijing: Hualing chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar; and Hao, Zhong (ed.), Deng Xiaoping de lilun yu shixian zonglan, 1938–1965 (Broad Views on Deng Xiaoping's Theories and Practice) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1991)Google Scholar.

5. To some extent this is done in the other contributions to this volume, but also see Oksenberg, Michel, “The Deng era's uncertain political legacy,” in Lieberthal, Kenneth et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Modern China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 309–340Google Scholar.

6. This is a characteristic noted as generally necessary for upward mobility in Chinese elite politics. See, for example, Lampton, David M., Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: Michigan Monographs on Chinese Studies, Vol. 55, 1986)Google Scholar; Oksenberg, Michel and Sai-cheung, Yeung, “Hua Guofeng's pre-Cultural Revolution Hunan years, 1949–1966: the making of a political generalist,” The China Quarterly, No. 69 (03 1977), pp. 3–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shambaugh, David, The Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang's Provincial Career (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), ch. 7Google Scholar.

7. For studies of Mao's political style see Solomon, Richard, Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Pye, Lucian W., Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1976)Google Scholar; Oksenberg, Michel, “Mao's policy commitments, 1921–1976,” Problems of Communism (11–12 1976), pp. 1–26Google Scholar; Oksenberg, Michel, “The political leader,” in Wilson, Dick (ed.), Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 70–116Google Scholar.

8. See Lucian Pye's contribution for an extended discussion of this aspect of Deng's style of rule.

9. Riker, William H., The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

10. See, for example, Lieberthal, Kenneth G. and Lampton, David M. (eds.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

11. Deng's given name at birth was Deng Bin. In France he went by Deng Xixian. There is some discrepancy as to when he changed it to Xiaoping. In many of his Western biographies (e.g. Goodman) it is dated from 1925, but one chronological biography dates it specifically as June 1927 in Wuhan so that he could maintain a false identity and hide from local Kuomintang police; see Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Weidade shixian, p. 6Google Scholar. For a discussion of Deng's Hakka origins and early life in Sichuan see Yang's, Benjamin contribution to this volume and Erbaugh, Mary, “The secret history of the Hakkas: the Chinese revolution as a Hakka enterprise,” The China Quarterly, No. 132 (12 1992), pp. 937–968Google Scholar.

12. Deng had previously been a member of the Chinese Communist Youth Party in Europe as well as the French Communist Patty; Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Weidade shixian, pp. 3–4Google Scholar. Also see Wong, Nora, “Deng Xiaoping: the years in France,” The China Quarterly, No. 92 (12 1982), pp. 698–705CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wong's is the most complete account of this period in Deng's life, and is based on French archival sources.

13. Deng and Li also had their differences, including the fact that Li apparently persuaded Deng's first wife to leave him. Having divorced, Jin Weiying (A Jin) and Li Weihan (Lo Man) had Li Tieying – whom Deng has promoted in high Party councils in recent years.

14. Both “universities” were established by the Comintern for the purpose of training would-be revolutionaries. The former was intended for those from the Middle East and Asia, while the latter was headed by Comintern agent Pavel Mif and established with Comintern funds in 1925 specifically to train young Chinese radicals (both Communists and Nationalists) in the theoretical and practical tools of revolution. Many of the so-called “28 Bolsheviks” who returned to China to constitute the “internationalist” wing of the Party studied there, but it is unclear what – if any – relations Deng had with them. One key “returned Bolshevik” was Yang Shangkun, with whom Deng would subsequently forge close ties, who arrived at the university a year after Deng's departure.

15. Not coincidentally, Deng had befriended Feng's daughter when classmates in Moscow. Li Xinzhi and Wang Yuezong date Deng's return as March 1927.

16. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Weidade shixian, p. 6Google Scholar.

17. For interesting, if not necessarily accurate, accounts of the Ruijin affair and Deng's fate, based on participants' reminiscences (including Yang Shangkun), see Salisbury, Harrison, The Long March: The Untold Story (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), pp. 139–142Google Scholar; and The New Emperors, pp. 40–43.

18. Ibid.; and interview with Mao's former secretary Li Rui, 1 June 1993.

19. Ibid., p. 143.

20. Goodman, , Deng Xiaoping, pp. 47–53Google Scholar.

21. See the excellent analysis in Goodman, David S. G., “The construction of the party-state in Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu, 1937–1945,” paper presented at the conference on “Construction of the Party-State and State Socialism in China, 1936–1965,” Colorado College, 06 1993Google Scholar.

22. Also see Benjamin Yang's and June Teufel Dreyer's contributions for more detail of Deng's military exploits during the Sino-Japanese and civil wars.

23. Interview, Central Committee Party History Research Office, 25 May 1991, Beijing. Little is known about this period in Deng's life. The best source is Lin Qingshan, Fengyun shinian yu Deng Xiaoping, neibu. Also see the reminiscences of Deng's daughter Mao Mao (Rong, Deng), “My father's days in Jiangxi,” Beijing Review, No. 36 (3 09 1984), pp. 17–18Google Scholar. Like Liu Shaoqi, Deng and his wife Zhuo Lin were evacuated from Beijing (where they had been under house arrest for the previous two years) under Lin Biao's Order No. 1. They spent the next three years in a former infantry academy turned May Seventh Cadre School in Xinjian county near Nanchang. Deng worked in a tractor factory under armed guard. Deng and his wife were permitted to maintain a garden and raise chickens, in which they invested much time. According to his daughter's account, Deng read books on Marxist theory and Chinese history late into the night. This account informs many of the other secondary biographies. See, for example, Han Shanbi, Deng Xiaoping pingzhuan, ch. 16.

24. Lin Qingshan, ibid. p. 267. The first letter commented on the relationship between the Party and the masses; in the second Deng admitted that he had made mistakes but remained loyal to “Mao Zedong Thought.” This brought him reinstatement. Similarly, in March 1977 Deng wrote to Hua Guofeng pledging his allegiance and admitting past mistakes.

25. For further on the rehabilitation process at this time see Wayne, Earl Anthony, “The politics of restaffing China's provinces,” Contemporary China (Spring 1978), pp. 116–165Google Scholar; and Domes, Jürgen, China After the Cultural Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

26. Deng's, opposition to the pace of communization at this time is noted in Hao, Zhong, Deng Xiaoping de lilun yu shixian, 1938–1965, pp. 42–44Google Scholar.

27. Zedong, Mao, “Speech at the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee,” in Leung, John K. and Kau, Michael Y. M. (eds.), The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976: Volume II (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 169Google Scholar.

28. Hao, Zhong, Deng Xiaoping de lilun yu shixian, p. 83Google Scholar.

29. “The major accusations against Deng Xiaoping,” Ba-er-wu zhanbao (August 25 Battle Report), 14 February 1967, Selections from China Mainland Magazines, No. 574 (1 05 1967), p. 15Google Scholar.

30. Ibid.

31. It was during a series of Politburo meetings in December 1964–January 1965 on management of the Socialist Education Movement that Mao's distrust of Deng and Liu Shaoqi crystallized. For analysis of this period see the discussion in Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979), ch. 11Google Scholar; and Baum, Richard, Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party, and the Peasant Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975)Google Scholar.

32. Despite the fact that Mao was largely incapacitated at this time, having reportedly suffered two strokes and the effects of Parkinson's disease, knowledgeable sources claim that he approved the Gang of Four's initiative to remove Deng from power.

33. Talbott, Strobe (trans, and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 252–53Google Scholar.

34. See Michael Yahuda's contribution in this volume; and Goldstein, Steven M., “Nationalism and internationalism: Sino-Soviet relations,” in Robinson, Thomas W. and Shambaugh, David (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 224–265Google Scholar.

35. Deng delivered the “Report on Revision of the Party Constitution” and Liu the “Political Report of the Central Committee,” and together they took charge of the drafting of these key documents. See Editing Group, Mianhuai Liu Shaoqi (Cherish the Memory of Liu Shaoqi) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenzhai chubanshe, 1988), p. 12Google Scholar.

36. At the time Deng believed that the purge of non-Party intellectuals and soldiers Was warranted, but in the 1980s confessed that the scope of the movement had been too broad although he refused to repudiate the campaign itself. See “Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 19 March 1980,” Selected Works, p. 279.

37. Peng Zhen was put in charge of overseeing the su-fan campaign and public security policy more generally. See Peng Zhen wenxuan (Peng Zhen's Selected Works) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 240–317Google Scholar. Also see Teiwes, Frederick C., “Mao and his lieutenants,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 19/20 (1988), pp. 68–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. For example Deng and Peng made five inspections together in Hebei province during April and May 1960, in order to ascertain the seriousness of the situation in the countryside in the aftermath of the Great Leap. See Xuewei, Chen, Lishi de qishi – shinian jiansheshi yanjiu (Historical Revelations – Research on Ten Years (1957–1966) of Historical Construction) (Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe, 1989), p. 132Google Scholar.

39. “Drag out Deng Xiaoping from the black den as a warning to others,” Xin Beida (New Beida), 25 February 1967, Survey of Mainland China Magazines, No. 177 (19 04 1967), p. 4Google Scholar.

40. See Goldstein, “Nationalism and internationalism.”

41. See Dehuai, Peng, Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 434–447Google Scholar.

42. See Huaxuan, Jiang et al. , Zhongguo gongchangdang huiyi zhaiyao (Shenyang chubanshe, 1991)Google Scholar; and Lieberthal, Kenneth and Dickson, Bruce, A Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1949–1986 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989)Google Scholar. Harrison Salisbury claims that Mao ordered Deng to remain in Beijing to run the government during Lushan, but then changed his mind and required Deng to attend. Salisbury, , The Last Emperors, p. 176Google Scholar. This is not corroborated by other sources, including Li Rui's account. See Rui, Li, Lushan huiyi shilu (Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1988), p. 26Google Scholar.

43. Interview with Li Rui, 2 June 1993.

44. A Hong Kong biography of Deng asserts that Deng knew in advance of Peng's plans, as Peng had informed Huang Kecheng of his intention during June 1959 and Huang had told Deng. See Shanbi, Han, Deng Xiaoping pingzhuan, Vol. 2, pp. 114–15Google Scholar.

45. Xiaoping, Deng, “Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 1 April 1980,” Selected Works, p. 280Google Scholar.

46. See Bachman, David, Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, China Research Monograph No. 29, 1985)Google Scholar; Lardy, Nicholas and Lieberthal, Kenneth (eds.), Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development: A Non-Maoist Alternative (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1983)Google Scholar.

47. For a comparison and analysis of these differences see Harding, Harry, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D. C: Brookings, 1987), particularly chs. 4–5Google Scholar.

48. See the 21 May 1989 letter addressed to Deng and the CMC and signed by Nie Rongzhen, Xu Xiangqian, Zhang Aiping, Ye Fei, Chen Zaidao, Yang Dezhi and others.

49. For an analysis of Yang Baibing's post-Tiananmen manoeuvrings see Shambaugh, David, “The soldier and the state in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 127 (09 1991), pp. 527–568CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50. For an analysis of the post-14th Party Congress political equation and the impact of the Yangs' purge, see Shambaugh, David, “Losing control: the erosion of state authority in China,” Current History (09 1993), pp. 252–58Google Scholar.

51. For discussion of Deng's and Zhao's relationship see Shambaugh, , The Making of a Premier, pp. 105–106, 118, 122Google Scholar. Some sources indicate that Deng was responsible for Tao's elevation to the Centre in order to facilitate Zhao's promotion. See Shanbi, Han, Deng Xiaoping zhuan, Vol. II, pp. 256–57Google Scholar; and “Drag out Deng Xiaoping from the black den,” pp. 5–7.

52. Wei, Zhao, Zhao Ziyang zhuan (Biography of Zhao Ziyang) (Hong Kong: Wenhua jiaoyu chubanshe, 1988), ch. 4Google Scholar.

53. Shambaugh, The Making of a Premier, ch. 6.

54. See “Zhao Ziyang's ‘Sichuan Experience’: blueprint for a nation,” Chinese Law & Government (Spring 1982).

55. See “The making of the big lie: content and process in the Chinese propaganda system during 1989,” Chinese Law & Government (Spring 1992), pp. 31–37.

56. See Zhongmei, Yang, Hu Yaobang: A Chinese Biography (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1988), p. 113Google Scholar.

57. There are a few precedents for purged leaders retaining their Central Committee seats (e.g. Wang Ming, Peng Dehuai and Hua Guofeng), but only in pro forma fashion.

58. It is possible that Deng brought Hu to Zhou Enlai's attention at the time and arranged for his transfer to the capital.

59. After the Secretariat was reorganized at the First Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee and Deng was appointed General Secretary, the other secretaries were as follows: Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, Tan Zheng, Huang Kecheng, Li Xuefeng, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Lu Dingyi, Kang Sheng and Luo Ruiqing. Alternate secretaries were Liu Lantao, Yang Shangkun and Hu Qiaomu.

60. Interview with Li Rui of the CCP Organization Department, 2 June 1993.

61. I am indebted to Fred Teiwes on this point.

62. This discussion draws upon Lieberthal, Kenneth, “The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yan'an leadership,” in MacFarquhar, Roderick and Fairbank, John King (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 323–24Google Scholar.

63. “Ten major accusations against Deng Xiaoping,” Ba-er-wu zhanbao, p. 15. This document is drawn from a speech given by Jiang Qing.

64. Deng refutes this and states that prior to the Beidaihe meeting of July–August 1962 Mao expressed approval of these documents. Xiaoping, Deng, “Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 1 April 1980,” Selected Works, pp. 280–81Google Scholar.

65. A detailed description of the Gang of Four's manoeuvring and sabotage at this time (albeit a historically revisionist and, in places, inaccurate, account) can be found in Gao, Gao and Jiaqi, Yan, “Wenhua da geming” shinian shi, 1966–76 (A Ten-Year History of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–76) (Tianjin: Renmin chubanshe, 1986), ch. 8Google Scholar.

66. Also see the excellent study by Swaine, Michael, The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Report R-4254-AF, 1992)Google Scholar.

67. Deng did have close ties with Li Jingquan (who ruled Sichuan prior to the Cultural Revolution and held Politburo status) and to some extent served as Li's patron during these years, but Li owed his position more to Marshal He Long, under whom he served in the First Field Army.

68. For an excellent study of the south-west during this period see Solinger, Dorothy J., Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949–1954 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar.

69. Xiaoping, Deng, “Talk with some leading comrades of the Central Committee, 1 April 1980,” Selected Works, p. 280Google Scholar.

70. Xiaoping, Deng, “Adhere to the Party line and improve methods of work,” Selected Works, p. 267Google Scholar.

71. See the description of this trait in Oksenberg, Michel, “The political leader,” in Wilson, , Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History, pp. 95–98Google Scholar.

72. Zhao Ziyang's statement to Gorbachev that all major decisions were referred to Deng may have been correct, but that does not mean that Deng actually made the decisions.

73. Again, see Oksenberg's discussion of this propensity of Mao's, n. 71. In 1992 Deng reflected on the reasons for having to sack Yaobang, Hu and Ziyang, Zhao, “Two men failed, and they failed not because of problems in the economy but because they stumbled on the issue of opposing bourgeois liberalization.” CCP Central Committee Circular on Transmitting and Studying Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Important Remarks (Central Document No. 2, 1992)Google Scholar, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report – China: Supplement (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 1 April 1992, p. 6.

74. For an intriguing insider's account of Ye's arrest of the Gang of Four see Shuo, Fan, Ye Jianying zai 1976 (Ye Jianying in 1976) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1990)Google Scholar.

75. Here Deng and Mao are not dissimilar. Reflecting in 1992, Deng said: “When you turn on the television, the programmes are full of meetings. There are too many meetings, too many long articles, and too many long speeches.… We should speak less and do more. Chairman Mao did not like to hold long meetings, his articles were concise, and his speeches were to the point. Chairman Mao [once] instructed me to draft Premier Zhou's report to the Fourth National People's Congress. He set a word limit at under 5,000. I did it, 5,000 words. Was that not useful?” FBIS-CHI, 1 April 1992, p. 6.

76. Interview with CCP historian Liao Gailong, 25 June 1991, Beijing.

77. Deng's, philosophy of dealing with opposition and criticism is evident in “Strengthen Party leadership and rectify the Party's style of work,” Selected Works, pp. 23–26Google Scholar.

78. See Deng's, lecture on abuse of privilege in section 1 of “Senior cadres should take the lead in maintaining and enriching the Party's fine traditions,” Selected Works, pp. 208–213Google Scholar.

79. With or without Deng's blessing, an outpouring of sycophantic works praising his achievements appeared after his 1992 Southern Sojourn, and his “thought” was officially proclaimed a “magic weapon” at the 14th Party Congress and enshrined in the CCP Constitution.

80. Power is one of the most extensively analysed yet elusive concepts in social science. In the Chinese context, we have examined several sources of power bases above; also see Dittmer, Lowell, “Bases of power in Chinese politics: a theory and analysis of the fall of the Gang of Four,” World Politics (10 1978), pp. 26–60Google Scholar. In international politics the Realist paradigm holds that power is the ability to influence. See, in particular, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (many editions). In comparative politics, elite power has been defined in a number of ways. In a classic study Arthur Bentley also adopted an influence-based definition. See his The Process of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908)Google Scholar. Another classic view is that of Lasswell, Harold and Kaplan, Abraham, who define power as “participation in decision-making”: Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950)Google Scholar. This view gave rise to the bureaucratic politics paradigm of the 1960s which continues to hold some currency and is particularly pertinent to the study of Chinese politics. See, for example, Lieberthal, Kenneth and Oksenberg, Michel, Policy Making in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)Google Scholar. Robert Dahl introduced a more pluralistic definition in which considerable competition exists over the control of the political agenda. See his Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982)Google Scholar. Many scholars, particularly in the field of American legislative politics, have adopted and refined Dahl's approach, and it seems that an agenda-setting approach has unexplored utility for studying Chinese leaders' distribution of power.

81. Among the numerous studies on the Deng reforms see Harding, Harry, China's Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D. C: Brookings, 1987)Google Scholar; Hamrin, Carol Lee, China and the Challenge of the Future (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990)Google Scholar; White, Gordon, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (London: Macmillan, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82. “Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development,” prepared by the State Planning Commission; “Outline Report on the Work of the Academy of Sciences,” prepared under the direction of Hu Yaobang and Hu Qiaomu; and “On the General Programme of Work for the Whole Party and Nation,” prepared by Deng Liqun and others.

83. On this point see the discussion in MacFarquhar, Roderick, “The Succession to Mao and the End to Maoism,” in MacFarquhar, and Fairbank, John King (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 388–393Google Scholar.

84. Deng closely monitored and personally engaged in the final round of negotiations in 1978 that led to Sino-American normalization. Interviews with knowledgeable officials in the U.S. and Chinese governments.

85. The use of experimental “test points” (shi dian) was a favoured method of Deng's dating to the 1950s.

86. This was a slogan put forward by Hua that whatever Mao did or said should be adhered to.

87. Adherence to the socialist road, dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought. By relegating the latter to only one (and the last) of four elements, Deng dealt Maoist ideology a severe blow.

88. See “Remarks on successive drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China’,” Selected Works, pp. 276–296.

89. Selected Works, p. 329.

90. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (1975–82) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 258Google Scholar. I am indebted to Keith Forster for bringing this to my attention.

91. Resolution on CPC History, (1949–81) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p. 27Google Scholar.

92. The economic cycle was more one of expansion–retrenchment, with the latter phase being intentionally induced to cool off overheating, rather than a real business cycle.

93. In point of fact, Deng began to withdraw his support for both these successors nearly a year before their fall from power. In Hu's case, by the middle of 1986 it became clear that he had offended Deng over his desire to accelerate the retirement en masse of the remaining elders on the Central Committee. Hu was also distrusted by the military high command. Deng apparently confronted Hu at an August 1986 Beidaihe work conference and at the subsequent Sixth Plenum in September. By the time student demonstrations erupted in December Hu's fate was sealed. Similarly, in the case of Zhao Ziyang, Deng began to withdraw active support at the August 1988 Beidaihe work conference that led to the economic retrenchment programme. Despite his lack of open support for Zhao I do not think Deng was convinced that Zhao had to go until the spring of 1989. Zhao's contradiction of the 26 April People's Daily editorial, which Deng had explicitly authorized, in his speech to the Asian Development Bank and his wait-and-see attitude toward the student demonstrations was bad enough, but his statements to Gorbachev was the coup de grâce as far as Deng was concerned.

94. See xuanchuanbu, Zhonggong Shenzhen shiwei (ed.), Yijiuernian chun: Deng Xiao-ping yu Shenzhen (The Spring of 1992: Deng Xiaoping and Shenzhen) (Shenzhen: Haitian chubanshe, 1992)Google Scholar; and Shambaugh, David, “Regaining political momentum: Deng strikes back,” Current History (09 1992). pp. 257–261Google Scholar.

95. Selected Works, pp. 166–191.

96. Selected Works, pp. 302–325.

97. “Beaters, smashers, and looters” during the Cultural Revolution.

98. At a meeting of provincial governors in April Deng called for renewed attention to “reform of the political structure.” In June he instructed the Central Committee Secretariat to formulate concrete political reform proposals. See Xiaoping, Deng, “Reform the political structure and strengthen the people's sense of legality,” Fundamental Issues in Present Day China, pp. 145–48Google Scholar. This endorsement of Deng's led to a summer-long series of political reform seminars and formation of a leadership small group under the direction of Hu Qili, until the conservatives counter-attacked at the August Beidaihe work conference. For details of the debate see Hsiang, Cheng, “News From Beidaihe,” Wen Wei Po, 8 August 1986, in Summary of World Broadcasts: Far East, 12 08 1986, pp. B2–4Google Scholar. In the wake of the Beidaihe meeting it is unclear whether Deng backed Zhao Ziyang's formation of the Political Structure Reform Office under the Central Committee in October 1986 or whether he began to withdraw his support.

99. On Deng's support for a new round of political structural reform, see Dongtai, Hou, “Deng Xiaoping he zhengzhi tizhi gaige,” Da Gong Bao (Hong Kong), 16 07 1986, pp. 5–7Google Scholar.

100. Ziyang, Zhao, “Advance along the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Documents of the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), pp. 42–60Google Scholar. I am indebted to Fan Cheuk Wan's analysis of this period; Wan, Fan Cheuk, “Reform to separate Party and government: an abortive attempt to undermine Party domination over the state between 1986 and 1989,” M. A. seminar paper, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1992Google Scholar.

101. Cf. n. 55.

102. For an analysis of this period see Shambaugh, “Regaining political momentum: Deng strikes back”; and Shambaugh, David, “China in 1991: living cautiously,” Asian Survey (01 1992), pp. 19–31Google Scholar.

103. For a useful discussion of this propensity see Harding, , China's Second Revolution, pp. 90–93Google Scholar.

104. Burns, James MacGregor, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1978)Google ScholarPubMed.