1. Bachman, David notes that “there is remarkably little discussion in Deng's [1975–1982] Selected Works on economic affairs.” Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, China Research Monograph No. 29, 1985), p. 156Google Scholar.

2. On this aspect of the reforms, see Lin, Cyril, “Open-ended economic reform in China”, in Nee, Victor and Stark, David (eds.), Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; and McMillan, John and Naughton, Barry, “How to reform a planned economy: lessons from China”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (spring 1992)Google Scholar.

3. We should note that our list is not too different from the official Chinese list of Deng's accomplishments. The hagiographic literature credits Deng with four economic innovations: legitimizing economic development as the main task of government; setting effective longrun economic objectives; initiating economic reform; and supporting the open door policy. See Ping, Yao (ed.), Xin shiqi Deng Xiaoping zhanlue sixiang yanjiu (Studies in the Strategic Thought of Deng Xiaoping during the New Era) (Xi'an: Shaanxi renmin chubanshe, 1989)Google Scholar.

4. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Weida de shijian, guanghui de sixiang: Deng Xiaoping geming huodong dashiji (Great Practice and Glorious Thought: A Chronology of Deng Xiaoping's Revolutionary Activity) (Beijing: Hualing chubanshe, 1990), pp. 102, 104, 109Google Scholar. Shanbi, Han, Deng Xiaoping pingzhuan (A Critical Biography of Deng Xiaoping) (Hong Kong: Dongxi wenhua shiye gongsi, 2nd ed., 1988), p. 283Google Scholar. An interesting perspective on Deng's role and ascent during the early years is provided by Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics at Mao's Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), esp. pp. 21, 70, 87–88, 117, 134, 145, 286Google Scholar.

5. See, for example, Liqun, Deng, Xiang Chen Yun tongzhi xuexi zuojingji gongzuo (Study Economic Work from Comrade Chen Yun) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1981), p. 9Google Scholar.

6. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, p. 132Google Scholar. The association between Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping dates back to their time in France in the 1920s. Deng Xiaoping had in effect served as Acting Premier on occasion in the late 1950s as well. Shanbi, Han, A Critical Biography, pp. 258–59Google Scholar.

7. Xiaoping, Deng, “Six directions for fiscal work” (12 01 1954)Google Scholar, in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (1938–1965) (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1938–1965) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 182–83Google Scholar.

8. Guangyuan, Yu, “Develop economic sciences,” Jingji yanjiu, No. 10 (1981), p. 4Google Scholar; Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, p. 121Google Scholar.

9. Xiaoping, Deng, “Adhere to the Party line and improve methods of work,” Selected Works (1975–1982), pp. 262–63Google Scholar; “Remarks on successive drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party',” ibid. p. 281. For more on Deng Xiaoping during the Great Leap Forward, see MacFarquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2: The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 60–61, 121, 166, 176, 323Google Scholar.

10. According to Yue, Li, cited in Jingjixue dongtai, No. 2 (1981), p. 14Google Scholar, the original plan was drafted “according to the ideas of Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping.” Mingfang, Yan, “The compilation and fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan.” Dangshi yanjiu, No. 6 (1986), pp. 38–39Google Scholar; Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, pp. 136, 140Google Scholar.

11. As a result of Chen's consistence and importance, we have two excellent English language studies of his life. Bachman, Chen Yun and the Chinese Political System; Lardy, Nicholas and Lieberthal, Kenneth, “Introduction” in Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1983)Google Scholar.

12. One commonly-held view is that after 1962 there was increasing divergence of views between Mao and other leaders, including Deng. See Nianyi, Wang, “A tentative discussion of the origins of the Cultural Revolution,” Dangshi yanjiu, No. 1 (1982) pp. 24–31Google Scholar. That may indeed be true, but there is no real evidence to substantiate it with the evidence currently available. In fact, it is still difficult to make any confident assertion about Deng's views during this period given the current state of our knowledge. Because Deng was not the top person in the hierarchy, his speeches have been less abundantly published and studied until very recently. Nearly all his important statements currently available have been subjected to high selective editing. See Schoenhals, Michael, “Edited records: comparing two versions of Deng Xiaoping's ‘7,000 Cadres Conference Speech’,” CCP Research Newsletter, No. 1 (1988), pp. 5–9Google Scholar, and below on factory manager systems. The selection of documents available is systematically biased to project certain images of Deng-for example, the official Selected Works contains no speeches between May 1957 and March 1960, in spite of Deng's intense activity during this period. Finally, since the most characteristic feature of Mao's proclamations during this period was inconsistency, and the most characteristic feature of most other Party leaders (including Deng) was slavish subordination to Mao's proclamations, it follows that selective compilation can produce almost any kind of historic record. All we can say is that there is currently no reliable evidence to support the view that Deng independently advocated any significant policy position before 1967.

13. Xiaoping, Deng, “How to revive agricultural production”, Selected Works (1938–1965), p. 305Google Scholar.

14. Yishun, Liu, “Ceng Xisheng and the responsibility fields in Anhui”, Dangshi yanjiu, No. 3 (1987), pp. 26–27Google Scholar; Yishun, Liu and Duoli, Zhou, “The question of ‘responsibility fields’ in Anhui in 1961”, Dangshi yanjiu, No. 5, (1983), pp. 35–40Google Scholar.

15. In fact, in this speech, Deng is very careful to specify that the policy of open experimentation is in effect only until a scheduled August Party meeting, which will develop more specific (and restrictive) rural work methods. Xiaoping, Deng, “How to revive agricultural production,” p. 305Google Scholar. Much later, Deng specifically noted that at that time “it seemed that Comrade Mao Zedong was then earnestly correcting ‘Left’ mistakes.… At the Beidaihe Meeting of July-August [1962], however, he reversed direction again, laying renewed and even greater stress on class struggle”. “Remarks on successive drafts of the ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party’,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982), (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), p. 281Google Scholar.

16. Indeed, the document served as the basis of policy for over a year without significant controversy, until it was swamped by the intensifying tensions between Mao and Liu Shaoqi, with their contrasting “experiences” and approaches to rural policy formulation. It may be, as some have argued, that the document represents a subtle shift towards greater acceptance of rural commercial activities than might have been envisaged by Mao, and argued for some safeguards to protect cadres. Even if true, such subtle shifts of emphasis were well within the general policy framework. Richard Baum, Prelude to Revolution: Mao, the Party and the Peasant Question, 1962–1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 43–59Google Scholar. Baum's summary of Deng's position on p. 165 still seems right: “Above all, Deng seems to have been concerned with establishing routinized bureaucratic norms and procedures and with regularizing the channels of communication between higher and lower levels within the Party – in short, with perfecting the instruments of ‘rational’ public administration.”

17. The fact that Mao was willing to recall Deng in early 1973 may also serve as indirect evidence that Deng played “by the rules” before 1967. If Mao seriously believed Deng had ignored Mao and pushed his own agenda, as charged by Cultural Revolution radicals, he surely would not have advanced him to positions of great power during the 1970s.

18. Nianyi, Wang, 1949–1989 nian de Zhongguo 3: da dongluan de niandai (China from 1949–1989, III: The Period of Great Chaos) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 516–523Google Scholar. I am grateful to Kam Wing Chan for providing a copy of this source. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, pp. 178–183, 187Google Scholar.

19. Nianyi, Wang, China from 1949–1989, p. 526Google Scholar.

20. A draft version of the document is reprinted in Hsin, Chi, The Case of the Gang of Four (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1977), pp. 239–272Google Scholar. See also Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works, 1975–1982, pp. 45, 8–11, 28–31Google Scholar. As Bachman points out, “Beginning in 1975, Deng has consistently advocated rectification of leading bodies in factories.” Bachman, , Chen Yun, p. 156Google Scholar. As we have seen, this advocacy can be traced back to 1961. See also Lieberthal, Kenneth, with Tong, James and Yeung, Sai-cheung, Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China (Ann Arbor: Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 33, 1978), esp. pp. 27, 44–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, pp. 177, 179– 180Google Scholar.

22. Naughton, Barry, “China's experience with guidance planning,” Journal of Comparative Economics, No. 14 (1990), pp. 746–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. On this period, see Lieberthal, Kenneth, “The polities of modernization in the PRC,” Problems of Communism, 05–06 1978, pp. 1–17Google Scholar.

24. Deng's 1957 speech was, however, an articulate expression of the importance of economic development: “From now on, the main responsibility is to carry out economic construction” (8 April 1957) in Selected Works (938–1956), pp. 249–257.

25. Xiaoping, Deng, “1992 nian 1 yue 18 hao zhi 2 yue 20 hao Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai he Shanghai shi de jianghua” (”Speeches given from 18 01 to 20 02 1992 while visiting Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai”). Internally circulated study materials, p. 9Google Scholar.

26. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Speeches, 1985–1986) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), pp. 124, 127, 178Google Scholar.

27. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, p. 297Google Scholar. Cf. ibid. p. 282.

28. This is according to Lin Zixin, who wrote the original draft. Informal remarks at Meridian House workshop on economic policy-making during the 1980s. Washington, D. C, 24 October 1991; Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works (1975–1982), pp. 112–13Google Scholar.

29. A 1980 description held that “in general, the current system is that the Party secretary is the number one man, and the factory manager is the number two man. Even when the number one man doesn't give direct orders, the number two man has to secure his agreement when managing production and doing administrative work.” Yan Chongzong, “Reform of the factory management system cannot be delayed,” Gongye jingji guanli congkan, No. 2 (1980), p. 26Google Scholar.

30. Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works (1978–1982), pp. 322–24Google Scholar; the original version is cited from System Reform Commission, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige shinian (Ten Years of Economic System Reform in China) (Beijing: Jingji guanli, 1988), p. 24Google Scholar.

31. System Reform Commission, Enterprise Reform Section, Zhongguo qiye gaige shinian (Ten Years of Enterprise Reform in China) (Beijing: Gaige, 1990), pp. 458–59Google Scholar; Zhanbin, Zhang, Xin Zhongguo qiye lingdao zhidu (New China's Enterprise Leadership System) (Beijing: Chunqiu, 1988)Google Scholar. There was some erosion of this accomplishment after 4 June 1989, which is discussed below.

32. Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works (1975–1982), p. 163Google Scholar.

33. Kecheng, Huang, “On the question of the appropriate attitude to Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought,” Dangshi yanjiu, No. 2 (1981), pp. 2–10Google Scholar.

34. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues, p. 195Google Scholar.

35. Bachman, , Chen Yun, p. 159Google Scholar.

36. In this respect, the most telling contrast is with Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev also had a weak grasp of economics, but unlike Deng he did not have good instincts with respect to the use of subordinates in economic matters. Gorbachev jumped from one fashionable economic adviser to another, each promising a quick solution to economic problems. Nothing was done, and the Soviet economy went to pieces. By contrast, Deng allowed Zhao Ziyang to chart a consistent policy course, and the Chinese economy responded well to effective policy-making.

37. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues, p. 149Google Scholar.

38. Xiaoping, Deng, “Speeches given in 1992,” p. 17Google Scholar.

39. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, pp. 287, 290, 291–92Google Scholar.

40. Xiaoping, Deng, “Speeches given in 1992,” pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

41. Bachman, , Chen Yun, pp. 157–58Google Scholar.

42. Xiaoping, Deng, “Speeches given in 1992,” p. 5Google Scholar.

43. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues, p. 189Google Scholar.

44. The share of gross income accounted for by rural enterprises was 33% of total rural income in 1985. Zhongguo tongji nianjian (Statistical Yearbook of China) 1986, p. 221. The document is “Draft regulations relating to several problems in developing commune and brigade enterprises,” (Guofa (1979) No. 170)Google Scholar in System Reform Commission, Jingji tizhi gaige wenjian huibian 1977–1983 (Collected Economic System Reform Documents, 1977–1983) (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji, 1984), pp. 97–104Google Scholar. The lower proportion of rural income accounted for by rural enterprises than targeted was due primarily to the more rapid growth of household agricultural income than anticipated – but clearly rapid growth of township enterprises had been anticipated.

45. Xiaoping, Deng, Selected Works (1975–1982), pp. 103, 106Google Scholar. According to Lin Zixin, Deng also said he wished to serve as “general head of logistics” for science and technology work. I have been unable to locate this remark in the published version of the speech.

46. Sheng, Hua, Xiaopeng, Luo and Xuejun, Zhang, “Chinese reform and state socialism,” unpublished book manuscript, Oxford University, 1990, ch. 2Google Scholar.

47. Zhining, Li, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dashidian 1959.10–1987.1 (A Dictionary of Major Economic Events in the PRC, 10 1949–01 1987) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1987), p. 453Google Scholar.

48. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues, p. 190Google Scholar; Crane, George T., The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), pp. 26–27Google Scholar.

49. Xinzhi, Li and Yuezong, Wang, Great Practice and Glorious Thought, pp. 254–56Google Scholar.

50. Xiaoping, Deng, “Speeches made in 1992,” p. 10Google Scholar.

51. On this aspect of the reform, see Lardy, Nicholas, “Is China different? The fate of its economic reform,” in Chirot, Daniel (ed.), The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left: The Revolutions of 1989 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991), pp. 147–162Google Scholar; and Lin, “Open-ended economic reform in China.”

52. The contrast is particularly acute with reformers in Poland and Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1980s, who stated clearly at the outset that the objective of the reform process was to create a market economy with mixed ownership forms, but based primarily on private ownership.

53. On managerial incenteive systems, see theodore Groves, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan and Barry Naughton, “China's evolving managerial labor market,” University of California, San Diego, Department of Economics Discussion Paper 92–36 (September 1992). On state sector productivity, see Chen, K., Jefferson, G, Rawski, T., Wang, H. and Zheng, Y., “Productivity change in Chinese industry, 1953–1985,” Journal of Comparative Economics, No. 12 (12 1988), pp. 570–591Google Scholar.

54. On these characteristics, see McMillan, and Naughton, , “How to reform a planned economy.” Naughton, Barry, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1992 (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

55. Lardy, Nicholas, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56. Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues, pp. 187, 176Google Scholar.

57. Chen's real attitude to spontaneous action is captured by his own simile, comparing plan and market to a caged bird: without a cage, the bird will fly away. Without controls, spontaneous activity will lead to degeneration into chaos. For full discussions of Chen's rich economic thought, see Bachman, Chen Yun and Lardy and Lieberthal, “Introduction.”