Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
One of the most extraordinary and puzzling events of the twentieth century is surely the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. This most profound crisis in the history of the Peking regime provides us with the best available opportunity to study the Chinese political system. For it is during a crisis that the nature, the strength, and the vulnerabilities of a political system fully reveal themselves. Further-more, we can attempt not only to note the unique features of this extraordinary event, and of Chinese politics itself, but also to see whether the seemingly unique Chinese experience does not reveal some universal dilemma of the human condition and fundamental problems of the socio-political order in a magnified and easily recognizable form. It is my belief that the Chinese political system prior to the Cultural Revolution is one of the purest forms found in human experience of a type of association in which there is a clear-cut separation between the elite and the masses. If one follows Ralf Dahrendorf in asserting that in every social organization there is a differential distribution of power and authority, a division involving domination and subjection, the Chinese political system can be taken as one of the polar examples of all social organizations, showing clearly their possibilities and limitations, their problems and dilemmas. From this perspective, the Maoist vision as it has revealed itself in its extreme form during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution can be considered a critique of this type of political organization.
1 The research for this article was undertaken under a grant from the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council. The author also wants to acknowledge the support given to him by the Center for International Studies, the Social Science Divisional Research Committee and the Committee on Far Eastern Studies of the University of Chicago.
2 Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 165, 169.Google Scholar
3 Marx, Karl, The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 160CrossRefGoogle Scholar, quoted in Tucker, Robert C., “The Marxian Revolutionary Idea,” in Friedrich, Carl J. (ed.), Revolution (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 219.Google Scholar
4 Barnett, A. Doak, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967).Google Scholar
5 Tse-tung, Mao, On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957).Google Scholar For Mao's departure from Soviet orthodoxy, see Hudson, G. F., “Introduction” in Tse-tung, Mao, Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom (N.Y.: The New Leader).Google Scholar Mao is apparently not the only one who has made this point. According to the Maoists, Liu wrote in his “On Organizational and Disciplinary Self-Cultivation by Communists” that the Party “is a combination of contradictions. It has leaders and those who are led, Party leaders and Party members, the higher Party organizations and lower Party organizations.” Peking Review, 15 November 1968, p. 18. This was a report delivered by Liu in the early 1940s at the Central Party School. The quotation can be found on page 3 of a mimeographed version in Chinese, Tsu-chih shang ho chi-lü shang ti hsiu-yang. See also Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 54.Google Scholar
6 Tsou, Tang, “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China,” in Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang (eds.), China's Heritage and the Communist Political System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 277–347.Google Scholar
7 For an earlier discussion of the tensions within the Party in terms of the differences in approaches between the guerilla leader and the political commissar, see John W. Lewis, “Leader, Commissar, and Bureaucrat: The Chinese Political System in the Last Days of the Revolution,” ibid. pp. 449–481.
8 One of the three slightly different versions of this self-criticism available to the author indicates that this self-criticism was made on 23 November 1966, at a Central Committee Work Conference. There was a central work conference in October 1966. It is possible that this self-criticism was made during that conference.
9 Editorial Department of Capital Red Guard, “P'i-ch'ou Chung-kuo Ho-lu-hsiao-fu ti fan-ko-ming sheng-ch'an-li lun” (“Criticize China's Khrushchev's Reactionary Theory on Production Forces Until It Smells”), Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), 3 September 1967.
10 Quoted in Peking Review, 13 October 1967, p. 11.
11 The Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 37.
12 Ibid. pp. 115–116.
13 Mainichi, 3 August 1967.
14 Editorial Departments of the Jen-min jih-pao, Hung-ch'i, and Chieh-fang-chün pao, “Struggle Between the Two Roads in China's Countryside,” translated in Peking Review, 1 December 1967, p. 12. As the spokesman of the Party's rich peasant line, Liu declared in a report in 1950 that the policy of preserving the rich peasant economy “is of course not a temporary policy but a long-term policy.” Shao-ch'i, Liu, “Report on the Problems of Land Reform,” Hsin-Hua yüeh-pao, Vol. II, No. 3 (15 July 1950), p. 494.Google Scholar
15 Liu Shao-ch'i's self-criticism, big character poster posted by Chingkangshan Red Guards on 26 December 1966. From a xeroxed handwritten copy in the author's possession.
16 Editorial Department of Capital Red Guard, “Criticize China's Khrushchev's Reactionary Theory on Productive Forces until it Smells,” Jen-min jih-pao, 3 September 1967.
17 Sankei, 16 August 1967, in Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 16 August 1967, p. 12. Liu declared in his political Report to the Eighth Party Congress that “workers in privately-owned factories were saved from unemployment.” The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Vol. I, p. 31.
18 “Thoroughly Criticize the Reactionary and False Theory of the Dying out of Class Struggle,” Jen-min jih-pao, 24 August 1967.
19 Shao-ch'i, Liu, Lun kung-ch'an-tang-yüan ti hsiu-yang (On the Self-cultivation of a Member of the Communist Party) (Hsin-Hua shu-tien, 1946), p. 40.Google Scholar
20 for example, Liu was reported to have said: “A Party member can only achieve his own success in the success of the Party.” “By striving for the development, success, and victory of the Party's cause, it is possible to develop oneself and rise to a higher position.” See “We must use the world view of the proletariat to build up a proletarian Party,” Jen-min jih-pao, 14 December 1967.
21 “Thoroughly Criticize the Reactionary and False Theory of the Dying out of Class Struggle,” Jen-min jih-pao, 24 August 1967.
22 Peking Review, 19 August 1966, p. 37.
23 Johnson, Chalmers, “China: The Cultural Revolution in Structural Perspective,” Asian Survey, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (January 1968), p. 4.Google Scholar
24 For an account of the Socialist Education Movement, see Baum, Richard and Teiwes, Frederick C., Ssu-ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962–1966 (Berkeley, Calif.: Center for Chinese Studies, 1968)Google Scholar; Baum, Richard and Teiwes, Frederick C., “Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadre Question,” Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 4 (April 1968), pp. 323–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an exchange of views between Baum, Richard and Neuhauser, Charles, see The China Quarterly, No. 34 (April-June 1968), pp. 133–144.Google Scholar
25 “Chairman Mao's Talk at the Central Work Conference,” printed by Red Guards on 19 December 1966. From an unpublished version in the author's possession.
26 “P'eng Te-huai's Statements—Records made in the interrogation of P'eng Te-huai under detention,” 28 December 1966–1975 January 1967, Current Background (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 851, 26 April 1968, p. 17. Yi's, Ch'en remark is in Hung-wei chan-pao (Red Guard Battle Bulletin), 8 April 1964, p. 4.Google Scholar
27 See for example, “P'eng Te-huai's Letter of Opinion,” in Current Background, No. 851 (26 April 1967), pp. 21–23; Editorial Departments of the Hung-ch'i and Jen-min jih-pao, “To Follow the Socialist Road or the Capitalist Road?”, in Hung-ch'i, No. 13 (1967), p. 11; and Peking Review, 25 August 1967, p. 10.
28 There are many well-documented accounts of these developments. Only two articles will be cited here. Gelman, Harry, “The New Revolution,” Problems of Communism (November-December 1966), pp. 2–14.Google ScholarBridgham, Philip, “Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development,” The China Quarterly, No. 29 (January–March 1967), pp. 1–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29 Shao-ch'i, Liu was reported to have said in the summer of 1961: “Chairman Mao concerns himself only with important state affairs. It is enough for him to propose to turn the whole country into a big garden and forest land. He has no time to solve this problem. … Therefore, I have to tackle it.”Google ScholarFen, Hung, “Exposing the Crimes Perpetrated in Heilungkiang Province by the Biggest Party Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road,” Heilungkiang Daily, 14 June 1967.Google Scholar
30 Tsou, loc. cit. (see note 6).
31 Hung-wei-ping pao (Red Guards' Newspaper), No. 15 (22 December 1967), p. 4.
32 Ibid. p. 1.
33 Chingkangshan, No. 4 (23 December 1966), p. 4.
34 “The Wicked History of Big Conspirator, Big Ambitionist, Big Warlord P'eng Te-huai,” in Current Background, No. 851 (26 April 1968), p. 7.
35 Ibid. p. 14.
36 Ko-ming kung-jen pao (Revolutionary Workers' Newspaper), No. 5 (19 February 1967), p. 4.
37 One of the most interesting sidelights of the Cultural Revolution is that the reports of the Red Guards have confirmed almost every detail of the account by Charles, David A. in “The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai,” The China Quarterly, No. 8 (October–December 1961), pp. 63–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Of the numerous materials on P'eng Te-huai, the most interesting one is the compilation issued by the Chingkangshan Corps of the Tsinghua University. This compilation is translated in Current Background, No. 851 (26 April 1968), pp. 1–31. For excerpts of the Resolution of the Eighth Plenum condemning P'eng Te-huai, see Peking Review, 18 August 1967, pp. 8–10.
38 Liu Shao-ch'i's first self-criticism, posted on 26 December 1966.
39 Premier Chou En-lai's important talk on 25 January 1966 to a rally of more than 20,000 revolutionary rebels on “the scientific and technological fronts” as reported in K'o-chi chan-pao (Science and Technology Battle Bulletin) (Peking), No. 2 (1 February 1967), p. 3.
40 Piao's, Lin talk at an enlarged session of the meeting of the Political Bureau in May 1966, quoted in Chingkangshan, Nos. 13–14 (1 February 1967), p. 6.Google Scholar It is clear that the cult of Mao was used to overcome the resistance to Mao's thought and policies. Mao himself said in 1967 that at the time when he presided over the drafting of the 16 May 1966 circular, a large group of persons considered his views outmoded and that, at times, only he himself agreed with his own views. Wu-ch'an-che chih sheng (The Voice of the Proletariat) (Wuchow, Kwangsi), No. 10 (1 January 1968), p. 1.
41 Piao's, Lin remark in September 1966 at a talk to members of military academies and colleges. Quoted in Chingkangshan, Nos. 13–14 (1 February 1967), p. 6.Google Scholar
42 Chou En-lai's remark cited above, p. 78, is one of the best evidences of the change in the mass line.
43 “A great strategic disposition—Chairman Mao's Latest Instruction,” reproduced in Wu-ch'an-che chih sheng (The Voice of the Proletariat) (Wuchow, Kwangsi), No. 10 (1 January 1968), p. 1.
44 Peking Review, 9 December 1968, p. 1.
45 For example, Po-ta, Ch'en told students at Peking University, on 26 July 1966, that “this leadership of the Party is the leadership of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the leadership of the Party Central Committee.” On 21 August 1966, T'ao Chu said that “now the only correct leadership is that of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee under his leadership.” Hung-se tsao-fan pao, 26 December 1966, p. 4Google Scholar, translated in Joint Research Publication Service (JPRS), No. 40, 349 (March 1967), pp. 76–77.
46 See above, p. 75, n. 28.
47 The Maoists had to counteract the tendency to obey the Party committees in various units by constantly reiterating the point that not every Party organization or individual Party member represents leadership by the Party. Ch'i Pen-yü told the Red Guards on 12 November 1966: “Leadership by the Party is mainly political and ideological leadership and leadership by Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is not specifically the leadership of a certain person or a certain organization.”
48 As we shall note later, another reason was that Mao made the establishment of a “great alliance” among the revolutionary rebel groups a condition for the establishment of revolutionary committees and their recognition by Peking.
49 Tsou, Tang, “Cultural Revolution: Causes and Effects,” Proceedings of the Symposium on China, 13 January 1968 (Berkeley, California: Chinese Students Association and the Center for Chinese Studies, 1968), pp. 34–41.Google Scholar
50 In outlining the steps to be taken in the seizure of power, Chou En-lai told the Red Guards on 23 January 1967 that as a first step they should merely supervise the business operations of the various agencies. But if the agencies concerned “do not have business operations as in the case of the departments and units within the Party, a thorough-going revolution can be made by the Red Guards.” Yu-tien feng-lei (Thunderstorm in the Postal and Telecommunications Services), No. 5 (10 February 1967), p. 3.
51 The worst offender against the Maoist line of supporting the Left was Chao Yung-fu the Deputy Commander of the military district of Chinghai province. See “Order of the Military Committee of the Central Committee,” 6 April 1966, Chung-kung chung-yang wen-chien hui-chi (Collection of Documents Issued by the Party Centre of the CCP), reprinted by the Liaison Station of the Red Guards of the Men-t'ou-kou district of the city of Peking (April 1967), pp. 170–173.
52 Tsou, , “Cultural Revolution: Causes and Effects,” Proceedings of the Symposium of China, pp. 34–41.Google Scholar
53 “Vice-Premier Hsieh Fu-chih's Seven Viewpoints,” Wu-ch'an-chieh-chi wen-hua ta-ko-ming yu-kuan ts'ai-liao pien-hui [sic] (Collection of Materials Pertaining to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) (Canton, 28 October 1966), Vol. II, pp. 25–27, in JPRS, No. 40,391 (24 March 1967), p. 7.
54 From the minutes of a forum held by the revolutionary teachers and students of the College of International Relations under the auspices of Hsiao-p'ing, Teng and Fu-ch'un, Li. See also Current Background, No. 819 (10 March 1967), p. 72.Google Scholar
55 Wu-ch'an chieh-chi wen-hua ta-ko-ming ta-shih chi. 1965.9–1966.12 (The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution—a Record of Major Events. September 1965–December 1966), in JPRS, No. 42,349 (25 August 1967), p. 26.
56 Yu-tien feng-lei, No. 5, 10 February 1967.
57 Ibid.; Huo-ch'e-t'ou (Locomotive), No. 7, 2 February 1967, in Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 3898 (14 March 1967), p. 4.
58 Tou-cheng pao (The Struggle Newspaper), early January 1967, p. 7.