1. The author wishes to thank The Washington and South-east Regional Seminar on China for supporting the seminar paper which preceded this study. Also, appreciation is extended to John W. Witek, S.J. for reading and commenting on a draft of this study.

2. See Wilbur, C. Martin and How, Julie Lien-ying, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918–1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956)Google Scholar . For another important survey of documents on that period, illuminating particularly the Russian role in the Chinese movement, see Eudin, Xenia J. and North, Robert C., Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–27: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957)Google Scholar.

3. See Tso-liang, Hsiao, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–34: A Study of Documents (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961)Google Scholar.

4. Pak, Hyobom, Documents of the Chinese Communist Party, 1927–30 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971)Google Scholar.

5. In early 1979, the Military Archives Division of the National Archives and Records Service accessioned from the Central Intelligence Agency 55 cubic feet of records of the Shanghai Municipal Police. The Shanghai Police Files had been captured by the Japanese during the Second World War and later, after cessation of hostilities, returned to the Chinese Nationalist Government. The CIA acquired the documents from the Nationalists in February 1949, as the Communists were taking Shanghai. The bulk of the records span the period from 1929 to 1944 with an incomplete series of dossiers dating back to 1894. Most of the records are in English, although a few are in Chinese or French with English translations. Portions of the Shanghai records, but not the Zhejiang Collection, were used by U.S. General Willoughby, Charles A. for his investigation of the Richard Sorge espionage case and in writing The Shanghai Conspiracy (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952)Google Scholar. Portions of the original collection of Shanghai Municipal Police Files still remain in the People's Republic of China. ProfessorChesneaux, Jean used some of those records in preparing The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919–1927 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968)Google Scholar. For extensive treatment of the Zhejiang Collection, see Ristaino, Marcia R., “The Chinese Communist Movement, 1927–28: Organizations, Strategies and Tactics for Making Revolution” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Georgetown University, 1977)Google Scholar.

6. Attempts to locate the Zhejiang Collection at both the British Public Record Office and the Library of Congress were unrewarded.

7. Zhejiang Collection, Vol, I. p. 8 (of the English translation). Hereafter, will be cited as Zhejiang Collection, 1.8.

8. One might speculate that a key reason why the Shanghai Municipal Police were so successful in arresting noted Communists and uncovering their organizations in the early 1930s was that they had through the Zhejiang Collection much valuable data concerning Communist organizational procedures, strategies and tactics to inform and guide their efforts.

9. In the Zhejiang Collection, two terms are used to identify the highest level of authority within the CCP: “the Central” and “The Central Government of the Communist Party”.

10. Reference by volume to key Communist events, contained in the Zhejiang Collection are: Vol. 1, p. 10 notes the Fifth CCP Congress (April-May 1927) as having taken place “this year” and the Seventh Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist international (ECCI) (November-December 1926) as having met “last year”. Also, mention is made of the intention to establish a communications branch in Shanghai to control documents from the Northern and South-eastern provinces (p. 19) and then (p. 9) of its having been established on 26 August (1927). Vol. 2, on pp. 10, 41 and 70 respectively, note is taken of the “Fifth General Meeting” (CCYL Fifth Congress of late July 1928); “Sixth Central Session” (CCP Sixth Congress, June-July 1928); and “Ninth Meeting of the ECCI” (February 1928). Vol. 3, on p. 40, what appears to be a complete document is marked as having originated from the “Provincial Committee”, on 21 August 1928. Sources consulted for dating these events included: Harrison, James P., The Long March to Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972)Google Scholar;Chien-min, Wang, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang shigao (Draft History of the Chinese Communist Party), Vols. I–II, Taipei, 1965Google Scholar; Kuo-t'ao, Chang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928–38, Vol. II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1972)Google Scholar;Kuo, Warren, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, Vols. I–II (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1968)Google Scholar. Additional data on dating the Zheijiang Collection will be provided as appropriate below.

11. Kuo, Warren, Analytical History, Vol. 2, p. 45Google Scholar. Party memberships by the Sixth Congress are estimated at 15,000 in North, Robert C., Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 110Google Scholar.

12. See Document 22, “Resolution on the Questions of the ‘left KMT’ and the Soviet Slogan “dated 19 September 1927 in Pak, Hyobom, Documents, pp. 129–31Google Scholar.

13. Kuo, Warren, Analytical History, Vol. 1, pp. 388–89Google Scholar.

14. Extracts from the important “Resolution of the Ninth ECCI Plenum on the Chinese Question” are contained in Degras, Jane, ed., Communist International, 1919–1943, Documents, 3 Vols. (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1956–1971), Vol. 2, pp. 436–40Google Scholar.

15. See particularly the “Political Resolution” (September 1928) and the “Resolution on the Peasant Movement” (September 1928) in Brandt, Conrad, Schwartz, Benjamin and Fairbank, John K., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 127–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. By primary Communist organs is meant CCP and CCYL bodies, which developed and implemented Communist policies within the movement. Other Communist bodies, such as red labour unions, peasant unions, youth groups, etc., did not develop policy, but received CCP or CCYL policy guidance, while maintaining separate organizational command structures.

17. See Zhejiang Collection, 1:4–11. Similar information, but concerning the CCP, is contained in the Party Constitution adopted at the CCP Sixth Congress. It is contained in: Linebarger, Paul M. A., The China of Chiang Kai-shek (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1943), pp. 359–70Google Scholar. The Chinese text is found in Chien-min, Wang, Draft History, Vol. 2, pp. 28–35Google Scholar.

18. For a comprehensive study of early CCYL history, see Chang-ling, Wang. Gongchanzhuyi qingnian tuan lunshi (Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Youth League, 1920–27) (Taipei: National Zhengzhi University, 1973)Google Scholar. See also: Pringsheim, Klaus H., “The Functions of the Chinese Communist Youth Leagues (1920–49)”, CQ, No. 12 (10–12, 1962)Google Scholar and Ristaino, Dissertation, Chap. 2, pp. 30–56.

19. Brandt, Conrad, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924–27 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company Inc., 1966), pp. 47–8Google Scholar.

20. Ibid. p. 127; see also, Xinhua Banyue Kan II (10 June 1957), p. 80.

21. Zhejiang Collection, 1:3. This is included in a section which attempts to define relations between the Party and the League (1:1–4).

22. This discussion of democratic centralism is based largely on the source material cited above in note 17. However, it also considers instructional material, similar in content and purpose, placed at the beginning of Vol. 2. See ibid, 2:2–6.

23. The branch, district and xian level organizations were, of course, to exist both in rural and urban areas: for example, the Communist organization in a city would have at the basic level street branches, factory branches, railway branches, etc. It was also to be divided into districts with district committee organs presiding. These district committees were to be supervised by a xian or municipal committee, which are described in the materials as similar in organization. In the countryside, the basic level was to be the village or as it was designated, the village branch. At the next level up, the rural district committee was to draw one-half of its membership from among the most important village branches. This district organ was to be supervised by a xian organ. Wherever a xian committee already existed, organization of a municipal committee was considered unnecessary.

24. Rich material concerning security procedures is contained in a section entitled “Secret Methods of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League” of the Zhejiang Collection, 1:13–22. As noted in Rinden, Robert and Witke, Roxane, The Red Flag Waves: Hung-Ch'i P'iao-p'iao Collection (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968) on pp. 80–81Google Scholar, that collection contains information on CCYL security procedures, some of which are similar, particularly Vol. IX, pp. 122–23.

25. Zhejiang Collection, 1:15. The translators of the original Chinese volume (1) included the Chinese characters for each of the entries in the list of pronouns.

26. Ibid. 2:6.

27. The failing of transforming peasant unions and even Soviets into Party organizations was condemned at the Sixth Party Congress. See Brandt, , Schwartz, and Fairbank, , Documentary History, p. 164Google Scholar.

28. At the Provincial Committee level, the disseminated materials might include: “ ‘Political Correspondence’, ‘Outline(s) of political propaganda,’ strategical problems, answers to logical problems, material for practical struggle, etc.” See Zhejiang Collection, 2:19.

29. Central Directive No. 54 entitled “On the Current Situation,” dated 21 June 1928 deals with the need to transmit aspects of the Party's political programme to various groups, but emphasizes translating them gradually through the medium of slogans developed “according to local conditions” and sensitivities. See Pak, Hyobom, Documents, pp. 455–56Google Scholar.

30. “Grey” periodicals, to be published by provincial-level propaganda organs, were ones which could not be directly identified with Communist organizations, but which were to criticize the existing political system and offer new programmes aimed at improving the situation in the province. They were to contain a section for correspondence. Mosquito newspapers were to be less formal publications aimed at making cogent observations and commentary about living and working conditions in a specific area. They might include local songs, cartoons, popular literature, etc. See Zhejiang Collection, 2:18–19.

31. For extensive guidance and instructions regarding external organizational work among these groups, see ibid. 2:11–18, 29–40.

32. In a lengthy section, the kinds of existing labour organizations are discussed and analyzed and an authoritative explanation provided of the correct strategy and tactics to be followed by cadres in the labour movement. See ibid. 2:30–33. Mention is made that “under the control of ‘red’ labour unions throughout the country, the number of organized labourers, moreover, is less than 40,000” (2:33). These materials are concluded with the term “great” and number 132 – a combination appearing 10 times in Vol. 2 and after major instruction.

33. The Provincial Defence Forces stationed in Zhejiang are described in the materials as a very difficult target for Communist infiltration programmes because reportedly they suffered no real personal or economic hardships. See ibid. 2:39.

34. Brandt, , Schwartz, and Fairbank, , A Documentary History, pp. 137–38Google Scholar .

35. Almost two-thirds of Vol. 2 is concerned with explaining the mobilization process and giving guidance concerning its proper implementation. See Zhejiang Collection, 2:27–79.

36. Ibid., 2:47. The meaning, development and successful management of struggle activities is the subject of numerous instructional passages in 2:46–64.

37. Ibid. 2:55.

38. Ibid., 2:46. There is one report available from Zhejiang describing actual conditions there in the movement. The picture drawn is one of weakness and chaos, with mass resignations by Party leaders, arrests, documents lost, factionalism, etc. See Document 42, dated 17 September 1927 in Pak, Documents, pp. 272–83.

39. Ibid. 2:50. The need to begin with economic struggle campaigns before advancing to political struggles is also emphasized in a report by the Hubei Provincial Secretary to Central authorities on 10 September 1927. See Pak, , Documents, p. 214Google Scholar.

40. The guidance states that external propaganda efforts should emphasize three areas:(1) anti-Japanese, British and American Imperialism; (2) anti-Guomindang; and (3) that which is appropriate to local struggle campaigns. Most important, the three should be connected and interrelated. See Zhejiang Collection, 2:55.

41. Ibid. 2:65. The excerpted material is concluded with the term and number, “Great 132”, which, as noted above, follows key instruction in the collection.

42. Ibid. 2:74. The first Chinese soviet was established at Haifeng in Guangdong province on 27 November 1927. There followed what was termed “the period of the soviet movement”, which lasted until September 1937. For a Communist account of soviet bases actually established between late 1927 and 1930, see Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. 2, pp. 13–17Google Scholar.

43. Zhejiang Collection, 2:75. Central instruction (11 May 1928) to the Shunzhi Provincial Committee emphasizes similar points concerning the uprising: the importance of preparatory work leading to uprising, the need for a good foundation in mass work, the importance of daily struggle activities, the need to persuade rather than compel worker participation, etc. See Pak, , Documents, pp. 489–94Google Scholar.

44. Examples from the text are: “…the non-payment of rent movement should be extended and should penetrate into the masses. In its course of development, the occupation of cities must be avoided…” (Great 83), ibid. 2:58; “When there is a sufficiently strong foundation in the peasant movement in these villages, the city will then be occupied, thus completing the uprising of this city. This applies to the provincial city which will only be attacked when the revolution in the whole province is nearing completion…” (Great 132), 2:66; “In short the mass movement is to be responsible for the occupation of a city while the military force is only to assist. You must not attempt the movement until you feel sure of your success nor when the mass is not in a position to receive our direction in full. We have carefully considered matters and think that at present no cities should be occupied in Chekiang pending further developments in the work…” (no term or number appended), 2:74; “These are material preparations for a city uprising. The close establishment of a relation between the labour uprising and the peasant uprising rests heavily on the shoulders of the Party. These single uprisings can never achieve any success ” (Great 196), 2:75. Restraint concerning the cities was included in decisions concerning Party work in Shaanxi Province. See Pak, , Document 60, dated 18 03 1928 in Documents, pp. 417–18Google Scholar.

45. Zhejiang Collection 2:67. This quoted passage is contained in Central Notice No. 50 (25 May 1928), included as Document 61 in Pak, , Documents, p. 428Google Scholar. The translations are somewhat different, but clearly both pertain to the same original Chinese document.

46. Zhejiang Collection, 2:66, 75.

47. Ibid. 2:66. For regulations concerning the conditions which must exist for occupying a city, and which in important ways were similar to the preconditions for uprising given above, see ibid. 2:74. At the Politburo's enlarged session meeting in Shanghai, 9–10 November 1927, basically the same preconditions of an urban insurrection were set forth. See Tso-liang, Hsiao, Chinese Communism in 1927: City vs. Countryside (Hong Kong. Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1970), p. 162Google Scholar .

48. A glossary entitled “Common Terms used by the Communist Party and the Communist Youth” is appended to Vol. 3 of the Zhejiang Collection, p. 51. Red Terror is defined as the “massacre and incendarism committed by Communists”; in the same list White Terror is explained as “suppression of Communism”.

49. Several instructions concerning the proper use of Red Terror, and revealing its past improper use, are contained in ibid. 2:67–68.

50. Ibid. 2:69. Discussion of the role and purpose of guerrilla warfare appear at 2:69–73.

51. Ibid. 2:70; cf. Brandt, , Shwartz, and Fairbank, , A Documentary History, pp. 161–62Google Scholar.

52. Another lengthy passage, concerning past defects in the implementation of guerrilla warfare, again virtually duplicates another subsection on guerrilla warfare in the “Political Resolution”. See Zhejiang Collection, 2:72; cf. Brandt, , Schwartz, and Fairbank, , A Documentary History, p. 162Google Scholar.

53. Reportedly, landowners and gentry often made this comparison for the peasantry in order to damage the Communists' position. See Zhejiang Collection, 2:76.

54. The same point is included in the CCP CC's 21 December 1927 letter to Zhu De contained inKuo, , Analytical History, Vol. 1, pp. 478–79Google Scholar.

55. Ibid. 2:72. This instruction must have originated after the fall of 1927. By contrast, cadres in charge of uprisings timed to take place in Hunan and Hubei during the autumn (1927) harvest season were directed to “first muster all available strength to attack the key city.… Only then, can we develop a general uprising”, rather than to consolidating a rural soviet base. See Pak, , Documents, pp. 65–66Google Scholar.

56. See Zhejiang Collection: labour unions, pp. 1–4; peasant unions, pp. 4–8; youth organizations, with the Boys' Corps and Youth Vanguards covered in detail, pp. 9–14, 22–35; military organizations, pp. 15–21, including military committees, the Red Army and Red Defence Corps (the latter without significant information concerning organizational structure); and relief organizations, pp. 35–43.

57. Information defining the proper relationship between the red labour unions and CCP and CCYL bodies appears at ibid. 3:1–2.

58. The full term for these rural organizations was Nongmin Xiehui. Reportedly, it was commonly abbreviated by the Communists to Nongxie, see ibid. 3:56. The described organizational structure and-relationship of peasant unions to primary Communist bodies closely resembled that proposed for red labour unions.

59. There are extensive instructions and regulations concerning the Boys' Corps, including an organizational chart (p. 35) indicating its relationship to peasant or labour unions and CCYL bodies, which were to direct its work. See ibid. 3:21–25.

60. The guidance in the Zhejiang Collection concerning military organizations strongly resembles that contained in Central Notice No. 51 entitled “On the Military Work”, dated 25 May 1928 in Pak, , Documents, pp. 431–46Google Scholar. Many duplications in information occur including a list of slogans for the soldiers' movement, which are the same: cf. Zhejiang Collection, 3:16–17; Documents, pp. 438–39.

61. Concerning the purpose and organizational character of the Military Affairs Committees, see Zhejiang Collection, 3:3–4; 6–7.

62. The Zhejiang Collection contains rich material concerning the Youth Vanguards, a rural organization of youth from 16–23 years, charged with important cultural, political and military responsibilities. See ibid. 3:22–31.

63. Ibid. 2:16.

64. See ibid. 3:44–49. For tables, constructed from the materials, explaining: (1) necessary pre-conditions for establishing Soviets at the various levels, and (2) internal staffing and operating procedures of the various-level Soviets, see Ristaino, , Dissertation, pp. 194–95Google Scholar.

65. Zhejiang Collection, 3:45.

66. Ibid. 3:44.

67. Ibid. 3:45.

68. The charts appear to be constructions based on instructional materials, but include both English and Chinese descriptive terms for the various offices and committees. See ibid. 3:52–55.

69. The information which follows is based on the authoritative instructions issued by the “Central Government”, described in the text.