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Communism and Chinese Communalism in Sarawak

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Justus M. Van Der Kroef
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Extract

The Chinese are still divided into two groups. One group is very left in its views, very vociferous, very active, very humourless, very narrow minded and forceful, and knows what it wants and intends to achieve its objects by fair means or foul, regardless of what the rest of the population may think. The other group is undoubtedly immensely larger, though one might be excused for not realising this, as it lacks cohesion and the people in it merely wish to be left alone to carry on their normal avocations. Since it has no strong feelings not only does this group not speak out, but in many cases it finds the line of least resistance is to support the other group when asked to do so.

The 1962 Annual Report for the District of Kuching, The Sarawak Gazette, May 31, 1963.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 20 , December 1964 , pp. 38 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1964

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References

1 Sarawak by the Week (Kuching: Sarawak Information Service), No. 30/62, July 22–28, 1962.Google Scholar

2 The Sarawak Tribune (Kuching), April 20, 1963.Google Scholar

3 There is no adequate full length study of Communism in Sarawak. For background material on the CCO in the following paragraphs I have largely relied on the publication of the Government of Sarawak's Information Service, The Danger Within. A History of the Clandestine Communist Organisation in Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, s.a., released in March 1963).Google Scholar

4 North Borneo News and Sabah Times (Jesselton), June 22, 1962.Google Scholar

5 The Danger Within, op. cit., pp. 25–27.Google Scholar

6 On Communist readiness to accept bourgeois leadership in united front strategy, see van der Kroef, Justus M., “On ‘National Democracy’,” Survey, April 1963, pp. 134–145.Google Scholar

7 Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak (Dichetak Dijabatan chetak Kerajaan oleh Thor Beng Chong, Pemangku Penchetak Kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, s.l., 1962), p. 8.Google Scholar

8 North Borneo News and Sabah Times, February 11, 1963.Google Scholar

9 Sarawak by the Week. No. 1/62, week of December 31, 1961to January 6, 1962.Google Scholar

10 See the unsigned article “Sarawak at the Polls,” Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), June 27, 1963.Google Scholar From its inception SUPP stressed its opposition to “colonialism” and its aim to bring “democratic independence” to Sarawak. Its periodicals and other propaganda materials were perhaps the best produced of all Sarawak political groups and SUPP leaders early showed their ability in staging mass demonstrations. See, e.g., Gambar-Gambar Sa'ati 1959–1962 (Kuching: 1962)Google Scholar; Tuan Chieh Pao-Sa'ati (Kuching), June 4, 1961Google Scholar; and Jen Ming Lien Ho Tang Mei Li Chih Pu Erh Chou Nien Chi Nien Te K'an—Bop Pengingat Chukup Kedua Taun Gerompong Sa'ati Rayat Sarawak dan di Miri (Kuching), No. 17, 1960–1962, esp. pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

11 Voters on the basis of universal adult suffrage and certain residence requirements first chose 429 District Councillors. These selected from among their number 108 Divisional Advisory Councillors, who in turn chose the 36 elected members of the Council Negri or Sarawak Legislative Assembly. The total number of members of the Council Negri is 43. The Council's seven non-elected members include the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary, three members appointed because of their special skills or interests, and one standing member.Google Scholar

12 The Sarawak Alliance Party won 138 District Council seats, SUPP 116, PANAS 59, and independents 116. The complexity of the indirect electoral system, combined with the weight accorded to rural constituencies, almost at once afforded the pro-Malaysia opposition to SUPP an opportunity after the election to exclude SUPP from any representation in the Council Negri through various forms of combination of votes and inter-party co-operation. At the end of June 1963, it seemed for a moment that SUPP, though it had won 116 District Council seats, and was far and away the leading spokesman of the Sarawak Chinese community, would in fact not have any seats on the Council Negri at all. Ultimately however, PANAS, which at one time had participated in the Alliance but had broken away though still favouring Malaysia, agreed to join its electoral strength with that of SUPP, so that both groups could jointly qualify for membership in the Council Negri and form the parliamentary opposition. This post-election political manoeuvre sharply accentuated Chinese communal antagonisms toward the rest of the Sarawak population. Another source of Chinese dissatisfaction has been instances of irregularities, particularly of unlawful pressure on voters by pro-Malaysia government officials, alleged to have occurred during the election. The report of the U.N. fact-finding mission in Sarawak stated that although “there have been several instances of unwarranted (and in some cases illegal) manifestations of over enthusiasm by local government officials to further the interests of the political party supporting the Malaysia plan, such instances cannot be regarded as indicative of any calculated or sustained plan on the part of the Central government,” nor could it be said that if these instances had not occurred the election results would have been reversed. According to the U.N. report Sarawak election returns showed 61 per cent. in favour of Malaysia, 22·2 per cent. opposed, and 16·8 per cent. neutral. The Sunday Times (Singapore), September 15, 1963.Google Scholar

13 According to the latest government data the total population of Sarawak in June 1962 was 776,990, divided over the following groups:

Sarawak Annual Report 1962 (Kuching: Sarawak Government Printing Office, s.a.), p. 11.

14 Ju-K'ang, T'ien, The Chinese of Sarawak: a Study of Social Structure. Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 12, Department of Anthropology, the London School of Economics and Political Science (London: 1953), p. 9.Google ScholarSee also Leigh, M. B., The Chinese Community of Sarawak (Singapore: 1964).Google Scholar

15 Ju-K'ang Tien, p. 81.Google Scholar

16 Sarawak By The Week, No. 31/62, July 22–28, 1962.Google Scholar

17 The Sarawak Gazette, No. 1263, May 31, 1963, p. 110.Google Scholar

18 Ibid. No. 1252, June 20, 1962, pp. 126–128.

19 Sarawak By The Week, No. 44/62, October 28–November 3, 1962.Google Scholar

20 Ibid. p. 3.

21 North Borneo News and Sabah Times, March 7, 1963.Google Scholar

22 Sarawak By The Week, No. 44/62, October 28–November 3, 1962, and ibid. No. 45/62, November 4–November 10, 1962.

23 North Borneo News and Sabah Times, December 21, 1962.Google Scholar

24 For the historical background see A Guide to Education in Sarawak (Kuching: Sarawak Information Service, 1961).Google Scholar

25 Compare Development Plan for Sarawak 1955–1960 (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 16.Google Scholar

26 Sarawak. Annual Report, 1962, op. cit., p. 151.Google Scholar

27 The Sarawak Gazette, No. 1253, July 31, 1962, p. 156.Google Scholar

28 Ibid. No. 1256, October 31, 1962, p. 233 and No. 1263, May 31, 1963, p. 111.

29 North Borneo News and Sabah Times, December 4, 1962.Google Scholar

30 The Sarawak Tribune, August 13, 1963, p. 3.Google Scholar

31 Sarawak By The Week, No. 48/62, November 25 to December 1, 1962.Google Scholar

32 The Sarawak Tribune, August 15, 1963.Google Scholar

33 The Borneo Times (Sandakan), July 19, 1963.Google Scholar

34 van der Kroef, Justus M., “Indonesia, Malaya and the North Borneo Crisis,” Asian Survey, April 1963, pp. 173–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 Sarawak By The Week, No. 50/62, December 9–15, 1962.Google Scholar

36 The Sarawak Tribune, May 1, 1963; June 5, 1963; June 8, 1963; June 10, 1963; June 21, 1963.Google Scholar

37 Sabah Times (Jesselton), May 13, 1964.Google Scholar On Indonesian penetration in the Sarawak and Sabah areas see also the Malaysian government's “White Book” entitled Indonesian Intentions towards Malaysia (Di-chetak di-jabatan chetak Kerajaan oleh Thor Beng Chong A.M.N., Penchetak Kerajaan, Kuala Lumpur: 1964), p. 49.Google Scholar

38 Sabah Times, June 23, 1964.Google Scholar

39 For Communist China's avowed support of the Indonesian “confrontation” of Malaysia and of the North Borneo insurgents see van der Kroef, Justus M., “The Sino-Indonesian Partnership,” Orbis, Summer, 1964.Google ScholarSee also editorial in Renmin Ribao, September 9, 1964.Google Scholar

40 See “Red Menace in Sarawak,” The Sunday Mail (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), October 27, 1963.Google Scholar

41 Sabah Times, December 28, 1963, and April 11, June 12 and July 9, 1964. In a sense Chinese Communist youths are now attempting to break down communal barriers, but in a way which the Sarawak government is not likely to approve of. Primarily since the early months of 1964 the CCO has sought to influence the Iban Daya element in Sarawak. Under CCO direction Chinese youths have been set to studying Dayak languages and the CCO has recently been circulating an Iban language Communist publication entitled Suara Bansa.Google Scholar

42 In his evaluation of the December 1962 revolt Sarawak's leading ethnologist has pointed out that the Kedayans, which number only about 10,000 in Sarawak, were principally involved in the rebellion and that if the revolt has taught anything from an ethnological point of view, it is “that you cannot afford to ignore small racial groups,” and that the Kedayans “have not been taken into account. There are practically no responsible Kedayans in any positions. They are not adequately represented in government,” and so on. (Tom, Harrison, “The Arc of Resolution,” North Borneo News and Sabah Times, January 12, 1963, p. 5.) Part passu, this observation applies to larger groups like the Chinese in Sarawak.Google Scholar