¹ An “Nth” country is one which is not yet a nuclear power. When a country goes nuclear the appropriate ordinal number is substituted for “N.” China is of course no longer an Nth country but the fifth nuclear power.

² See Garthoff, Raymond, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1962), 2nd ed.Google Scholar, and Wolfe, Thomas, Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard Un. Press, 1964)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Neither the existence nor the abrogation of this treaty were known with certainty in the West for a long time. The details were first made clear by the Chinese in their statement of August 15, 1963 (see Griffith, William E., The Sino-Soviet Rift, p. 351Google Scholar). There had, of course, been speculation before 1963 that the Russians had aided the Chinese nuclear programme. On this point consult Hsieh, Alice, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Clifis, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁴ There is some controversy over the importance of this aid to the Chinese programme resulting in the October 16, 1964, detonation. See Hsieh, Alice, The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963, RAND P-2852, pp. 31–38Google Scholar, and Halperia, Morton, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger, 1965), especially pp. 78–82Google Scholar.

⁵ See especially the affirmative Soviet vote on the “Swedish resolution” at the 16th session in 1961. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, pp. 17–18.

⁶ The relevant section is article 16 of the March 15, 1962 draft treaty. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1962, 1 (01–06 1962), p. 113Google Scholar.

⁷ Hsieh, RAND P-2852, p. 21, and Dallin, Alexander and others, The Soviet Union, Arms Control, and Disarmament (New York: Columbia Un. Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁸ Halperin, Morton and Perkins, Dwight, Communist China and Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 168–169Google Scholar.

⁹ For a recent discussion of the Soviet reaction to the MLF proposal, see Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence,” Foreign Affairs, XLIII, No. 1 (10, 1964), pp. 126–134CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ See, for example, the Chinese government statement of August 15, 1963, Griffith, , Sino-Soviet Rift, pp. 347–348Google Scholar.

¹¹ Dallin, and others, The Soviet Union, p. 141Google Scholar.

¹² On the October 16, 1964 detonation see Asian Recorder, X, No. 50 (12 9–15, 1964), p. 6186Google Scholar (citing Pravda). See also New York Times, May 15, 1963.

¹³ This and the following points concerning the meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Commission are based on a talk by Sir Harold Beeley, principal British disarmament negotiator, at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, May 17, 1965.

¹⁴ The Soviet initiative in July, 1965 in reopening the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva and their subsequent tabling of a draft treaty on non-proliferation may well have signified, amongst other things, that the Russians were less sensitive to Chinese criticisms in the summer than they were in the spring. The fact that the United Nations Disarmament Commission was apparently chosen as an arena in early 1965 primarily for its value as a political forum emphasises this view.

The Soviet position on proliferation is probably also somewhat affected by the conflict between the “modernists” and the “traditionalists” within the Soviet decision-making system. The policy of non-proliferation is almost certainly emphasised far more by the modernists than by the traditionalists, who may well have reservations. Although Khrushchev was a leader of the modernists on such issues, the general Soviet orientation on issues such as proliferation does not appear to have shifted markedly since the change in leadership of October, 1964. On the general differences between modernists and traditionalists, see Dallin and others, pp. 50–51.

¹⁵ One important exception to this generalisation, which adumbrates the later position of the Chinese, appeared as early as 1951. At that time they argued that “only the fact that other countries, in the first place the Soviet Union, possess the atomic weapon can bring America to believe that there is not the slightest advantage in atomic militarism,” Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), 10 7, 1951, printed in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 190Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Chinese government statement, August 15, 1963, Griffith, p. 347, hereafter August 15, 1963 statement.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ For a typical example see Chinese comment on the Soviet open letter of July 14, 1963 (5), November 18, 1963, Griffith, p. 486.

²⁰ See, for example, speech by Cheng-chin, Liao, “People of the World Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons,” Peking, 08 1, 1963, pp. 69–70Google Scholar.

²¹ Halperin, , China and the Bomb, pp. 45–46Google Scholar.

²² Ku-ping, Jen, “The Tito Group—An Army Corps of U.S. Imperialism in its Grand Strategy of Counter-Revolution,” NCNA, 09 21, 1962, SCMP, No. 2826Google Scholar.

²³ August 15, 1963 statement.

²⁴ People's Daily editorial, August 9, 1962, SCMP, No. 2799.

²⁵ See, for example, Cheng-chih, Liao, “People of the World Unite,” pp. 69–70Google Scholar, and People's Daily editorial, December 22, 1961, SCMP, No. 2648.

²⁶ Halperin, pp. 50–51.

²⁷ August 15, 1963 statement.

²⁸ Wilton Cole's interview with Marshal Chen Yi, October 5, 1961, and an article by General Liu Ya-lou in 1958 cited by Hsieh, Alice, “Communist China and Nuclear Force,” The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, Rosecrance, R. N. (ed.) (New York: Columbia Un. Press, 1964), p. 159nGoogle Scholar.

²⁹ August 15, 1963, statement.

³⁰ See, for example, Halperin, and Perkins, , Communist China and Arms Control, Chap. 1 and especially p. 1Google Scholar.

³¹ See, for example, the work of Alice Hsieb, who feels that while Chinese ignorance about various aspects of nuclear warfare may have been a relevant consideration in the fifties, this has not been the case since at least the late fifties— Hsieh, in Rosecrance, pp. 163–169. The same conclusion is suggested by Alice Hsieh's 1962 book, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era.

³² Peking Review, VII, No. 42 (10 16, 1964)Google Scholar.

³³ People's Daily editorial, October 22, 1964, SCMP, No. 3325.

³⁴ Peking Radio, October 30, 1964.

³⁵ NCNA, December 31, 1964.

³⁶ Chinese Government statement, October 16, 1964. This position has since been repeated on a number of occasions, including the NCNA communiqué’ after the third nuclear test on May 9.

³⁷ For the original statement of this view see Chinese comment on the Soviet open letter of July 14, 1963 (5), November 18, 1963, Griffith, pp. 486–487. The Chinese have implied since the 1964 detonation that they see no reason to change this view.

³⁸ Chinese Government statement, November 22, 1964, as cited in Halperin and Perkins,p. 178.

³⁹ An interesting indication of Chinese thinking at least roughly along these lines is to be found in Edgar Snow's report of his recent interview with Mao Tse-tung. Snow, Edgar, “Interview With Mao,” New Republic, No. 9 (02 27, 1965),p. 20Google Scholar. See also “China's Effort in Africa,” The Interpreter, March 1965, pp. 11–16.

⁴⁰ NCNA Hindi broadcast to India, June 27, 1965.

⁴¹ NCNA, July 27, 1965.

⁴² NCNA, August 11, 1965.

⁴³ Peking Review, VIII, No. 41 (10 8, 1965), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See, for example, speech by Liu Ning-i, Chinese delegate to the Tokyo Conference, NCNA, July 28, 1965, and speech by Liu Ning-i, NCNA, August 1, 1965.

⁴⁵ Chinese Government statement, September 1, 1963, Griffith, p. 386.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Griffith, p. 328.

⁴⁸ Halperin and Perkins, p. 175

⁴⁹ Joint statement by the Chinese and a delegation of Japanese socialists, NCNA, October 29, 1964, SCMP, No. 3330.

⁵⁰ Halperin and Perkins, p. 133 et seq.

⁵¹ Griffith, p. 336.

⁵² Griffith, p. 432.

⁵³ A statement of the extended version of the “intermediate zone” theory, one of the more recent developments in doctrine, Chinese, appears in “Mao Interview,” Pravda, 09 2, 1964Google Scholar, Moscow Radio, September 6, 1964.

⁵⁴ Rosecrance, Richard, “International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion,” in Rosecrance, p. 307Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Halperin and Perkins, p. 10.

⁵⁶ For indications of U.S. thinking on this subject see Cromley, Ray, “Drastic Moves Against China Are Discussed,” Washington News, 11 13, 1964Google Scholar; Cromley, Ray, “Peking Poses the Great Imponderable,” Washington News, 11 17, 1964Google Scholar; and Alsop, Steward, “The One Great Question,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 14, 1964Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ See Chinese comment on the Soviet open letter of July 14, 1963 (1), September 6, 1963, Griffith, p. 339.

⁵⁸ For the various strands of the Chinese attitude toward the MLF, consult Chu-fong, Yang, “A Nuclear Force Without a Name,” Peking Review, VI, No. 24 (06 14, 1963), pp. 9–13Google Scholar, and “Nuclear Proliferation: Bonn's Finger on the Trigger?”, Peking Review, VII, No. 43 (10 23, 1964), pp. 20–21Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Brady, Thomas, “Pressure Grows for India A-Bomb,” New York Times, 10 27, 1964Google Scholar. This is one of a number of news dispatches on a speech by Homi Bhahba, Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, in which he cited figures on India's nuclear programme.

⁶⁰ From the Chinese point of view, one possible long-term disadvantage of an Indian nuclear programme is that an Indian decision to go nuclear might push Japan in the direction of opting for its own nuclear programme. Although such a development presently seems doubtful for political reasons, the great Chinese fear of military resurgence in Japan might make any possibility of positive influence on a Japanese nuclear programme seem important to the Chinese.

⁶¹ The joint communiqué’ from, this visit appears in Peking Review, VIII, No. 6 (02 5, 1965), pp. 6–8Google Scholar. For an analysis of the communiqué’ see Research Department of Radio Free Europe, Communist Area, 01 30, 1965Google Scholar, “Chinese-Indonesian Joint Communiqué”.

⁶² Ibid. Tad Szulc's commentary on Chen Yi's November 1964 visit to Jakarta: “Sukarno Bufld-Up Linked to Peking,” New York Times, January 8, 1965. For an unsubstantiated report that China was planning, before the fall of 1965, to “supply Indonesia with enough enriched uranium to permit her to explode a nuclear device,” see Zilbert, E. R., “The Chinese Nuclear Explosion, N-Nation Nuclear Development and Civil Defense,” RAND, P-3074, 04 1965, p. 22Google Scholar.

⁶³ The Indonesians presently have 30 Tu 16 (Badger) bombers of Soviet construction, while the most advanced Chinese bomber is the greatly inferior Tu 4. See Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1964–1965 (London, 1964)Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ For another interesting Chinese attempt to influence the Indonesian army see the reports during 1965 that the Indonesians were considering a proposal made by Chou En-lai to the effect that they should merge their regular and volunteer armed forces. Washington Post, June 1, 1965, citing a UPI dispatch of May 31 from Jakarta.

⁶⁵ For an example see the article of Commentator in Peoples Daily, February 19, 1965, reprinted in Peking Review, VIII, No. 9 (February 26, 1965), p. 17.

⁶⁶ Interestingly, the Chinese have recently announced that the Kuriles, Ryukyus and Bonins should be returned to Japan. This is undoubtedly a move to stem any Japanese inclination toward revanchism and resurgent militarism, although it also has implications for the Chinese dialogues with the Soviet Union and the United States. See “Chen I Questioned on CPR-Japan Relationship,” Tokyo Sankei, Peking Radio in Japanese to Japan, January 19, 1965.

⁶⁷ There is now reliable information to the effect that the Japanese are far along on the development of rockets, ostensibly for purposes of orbiting satellites, which would be more than adequate for the delivery of nuclear bombs against large portions of China.

⁶⁸ The Japanese GNP, for example, is far larger than China's, while there is no comparison between the GNP of Germany and the far larger one of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁹ The Chinese have repeatedly stated their desire that Japan should “free itself from American control” as a prelude to improved Sino-Japanese relations. For a recent example see Tokyo Mainichi (in Japanese), 01 18, 1965Google Scholar, Peking Radio, in Japanese to Japan, January 19, 1965, translation of details of Utsunomyia's interview with Chen Yi.

⁷⁰ On this point see Burns, A. L., “Measures Against Nuclear Dispersal in the Indo-Pacific Area,” Proceedings of the Seminar on Nuclear Dispersal in Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region (Canberra: Australian National Un., 1964), pp. 89–93Google Scholar.

⁷¹ NCNA, Cairo, January 13, 1965, SCMP, No. 3380.

⁷² See New York Times, April 9, 1965.

⁷³ For a reference to the proposed Nasser, visit see “Red China: An Insistent Presence,” Newsweek, 03 15, 1965Google Scholar. Chou En-lai visited Cairo in late May 1966 shortly after Kosygin and before him Tito had gone to see Nasser.

⁷⁴ Commentator, , “China Backs Arab People's Just Struggle,” People's Daily, in Peking Review, VIII, No. 12 (03 19, 1965), p. 11Google Scholar; see also Chou, PremierAnswers Questions of Middle East News Agency,” Peking Review, VIII, No. 15 (04 9, 1965), pp. 8–10Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ For a discussion of this possibility see Halperin and Perkins, p. 74.

⁷⁶ “Normalisation” of relations in this connection would refer to a settlement of the recognition issue and therefore of the Taiwan issue as well.