1. Hinton, Harold, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1975)Google Scholar. Hinton, Harold, The Bear at the Gate; Chinese Policy making Under Soviet Pressure (Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1971)Google Scholar. Whiting, Allen S., “The Sino-American détente: genesis and prospects,” in Wilson, Ian (ed.), China and the World Community (Sydney: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1973)Google Scholar. Sutter, Robert G., China-Watch, Toward Sino-American Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978)Google Scholar.

2. Gottlieb, Thomas M., Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand, P-1902-NA, 11 1977)Google Scholar.

3. See supra, nn. 1 and 2. See also, Brown, Roger G., “Chinese politics and American policy: a new look at the triangle,” Foreign Policy, No. 23 (Summer 1976), p. 5Google Scholar.

4. The “Military” faction did not speak for or control the entire PLA. Nor was the PLA a unified entity. Lin Biao's support was drawn largely from the Air Force, the Central Command of the PLA, and certain military units closely linked to him (i.e. the 38th Army garrisoning Beijing). Lin's control over the regional commands, and the regional forces they commanded, was greatly limited and these commands broke with him after the Second Plenum and supported the central civilian leadership.

5. Dillon, Linda D., Burton, Bruce and Soderlund, Walter C., “Who was the principal enemy?: shifts in official Chinese perceptions of the two superpowers, 1968–1969,” Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 5 (05 1977), p. 471Google Scholar. Dillon, et al. have no explanation for the reversal of quantitative emphasis in October 1969.

6. The two most important ones were “Leninism or social imperialism,” Peking Review, No. 17 (24 04 1970), p. 7Google Scholar, and “Long live the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” Peking Review, No. 12 (19 03 1971), p. 4Google Scholar.

7. Peking Review, No. 27 (23 07 1970), p. 28Google Scholar.

8. Ibid. p. 57.

9. By the terms of the treaty the Soviet Union agreed to respect the status quo of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the East European countries – which it had previously refused to do because those countries recognized the German Democratic Republic. Both sides agreed that the existing territorial status quo in Europe would be “respected” and both sides renounced any territorial claims in Europe. Bonn did, however, maintain the right of the German people to reunify their country.

10. Peking Review, No. 38 (18 09 1970), pp. 7–10Google Scholar.

11. Fejto, Francois, History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin (Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1974)Google Scholar.

12. Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 4634, pp. 36 and 42; No. 4636, p. 112Google Scholar. The notion of a united front of the peoples of Asia against U.S. imperialism was not new. It had been broached by Beijing in the early 1960s. See, for example, Drive U.S. Imperialism Out of Asia (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960)Google Scholar.

13. “People of the world unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs,” Peking Review, 25 May 1970, special issue.

14. “People of Asia, unite and drive U.S. aggressors out of Asia,” ibid. No. 27 (3 July 1970), p. 12.

15. “Down with revived Japanese militarism,” ibid. No. 36 (4 September 1970), p. 7.

16. “U.S. imperialism has not laid down its butcher knife,” ibid. No. 31 (31 July 1970), p. 19.

17. Zhou's visit to Pyongyang in April 1970 was part of a warming of Sino-North Korean relations which had begun in October 1969 when a North Korean delegation flew to Beijing at the last minute to participate in China's National Day ceremonies. Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang had become very strained during the Cultural Revolution when Red Guards attacked Kim Il-sung as a revisionist. There were reports of border incidents and the closing of the border early in 1968. Beijing's ties with Hanoi became strained in May 1968 When the Vietnamese decided to begin the negotiations proposed by President Lyndon B. Johnson. Beijing objected to this move, counselling Hanoi to instead refuse the negotiations and continue waging a protracted guerrilla war. It was not until July 1971 that Beijing finally supported the NLF's and North S Vietnamese's peace negotiations proposals, thereby implicitly approving of Vietnamese participation in those negotiations. During 1970 Beijing went to great lengths to convince Hanoi and Pyongyang of China's support for their struggles against the U.S. There were frequent exchanges of delegations and visits by high level personnel, Chinese statements of support, joint ceremonies of various sorts – including the commemoration of the start of the Korean War in June 1970 and the sponsorship of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese People's in April 1970 – aid agreements, and so forth.

18. For the Chinese position see Foreign Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), Trends in Communist Propaganda, 10 January 1975, p. 1. The Soviet position is in FBIS, Trends, 27 November 1974, p. 5 and 26 February 1975, p. 1.

19. Lieberthal, Kenneth G., Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica: Rand, R–234–NA, 07 1978), p. 189Google Scholar.

20. Ibid. p. 55.

21. See Brezhnev's, speech at Alma Ata in August 1970, Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. XXII, No. 35 (29 09 1970), p. 7Google Scholar and Mao's comment to the Soviet representative on May Day 1970, Astafyev, G. V., From Anti-imperialism to Anti-socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 58Google Scholar.

22. SCMP, No. 4910, p. 150.

23. SCMP, No. 4694, p. 237. Peking Review, No. 1 (1 01 1970), p. 7Google Scholar. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 51 (19 01 1971), p. 26Google Scholar. The JCNBR had met in Khabavarovsk in 1969 for its first meeting since 1967. In 1969 it met from 18 June to 8 August, and reached agreement on “specific measures to improve shipping on border rivers” and to meet again in 1970. SCMP, No. 4483, p. 22.

24. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 28 (15 09 1970), p. 8Google Scholar.

25. Prybyla, Jan, “The China trade,” Current History, Vol. 63, No. 373 (09 1972), p. 110Google Scholar.

26. Hsing-tao jih-pao (Hong Kong), 14 11 1970, p. 1Google Scholar.

27. SCMP, No. 4784, p. 35; No. 4790, p. 120.

28. Current Background, No. 928, 19 03 1971Google Scholar, and No. 937, 14 June 1971, “Agreements between Communist China and foreign countries.”

29. SCMP, No. 4762, p. 140.

30. New China Daily News Release (NCNA), 26 November 1970, p. 5.

31. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 48 (29 12 1970), p. 32Google Scholar.

32. Peking Review, 23 May 1970, special issue, p. 14.

33. NCNA, 2 October 1970, p. 2.

34. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 43 (24 11 1970), p. 26Google Scholar.

35. SCMP, No. 4779, p. 32.

36. The Soviet Union published the Chinese statement deleting only a favourable reference to Stalin. Hinton, , Bear at the Gate, p. 65Google Scholar. The Chinese message in November 1969 had been perfunctory, extending “warm greetings to the fraternal Soviet people” and hoping that the Soviet people would march forward along the road of the October Revolution blazed by Lenin and called for a long life to the friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. SCMP, No. 4536, p. 31.

37. SCMP, No. 4780, p. 69. A similar reception had been held in 1969, SCMP, No. 4536, p. 30.

38. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 35 (29 09 1970), p. 7Google Scholar.

39. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No 48 (29 12 1970), p 18Google Scholar; CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 51 (19 01 1971), p. 26Google Scholar.

40. Lieberthal, , Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

41. Hinton, , Sino-Soviet Confrontation, p. 72Google Scholar.

42. CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 48 (29 12 1970), p. 18Google Scholar.

43. Hinton, , Sino-Soviet Confrontation, p. 72Google Scholar.

44. Most analysts have overlooked the pronounced pro-Soviet tilt of Chinese foreign policy in 1970 and have not, consequently, sought to explain it other than as a consequence of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April 1970 and a political counter-attack by Iin Biao.

45. Geoffrey Hudson has pointed out that the period of maximum danger for a developing nuclear power is at that point at which it is just on the threshold of acquiring an effective nuclear strike capability, but does not yet have such a capability, and thus had no strategic deterrent. At that point there is great temptation for superior nuclear powers who feel threatened by the developing nuclear power to seek to “cripple” the further development of the lesser power's nuclear capability and preserve the existing status quo. See “Paper Tigers and Nuclear Teeth,” The China Quarterly (CQ), No. 39 (07–12 1969), p. 64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46. “Mixing sand” was one of the three tactics which Mao Zedong said he employed to undermine Lin Biao's position after these two men came into opposition after the Second Plenum in August 1970. By “mixing sand” in that case Mao meant the reorganization of the Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee. See Ginneken, Japp van, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (New York: Avon Books, 1972), p. 237Google Scholar.

47. See Logoreci, Anton, “China's policies in East Europe,” Current History, Vol. 63, No. 373 (09 1972), p. 118Google Scholar. Ray, Hemen, “China's initiatives in Eastern Europe,” Current Scene, Vol. VII, No. 23 (1 12 1969), p. 1Google Scholar.

48. “Programme for anti-imperialist struggle,” Peking Review, No. 21 (21 05 1971), p. 4Google Scholar.

49. Armstrong, J. D., Revolutionary Diplomacy; Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 99Google Scholar.

50. “People of Asia, unite and drive U.S. aggressors out of Asia,” Peking Review, No. 27 (3 07 1970), p. 12Google Scholar.

51. “Programme for anti-imperialist struggle,” p. 4.

52. See Barnett, Doak, “Peking and the Asian power balance,” Problems of Communism, 08 1976, p. 36Google Scholar.

53. See Brown, “Chinese politics and American policy” and Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy.

54. O'Leary, Greg, “Chinese foreign policy – from ‘anti-imperialism’to ‘antihegemonism',” in Brugger, Bill (ed.), China: The Impact of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1978), pp. 243–44Google Scholar.

55. As listed in Lin Biao's Political Report to the Ninth Congress these were: the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other. See Kau, Michael Y. M., The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (New York: IASP, 1975), p. 552Google Scholar.

56. NCNA, 30 April 1970, p. 21.

57. Astafyev, , From Anti-imperialism to Anti-socialism, p. 58Google Scholar. Peking Review's coverage of this event noted that the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the boundary negotiations, V. G. Gankovsky, was present on the rostrum on May Day. It also pointed out that when Mao mounted the rostrum in the morning. “In excellent health and high spirits, Chairman Mao greeted … distinguished guests and diplomatic envoys from various countries, cordially shaking hands and chatting with them.” Peking Review, No. 19 (8 05 1970), pp. 5 and 29Google Scholar. The Soviet Union promptly responded to Mao's gesture: on 3 May, V. V. Kuznetsov, head of the Soviet delegation to the boundary negotiations, returned to Beijing from Moscow.

58. SCMP, No. 4574, p. 43.

59. Ibid. No. 4762, p. 140. On 13 October Tolstikov presented his credentials to Deng Biwu and “had a talk” with Deng and Vice-foreign minister Jiao Guanhua. SCMP, No. 4764, p. 142.

60. Hinton, , Sino-Soviet Confrontation, p. 13Google Scholar.

61. SCMP, No. 4787, p. 165.

62. Ibid. No. 4936, p. 177.

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69. See Kau and Perrolle, “The politics of Lin Piao's abortive military coup.”

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72. On the evening of 30 September 1971 Yao Wenyuan presided with Geng Biao over a reception given for comrades from other Marxist-Leninist Parties. On 1 October 1971 Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were present at a large reception for foreigners, Ginneken, van, The, RiseandJ?all of Lin Piao, pp. 21–22Google Scholar.

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74. “Commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party,” ibid. No. 27 (2 July 1971), p. 18.

75. “Outline of Project 571” in Kau, , The Lin Piao Affair, p. 78Google Scholar. Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, Vol. I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974), p. 79Google Scholar. See also, Tien-min, Li, “On Lin Piao's ‘illicit relations with foreign countries',” Issues and Studies, Vol. IX, No. 6 (03 1973), p. 24Google Scholar.

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80. Ginneken, van, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao, p. 28Google Scholar. van Ginneken points out that Lin had been in the Soviet Union for extended periods for medical treatment and that the Soviet authorities almost certainly would have had his dental records – which would have provided positive identification of the corpse.

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87. It is interesting to note that both the Chinese and U.S. governments have an interest in the acceptance of the view that a Soviet threat to China underlies the Sino-American rapprochement. From the vantage point of both capitals such a view helps justify a “U.S. policy” and a “China policy” respectively which has come under attack from certain domestic critics. It also has the advantage of helping to rally diverse forces to the anti-Russian front, both internationally and domestically.