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The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Extract

The chief purpose of this discussion is to suggest areas of inquiry which might illuminate the way in which China may have influenced Soviet disarmament policy in recent years. One must be careful not to exaggerate Chinese influence on Soviet disarmament policy. There are obviously many other factors: domestic political considerations, relations with the East European countries, relations with less developed countries, relations with the West, including the Soviet assessment of the strategic “correlation of forces,” and sometimes perhaps even disarmament considerations per se. In recent years there may have been a tendency to look too much to the Chinese in seeking explanations for Soviet behaviour in the disarmament field, partly because the drama of the evolving Sino-Soviet split was so fascinating that all else seemed to pale in significance and partly because “China” sometimes seemed a convenient explanation for otherwise baffling Soviet moves. I propose, rather arbitrarily, to analyse Soviet disarmament policy in four categories: (1) tactics on formal disarmament conferences; (2) the formal proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R.; (3) the general thrust of Soviet disarmament propaganda; and (4) decisions, or what appear to be decisions, by the U.S.S.R. to negotiate seriously for the purpose of actually achieving an agreement.

Type
Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1966

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References

* I have not reviewed the disarmament negotiations which have taken place nor attempted to correlate Soviet tactics in them to developments in the Sino-Soviet relationship because other have done so.

1 It should not be overlooked, however, that important agreements with arms control implications were achieved in earlier years: e.g., the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956 and the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.

2 It is clear, at any rate, that the Polish proposals in 1964 for a nuclear freeze in Europe, which the Russians supported, would not have precluded formation of an MLF.