1. For full text, see: New Times (Moscow), No. 46 (11 1978), pp. 6–7Google Scholar. Art. 6 reads: “In case one of the Parties becomes the object of attack or of a threat of attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately begin mutual consultations for the purpose of removing that threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries.”

2. After the conflict began, the Chinese published a full account of the number of provocations they claimed the Vietnamese committed from 1975 onwards. I had earlier felt that during 1976 Vietnam attempted to take advantage of China's domestic troubles to harass the Chinese southern flank. While the Chinese data cannot be said to be conclusive, they remain interesting:

Hence, the list shows that in 1976, alleged provocations increased rapidly, fell off in 1977 as China and Vietnam tried to patch up relations (but failed), and rose again in 1978 as tension increased once more. During an interview with a Chinese foreign affairs official in Peking during the war, I inquired if he felt that in 1976 the Vietnamese might have exploited leadership problems in China (and showed their annoyance with China's backing of Pol Pot) by increasing pressure on the border. The official replied: “I don't know; you'll have to ask the Vietnamese about that” (2 March 1979).

3. The formulation was first used by Teng in a television interview while in the United States. See Jen-min, 30 January 1979. Li Hsien-nien used it again on 12 February; Jen-min, 12 February 1979.

4. Time, 5 February 1979, p. 16.

5. “U.S.A.-China,” New Times, No. 7 (02 1979), p. 7Google Scholar. For Soviet concern re possible American arms sales to China, see Mainichi Daily News (MDN), 29 January 1979, p. 3; for Izvestiia report of concern regarding a Chinese-Japanese-U.S. tripartite alliance, see MDN, 31 January 1979, p. 1; for a TASS critique of United States-China “connivance,” see MDN, 3 February 1979, p. 1.

6. Summary in New York Times, 30 January 1979, p. 9; full texts in Bulletin, Department of State, March 1979, pp. 1–2.

7. New York Times, 31 January 1979, p. 1.

8. Ibid. p. 6.

9. Ibid. 1 February 1979 (article by Fox Butterfleld).

10. As reported in Hsin-hua News Bulletin (HNB), 4 February 1979, p. 25.

11. HNB, 6 February 1979, p. 33.

12. Ibid. p. 32.

13. New York Times, 1 February 1979, p. A17.

14. “Joint Press Communiqué,” 1 February 1979; in Bulletin, U.S. Department of State (March 1979), p. 11. New York Times (2 February 1979), p. A9, reported that the Chinese wanted only the word “hegemony” in the statement; the United States side, sensitive to Soviet possible reactions, added the phrase “and domination” hoping to allay Soviet concerns. This effort did not succeed.

15. From President Carter's Press Conference of 12 February 1979, in Bulletin, U.S. Department of State, 03 1979, p. 33Google Scholar.

16. See: Tretiak, Daniel, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident prelude,” Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 12 (12 1978), pp. 1235–49, esp. pp. 1246–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. In October, just before and during Teng's visit to Japan, I discussed the Japanese-Chinese relationship with a number of Diet members (upper and lower Houses). I am grateful to them for their insights and candour; the following views are based on those long, careful and sometimes exciting interviews. My promise of confidentiality prevents me from indicating with whom I spoke, save to say, the interviewees were Dietmen representing all major parties; and in the case of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), members of major factions (e.g. Fukuda and Ohira) as well as informal groups (e.g. Seirankai).

18. Mainichi Daily News, 8 February 1979, p. 1; Jen-min, 7–8 February 1979; New York Times, 7–8 February 1979.

19. MDN, 8 February 1979, p. 1.

20. New York Times, 8 February 1979. See also the bland report on Teng's, Tokyo stop-over in HNB, 8 02 1979, pp. 4–5Google Scholar; also stories in Jen-min, 8 February 1979, p. 1. For a Soviet commentary, see “Japan-China,” New Times, No. 8 (02 1979), pp. 9 and 11Google Scholar.

21. Jen-min, 9 February 1979, p. 1.

22. I have promised all persons interviewed during this period confidentiality and thus cannot indicate names. However, the interviews were spaced out over the course of the conflict and were with knowledgeable and articulate MFA personnel. The “signalling” theme developed after my stay in Peking, especially in discussions with a number of Australian China-specialists in July 1979.

23. A number of specialists in Hong Kong and elsewhere feel that it was indeed a counter-attack.

24. These evaluations are based, in part, on my having seen a large number of MiG-17s at the Kunming airfield in mid-March 1979.

25. Interview in Peking, 28 February 1979.

26. Jen-min, 26 March 1979, pp. 1 and 4. Both hailed the victory of the Chinese troops, although their remarks were not inflammatory. See also the low-keyed story about the return of “frontier troops” to P'ing-hsiang, Kwangsi in Ta Kung Pao (Weekly Supplement), (TKP(WS)), 15–21 March 1979, p. 1. In a wide-ranging interview on March 11 with the outgoing Thai ambassador, Teng Hsiao-p'ing indicated that “China had shown Vietnam was ‘not so powerful’”; “on the subject of the ‘lesson’ China had given the Hanoi leadership, Mr Teng said the operation had ‘managed to reduce somehow the water they had in their head, but they still have a lot of water that inflates their head.’” Agence France Presse (AFP) report, cited in TKP(WS), 15–21 03 1979, p. 3Google Scholar.

27. See TKP(WS), 31 May-6 June 1979, p. 3 for summary of Wei Kuo-ch'ing's remarks and a Jen-min editorial.

28. See TKP(WS), 7–13 June 1979, p. 4 for report of heroes being met by Hua, Teng and Wang Tung-hsing.

29. For report on Ch'en's, views on the Vietnam War, see South China Morning Post, 4 08 1979, p. 5Google Scholar. According to an AFP story from Taipei, Ch'en claimed Vietnam was “only hurt a little” in the war with China … “We didn't break their fingers, but merely hurt them. In some respects we actually helped them.” The article added that “Mr Ch'en did not elaborate but said he differed with Vice-premier Teng on the point.” Ch'en defended his position on the basis of the economics involved: “But there is no war which does not involve economics.”

30. “Vietnamese casualties revealed,” TKP(WS), 3–9 May 1979, p. 1; assuming the accuracy of Wu's figure, it is generally felt that since the PLA was carrying out offensive actions against the Vietnamese, more than half of the 20,000 was accounted for by PLA men killed in action. If so, in two weeks, China's forces suffered 20 per cent of the deaths of American forces in Vietnam in over 10 years.

31. Liberation Army Daily, n.d.; summarized, with some quotations, in TKP(WS), 5 April 1979; p. 3. The article did not appear in Jen-min jih-pao.

32. Peking, 3 March 1979.

33. It was a military fiasco because it did not succeed in its political goals, and because the Chinese military, although performing bravely, did not shatter what was, it must be remembered, not even the cream of the Vietnamese army, but instead second-line defensive troops.

34. Ching-fu, Chang, “Report on the final state accounts for 1978 and the draft state budget for 1979,” HNB, 30 06 1979, pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

35. “What the results of China's NPC mean to foreign business,” Business China (BC) (Hong Kong), 11 07 1979, p. 94Google Scholar.

36. “Vietnamese casualties revealed,” TKP(WS), 3–9 May 1979, p. 1 (citing an AFP report from Peking).

37. On aspects of the economic re-assessment, see: Liu, Melinda, “China stops to rethink its development priorities,” Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 16 03 1979, pp. 106–108Google Scholar; Dahlby, Tracy, “Peking's delay worries Japan,” FEER, 16 03 1979, pp. 108–109Google Scholar; Bonavia, David, “A revolution in the communes,” FEER 30 03 1979, pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Bonavia, David, “China gambles on quick profits,” FEER 4 03 1979, pp. 80–81Google Scholar; Bonavia, David, “At the root of the problem,” FEER 11 05 1979, pp. 49–50Google Scholar; Liu, Melinda, “Putting things in proportion,” FEER 25 03, p. 74Google Scholar.

See also: “Likely meaning, outcome of China's suspension of contracts, slower buying,” BC, 7 March 1979, pp. 31–32; “Sino-Japanese talks to resolve problems of suspended deals,” BC, 21 March 1979, p. 39; “New opportunities emerge as China reshuffles priorities,” BC, 4 April 1979, pp. 47–49; “Foreign exchange worries spur Peking's drive for foreign co-operation,” BC, 16 May 1979, pp. 65–67.

If Teng was politically hurt by the economic re-assessment, it is possible that the backlash against limited political liberalization may also have been related to Teng's diminished power. For the cut-back, see Bonavia, David, “Human rights and wrongs,” FEER, 13 04 1979, pp. 13–14Google Scholar. Bonavia places responsibility for the cutback on Teng. Also, Bonavia, David, “Retreating to conservatism,” FEER, 27 04 1979, pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

38. Of particular importance are the reports of Hua Kuo-feng, Yu Ch'iu-li, Chang Ching-fu and the State Statistical Bureau, all of which are in late June issues of HNB (English) or Jen-min jih-pao (Chinese).

39. New York Times, 4 February 1979, p. 1.

40. MDN, 18 February 1979, p. 1. See also: New York Times, 19 February 1979, p. 1 (especially article by Bernard Gwertzman).

41. HNB, 26 February 1979, p. 76; Jen-min, 26 February 1979, p. 6.

42. Ibid.

43. The full text of the Blumenthal speech does not appear in any of the sources cited in this article. It was given to me by the U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong and presumably is available in collections of speeches by cabinet officials at major libraries.

44. On 27 February Teng met with Blumenthal; during that meeting, Blumenthal twice tried to discuss the American position with regard to Chinese military action in Indo-China. In an interview with an American present at the meeting, I was told that on each occasion Blumenthal raised the war question, Teng blatantly expectorated into a nearby spitoon to show his displeasure – perhaps contempt – for Carter's criticism. Interview, Hong Kong, 1 November 1979.

45. The Chinese memory of the Blumenthal speech was long and bitter. During a meeting I had with a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official in New York in late September 1979, as we reviewed the current situation in South-east Asia, the official suddenly raised the matter of the American position on China's conflict with Vietnam, especially the Blumenthal speech. He suggested that if the Americans were going to be unhappy about Chinese behaviour they could have at least been quiet about it. Interview, New York, 27 September 1979.

46. Pravda charged that American comments about Chinese intentions before the War began were “ambiguous” and that: “There were those among [Teng's American] friends who would like to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and belatedly punish them for the ignominious defeat sustained by the American military in Vietnam,” Pravda, 19 February 1979; cited in MDN, 21 February 1979, p. 1. Just before the Gromyko, speech, for example, TASS commented that the Blumenthal visit was “nothing other than a gesture of approval for the Chinese actions against Vietnam.” Reported in: New York Times, 27 02 1979Google Scholar (article from Moscow by Craig Whitney).

47. Ibid. I do not rule out that since Blumenthal spoke in Peking on the 25th, his tough words had been communicated to and accepted at face value in Moscow by 26 February.

48. When Blumenthal went to call on Hua Kuo-feng the day after the speech, the meeting began 45 minutes late. The tardiness may have been accidental or it may have been China's way of showing its displeasure with the American position.

49. For a good summary of the legislative process and the areas of Chinese concern, see MDN, 12 April 1979, p. 10. For Hua's, Huang meeting with Woodcock, , see Jen-min, 24 03 1979, p. 5Google Scholar. Jen-min jih-pao did not report Congress' actual passage of the legislation or Carter's signing of it; one observer has felt these omissions were subtle indications not only of displeasure but the fact that at least some Chinese leaders were embarrassed by the U.S. actions.

50. Interview, Peking, 6 June 1979.

51. Interview, New York, 13 June 1979.

52. These evaluations are based on a careful listing and evaluating of all Jenmin jih-pao articles published during the periods specified.

53. An English-language report appeared in South China Morning Post, 13 August 1979, p. 8; and a Chinese one was printed in Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 12 08 1979, p. 1Google Scholar. The reports are similar, but not identical. The quotation is from the Post.

54. Pravda, 19 February 1979; full text in Information Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. 7 (15 04 1979), pp. 7–8Google Scholar.

55. TKP(QVS), 5–11 April 1979, p. 1.

56. New Times, No. 18 (04 1979), p. 3Google Scholar.

57. Teng interview with Jiji News Agency reported by Reuters from Peking; in TKP(WS), 17–23 May 1979, p. 1.

58 TKP(WS), 31 May–6 June 1979, p. 15; HNB, 28 May 1979.

59. New Times, No. 24 (06 1979), p. 2Google Scholar.

60. Hua's speech to NPC, released by Hsin-hua on 25 June 1979; in HNB, 26 June 1979, p. 53.

61. HNB, 25 July 1979, p. 21.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid. 1 August 1979, p. 23.

64. New Times, No. 30 (07 1979), pp. 22–23Google Scholar. The report cited Hsien-nien's, Li remarks of late 1978 that the Chinese economy “was in a grievous state” (New Times' term)Google Scholar. Hua Kuo-feng's remarks with regard to Lin Piao, the “gang of four” and class struggle were noted quickly albeit not negatively. The report noted that a State Finance and Economic Committee was set up under the State Council. “It is headed by Ch'en Yun, a leading figure in Party and state councils in the 1950s and an expert on national economy problems, only recently rehabilitated after having been persecuted during the ‘cultural revolution.’” Li, Hua and Ch'en were not described negatively – and no mention was made of Teng. Ritualistic denunciations of Chinese foreign policy were included.

65. South China Morning Post, 13 August 1979, p. 9.

66. Hong Kong Standard, 22 August 1979, p. 6.

67. During June and July 1979, Jen-min jih-pao ran six positive articles about Poland, four positive ones each about Czechoslovakia and Hungary, three positive ones about Bulgaria and two about CMEA.