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China's Drive to Close the Technological Gap: S&T Reform and the Imperative to Catch Up
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
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It would appear that many western observers of China, with some recent notable exceptions, have systematically underestimated the importance attached to S&T (science and technology) development by both the Maoist and post-Mao leadership. This article will argue that it is difficult to understand the complexities of Chinese affairs since 1949 within the political, economic and military spheres without direct reference to China's research and development (R&D) and education systems.
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References
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99. China Daily, 13 June 1988, p. 2.
100. “Torch Plan to promote technology,” Xinhua, 31 July 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–148, 2 August 1988, p. 36.
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107. “Beijing seeks to expand hi-tech development zone,” Xinhua, 2 July 1988; translated in FBIS-CHI-88–128, 5 July 1988, p. 71.
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110. “Open zone for S&T research,” China Daily, 30 March 1988, p. 1.
111. Data within this section are drawn from a four part article in Jisuanji xinxi bao (Computer Information Gazette), 14 June 1988, 12 July 1988, 19 July 1988 and 30 August 1988.
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114. “Scholars succeed with China's IBM,” China Daily, 17 February 1987, p. 3.
115. “China's IBM - Stone's ambition,” Beijing Review, 23 February 1987, pp. 6–8.
116. “Firm accused of poaching personnel, technology,” South China Morning Post, 11 June 1988, pp. 1,7.
117. “Computer company launches joint venture,” China Daily (Business Weekly Supplement), 22 June 1987, p. 1.
118. Huang Tingwei and Wang Ling, “The international situation in retrospect and prospect,” Liaowang (overseas edit.), 11 January 1988, pp. 24–25.
119. Li Peng, “Make full use of favourable conditions in science and technology to contribute more to economic construction,” Keji ribao, 13 March 1988, p. 1.
120. “Scientific work must get priority,” Beijing Review, 4–10 April 1988, pp. 11–12.
121. “Science reform to be deepened,” Beijing Review, 6–12 June 1988, p. 13.
122. “Mao Hong proposes pushing forward technological progress,” Renmin ribao, 15 January 1988, p. 2.
123. “Scientists praise successful collider experiment,” Xinhua, 20 October 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–204, 21 October 1988, p. 18.
124. “World attention focused on electron accelerator,” Xinhua, 21 October 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–206, 25 October 1988, p. 5.
125. “Deng, Zhao view electron-positron accelerator,” Xinhua, 24 October 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–206, 25 October 1988, pp. 16–17.
126. “Aerospace to be a top priority,” China Daily, 10 December 1988, p. 1.
127. Ibid.
128. “Satellite results described,” Xinhua, 22 June 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI 88–122, 24 June 1988, pp. 3–4.
129. “Dependence on foreign satellites comes to an end,” China Daily, 25 March 1988, p. 3. See also Beijing Review, 2–8 January, 1989, p. 11.
130. “Achievements of Jiuquan satellite centre viewed,” Beijing Domestic Service, 5 October 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–197, 12 October 1988, pp. 36–37.
131. Yu Qingtian, “Xichang: centre of spacecraft technology,” Xiandaihua (Modernization), No. 6 (June 1988), p. 33.
132. “China determined to improve rockets and satellites,” China Daily, 13 May 1988, p. 1.
133. “Aerospace minister aims high for future,” China Daily, 6 July 1988, p. 1.
134. “Changzheng rocket engines displayed for first time in Guangzhou Export Commodities Fair,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, 11 October 1988; trans, in FBIS-CHI- 88–200, 17 October 1988, pp. 36–37.
135. “Still awaiting lift-off,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 May 1988, pp. 70–71.
136. Major questions have existed, however, regarding the Long March III, which as of mid 1987 had only completed one successful launch. See “Intensified Chinese space activities,” Technische Rundschau, 20 March 1987, pp. 96–97.
137. “Satellite launch program defended,” Renmin ribao, 20 June 1988, p. 3; trans, in FBIS-CHI-88–124, 28 June 1988, pp. 21–22.
138. “Satellite plea by top engineer,” China Daily, 6 July 1988, p. 1.
139. “Know-how export on the increase,” Beijing Review, 26 February-6 March 1988, p. 43.
140. “State Council approves steps to encourage technology exports,” Keji ribao, 22 September 1987, p. 2.
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