Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-rcrh6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T23:43:57.655Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

China, Thailand and the Spirit of Bandung (Part I)*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

David A. Wilson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Political relations between the Kingdom of Thailand and the People's Republic of China are conditioned by important historical, geographical and social facts. While Thailand and China are situated in close proximity to each other on the north and south-west respectively, they do not have a common border; a narrow strip of both Burma and Laos joins to form an intervening corridor. This border region shared by the four countries is an area of rugged mountains and primitive communications. Neither railroad nor all-weather highway connects China with Thailand. The most effective form of land communication between Chiengrai in north Thailand and Che-li in China's southern province is by horseback. The possibility of the movement of heavy traffic over difficult terrain cannot be denied since the experience of the siege of Dien Bien Phu. There are roads of some sort from Yunnan through Burma to Chiengrai, and also (and probably more importantly) from Vietnam through Laos to Nongkhai and Nakhon Phanom.

Type
Chinese Communist History and Historiography
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 30 , April 1967 , pp. 149 - 169
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1967

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Un. Press, 1957), pp. 241–242Google Scholar.

2 Somewhere between the category of people's diplomacy and that of diplomacy proper, there is some possibility that there have been on occasions contacts between government leaders on both sides on a very non-committal basis by means of middle men. The extent of such explorations was probably slight and their results mutually unrewarding.

3 This is evidenced in their specification of the meaning of “national liberation ” in Asia, and their holding the Chinese experience up as a model for the “peoples of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries and their fight for national independence and people's democracy.”

(Opening address of Liu Shao-ch'i at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian countries, Peking, November 16, 1949, as translated by New China News Agency (NCSA), November 23, 1949. Quoted in Steiner, H. Arthur, The International Position of Communist China (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958), p. 34.)Google Scholar

4 New York Times (NYT), January 29, 1950, p. 2.

5 NCNA, November 21, 1950, inSurvey of China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 15, 11 22–23, 1950, p. 3Google Scholar.

6 NYT, January 29, 1950, p. 2.

7 NCNA, December 9, 1950, in SCMP, No. 27, December10–11, 1950, p. 5.

8 NYT, January 22, 1950, p. 11.

9 NYT, January 29, 1950, p. 2.

10 NCNA, November 21, 1950, in SCMP, No. 15, November22–23, 1950, p. 3.

11 Ibid.

12 NCNA, December 9, 1950, in SCMP, No. 27, December10–11, 1950, p. 5.

13 NYT, January 29, 1950, p. 2.

14 This passage follows immediately after a reference to “some countries” which followed the U.S. in Korea.Current Background (Cfl) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 134, 11 5, 1951, p. 6Google ScholarPubMed.

15 Stalin, J. V., Economic Problems of Socialism (New York: International Publishers, 1952)Google Scholar.

16 Ibid. p. 30.

17 Ibid, emphasis added.

18 People's China, May 16, 1952, p. 5.

19 “A Call for the Convocation of a Peace Conference for Asia and the Pacific Regions,” Supplement to People's China, May 16, 1952, p. 1.

20 People's China, September 17, 1952, p. 17.

21 NCNA, October 8, 1952, in SCMP, No. 431, October10–11, 1952, pp.25–26.

22 The programme of this latter group was armed overthrow of the government, with manifestos and broadsides couched in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology. Its core seems to have comprised a number of disaffected young military officers. It seems, however, to have had no connection with the Chinese Communist Party or the Thai Communist Party.

23 People's China, May 16, 1954, pp.3–5.

24 People's China, Supplement 1, September 1954, pp.5–6.

25 Ibid. p. 6.

26 Ibid. pp.6–7, emphasis added.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid. pp.7–8.

29 The Thai resolution took note of the tense situation in Indo-China in the first half of 1954 and called for a team of observers to go to the Thai border to watch for aggression from Laos. The resolution was vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union and Thailand announced its intention to take it to the General Assembly under the United For Peace resolution. Any action was postponed, however, until the outcome of the negotiations in Geneva was known. It was dropped on July 28, 1954.

30 NYT, June 22, 1954, p. 5.

31 NYT, July 14, 1954, p. 1.

32 NCNA, July 16, 1954, inSCMP, No. 850, 07 17–19, 1954, p. 12Google Scholar.

33 ibid. p. 13.

34 Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), July 29, 1954.

Pridi Phanomyong was the most outstanding of the young intellectuals in the Thai revolution of 1932. During the Second World War he had split with Phibun Songkhram over a variety of issues, and with the collapse of Phibun's policy of collaboration with Japan, Pridi had emerged as the undisputed power in the kingdom. His regime was overthrown in late 1947 by a military clique which returned Phibun to power. Pridi fled the country and his whereabouts were unknown for several years. His appearance in Peking in 1954 was the first confirmation of rumours that he had moved to China. In view of his previous position and attitude, he presented a distinct alternative regime to the Phibun Songkhram group.

35 The summary of the article appears in NCNA, July 29, 1954, in SCMP, No. 859, July 30, 1954, pp.16–17.

36 Excluding the special situation in Vietnam.

37 Fisher, Margaret W. and Bondurant, Joan U., Indian Views of Sino-lndian Relations (Berkeley, Cal.: Un. of California Press, 1956), pp. 102–103Google Scholar.

38 People's China, October 16, 1954, p. 26.

39 Ibid. p. 35.

40 Fisher, and Bondurant, , Indian Views, op. cit., p. 10Google Scholar.

41 People's China, January 1, 1955, Supplement, p. 3.

42 Ibid. pp.4–5.

43 NCNA, September 13, 1954, inSCMP, No. 887, 09 14, 1954, p. 28Google Scholar.

44 People's China, October 16, 1954, p. 25.

45 NCNA. February 28, 1955, inSCMP, No. 997, 03 1, 1955, p. 17Google Scholar.