1. See Li Peng, “Government work report,” Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 24 March 1994, pp. 1–2.

2. See the reports in Jingji ribao, 24 March 1994, p. 1.

3. See the reports in Nongmin ribao (Farmer's Daily), 19 October 1993, p. 1.

4. See reports in Nongmin ribao, 7 January 1994, p. 1.

5. During the meeting, Peng, Li delivered a speech entitled “Shixing shizhang fuzezhi, zhuahao ‘cailanzi’ gongcheng” (“Adopt the mayor responsibility system, accomplish satisfactorily the ‘vegetable basket’ projects”), Jingji ribao, 18 March 1994, p. 1.Google Scholar Note that the term “vegetable basket” was used as an synonym for non-staple food.

6. The figure for 1993 is taken from Jingji ribao, 25 March 1994, p. 2. Figures for 1988–92 are computed by data published in Zhongguo tongji nianjing 1993 (China's Statistical Yearbook 1993), p. 312. The growth rate has been deflated by the general retail price index in rural areas.

7. Rural industries expanded by 57.6%, compared with the 4% growth in the agricultural sector.

8. The problem of IOUs first emerged in 1985 and became serious in 1989. It was the result of a number of institutional and policy factors, which are not analysed in detail here. For a comprehensive analysis of the origins of the problem, see Study Group of Research Office in State Council, Nongchanping liutong tizhi gaige yu zhengce baozhang (The Reform and Policy Protection of the Circulation System of Agricultural Products) (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1992), Special Report No. 5, pp. 152–166.Google Scholar

9. The most publicized case was the riots in Renshouxian in Sichuan province, where hundreds of farmers resisted paying fees for building a road and attacked governmental departments. See reports in Hong Kong Economic Journal, 9 June 1993, p. 24 and Wenhui boo, 13 June 1993, p. 2.

10. The State Council dispatched an urgent circular stipulating that all IOUs had to be repaid before 15 January 1993. See Jinrong shibao (Financial Daily) 7 January 1993, p. 1.

11. Liu Jiang, the Minister of Agriculture, introduced the government policies in this regard in an interview, see Nongmin ribao, 10 October 1993, pp. 1 and 4.

12. As pointed out by economists interviewed by the authors in Beijing in July 1993, most IOUs have been repaid but they still exist in some areas. Some funds, such as those channelled to investments in fixed assets of rural enterprises, could not be easily drawn back for procurement of agricultural products. For concrete examples of the problems of IOUs in 1993, see reports in Zhongguo shangbao (China Commercial News), 20 May 1993, p. 1; and Jingji xinxi bao (Economic Information News), 21 September 1993, p. 1.

13. Total levies on farmers still registered large increases in regions such as Liaoning, Beijing, Fujian and Inner Mongolia in the first half of 1993. See Zhongguo xinxibao (China Information), 13 September 1993, p. 1.

14. One of the reasons for the increased attention was its rising importance in the actual grain marketing system. For instance, a report by the World Bank notes that state procurement of grain at negotiated price increased rapidly in the 1980s, from less than 15% of total state procurement in 1980 to 35% in 1987. The ratio shot up to more than 40% later. See World Bank, China: Options for Reform in the Grain Sector (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank), 1991, p. 85.Google Scholar

15. For more detailed discussions, see Oi, Jean C., “Peasant grain marketing: China's grain contracting system,” The China Quarterly, No. 106 (June 1986), pp. 272–290CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Sicular, Terry, “Agricultural planning and pricing policy in the post-Mao period,” The China Quarterly, No. 116 (December 1988), pp. 693–702.Google Scholar

16. Stability is a key issue in any double-track system and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities are very concerned about it, particularly in the grain sector. As we have shown in a theoretical treatise elsewhere, in a situation where plan and market coexist, excessively large adjustments in farmers’ output can occur. See Cheng Yuk-shing, Tsang Shu-ki and Thomas Chan Man-hung, “Price responsiveness of Chinese agricultural production under the double-track system,” paper presented at the International Conference on “Prospects for Chinese Agricultural Development in the 1990s,” jointly organized by the American Agricultural Economics Association, the Agricultural Economics Association of China (PRC) and the Rural Economics Society of China (Taiwan), held in Beijing on 20–25 August 1992. A Chinese version of the paper was published in Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research), No. 1 (1993), pp. 16–25.

17. Another distinction between tonggou and paigou was that the mandatory procurement quota for the former was set by the State Council and that of the latter by the responsible ministries, which might be adopted nation-wide or only in major production areas. See Wang, Lan (ed.), Nongcun jinrong mingci ciyu huisi (Explanations of Common Terms in Rural Finance) (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1991), p. 45.Google Scholar Yet Sicular gives a different definition of “designated procurement” by stating that “procurement plans were also set centrally, but provinces were granted more independence in pricing and plan implementation.” However, no source has been cited. See Sicular, “Agricultural planning,” p. 684.

18. For the above categorization of agricultural products, see Bangding, Hu, Dangdai Zhongguo de wujia (Contemporary China's Prices) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), p. 106.Google Scholar

19. For a theoretical exploration of the extraction of surplus from agriculture to benefit industry, see Sah, and Stiglitz, , “Economics of price scissors,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (1984), pp. 125–138.Google Scholar For an estimation of the resources flow from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sectors caused by the pricing policies in China during 1952–88, see Yuming, Sheng, “The capital sources of China's industrialization,” The Developing Economies, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 173–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20. For a detailed discussion of evolution of the procurement and the distribution system of grain in the 1950s, see Walker, Kenneth R., Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, chs. 1 and 2.

21. Dao, Chen (ed.), Jingji da cidian – nongye jingji juan (Economic Dictionary -Agricultural Economics Volume) (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe; and : Nongye chubanshe, 1983), p. 256.Google Scholar

22. The price of tonggou of grain was raised by 3.1% in 1958. In the years 1960, 1961 and 1965, the price was further increased by 2.6%, 25.3% and 1.5% respectively. As a result, the price in 1965 was 35% higher than that in 1957. See Fasheng, Zhao, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo {Contemporary China's Grain Work) (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1988), p. 131.Google Scholar

23. The exact time that the Chinese government began to practise above-quota procurement seems to have long been a puzzle in the existing literature. As Lardy said in a paper in 1983, “Many scholars have the impression that the system was in existence in the 1950s although I am coming to doubt this interpretation because of a lack of documentary evidence. According to the Chinese Agricultural Yearbook 1980, the system was first implemented for grain in 1970 with a premium rate of 20%.” (Lardy, Nicholas R., “Agricultural prices in China,” World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 606 (1983), p. 5).Google Scholar On the other hand, Oi said that “the precise date this system began is unclear. One source gives I960,…Another gives 1965.” (Oi, Jean C., State and Peasant in Contemporary China – the Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), n. 28, p. 51).Google Scholar Here we present documentary evidence that shows the emergence of above-quota procurement and its formalization in the 1960s.

24. For Heilongjiang, Jilin and Inner Mongolia, the per capita standard was set at 150 kg. For Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia and Beijing, it was 50 kg. For other provinces, the standard was 100 kg. See Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, p. 132 and Editorial Board of “Contemporary China's Economic Management” (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji guanle dashiji (Chronology of Economic, Management in People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe, 1985), p. 188.Google Scholar

25. Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, p. 133.

26. Ibid. p. 132. This policy was actually formulated in 1964. It was suggested then that the practice of exchanging industrial goods for excess grain should be replaced by chaogou (above-quota procurement) – the first usage of such a term that we can locate in the Chinese literature (see Editorial Board of “Contemporary China's Economic Management, Chronology of Economic Management, p. 203). Some Chinese economists regard the practice of above-quota procurement as formally started in 1965. For instance, see Liuzheng, Zhang, “Shilun nongchanpin chaogou jiajia de gaige,” (“On the reform of above-quota purchases of agricultural products”) Jingji yanjiu, No. 6 (1982), pp. 45–50.Google Scholar

27. See Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, pp. 132 and 158; and Oi, State and Peasant, p. 51. Maxwell and Nolan found from a field trip that the practice of “above quota purchase” began in 1957 but the price paid was the same as that of “fixed quota purchase,” and that the state added a premium to it from 1972–73 onwards. This arrangement might have applied to the regions that they visited in Guangdong and Hebei. See Maxwell, Neville and Nolan, Peter, “The procurement of grain,” The China Quarterly, No. 82 (June 1980), p. 304–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28. As Oi put it, “Unlike quota sales, there were no predetermined targets for above-quota sales; they were based on ‘negotiation’.” See Oi, State and Peasant, pp. 50–51.

29. See for example Kueh, Y.Y., “China's new agricultural-policy program: major economic consequences, 1979–83,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 8 (1984), p. 354.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30. Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, p. 159.

31. Ibid. pp. 135–36.

32. Song Guoqing cites examples showing the existence of free markets for grain during the Cultural Revolution. He even argues that under this imperfect unified purchase system, it was the market price of grain that determined the output. See Song Guoqing, “Liangshi zhouqi he nongchanpin gongqiu” (“Foodgrain cycle and supply and demand of agricultural products,” in China Economic System Reform Research Institute (ed.), Zhongguo dejingji bodong (China's Economic Fluctuations) (Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1988), pp. 6–59.Google Scholar

33. Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, pp. 149–150.

34. Sicular has done an excellent job of documenting and analysing these reform measures. See “Rural marketing and exchange in the wake of recent reforms,” in Perry, Elizabeth J. and Christine, Wong (eds.). The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 83–109Google Scholar; “Agricultural planning and pricing policy in the post-Mao period,” The China Quarterly, No. 116 (December 1988), pp. 693–702; “What's wrong with China's agricultural price policies?” Journal of Asian Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1992), pp. 29–56.

35. In microeconomic terms, such a bonus system of above-quota prices results in a stepwise marginal revenue curve and a rising average revenue curve for agricultural producers. See the theoretical exploration by Wyzan, Michael L., “Soviet agricultural procurement pricing: a study in perversity,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1985), pp. 24—45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Analyses of China's agricultural pricing system in the reform period in this context are provided by Gavin Peebles, “Soviet-style agricultural bonuses and their effect on prices in China: a search for perversity and its consequences,” Hong Kong Economic Papers, No. 16 (1985), pp. 40–53; and Chai, Joseph C.H., “Agricultural development in China, 1979–89” in Chen, Edward K.Y. and Toyojiro, Maruya (eds.), Economic Development in China, 1979–89 (Tokyo: Institute of Development Economies, 1991), pp. 4–28.Google Scholar

36. Xiaomeng, Gaoet al., “Liangshi wenti beiwanglu” (“Memorandum of grain problems”) in Gao, Xiaomeng and Song, Guoqing (eds.), Zhongguo liangshi wenti yanjiu (Studies of China's Grain Problems) (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1987), pp. 1–31.Google Scholar

37. It is reported that the first method was employed in most cases of negotiated purchase. See Xiaomeng, Gao, “Zhongguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi de xianzhuang yu gaige” (“The current situation and the reform of China's procurement and sales system of grain”), Fazjhan yanjiu tongxin (Development Study Bulletin), No. 117 (1989), pp. 899–914.Google Scholar

38. See Ministry of Commerce, “Guanyu wancheng liangyou tonggou renwu hou shixing duoqudao jingying ruogan wenti de shixing guiding” (“Tentative regulation on multi-channel marketing of grain and edible oil after the fulfillment of mandatary purchase quota”); and State Commission for Restructuring Economic System, “Guanyu gaige nongcun shangpin liutong tizhi ruogan wenti de shixing guiding” (“Tentative regulation on reforming the rural commodity circulation system”). Both are cited in Editorial Board of “Contemporary China's Economic Management,” Chronology of Economic Management, pp. 491 and 494 respectively.

39. Zhao Fasheng, Dangdai Zhongguo de liangshi gongzuo, pp. 188–191.

40. For the ratio of price data, see Gao Xiaomeng, “Zhongguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi de xianzhuang yu gaige,” table 16, p. 912; and Sicular, “What's wrong,” table 4, p. 36.

41. Shou, Wu, “Woguo shengji liangshi liutong he pifa shichang,” (“Inter-provincial circulation and wholesale marketing of grain in our country”) Zhongguo nongcun jingji (Chinese Agricultural Economy), No. 10 (1992), p. 18.Google Scholar

42. Gao Xiaomeng, “Lishixing de zhuanzhe” (“The historical turning point”), in Gao Xiaomeng and Song Guoqing, Zhongguo liangshi wenti yanjiu, pp. 78–80; Song Guoqing, “Guanyu nongcun jingji xingshi he duice de baogao” (“Reports on the rural economic situation and policy recommendations”), in Research Group for China's Rural Development Problems (ed.), Nongcun, jingji, shehui (Countryside, Economy, Society), Vol. 4, (Nongcun duwu chubanshe, 1986), pp. 34—42Google Scholar; and “Nongcun fazhan de zhuanzhe” (“The turning point in rural development”) in Gao Xiaomeng and Song Guoqing, Thongguo liangshi wentiyanjiu, pp. 103–117.

43. Putterman, Louis, “Dualism and reform in China,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1992), pp. 467–493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44. “Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan guanyu jinyibu huoyue nongcun jingji de shixiang zhengce” (“Ten policy measures of the CCP and the State Council to further activate economic development in the countryside”), collected in Wang, Jiye and Zhu, Yuanzhen (eds.), Jingji tizhi gaige shouce (A Handbook of Economic System Reform) (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1987), pp. 110–14.Google Scholar

45. It was not written down in any published policy document of 1985 that the volume of negotiated purchase would be enlarged. However, an economist revealed that the strategy adopted by the central leadership was “to reduce contract procurement gradually, and to enlarge negotiated purchase gradually” (“jianshao hetong shougou, kuoda shichang yigou”), see Ning, Xiang, “Woguo liangshi gouxiao tizhi gaige shiyan” (“China's reform experiments in the procurement and sales system of grain”), Fazhan yanjiu tongxin. No. 135, (1989), pp. 1183.Google Scholar

46. Oi, “Peasant grain marketing,” p. 285.

47. Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1990 (Almanac of China's Economy 1990), p. III–191.

48. Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1989 (Almanac of China's Economy 1989), p. V–227.

49. The planned amount for 1993 is given by Bai Meiqing, the Vice-Minister of Domestic Trade. See Zhongguo xiaofeizhe bao (China Consumer Post), 31 May 1993, p. 2.

50. Zhongguo jingji nianjian (Almanac of Chinese Economy), 1987, p. VI–155.

51. Zhongguo jingji nianjian (Almanac of Chinese Economy), 1988, p. V–221.

52. Some may apply the term more broadly to all forms of negotiated purchase. Although sporadic evidence may reveal the obligatory nature of “market purchase” in its implementation in some places, the scope of such compulsion is not known. Nevertheless, even if we treat all forms of negotiated purchase as part of compulsory state procurement, their share in total marketed grains did not grow much during 1986–88, as will be discussed later. Furthermore, in the wake of consecutively good harvests since 1989, the mandatory practice has apparently been dismantled, despite the floods in 1991.

53. Shutian, Guo, Zhongguo liangshi: duojiaodu yanjiu yu sikao (China's Foodgrain: A Multi-dimension Study and Thoughts) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), p. 45.Google Scholar

54. Gao Xiaomeng, “Lishixing de zhuanzhe,” pp. 78–80.

55. Zhenqing, Ye, “Dui woguo liangshi zhengce de huigu yu zhanwang,” (“Retrospect and reflections on China's grain policy”) Nongye jingji wenti (Problems of Agricultural Economy), No. 147 (1992), pp. 13–18.Google Scholar

56. For 1986, the amount of “entrusted procurement” was 886.5 tons (in commercial grain), equivalent to only 21.5% of the total amount of negotiated purchases (i.e. 886.5 tons + 3,232.6 tons, as shown in Table 2).

57. For the occurrence of the “rice war”, see discussions of Shou, Wu and Min, Yang, “Liangshi liutong zouchu kunjing de duice yanjiu,” (“Policy research for solving the circulation problems of grain”) Nongye jingji wenti, No. 2 (1991), pp. 8–14Google Scholar; and Xinyuan, Tang, “Liangshi liutong tiji gaige mubiao de sikao,” (“Considerations on the target of the reform in the grain circulation system”) Liangshi jingji yanjiu (Study of Grain Economy), No. 3 (1991), pp. 1–3. For a discussion of “procurement wars” of agricultural products, see Study Group of Research Office in State Council, The Reform and Policy Protection of the Circulation System of Agricultural Products, Special Report No. 3, pp. 86–106.Google Scholar

58. The Chinese government also recentralized control over agricultural input markets at the end of 1988 to stop the excessive rise in input prices. See State Council, “Guowuyuan guanyu huafei nongyao nongmo shixing zhuanying de jueding,” (“State Council's decision on the implementation of authorized delivery of chemical fertilizers, agricultural chemicals and plastic sheets for agricultural purposes”), Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1989, pp. 562–63.

59. Sicular uses this second amount to represent state purchase. (See Sicular, “What's wrong,” table 3, p. 34). Both indicators are in fact problematic. Firstly, the state might not have strict control over the grain purchasing activities of supply and marketing co-operatives. As mentioned above, when the state wanted to have a greater control over grain marketing, forbidding these units to participate in it was one of the measures. Secondly, a growing proportion of the purchase by state commercial departments was at negotiated prices which were agreed voluntarily. If this is to be included in the amount of state purchase, why should not negotiated purchase by other state-owned departments (e.g. industrial enterprises)? Our indicator in Table 2 probably avoids the first problem, but the quality of data may not be as good as Sicular's.

60. Zhonghai, Wang, “Woguo liangshi shichang chixu piruan de yuanyin fenxi yu duice tf jianyi” (“The causes of persistent sluggishness in the grain market and policy recommendations”) Nongye jingji wenti, No. 149 (May 1992), pp. 10–15.Google Scholar

61. Zhongguo shangbao, 20 November 1990, p. 1. It is also notable that the term “contract procurement” was changed in 1990 to “state procurement” (guojia dinggou) to reflect its obligatory nature.

62. See discussions by Zhongren, Xu, “Jianli liangshi chubei tixi, jiaqiang liangshi hongguan tiaokong” (“Establish the grain reserve system, strengthen the macro-control of grain supply”), Zhongguo shangye nianjian (Almanac of China's Commerce), 1991, pp. 1–11–1–13.Google Scholar

63. See discussions in ibid pp. IV–l–IV–6.

64. Jingji ribao, 10 December 1992, p. 1.

65. Shajun, Yang and Zhengqiang, Li, “Zhongguo liangshi sunshi: xianzhuang, chengyin ji duice yanjiu” (“China's grain loss: current situation, causes and policy prescriptions”) Liangshi jingji yanjiu. No. 4 (1991), pp. 5–8 and 13.Google Scholar The situation of Hubei province was illustrative. About 26.7% of the total capacity were built in the 1950s and the 1960s and became out of repair; 30.6% were built in the 1970s by low-cost methods and crudely equipped. Many of the granaries were damaged by the two earthquakes that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, but were still in use in the late 1980s. See Zhongguo shangbao, 26 July 1990, p. 2.

66. See Yuanpeng, Cheng and Ruzu, Zhang, “Lun xin xingshixia de qunzhong chuliang” (“On storage of grain by the mass under the new situation”) Liangshi jingji yanjiu, No. 1 (1992), 47–49.Google Scholar Another source reported that there were more than 40 million tons of grain stored in open space in 1990. See Jingyong, Xu, “Lun liangshi jiage fengxian de chehgdan” (“On the risk burden of grain price”), Caijing lilun yu shijian (Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics), No. 5 (1991), pp. 3–5.Google Scholar

67. Jingji ribao, 16 April 1992, p. 1.

68. This could also be observed in Anhui. See Guotai, Chen, “‘Mai Hang nan’ xianxiang de toushi” (“Perspectives on the phenomenon of ‘hard to sell grain’ ”) Liangshi jingji yanjiu. No. 3 (1991), pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

69. For an analysis of the economic losses (especially the agricultural losses) from the 1991 summer floods, see Yuk-Shing, Cheng, “The economic impact of the summer floods,” in Kuan, Hsin-Chi and Maurice, Brosseau (eds.), China Review 1992 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1992), pp. 8.1–8.25.Google Scholar

70. Chen Guotai, “‘Mai liang nan’ xianxiang de toushi,” pp. 33–34.

71. See Yuan, Tian, Zhongguo qihuo shichang (China's Futures Markets) (Guangdong: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992), p. 94.Google Scholar

72. Guangdong liangshi jingji (Guangdong Grain Economy), No. 4 (1992), p. 4.

73. Xiaoran, Li, “Jianli liangshi chubei tiaojie tixi zengqiang guojia hongguan tiaokong nengli” (“Establish the management system of grain stock, increase the state's control capacity at the macro level”), Nongye jingji wenti. No. 9 (1992), pp. 47–50.Google Scholar

74. Jingji ribao, 30 December 1992, p. 1.

75. Chunlin, Wang and Ziduo, Shun, “Dangqian liangshi gongji mianlin de wenti ji sikao” (“Current problems of grain supply and counter measures”) Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 9 (1991), pp. 35–39Google Scholar; and Lianglun, Shun and Guotai, Chen, “Wanshan guojia zhuanxiang liangshi chubei jidu de sikao” (“Considerations on the improvement of the state special grain reserve system”) Liangshi jingji (Grain Economy) No. 3 (1992), pp. 17–19.Google Scholar

76. For the case of Jiangxi, see Zhonghua gongshang shibao (China Industrial and Commercial Times), 10 May 1993, p. 1.

77. For instance, see Wu, Zhanet al., “Guanyu woguo zaici chuxian ‘mai liang nan’ de jidian sikao” (“Some reflections on the re-appearance of the phenomenon of ‘finding it hard to sell grain’”) Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 8 (1992), pp. 10–16.Google Scholar The amount of grain that had been stocked over a viable period was as large as 10 billion kg. in Jiangxi, Hunan and Anhui in early 1993. The amount in Zhejiang alone was 4 billion kg. The total in these four provinces constituted more than 11.7% of China's total stock of 120 billion kg. See Nongmin ribao, 9 February 1993, p. 1.

78. For instance, see the speech given by Junsheng, Chen, the State Councillor who has been responsible for agricultural works, “Guanyu gaohuo nongchanpin liutong wenti” (“Some problems concerning how to improve the circulation of agricultural products”), Jingji ribao, 16 October 1991, p. 3Google Scholar; and Premier Li Peng's recent speech, “Adopt the mayor responsibility system.”

79. Zhongguo shangbao, 11 August 1990, p. 1.

80. Cheng Yuanpeng and Zhang Ruzu, “Lun xin xingshixia de qunzhong chuliang,” pp. 47–49.

81. Gongkai, Zhang, “Guanyu pingyi feiyong fentan wenti” (“Problems in separating the operating costs between quota and negotiated purchase”) Uangshijingjiyanjiu, No. 1 (1992), pp. 38–39 and 46.Google Scholar

82. This was disclosed by Liu Jiang, the Minister of Agriculture, in an interview. See Jun, Han, “Yong shenhua gaige de banfa jiejue nongcun mianlin de wenti” (“Solving rural problems by deepening reform: an interview with Mr Liu Jiang, the Minister of Agriculture”), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 107 (November 1993), pp. 1–9.Google Scholar

83. Jingji ribao, 4 June 1991, p. 1.

84. For the background and more details concerning the price adjustment in 1991, see Yuk-Shing, Cheng, “On the adjustment of the selling prices of food grains and edible oil by China in 1991,” Business Research Centre Working Paper Series (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist College), August 1991Google Scholar, No. CS91013.

85. These regions included Guangdong (see Yuegang xinxi ribao (Guangdong-Hong Kong Information Daily), 5 April 1992, p. 1), part of Sichuan (see Jingji cankaobao (Economic Information Daily), 25 November 1992, p. 1), Heilongjiang (see Shoudu jingji xinxi bao (Capital Economic Information Post), 10 November 1992, p. 1), Yuelin (a city in Guangxi, I see Jingji cankaobao, 29 November 1992, p. 2), Zhenjiang (see Xinxi shibao (Information Times), 15 September 1992, p. 1), and Hunan (see Hunan jingji bao (Hunan Economic Post), 11 September 1992, p. 1 and Hunan nongcun bao (Hunan Rural Post), 30 November 1992, p. 1).

86. This was disclosed by Bai Meiqing, then Vice-Minister of Commerce. See Jingji A cankaobao, 10 December 1992, p. 1.

87. The only exception was 13 xian in Yunnan province and 12 xian in Qinghai province. See Zhongguo shangbao, lO March 1994, p. 1. Most places had adopted the policy well before the end of 1993. As reported, 1,800 counties of 27 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities had liberalized grain prices by May 1993. See Zhongguo xiaofeizhe bao, 17 May 1993, p. 1.

88. Xinan jingji ribao, (South-west Economic Daily), 30 January 1993, p. 1.

89. Hebei jingji ribao (Hebei Economic Daily), 25 February 1993, p. 4.

90. Other policies to enhance the development of agriculture were adopted in 1993. For instance, the special agricultural and forestry product tax was adjusted downwards and preferential policies were applied to major grain production regions. See the reports in Hebei jingji ribao, 25 February 1993, p. 4.

91. Renjian, Tang and Yanxin, Huang, “An investigation on the implementation of the national grain production and marketing policies,” Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 102 (June 1993), pp. 3–7.Google Scholar The report discusses the ineffectiveness of other agricultural policies in 1993 as well.

92. See Jingji cankaobao, 9 December 1992, p. 2. For discussions of the strategy of building up of a marketing network, see Ying, Du, “Xinxingshixia nongcun gaige mianlin de zhuyao keti,” (“Main tasks of rural reform under the new situation”), Zhongguo nongcun jingji, No. 10 (1992), pp. 3–7Google Scholar; and Wu Shou, “Woguo shengji liangshi liutong he pifa shichang,” pp. 16–23.

93. For an excellent description of the debates and the policy process concerning future markets for grain, see Tian Yuan, Zhongguo qihuo shichang, ch. 5.

94. See Jingji shuiwubao (Economic and Tax Affairs Post), 2 June 1993, p. 2.

95. See reports in Huadong xinxibao (East China Information Post), 26 December 1993, p. 1.

96. See reports in Wenhui bao, 6 January 1994, p. A3.

97. Hong Kong Economic Times, 22 December 1993, p. A7.

98. It is reported that Li Peng made this statement in the Central Work Conference for Rural Development held in March 1994. See Jingji ribao, 24 March 1994, p. 1.

99. Even in Guangdong, the most open region of China, the provincial government recently decided to promulgate obligatory targets on sown areas of grain that authorities of lower levels (down to shi, xian, xiang and zheri) had to enforce. See Yuegang xinxi ribao, 21 March 1994, p. 1.