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The Central Case Examination Group, 1966-79*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Extract

One of many things that Joseph V. Stalin and Mao Zedong had in common, according to Chinese official perceptions, was that late in life they “committed almost identical errors.” Both men supposedly “ignored the socialist democratic and legal systems and destroyed the democratic life inside the party....” Western historians may be prepared to go along with the substance of this assessment, allowing for minor qualifications and the use of a different terminology. Closer scrutiny of what took place in the Soviet Union during the Great Purge and in China during the “Great Cultural Revolution,” however, does point to some interesting differences. These differences, as Stuart R. Schram has suggested, lay not so much in the amount of extreme violence the leaders of the two Communist countries sanctioned, but in their preferences for different “modes” of violence.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1996

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References

1 Wang Hongchang, “Duanzheng dangfeng yu tizhi gaige” (“To rectify the Partys work–style and reform our political system”), in Xin shiqi dang de jijian gongzuo (Party Discipline Inspection Work in the New Era)(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985), p. 257.

2 Stuart R. Schram, “The limits of cataclysmic change: reflections on the place of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the political development of the Peoples Republic of China,” The China Quarterly,No. 108 (December 1986), p. 619.

3 Frederick C. Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China(2nd ed.) (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 481

4 An official nomenklatura list of the positions whose occupants constitute the bulk of “cadres managed by the Centre” is in Zhongguo renmin yinhang renshisi (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian {Selected Documents on Personnel Work(Beijing: Zhongguo fjinrong chubanshe, 1985), pp. 398–05.

5 Wang Li, interview May 1995.

6 Xianchang, lishi: wenhua dagemingjishi (On the Scene of History: Chronicle of the Great Cultural Revolution)(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 90.Google Scholar

7 A wide variety of sources have been consulted in the writing of this article. The most important contemporary ones include a complete set (600 issues) of the internal daily bulletin of the Beijing Political and Legal Institute “Political and Legal Commune, ”collections of Central Documents compiled by the CCP Central Committee General Office and State Council General Office, a variety of collections of transcripts of Party leaders speeches, and material on the personal histories of selected “renegades” put together by Red Guards at Nankai University. The data in these contemporary sources have been checked against the information provided by CCP historians writing after the event, as well as against recent memoir literature and personal recollections by survivors, former case group heads and prison wardens. I am particularly grateful to Wang Li for his willingness to share his personal recollections of the CCEG, a body of which he was not a member but the operation of which, in his own words, “was not kept secret” from him. On the whole, I have confidence in the general accuracy of the “story” and only wish it were less fragmented. Additional data and translations of key sources on the CCEG will appear in a forthcoming issue of Chinese Law and Government.

8 CCP history books refer to it as the “Central Case Examination Committee” (Zhongyang zhuan an shencha weiyuanhui),but according to Wang Li its name originally did not include the word “Central.” Similar but less powerful and long–lived bodies had existed in the past, e.g. the groups set up after the Tenth Plenum to examine the case of Marshal Peng Dehuai and that of the Xi Zhongxun, Jia Tuofu and Liu Jingfan “clique.” On the former, see Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961–1966,forthcoming, ch. 7. On the latter, see David Holm, “The strange case of Liu Zhidan,” in Jonathan Unger (ed.), Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 104–123.

9 Zhongguo gongchandang lishi da cidian: shehuizhuyi shiqi (Large Dictionary of CCP History: The Socialist Period)(Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), p. 298.

10 Text in Guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi (ed.), “Wenhua dageming” yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials on the “Great Cultural Revolution”),3 vols. (Beijing, 1988), Vol. 1, pp. 24–25.

11 Wang Li, interview May 1995. At this early stage, the Peng Zhen Group was led by Zhou Enlai and the Yang Shangkun Group by Kang Sheng.

12 “Zhou zongli de jianghua” (“Premier Zhous speech”), in Gaoju Mao Zedong sixiang weida hongqi (Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Zedong Thought)(N.p., n.d.), pp. 20–21. The same expression was used in Republican China to refer to the powerful clans of Chiang Kai–shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li–fu.

13 Wang Li, interview May 1995.

15 Zhang Songshan, “Yu lang gongwu de rizi: yige zhuanan zuzhang de chanhui” (Dancing with wolves: the head of a case examination group repents), Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend),instalment No. 1, 9 December 1994. All other sources corroborate the information provided by Zhang. Qing Ye and Fang Lei are incorrect in claiming that Zhou Enlai controlled the CCEG first office, Lin Biao the second office and Wang Dongxing the third office. Cf. Deng Xiaoping zai 1976: Huairentang shibian (Deng Xiaoping in 1976: The Coup in Huairen Halt)(Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe, 1993), p. 20.

16 Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, “Wenhua dageming” zhong de renmin jiefangjun (The PLA in the “Great Cultural Revolution”)(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), p. 248. There is reason to believe that this figure represents only the number of seniorofficers employed by the CCEG. The total number was in all likelihood far larger, given for instance that one of the 20 or so sub–groups of the He Long Case Group alone employed over 20 officers in 1967. See Zhang Songshan, instalment No. 2, 16 December 1994.

17 Chen, Hong, “Suowei zhengli Jiang Qing hei cailiao de shimo” (“The beginning and end of the so–called compilation of Jiang Qings black materials ”), in Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (CCP Party History Materials),Vol. 43 (1992), p. 238.Google Scholar

18 Tan Zongji, “Kang Sheng: zai lishi de chiruzhu shang” (“Kang Sheng: on the shame pole of history”), in Cheng Min (ed.), Dangneidajian (Intra–Party Super–Renegade)(Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993), p. 9.

19 Wang Nianyi, “Guanyu He Long yuanan de yixie ziliao” (“Some materials concerning the unjust case against He Long”), Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Party History Research Materials),No. 177 (1992), p. 9. Zhang Songshan, instalment No. 2, states that Kang Sheng “personally grasped” the He Long case, but that the Political Commissar of the PLA Air Force Yu Lijin became the formal head of the Case Group. Yu was later replaced by the Political Commissar of the PLA Navy Wang Xiuchuan.

20 Wang Nianyi, “Guanyu He Long,” p. 9.

21 Li Ling (ed.), Gongheguo tebie da shenpan: miqing yu jishi (Super Trial of the Republic: Secrets and Facts)(Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993), p. 11.

22 Wang Nianyi, “Guanyu He Long,” p. 10. Zhang Songshan, instalment No. 2, lists the names of 17 of these senior cadres.

23 Tan Zongji, “Kang Sheng,” p. 9.

24 Ibid.p. 269.

25 Cheng Qian, “Wenge” mantan (Informal Discussion of the “Cultural Revolution"”),manuscript, p. 67.

26 See “Mao zhuxi shicha Hubei shi de zhongyao jianghua” (“Chairman Maos important remarks while inspecting Hubei”), in Doupigai zhanbao (Struggle–Criticism–Transformation Battle Report),No. 2 (1967), p. 10.

27 According to an official source.

28 “Beijing shi wenhua dageming dashiji” (“Record of major events in the Great Cultural Revolution in Beijing municipality”), pt. 1, in Beijing dangshi ziliao tongxun (Beijing Party History Materials Newsletter),extra issue No. 17, May 1987, p. 19

29 Qinghua daxue Jinggangshan 414 zongbu xuanchuanzu (ed.), Jiang Nanxiangjiaodai cailiao (Jiang Nanxiangs Written Confession)(Beijing, 1967), p. 2.

30 “Zongli guanyu qingcha wuyaoliu de zhishi (zhailu)” (“Excerpts from the Premiers instructions on investigating the May 16th conspiracy”) (1 November 1970). Handwritten transcript.

31 Wang Nianyi, “Guanyu He Long,” p. 11.

32 Wen Yuequn and Hao Ruiting (eds.), “Wenhua dageming” thong de mingren zhi sheng (The Rise of Famous People During the “Great Cultural Revolution”) (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1993), p. 85.

33 Huang, Ping, “Lu Dingyi Qincheng mengnanji” (“Lu Dingyi faces danger in Qincheng”), in Cheng Min (ed.), Haojie chuqi (The Beginning of the Great Calamity) (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993), p. 340.Google Scholar

34 Wang Niany i, Da dongluan de niandai(Years of Great Turmoil),manuscript of revised edition, p. 56.

35 “Wang Li xiang dang zhongyang de zhengshi shensushu” (“Wang Lis formal appeal to the Party Centre”) (30 March 1983), in Wang Li, Lishijiang xuangao wo wuzui (History Will Declare Me Innocent)(Beijing, 1993), p. 7.

36 “Zhou zongli jiejian ge daqu he shengwei shuji shi de jianghua” (“Premier Zhous speech at a reception for regional and provincial Party secretaries”), in Beijing boli zongchang hongweibing lianluozhan (ed.), Zhongyang shouzhang jianghua (CentralLeaders Speeches),(Beijing, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 133.

37 Liu, Yang, Tejian yishi (Anecdotes From a Special Prison)(Beijing: Renmin Zhongguo chubanshe, 1992), pp. 59.Google Scholar

38 “Beijing shi wenhua dageming dashiji,” pt. 1, p. 31.

39 “Li Fuchun fu zongli dui gongjiao bumen de zhishi” (“Vice–Premier Li Fuchuns instructions to the industry and transport sector”), in Beijing boli zongchang hongweibing lianluozhan, Zhongyang shouzhang,Vol. 2, p. 145.

40 Liu Yang, Tejian,pp. 13–15.

41 Ibid.pp. 11–13.

42 Wu, Linquan and Peng, Fei, Caolan chunqiu (Caolan Annals)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1988), p 271.Google Scholar

43 Xiao Sike, Chaoji shenpan (Super Trial)(Jinan: Jinan chubanshe, 1992), p. 227.

44 Huang Ping, “Lu Dingyi,” p. 340.

45 Liu Yang, Tejian,p. 17.

46 Ibid. p. 31.

47 Wu Linquan and Peng Fei, Caolan,pp. 271–72. This account appears to be based on I original CCEG records to which the authors had access and from which they occasionally F quote.

48 Ibid. pp. 273, 299.

49 Ibid. p. 274.

50 Zuigao renmin fayuan yanjiushi (ed.), Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan tebie fating shenpan Lin Biao, Jiang Qing fangeming jituan an zhufanjishi (Record of the PRC Supreme Peoples Court Special Court Case Against the Main Culprits of the Lin Biao, Jiang Qing Counter–Revolutionary Cliques)(Beijing: Falti chubanshe, 1981), p. 22; Wu Linquan and Peng Fei, Caolan,p. 275.

51 “Kang Sheng tongzhi tan zhuanan gongzuo” (“Comrade Kang Sheng on case work”) (8 February 1968), in Zhongguo kexueyuan geming weiyuanhui ziliaozu (ed.), Xuexi wenjian (Study Documents),No. 2, April 1968, pp. 10–11.

52 For extracts from such reports submitted to Kang Sheng and the CCEG by the Bo Yibo Case Group, see Wu Linquan and Peng Fei, Caolan,pp. 249–256.

53 Huang Zheng, “Liu Shaoqi zhuananzu shimo” (“Beginning and end of the Liu Shaoqi Case Group ”), in Dang de wenxianbianjibu (ed.), Zhonggong dangshi zhongda shijian xushi (Factual Accounts of Important Events in CCP History)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 263–64.

54 Cf. Wang Nianyi, Da dongluan de niandai (Years of Great Turmoil)(Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988), p. 225; Wu Linquan and Peng Fei, Caolan,pp. 235–36.

55 “Zhou zongli zai jiejian Jiangsu sheng geming zaofanpai duoquan weiyuanhui fu–Jing daibiao shi de jianghua” (“Premier Zhous speech at a reception for representatives of the Jiangsu Province Revolutionary Rebels Power Seizure Committee visiting Beijing”) (8 February 1967), quoted in Beijing zhengfa xueyuan geming weiyuanhui shoudu hongdaihui zhengfa gongshe Tao Qu zhanbaobianjibu (ed.), Tao Qu: Chedi gaochoudapantu Qu Qiubai ziliao huibian (Condemn Qu: Collected Materials to Thoroughly Discredit the Big Renegade Qu Qiubai)(Beijing, 1967), p. 6.

56 “Beijing shi wenhua dageming dashiji,” pt. 1, p. 42.

57 “Zhongyang shouzhang zai yu shoudu bufen yuanxiao shisheng liangci zuotanhui shang de jianghua” (“Speeches by central leaders at two informal meetings with teachers and students from schools in the capital”), in Beijing boli zongchang hongweibing lianluozhan, Zhongyang shouzhang,Vol. 1, p. 211.

58 Cf. paragraphs IV and V of the financial regulations circulated as Central Document Zhongfa[1967] 247: “Beijing shi geming weiyuanhui guanyu ge geming qunzhong zuzhi jingfei kaizhi de zanxing guiding” (“Temporary regulations of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee governing the expenses of revolutionary mass organizations”) (30 June 1967), in Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting guowuyuan mishuting wenhua geming lianhe jiedaishi (ed.), Wuchanjieji wenhua dageming youguan wenjian huiji (Collected Documents Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution),5 vols. (Beijing, 1967–68), Vol. 3, pp. 220–23.

59 Wengejianxun (Cultural Revolution News in Brief),No. 390, 2 August 1967.

60 Wengejianxun,No. 391, 2 August 1967.

61 Wenge jianxun,No. 449, 31 August 1967.

62 Wenge jianxun,No. 436, 24 August 1967.

63 Cheng Qian, “Wenge”p. 64.

64 “Zhang Chunqiao tongzhi tan qingli jieji duiwu he zhengdang” (“Comrade Zhang Chunqiao speaks about cleansing the class ranks and Party rectification”) (15 January 1968), in Zhongguo kexueyuan geming weiyuanhui ziliaozu, Xuexi wenjian.No. 2, p. 16.

65 Dong Baocun, “Yang Yu Fu mengnan ji” (“Yang, Yu and Fu in danger”), in Zhou Ming et al., Lishi zai zheli chensi (Here History is Lost in Thought), 6vols. (Taiyuan: Beiyue wenyi chubanshe, 1989), Vol. 5, p. 398. The CCEG second office was later incorporated into the CCEG third office and no longer existed as a separate entity at the time of the dissolution of the CCEG in 1979.

66 “Beijing shi wenhua dageming dashiji,” pt. 2, in Beijing dangshi ziliao tongxun,extra issue No. 18, June 1987, p. 14.

67 Tan Zongji, “Kang Sheng,” p. 10.

68 According to an official source.

69 The bulk of the memoirs of CCEG cadre Zhang Songshan who handled Deng Xiaopings “case” will appear in a forthcoming issue of Chinese Law and Governmentabout Deng, edited by Richard Siao. CCP party historian Huang Jings official history of the Liu Shaoqi Case Group will also appear in a forthcoming issue of the same journal, edited by the present author.

70 Zhang Songshan, instalment No. 4, 30 December 1994. Wang Li claims that prior to this, information on Deng had already been collected for some time by the Peng Zhen Case Group. Interview, May 1995. See also “An insiders account of the Cultural Revolution: Wang Lis memoirs,” in Chinese Law and Government,Vol. 27, No. 6, p. 29.

71 According to an official source.

72 Wang Li, Xianchang,p. 96.

73 “Wode zishu (zhailu)” (“My own account (excerpts)”), in Canyue cailiao (Reference Reading Matter),Vol. 10 (n.d. [1976?]), p. 19.

74 Zhang Songshan, instalment No. 9, 2 March 1995.

75 Wang Nianyi, Da dongluan,p. 315.

76 Chen Boda, quoted in Qi Li (ed.), “Zuopai” lilunjia fuchen lu (Rise and Fall of “Leftist” Theorists)(Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993), p. 239.

77 Su, Caiqing, “Wenhua dageming shishi bianwu san ze” (“Clarifying three errors of fact involving the Great Cultural Revolution ”), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (CCP Party History Research), No. 5Google Scholar(1989), pp. 78–79.

78 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo zuida yuanan (The Biggest Unjust Case of the Republic)(Beijing: Falii chubanshe, 1993), p. 89; Xiao Sike, Chaoji,p. 43.

79 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo,p. 89.

80 Ibid.p. 90.

81 Mu Xin,Ban Guangming ribao shinian zishu (My Account of Running the Guangming Daily for Ten Years)(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1994), p. 373.

82 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo,p. 89; Li Ling, Gongheguo,p. 302; Xiao Sike, Chaoji,pp. 43 14. Only Chen Boda was for some reason accorded very humane treatment t while in Qincheng. See his own account in Qi Li, "Zuopai,"pp. 199–201. Jf–

83 Wang Li, Xianchang,p. 14. See also Wang Lis remarks translated in the editors introduction to Chinese Studies in Philosophy,Vol. 26, Nos. 1–2, p. 5.

84 Mu Xin, Ban Guangming,pp. 375–76.

85 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo,p. 89. Xiao Sike (Chaoji,p. 43) cites a former Qincheng warden who gives the number of prisoners who went insane as “more than 30."

86 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo,p. 89. Mu Xin (Ban Guangming,p. 372) says spring 1973.

87 Wang Li, Xianchang,pp. 14–15.

88 Mu Xin, Ban Guangming,p. 388.

89 Central Document Zhongfa [1971 ] 64, in Guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi, ”Wenhua dageming” yanjiu ziliao,Vol. 2, p. 642.

90 Xiao Sike, Chaoji,pp. 167, 173.

91 Central Document Zhongfa[1973] 34, in Guofang daxue dangshi dangjian zhenggong jiaoyanshi, “Wenhua dageming” yanjiu ziliao,Vol. 3, pp. 17–19.

92 Liu Jintian el al.(eds), Lijie Zhonggong zhongyang weiyuan retiming cidian (Dictionary of Members of Successive CCP Central Committees)(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1992), p. 140.

93 Jin Chunming, Huang Yuzhong and Chang Huimin (eds), “Wenge” shiqi guaishi guaiyu (Strange Things and Strange Expressions from the “Cultural Revolution”) (Beijing: Qiushi chubanshe, 1989), p. 314.

94 Xinjiang yuanyu shimo (Beginning and End of the Xinjiang Frame–up)(Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1991), pp. 380–81.

95 Zhang Tuosheng, “Yijiuqiwu nian de quanmian zhengdun” (“The overall shake–up of 1975”), in Tan Zongji etal., Shinian hou depingshuo (An Appraisal Ten Years Later)(Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987), p. 113.

96 Wu Linquan and Peng Fei, Caolan,pp. 296–306.

97 Xinjiang,p. 382.

98 Chen Yun, “Jianchi youcuo bijiu de fangzhen” (“Adhere to the long–term policy of rectifying mistakes wherever they occur”), Dang de wenxian (Historical Documents of the Party),No. 6 (1988), p. 10.

99 “Zhongguo gongchandang di shiyi jie zhongyang weiyuanhui di san ci quanti huiyi gongbao” (“Communique of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee”), in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selected Important Documents Since the Third Central Committee Plenum)(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), p. 9.

100 Tumen and Kong Di, Gongheguo,p. 212.

101 According to the calculations of the CCP Central Organization Department, quoted in Zhongguo renmin yinhang renshisi, Renshi,p. 870. For a detailed history of one provincial–level case examination group see Shanghai “wenge” shiliao zhengli bianzuan xiaozu (ed.), Shanghai “wenhua dageming” shihua (Story of the “Great Cultural Revolution” in Shanghai)(Shanghai, 1992), pp. 504–520.

102 According to an official source.

103 Mao Zedong, July 1970 and 15 December 1973. Cited from an official source.

104 As attributed to Mao Zedong and quoted by Li Xuefeng on 23 June 1966 in “Beijing shi wenhua dageming dashiji,” pt. 1, p. 17.

105 Qiu Huizuo, quoted in Jiang Bo and Li Qing (eds), Lin Biao 1959 nian yihou (Lin Biao after 1959)(Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 479.

106 For rare glimpses into the operation of an early 1960s case group investigating four senior cadres, see “Jiu Chuannan–Liu, Deng, He, Li jinxing zibenzhuyi fubi de hei judian” (“The old Southern Sichuan–black stronghold from where Liu, Deng, He and Li practised capitalist restoration”), Qianjunbang (Hundredweight Cudgel),No. 16(1967), pp. 15–18. For forms of torture and other methods of obtaining confessions employed in the Soviet Union under Stalin, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalins Purge of the Thirties(revised ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 197–202.

107 Cf. “Wenhua dageming” zhong de Zhou Enlai (Zhou Enlai in the “Great Cultural Revolution”)(Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), passim.

108 Lin Biaos stated position, as explained to members of his staff, who sometimes ended up having to sign documents on his behalf, was “if the Chairman has expressed his approval, then I approve” and “if Mao Zedong agrees, then I agree too.” Cf. Wang Nianyi, Da dongluan,p. 371.

109 Wenge jianxun.No. 520, 13 October 1967.

110 “Urban violence during the Cultural Revolution: who is to blame?” in Jonathan, Lipman and Stevan, Harrell (eds.), Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 165.Google Scholar