1. There are many general accounts of the Great Leap Forward, usually limited to a chapter or section in a monograph. The book by MacFarquhar, Roderick is the only book-length study of the “leap.” The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume 2: The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)Google Scholar. My The Dynamics of Policy-Making in China: The Case of the Great Leap Forward, 1958 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 1988)Google Scholar attempts to address the following key questions: How was mobilization on such a colossal scale possible? How were policies being formulated and implemented? What were the effects of intense mobilization on decision-making and implementation? Why did large-scale mobilization campaigns fail to achieve the desired results? Was the GLF uniquely Chinese? How can it be explained?

2. Walker, Kenneth R., Food Grain Procurement and Consumption in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

3. Zedong, Mao, Mao Zedong sixiang wansui. (Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought!) (n.p.: 1969), p. 373–74Google Scholar. The text is dated 1961–62, but it seems that 1960 is the more accurate date. See Zedong, Mao, Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought! (n.p.: 1967), pp. 167–247.Google Scholar

4. For the failure of the agricultural “leap” in Liaoning, see Liaoning ribao (hereafter LNRB) 8 10 and 3 12 1958.Google Scholar

5. On this point, see Lieberthal, Kenneth, “The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yenan leadership,” in MacFarquhar, Roderick and Fairbank, John K. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 293 and 298Google Scholar. At the Nanning conference (8–22 January), Mao reintroduced the “leap forward” strategy in economic development. Three Politburo leaders, the premier Zhou Enlai and deputy premiers Chen Yun (commerce minister) and Li Xiannian (finance minister), were chastised for their opposition to the 1956 “leap.” Consequently, they retracted their objection to “adventurism,” clearing the way for further mobilization and experimentation. See Zedong, Mao, Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought! (1969), pp. 146 and 395Google Scholar; Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshi jiangyi (Concise Teaching Notes on the History of the Communist Party of China), Vol. 2 (hereafter Jianshi jiangyi) (Guangdong Renmin chubanshe, 1981), pp. 341–42Google Scholar; Zhongguo Gongchandang lishi jiangyi (Teaching Notes on the History of the Communist Party of China), Vol. 2 (hereafter Lishi jiangyi) (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), p. 64Google Scholar. Later in 1958, Zhou was in charge of supervising the iron and steel campaign and ensuring that “other activities would give way.” Enlai, Zhou, Zhou Enlai xuanji (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai), Vol. II (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 406Google Scholar. Chen Yun, on the other hand, was the chief architect in drafting two of the three most important documents on decentralization which launched the GLF. See Yun, Chen, Chen Yun tongzhi wengao xuanbian, 1956–1962 (Selected Manuscripts of Comrade Chen Yun, 1956–1962) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), pp. 60–69Google Scholar; Lardy, Nicholas and Lieberthal, Kenneth, Chen Yun's Strategy for China's Development (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1983), pp. 76–87Google Scholar. This contradicts the widely-shared view that Chen's role in economic decision-making was curtailed after the Third Plenum of September/October 1957. See, for example, Teiwes, Frederick C., Politics and Purges in China (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979), pp. 342–46.Google Scholar

6. Teiwes, , Politics and Purges, pp. 351, 379Google Scholar. According to him, of all the purges and dismissals carried out immediately after the Third Plenum, only Yunnan and Shandong were accused of opposing the GLF specifically, although he also notes that Liaoning was charged with ignoring small industries in 1958. See ibid. pp. 351 and 361. When the radicalism of the GLF subsided in 1960–61, several provincial leaders were removed, without public charges, probably for the excesses committed during the “leap.” Teiwes, Frederick, “Provincial politics in China: themes and variations,” in Lindbeck, John H..), China, Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 132.Google Scholar

7. Sichuan and Guizhou, which were not affected by the purges, were enthusiastic supporters of the GLF. Goodman, David G., Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 93 and 114Google Scholar. Guangdong, under the leadership of “the most Maoist party bureaucrat” Tao Zhu and Zhao Ziyang, was another example. Vogel, Ezra, Canton Under Communism (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1976), ch. 6Google Scholar; Shambaugh, David L., The Making of a Premier (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 18ffGoogle Scholar. Shambaugh's conclusion that both Tao and Zhao disappeared from public view in the autumn of 1958 because they were opposed to the communes, or that they adopted a wait-and-see tactic before committing themselves, is incorrect. According to the requirements of a “big check-up” campaign which lasted from 15 September to the end of October, the two men had to oversee the promotion of various aspects of the “leap” among the grassroots. For details see my The Dynamics of Policy-Making, pp. 422ff and 440ffGoogle Scholar. Recent revelations about the role of Chinese leaders during the GLF may not always be accurate, for political or other reasons. For instance, an article about Liao Luyan claimed that he maintained his sobriety during the “leap,” although numerous contemporary accounts showed exactly the opposite. See Xinhua yuebao, No. 4 (1979), p. 65Google Scholar. Another article about Tao Zhu during the GLF emphasized his “pragmatic” role in the retreat from the “leap” policies, completely ignoring his words and deeds in 1958. See Renmin ribao, 30 11 1989Google Scholar. Henan and Zhejiang's radicalism is described in Chang, Parris, Power and Policy in China (University Park & London: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1978 (2nd ed.)), ch. 3.Google Scholar

8. Schumann, Franz's Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968)Google Scholar, was the first to propound the “decentralization thesis.” See pp. 176, 183, 208, 262–63. Two recent authors who hold this view are Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China and After (New York: The Free Press, 1986), p. 229Google Scholar, and Harding, Harry, Organizing China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 176–77, 180–81 and 189Google Scholar. According to Goodman, Sichuan and Guizhou enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in implementing the GLF. See his Centre and Province, p. 93. However, in his research into the fiscal relationship between the centre and the provinces, Nicholas Lardy argues that despite the decentralization in the late 1950s, Beijing retained broad planning power and the ability to allocate important resources. By virtue of these, it was able to pursue continuously its goals of reducing regional disparities by drawing from the wealthier provinces to subsidize the less developed provinces. See Lardy, Nicholas, “Economic planning in China: central and provincial relations,” in China: A Reassessment of the Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 95Google Scholar, and his “Centralization and decentralization in China's fiscal management,” The China Quarterly, No. 61 (03 1975), pp. 25–60Google Scholar. For a further discussion of the nature and effects of the 1957–58 decentralization, see Lardy, Nicholas, Economic Growth and Distribution in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), ch. 3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9. Stephen Quick argues that the nature of policy goals structures the implementation process to a large extent. Hence, multiple and ambiguous goals make rational implementation difficult because there is no logical way to set priorities. Since inaction is ruled out by political pressure, the implementers will rely on political criteria in setting priorities and concentrate on the short-run and measurable results. They cannot achieve all the goals and can be blamed for many things; therefore they zealously respond to all the clues from their superiors, but this hypersensitivity may lead to the misrepresentation of the wishes of the national leadership, and inhibits feedback information. See Quick, Stephen, “The paradox of popularity: ideological program implementation in Zambia,” in Grindle, Merilee S. (ed.), Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980)Google Scholar. See also Bardach, Eugene, The Implementation Game (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Hogwood, Brian and Peters, B. Guy, The Pathology of Public Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985)Google Scholar; and Nakamura, Robert and Smallwood, Frank, The Politics of Policy Implementation (New York: St Martin Press, 1980).Google Scholar

10. Walker, , Food Grain Procurement and Consumption, pp. 71, 74, 116–122, and 186Google Scholar; LNRB, 28 01 1958 and 26 September 1959.Google Scholar

11. See LNRB, 25 05, 1 and 26 June 1958.Google Scholar

12. LNRB, 17 01 1958Google Scholar. The National Programme for Agricultural Development was a general and long-term programme for rural development and had been instrumental in launching the 1956 “leap forward” and the Great Leap Forward of 1958–1960. For a discussion of why it was resurrected at the Third Plenum (20 September–9 October 1957), see my The Dynamics of Policy-Making, pp. 298ffGoogle Scholar. In Guangdong, an ambitious provincial Ten-Year Plan based on the NPAD had already been drawn up by early November. See Renmin ribao, 16 11 1957.Google Scholar

13. LNRB, 14 01 1958.Google Scholar

14. Compare this with recent and more realistic figures of grain production in Liaoning (in million tonnes):

(From Liaoning sanshiwu nian (Liaoning's 35 Years) (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin chubanshe, 1984), p. 208.)Google Scholar

15. LNRB, 28 and 30 01, 5 February 1958Google Scholar. In Guangdong, the various prefectural and county committee also convened “oath-taking” conferences in order to create several hundred thousands of activists to act as a leadership nucleus to spearhead the GLF. See Nanfang ribao, 10 01 1958.Google Scholar

16. LNRB, 21 02, 1 March, and 10 September 1958.Google Scholar These plans required 15,000 large tractors, 200,000 pieces of farm machinery, and all types of engines, power generators, turbines, and so on.

17. At the Nanning Conference (8–22 01)Google Scholar, Mao reintroduced the “leap forward” strategy in economic development. He also prepared the country for a projected high tide in production and recaptured Party control over the bureaucracy. See MacFarquhar, , Origins, pp. 24–29.Google Scholar Like the NPAD, the Sixty Articles was another programmatic statement which ushered in the GLF. The full text is in Zedong, Mao, Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought! (1967), pp. 29–38.Google Scholar See also Jiangshi jiangyi, pp. 341–42Google Scholar and Lishi jiangyi, p. 64.Google Scholar The full text of the anti-waste and anti-conservatism campaign is in RMRB, 4 03 1958.Google Scholar See Lishi jiangyi, p. 64.Google Scholar

18. LNRB, 6 and 8 03 1958.Google Scholar

19. LNRB, 9 03 1958.Google Scholar

20. According to the Provincial Waterworks Department, a total of ¥3.3 billion and 2.5 million work days had already been invested in the first months of 1958. Another account claimed that tens of thousands of reservoirs and dams had been constructed. See LNRB 25 05 and 26 June 1958.Google Scholar

21. LNRB, 2 04 1958.Google Scholar

22. Ibid.

23. LNRB, 13 04 1958.Google Scholar

24. Lishi jiangyi, pp. 64, 67–68.Google Scholar

25. LNRB, 20 02 and 11 06 1958.Google Scholar The Henan case is described in Chang, , Power and Policy in China, pp. 80–82.Google Scholar For an interesting account of the origins of the communes, see MacFarquhar, , Origins, pp. 77–82.Google Scholar The original APCs in Liaoning had an average of 300 households; the merger increased their size to about 2,000; households. In most cases, a top leadership to co-ordinate such activities as water; conservancy and fertilizer accumulation was formed. However, savings, investment,; the division of harvest, and so on, were still carried out as before. The people's I communes introduced in September were even larger units of about 5,000 households, and all functions of accumulation, distribution, and the assignment of work were subject to the unified decisions by the commune management committee.

26. LNRB, 20 05 1958.Google Scholar

27. LNRB, 19 06 1958.Google Scholar

28. LNRB, 19 05 and 19 06 1958.Google Scholar

29. LNRB, 19 06, 29 08, 10 09, and 9 12 1958.Google Scholar

30. LNRB, 24 05 1958.Google Scholar

31. LNRB, 29 05 1958.Google Scholar

32. LNRB, 12 06 1958.Google Scholar The PPPC decided to mobilize 10,000 people to assist in agricultural work in Shenyang's suburbs.

33. LNRB, 18 06 1958.Google Scholar

34. LNRB, 19 06 1958.Google Scholar The previous grain target was 13 million tonnes, but one should not pay too much attention to this discrepancy. Apart from the ever-increasing targets, at least three sets of production plans were used during the GLF, and leaders never specified which plans they were referring to in their speeches.

35. LNRB, 7 06 1958.Google ScholarChung-yen, Kao, Changes of Personnel in Communist China (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970), p. 491.Google Scholar The so-called anti-Party clique, which was said to have been led by Wang Zheng and included Song Li, Du Zheheng, Li Tao, Zhang Lie and Wu Du, was alleged to have formed an “underground PPC” and “underground headquarters” to carry out “splitting” and covert activities to oppose the first secretary, Huang Oudong (elected in September 1956). The group in general was charged with political ambition and cultivating networks of personal loyalties. More specifically, in issues pertaining to industrial development in the GLF, it was charged with the withholding of the irrigation and drainage machinery ordered by the other “fraternal” provinces and with the tearing up of signed contracts. It was also accused of refusing to execute the important tasks of manufacturing metallurgical equipment assigned jointly by the State Economic Commission, the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, and the First Machinery Ministry. Finally, it was also charged with the large-scale and unilateral reduction of the amount of rolled steel equipment commissioned by the state. These alleged crimes of “departmentalism” were regarded as very serious, as the success of the GLF depended to a large extent on the industrialized provinces. For more details, see LNRB, 31 October; 2, 3, 6 and 21 November; and 9 December 1958.

36. LNRB, 5 06 1958.Google Scholar

37. Chang, , Power and Policy, p. 73.Google Scholar

38. LNRB, 3 07 1958.Google Scholar

39. LNRB, 10 and 16 09 1958.Google Scholar

40. LNRB, 14 05 and 7 12 1958.Google Scholar

41. LNRB, 25 10, 3, 7, 10 and 25 12 1958.Google Scholar

42. Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo fagui huibian (Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 1980), Vol. 8, p. 7.Google Scholar

43. LNRB, 20 09 1958.Google Scholar

44. LNRB, 26 09 1958.Google Scholar

45. LNRB, 5 11 1958.Google Scholar

46. LNRB, 4 12 1958.Google Scholar

47. LNRB, 3 12 1958.Google Scholar

48. LNRB, 5 03 1959.Google Scholar

49. The prototype of this plough was discovered by Tan Zhenlin, secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in charge of agriculture, and he ordered the provinces to popularize it as part of the national drive to mechanize agriculture.

50. LNRB, 24 09 1958.Google Scholar Like other provinces, Liaoning was ordered to launch vigorous and relentless mass campaigns to smelt iron and steel using indigenous methods, even though the metallurgy industry was well-established there. Between September and December of 1958, the millions mobilized for this purpose tied up rural manpower and the primitive blast furnaces competed with the major enterprises for labour and resources. The elaborate but futile iron and steel campaigns organized by the PPC demonstrate the extraordinary lengths it would go to execute central order. See LNRB 13 10, 1,12, and 24 November, and 31 December 1958.Google Scholar

51. LNRB, 26 09, 8 and 12 October 1958.Google Scholar

52. LNRB, 8 October and 3 December 1958.Google Scholar In fact, Huang Oudong admitted that Liaoning's performance in agriculture in 1958 was “especially unremarkable,” as the output of grain was only 9 million tonnes, far short of the 10 and 13 million tonnes projected earlier. Clearly, even the 9 million tonnes figure was not reliable, because it represents a 30% increase over the production of 1957. In contrast, Guangdong, by referring to the most flimsy evidence, declared that it had fulfilled the requirements of the NPAD nine years ahead of schedule and that its increase in grain output was 180% over 1957.

53. LNRB, 9 and 15 11 1958.Google Scholar

54. LNRB, 1 10 1958Google Scholar. Fanshen literally means turning over. Figuratively speaking, it means standing up on one's feet or freeing oneself from restrictions. The term is used as the title of William Hinton's well-known book about the pre-1949 Chinese Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).Google Scholar

55. Many references mentioned Deng as the initiator of the campaign. See LNRB, 8, 23 and 26 10 1958.Google Scholar

56. LNRB, 22 09 and 9 10 1958.Google Scholar

57. Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo fagui huibian, Vol. 8, pp. 11–14.Google Scholar

58. LNRB, 8 and 9 10 1958.Google Scholar

59. LNRB, 8 10 1958.Google Scholar

60. LNRB, 23 10 1958Google Scholar; 15 and 18 November 1958.

61. LNRB, 26 10 1958.Google Scholar

62. LNRB, 3 12 1958.Google Scholar