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Bureaucratic Shirking in China: Is Sanction-based Accountability a Cure?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2021

Wenyan Tu  and
Ting Gong Open the ORCID record for Ting Gong [Opens in a new window]
Wenyan Tu
Affiliation:
Fudan University, Shanghai, China. Email: [email protected].
Ting Gong*
Affiliation:
City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China.
*
Email: [email protected] (corresponding author).
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Abstract

This study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some “strategic” adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking.

摘要

摘要

本研究探讨了惩处型问责与官僚懒政行为之间的复杂关系。基于对中国公职人员的问卷调查，本文分析了惩处型问责是否能够有效地规范官僚行为，并降低其懒政行为。本文揭示了中国官僚体系懒政行为的特征，并区分了三种基本模式：回避责任，推诿责任及异化责任。研究结果表明，惩处型问责能够遏制回避责任这类直接忽视和敷衍责任的行为，如拖延和不作为，但却使一些官员通过异化责任这类更隐蔽的方式来规避风险和减轻问责压力。官僚会对其行为进行 “策略性调整”，从直接逃避责任转向更为隐蔽的避责方式。因此，惩处型问责并不是治理官僚懒政行为的灵丹妙药。

Keywords

shirkingaccountabilitybureaucratic behaviourcivil servantscorruptionChina懒政问责官僚行为公务员腐败中国
Type
Research Report
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 249 , March 2022 , pp. 259 - 274
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London

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