1. I use the term “spatial inequality” to refer to the degree to which social resources are spatially distributed in an unequal way. Social resources is meant to include income, wealth and access to public services (e.g. health, education). There is a solid conceptual overview of the use and measurement of social resources in the China literature in Tsui, Kai-yuen, “The measurement of China's regional inequalities: some issues and problems,” in Chan, Roger C. K., Tien-tung, Hsueh and Chiu-ming, Luk (eds.), China's Regional Economic Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996)Google Scholar. There is also a good discussion of the concept in the introductory paragraphs (and first five footnotes) of Davis, Deborah S., “Inequality and stratification in the nineties,” in Kin, Lo Chi, Calhoun, Craig and Yuen, Tsui Kai (eds.), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995)Google Scholar. For a comprehensive overview of the different ways that social resources are stratified in China, see World Bank, China 2020: Disparities in China: Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997).Google Scholar

2. Of all of the works I have read in this literature, Calhoun, Craig makes the best case for using the RAF in “Patterns of China's regional development strategy,” The China Quarterly, No. 122 (1990), pp. 230–257Google Scholar. Yang, himself has already incorporated some of the issues I advocate in his new book: Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997), see especially pp. 7–9.Google Scholar

3. The coastal provinces are Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi.Google Scholar

4. The central provinces are Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Hunan and Jiangxi.Google Scholar

5. The western provinces are Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang.Google Scholar

6. Calhoun, Craig, Geography and Trade (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993).Google Scholar

7. Due to the lack of 1995 population data, I use the 1990 population census to compute the number of people living in different parts of urban China. The definition of urban used in the 1990 census is explained by Chan, Kam Wing, “Urbanization and rural-urban migration in China since 1982,” Modern China, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1994), pp. 243–281. Across different data sources, “urban” may be defined in slightly different ways. It is conceivable that the definition of urban used by the department of the State Statistical Bureau responsible for the Population Census differs slightly from that used by the department of the State Statistical Bureau responsible for helping compile the Labour Statistical Yearbook or the part of the government which compiled the Industrial Census. The source of the discrepancy would be small towns. To check for a possible bias, I computed the statistics of this paper twice in an earlier draft – once including township enterprises and once excluding them. Results differed slightly for Yunnan and Liaoning. I have not included township and village enterprises in the calculations for this paper. When they are included, the evidence supports my argument in a stronger way.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8. While this empirical focus does not capture all of the dimensions of social resources, the spatial distribution of urban industrial job opportunities is perhaps the single most important dimension of spatial inequality and certainly correlates with other dimensions of spatial inequality.Google Scholar

9. By “state-owned,” I am referring solely to those enterprises which are explicitly classified as state-owned (guoyou qiye). When I refer to non-state enterprises, I am referring to all others, including the large collective enterprises. It is true that some of the large and medium-sized collectively-owned enterprises are better treated as state-owned than non-state. But it is also the case that many collectively-owned enterprises are in fact private, registered as collective for tax purposes. There is no easy way to solve this problem with the aggregate data. However, there should not be a large impact upon the empirical analysis in this paper. When the empirical ambiguity possible impacts on my analysis (especially for Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), I note this in the text.Google Scholar

10. See for example Zhao, Simon Xiaobin, “Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953–92: a comparative study,” Development and Change, Vol. 27 (1996), pp. 131–163.Google Scholar

11. After reviewing the Chinese literature, one author points out that there is little discussion of the role of non-governmental actors. See Fan, C. Cindy, “Uneven development and beyond: regional development theory in post-Mao China,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1997), pp. 620–639, especially p. 632.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. See Zhao, Simon Xiaobin, “Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953–92.”Google Scholar

13. Ibid. For documentation of the important role Shanghai played in developing the RAF, see Jacobs, J. Bruce and Calhoun, Craig, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” in Goodman, David S. G. and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 241.Google Scholar

14. Simon Xiaobin Zhao, “Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953–92.”Google Scholar

15. Yang Dali, “Patterns of China's regional development strategy.”Google Scholar

16. Under Premier Li Peng, government officials in the State Planning Commission developed several other frameworks, of which the most recent one is called the “omnidirectional opening” policy. See Kim, Ick Soo, “Regional disparities, localism and China's search for a new regional development strategy in the 1990s,” in Simon, Denis F. and Lee, Hong Pyo (eds.), Globalization and Regionalization of China's Economy: Implications for the Pacific Rim and Korea (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 251.Google Scholar

17. The exact meaning of comparative strengths is usually not stated in literature which uses the RAF. When it is explained, elements such as ties to the homeland and transportation costs are typically noted.Google Scholar

18. There is an exciting sociological literature devoted to this topic, though for reasons of space, I have not discussed it in the text. For an example of this type of analysis, see Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, The Power Structure of American Business (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985)Google Scholar, or Roy, William G. and Calhoun, Craig, “Interlocking directorates and communities of interest among American railroad companies, 1905,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 53 (1988), pp. 368–379CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For discussion of how to undertake this analysis, see Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Intercorporate Relations: The Structural Analysis of Business (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).Google Scholar For a theoretical framework, see Calhoun, Craig, “Economic action and social structure: a theory of embeddedness,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91 (1985), pp. 481–510.Google Scholar

19. The best argument I have seen is by Ick Soo Kim, “Regional disparities, localism and China's search for a new regional development strategy in the 1990s.” In only the most sophisticated analysis using the RAF, Yang Dali's Beyond Beijing, has an author discussed economic and social mechanisms of prosperity diffusion.Google Scholar

20. See for instance Yang Dali, “Patterns of China's regional development strategy.”Google Scholar

21. See for example Calhoun, Craig, Growing Out of the Plan. Chinese Economic Reform: 1978–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This was first brought to my attention during a series of lectures on the Chinese economy given by Songlin Li at the Hopkins-Nanjing Centre of Nanjing University in the autumn of 1996.Google Scholar

22. Krugman, , Geography and Trade.Google Scholar

23. Also, one of the reviewers called my attention to excellent work of a somewhat similar nature by C. Cindy Fan in the China area. In one article, Fan applies some of the growth pole theories to the Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces. See Fan, C. Cindy, “Developments from above, below and outside: spatial impacts of China's economic reforms in Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces,” Chinese Environment and Development, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2 (1995), pp. 85–116.Google Scholar In another article, Fan meticulously examines data at the county, province and regional level to understand spatial restructuring. See Fan, C. Cindy, “Of belts and ladders: state policy and uneven regional development in post-Mao China,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 421–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24. This is composed of the Ruhr, Northern France and Belgium. See Krugman, , Geography and Trade, p. 11.Google Scholar

25. This belt is an approximate parallelogram from Green Bay to St. Louis to Baltimore to Portland. See ibid.Google Scholar

26. For a longer explanation of this theory, see ibid. pp. 36–54.Google ScholarSee also Calhoun, Craig, Beyond Beijing, pp. 7–13.Google Scholar Note that this theory is very similar to the Worlds Systems Theory which posits that there are core, semi-periphery and peripheral areas of economic production. See Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, East Asia and the World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), for discussion of industrialization and regional differentiation in China. One way to read this article, then, is as an update of the micro details of their Worlds Systems analysis of China.Google Scholar

27. Locationally-bound enterprises are those which produce in a particular location because the production materials are located there and transporting them to another place for production would substantively increase production costs.Google Scholar

28. “Footloose enterprises” refer to those which are not bound to produce in a certain areas because of resource constraints. For instance, it is difficult to produce tobacco too far away from the place of cultivation, because the leaves deteriorate.Google Scholar

29. Krugman, , Geography and Trade.Google Scholar

30. In this paper, I apply the insights of Paul Krugman to China for understanding spatial inequality and state-owned enterprise reforms. Future research on the emergence and development of these manufacturing zones is certainly worthwhile.Google Scholar

31. Guangzhou, Panyu, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Huizhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Foshan, Nanhai, and Shunde. This list is adopted from Chan, Roger C. K., “The Pearl River Delta region,” in Cheng, J. and MacPherson, S. (eds.), Development in Southern China: A Report on The Pearl River Delta Region, Including the Special Economic Zones (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1–3. Note that other people define this zone in a slightly different way. For example, there is a “small delta” comprised of four cities and 12 counties, originally designated by the central government in 1985. In December 1987, Guangdong, with the permission of the State Council, enlarged the area, adding three more cities and eight more counties. I have not included the municipalities of Xiaoqing or Qingyuan, which are administratively part of the greater Zhu River Delta, because they are economically lagging.Google Scholar

32. See also Peter Tsan-yin, Cheung, “Pearl River Delta development,” in Joseph Cheng, Yu-shek and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), China Review 1993 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), ch. 18, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

33. Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou. See Calhoun, Craig, “Rural enterprises and urbanization: the Sunan region,” in Kwok, R. Yin-Wang, Calhoun, Craig, Anthony Gar-on, Yeh, with Qiang, Xu Xue (eds.), Chinese Urban Reform: What Model Now? (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990). See p. 171 for a discussion of which areas constitute the southern region of Jiangsu. The authors include Zhejiang in their list. I do not include Zhejiang, following the lead of Jacobs and Lijian Hong, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley,” p. 241.Google Scholar

34. Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing, Ningbo and Zhoushan. See Calhoun, Craig, “Zhejiang: paradoxes of restoration, reinvigoration and renewal,” in Goodman, David S. G. (ed.), China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997), especially p. 254.Google Scholar

35. The northern part of Zhejiang province contains about 51% of the population, but contributed 77% of the provincial Gross Value Industrial Output in 1984. See Forster, “Zhejiang: paradoxes of restoration, reinvigoration and renewal,” especially p. 254. The author notes that this decreased slightly by 1993, without specifying the details.Google Scholar

36. Development of this manufacturing zone in pre-1949 China has been extensively analysed by, for instance, Skinner, G. William, “Regional urbanization in nineteenth-century China,” in Skinner, G. William (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977).Google Scholar

37. For details of this political process, see Jacobs, and Calhoun, Craig, “Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley.”Google ScholarSee also Calhoun, Craig “China's post-1979 uneven regional policy: Shanghai and Guangdong,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (1997), pp. 61–78.Google Scholar

38. I have drawn on East Asia Analytical Unit, “China's regions – disparities and prospects,” in China Embraces the Market: Achievements, Constraints, and Opportunities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997), ch. 8, p. 283. Note that I have expanded their original list to include the cities of Beijing, Tanggu, Jinan and Zibo.Google Scholar

39. Dalian, Dandong and Yingkou. For an in-depth discussion of Liaoning province, see Calhoun, Craig, “Liaoning: struggling with the burdens of the past,” in Goodman, (ed.), China's Provinces in Reform, pp. 93–121.Google Scholar

40. Panshan, Jingxi, Tangshan, Qinghuangdao, Cangzhou and Tanggu.Google Scholar

41. Qingdao, Yantai, Weifang, Dongying, Weihai, Jinan and Zibo.Google Scholar

42. Again, for the purpose of this paper I set aside the details of manufacturing zones. Marxists could contribute to this effort by spelling out the ways in which productive activities integrate enterprises in these manufacturing zones. Neo-classical economists, on the other hand, could elaborate how exchange relations integrate enterprises within these manufacturing zones.Google Scholar

43. Triangular debt chains refer to the situation where several enterprises are all indebted to each other and as a result none of them pay off their debts to each other.Google Scholar

44. An excellent description of how these chains weigh down state-owned enterprises is contained in: Lee, Pak K., “The political economy of state enterprise relations in China's Shaanxi province,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1997), pp. 287–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45. Calhoun, Craig, “A community without boundary: the basic structure of a migrant enclave in contemporary China,” paper presented at the international conference, Labour Mobility and Migration in East Asia (Beijing, 17–18 April 1998).Google Scholar

46. Obviously, there can be too many migrant workers, as is the case in some mega-cities such as Bombay or Lagos. I am referring to cases in which the number of migrant workers is not greater than the capacity of the municipality to provide services.Google Scholar

47. In fact, state-owned enterprises may even be laying-off municipal workers for migrant workers because the total wage package requirements of migrants are much less. According to the research of Zhou Qiren, professor of economics at Beijing University's China Centre for Economic Research, migrants represent about one-third of the cost of municipal workers. This was calculated from his research in Mianyang, Sichuan (personal communication).Google Scholar

48. Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Chinese rural migrants in urban enterprises: three perspectives,” paper prepared for the seminar, Rural Labour Migration and Employment (Beijing, April 1998), p. 17.Google ScholarSee also Solinger, Dorothy J., “The impact of the floating population on the danwei: shifts in the pattern of labor mobility control and entitlement provision,” in Calhoun, Craig and Perry, Elizabeth J. (eds.), Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 203.Google Scholar

49. This theme is found in Shirk, Susan L., “The politics of industrial reform,” in Perry, Elizabeth J. and Wong, Christine P. (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 195–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. This is not surprising since Shenzhen did not have state-owned enterprises in the beginning of the reform period.Google Scholar

51. This is noted by Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Institutional innovations and the role of local government in transition economics: the case of Guangdong province of China,” in Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 175–193.Google Scholar

52. This is noted in “Who's the Boss?” Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 1998, along with other reforms instituted by Zhu Rongji when he was leading Shanghai.Google Scholar

53. This was pointed out to me by Ralph Thorpe, currently engaged on doctoral research about land use in Beijing.Google Scholar

54. For a solid explanation of the “price scissors,” see Calhoun, Craig, “Price reform and structural change: distributional impediments to allocative gains,” Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1992), pp. 171–196.Google Scholar

55. This theme is touched upon by Shirk, “The politics of industrial reform.”Google Scholar

56. This tax is 7% of the combined value of the product tax, the VAT and the business tax. See Chan, Kim Wang, “Urbanization and urban infrastructure services in the PRC,” in Wong, Christine P. (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 83–125.Google Scholar

57. This is not to deterministically argue that every single state-owned enterprise outside a manufacturing zone will fail. The research of Zhou Qiren demonstrates that at least one footloose manufacturing state-owned enterprise in Mianyang, Sichuan, is producing efficiently, because of low labour costs, good management and good relationships with the local government (personal communication).Google Scholar

58. Krugman, , Geography and Trade.Google Scholar

59. The increase of manufacturing outside these zones would probably be competitive in nature and thus would cut down on the economies of scale enjoyed by the existing enterprises.Google Scholar

60. China State Statistical Bureau, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 1995 disanci quanguo gongye pucha ziliao zhaiyao (Abstract of the 1995 Third Industrial Census of the PRC) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996).Google Scholar

61. Two in particular have been very helpful: Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan, and Lin, Cyril Zhiren, “Open-ended economic reform in China,” in Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 95–136, endnotes 375–76.Google Scholar

62. I compare the percentage of urban residents in a province to the percentage of enterprises to get a rough feel for the number of employment opportunities in a province. I compare the percentage of urban residents in a province to the percentage of operating profit generated to get an idea of the sustainability of an urban population. Obviously, if the percentage of urban population is much less than the percentage of profit generated, then it is less likely that the urban population is sustainable.Google Scholar

63. By “sustainable,” I mean that the workers are generating a profit commensurate with the level of the population. Obviously, if workers are not generating a profit for an enterprise, those jobs are not sustainable. It is hard to say exactly when enough profit is being generated to sustain jobs. As a rough indicator, I compare the percentage of nation-wide population with the percentage of nation-wide profit. Note this is aggregate data and has the potential of an ecological fallacy. In other words, it is possible that most of the profit is being generated by a few companies in a province while the other enterprises are all loss-making. To check for this, I have done some preliminary examinations of provincial yearbooks and highlight the results below. Again, these data are not ideal for studying this process, but they are the best population data available.Google Scholar

64. This point is beautifully brought out by Calhoun, Craig, “Political determinants of foreign investment in mainland China,” in Sumner, J. La Croix, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig (eds.), Emerging Patterns of East Asian Investment in China: From Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995). In this paper, So shows how the quantity of FDI is the result of politics inside Hong Kong and Taiwan, not merely the result of the central government policies of the mainland Chinese government.Google Scholar

65. The way that the data were collected does not allow for a definitive testing of the MZF. Nevertheless, the data do allow for corroborative evidence of a preliminary nature.Google Scholar

66. Note that a few provinces do not conform to the MZF predictions on one or two of the indicators. For instance, in the case of Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan and Sichuan, there are more non-state enterprises than expected. This is probably due to a high number of collective enterprises from the Maoist period. In the case of Heilongjiang and Jilin, there are more labourers than expected. Again, this is probably due to the Maoist legacy. In the Maoist period, several large collectives were established in these two provinces. Henan and Yunnan illustrate the importance of locationally-bound enterprises in providing industrial job opportunities. In these two provinces, there is greater profit than expected in the non-state sector. Yunnan is the centre of tobacco production for China: Yunnan nianjian (Yunnan Yearbook) (Yunnan: Yunnan nianjian bianjibu, 1996).Google Scholar The major industries performing well in Henan are coal extraction and oil extraction: Henan jingji tongji nianjian (Henan Economic Statistical Yearbook) (Henan: Henan tongji chubanshe, 1996).Google Scholar

67. Calhoun, Craig, “Regionalism in Fujian,” in Goodman, David S. G. and Calhoun, Craig, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 203–208.Google Scholar

68. Long, “Regionalism in Fujian.”Google Scholar

69. An interview with a government official from Fuzhou revealed that the non-state sector in Fuzhou, Fujian, is also relatively vibrant. There are plans for linking Fuzhou, Fujian, and Wenzhou, Zhejiang, but these have not yet materialized.Google Scholar

70. For an overview of the role of state-owned enterprises in China during the Maoist period, see Yang Dali, “Patterns of China's regional development strategy.” For a comprehensive overview of the changes to state-owned enterprises during the reform period, see Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. For a review of changes to state-owned enterprises during the early parts of the reform, see Lin, “Open-ended economic reform in China.”Google Scholar

71. Chamberlain, Heath B., “Party management relations in Chinese industries: some political dimensions of economic reforms,” The China Quarterly, No. 112 (1987), pp. 631–661.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

72. In particular, township and village enterprises emerged in force and ate away at the monopoly profits of state-owned enterprise. See Naughton, , Growing Out of the Plan, p. 237.Google Scholar

73. For example, the central government ordered all enterprises to begin using the same accounting system beginning on 1 July 1993, and on 1 January 1994, the central government instituted a new tax system in which enterprises were treated equally. See ibid.Google Scholar

74. See Calhoun, Craig, “Perspectives on social stability after the 15th Party Congress,” paper presented at the international conference, The PRC After the 15th Party Congress: Reassessing the Post-Deng Political and Economic Prospects (19–20 February 1998).Google Scholar

75. As noted above, the jobs in Tianjin and Liaoning do not appear sustainable in these data for special reasons. For Liaoning, only a very small part of the province is in a manufacturing zone. For Tianjin, there is competition with Beijing.Google Scholar

76. This is according to the staff calculations of the World Bank, which has a large project examining the economic restructuring in the Heilongjiang province.Google Scholar

77. Calhoun, Craig, “Shanxi: China's powerhouse,” in Goodman, David S. G., China's Regional Development (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 135–152.Google Scholar

78. Henan jingji tongji nianjian (Henan Economic Statistical Yearbook) (Henan: Henan tongji chubanshe, 1996).Google Scholar

79. Recall that enterprises in Tianjin are competing with those in Beijing, and thus are not able to develop economies of scale. For Liaoning, the southern part is only a small part of the entire province, and so the aggregate data are not able to capture the synergy.Google Scholar

80. In fact, in his most recent book, Beyond Beijing, Yang Dali draws on some of the literature of growth poles incorporated by Paul Krugman into his MZF.Google Scholar

81. I am not arguing that industrial activity will only take place in manufacturing zones. There are islands of activity around natural resources (Daqing, Heilongjiang) and transportation nodes (Wuhan). Some areas are miniature manufacturing zones, such as Xiamen, Fujian. I do argue that these areas will not flourish to the same extent as manufacturing zones.Google Scholar

82. Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Woo, Wing Thye, “Experiences in the transition to a market economy,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 271–27, especially p. 272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

83. Implicit in this debate is the definition of an acceptable criteria for what constitutes “adequate” performance. The interested reader is encouraged to consult the literature cited in the following footnotes.Google Scholar

84. To understand this position, see, for example, Woo, Wing Thye, “The art of reforming centrally planned economics: comparing China, Poland, and Russia,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 276–308;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWoo, Wing Thye, “How successful has Chinese enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 410–437;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCao, Yuan Zheng, Calhoun, Craig and Woo, Wing Thye, “Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges,” in Woo, Wing Thye, Calhoun, Craig and Sachs, Jeffrey D. (eds.), Economies in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997);Google ScholarWoo, Wing Thye, “Improving the performance of enterprises in transition countries,” in Woo, Wing Thye, Parker, and Sachs, (eds.), Economies in Transition.Google Scholar

85. By technical efficiency, Woo is referring to increases in capital and labour productivity – what he terms Total Factor Productivity (TFP).Google Scholar

86. There is an interesting exchange between several economists over the computational details of growth calculations. On the one hand, a set of authors argues that during the 1980s, state-owned enterprises had a productivity growth of 2.4% in comparison to 4.6% productivity growth of collective-owned enterprises. See Jefferson, Gary H., Rawski, Thomas G. and Calhoun, Craig, “Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992), pp. 239–266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Another set of economists argue that this finding is biased. In fact, state-owned enterprises had a negative growth of 1% during the 1980s. See Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, “Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges.” Afterwards, there was an exchange printed in a journal solely on this point of measuring total factor productivity. See Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Comment on the efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform by Woo, Fan, Hai and Jin,” China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 235–241;Google ScholarWoo, Wing Thye, Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng,” China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

87. See Wing Thye Woo, “The art of reforming centrally planned economies.”Google Scholar

88. See for example, Calhoun, Craig, “What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 470–490;Google Scholar Jefferson, Rawski and Yuxin Zheng “Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry”; Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig, Calhoun, Craig and Calhoun, Craig, “Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953–1985,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 570–591;Google ScholarCalhoun, Craig, “Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation,” Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 14–41.Google Scholar

89. Naughton, “Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation.”Google Scholar

90. Calhoun, Craig, “Path dependence and privatization strategies in East Central Europe,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 6, (1992), pp. 17–54.Google Scholar

91. Calhoun, Craig, “Preface,” in Calhoun, Craig (ed.), Privatizing the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Communist Societies (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 12.Google Scholar