1. GAOR, 26th Sess., 1996th plenary meeting (26 November 1971), paras. 133, 136.

2. GAOR, 26th Sess., A/C.1/PV.1847 (9 December 1971), para. 95.

3. “At Special Session of UN General Assembly: speech by Teng Hsiao-ping, chairman of delegation of People's Republic of China,” Peking Review, supplement to No. 15 (12 April 1974), p. v.

4. UN Doc, A/C.1/PV.2084 (11 November 1975), p. 18.

5. For an excellent essay on sources and methodological problems in the study of contemporary China, see Oksenberg, Michel, “Sources and methodological problems in the study of contemporary China,” in Barnett, A. Doak (ed.), Chinese Communist Politics in Action (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969), pp. 577–606Google Scholar.

6. An analysis along these lines is explored in Chapter III of China, the United Nations, and World Order.

7. Because of the generalized trend from voting to consensus, it is not possible to make a complete voting analysis of any member state in many organs and agencies of the United Nations system. Even in the Security Council and the General Assembly, this trend is noticeable. However, controversial issues tend to get pressed to a roll-call or recorded vote in both organs. I have completed detailed voting analyses of Chinese voting behaviour in the General Assembly and the Security Council in Chapters III and IV of China, the United Nations, and World Order.

8. My analysis of the other kinds of Chinese behaviour is contained in Chapter III in ibid,

9. The international relations literature that employs the concept of image is too extensive to cite here. For a pioneering essay urging a greater use of perception (image) theory in the study of Chinese foreign policy, see Boardman, Robert, “Perception theory and the study of Chinese foreign policy,” in Dial, Roger (ed.), Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy (Halifax, Canada: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1974), pp. 321–52Google Scholar.

10. Bailey, Sydney B., The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice. Revised edition. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 70–71Google Scholar.

11. UN Doc, A/8536 (24 November 1971), p. 3; emphasis added.

12. See Ch'iao Kuan-hua's first major policy speech before the plenary of the General Assembly on this point in GAOR, 26th Sess., 1995th plenary meeting (24 November 1971), para. 40.

13. GAOR, 26th Sess., 1996th plenary meeting (26 November 1971), para. 135.

14. It should be noted in this connection that the Afro-Asian Group of the 1950s and 1960s became defunct in the 1970s and a much larger coalition of Asian, African and Latin American countries – the Group of 77 – emerged as a “geographical-ideological” bloc to play the dominant role in the North-South confrontation in the United Nations.

15. The 36 member states of the UN that make up the Asian Group are as follows: Afghanistan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Burma; China; Cyprus; Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia); Democratic Yemen; Fiji; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Japan; Jordan; Kuwait; Laos; Lebanon; Malaysia; Maldives; Mongolia; Nepal; Oman; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Qatar; Samoa; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Sri Lanka (Ceylon); Syria; Thailand; United Arab Emirates; and Yemen. Turkey is a quasi-member of the Asian Group, because she participates in the consultative process of the Asian Group but belongs to the West European and other states group for purposes of election. I have therefore excluded Turkey from the membership list; with Turkey included the membership reaches 37, however.

16. The Mongolian membership question came up again on 25 October 1961. This time, however, the representative of the ROC opted for non-participation in the vote – notwithstanding his strong opposition – in deference to the appeals of African friends that his veto would jeopardize Mauritania's admission into the UN by inviting a Soviet veto. See SCOR, 16th Year, 971st meeting (25 October 1961), pp. 8, 13.

17. See Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries Made at the Conclusion of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN Doc, E/CONF.46/138 (1965). The First Session of UNCTAD was convened pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 917 (XXXIV) and General Assembly Resolution 1985 (XVII). Thereafter, General Assembly Resolution 1995 (XIX) established the institutional framework of the Conference, providing for periodic meetings. Between quadrennial plenary conferences, the organization's purposes are pursued through its Secretariat and Trade and Development Board (TDB) located in Geneva. The Conference met twice before the PRC's entry: in 1964 at Geneva and in 1968 at New Delhi.

18. See “Unite to smash the old and establish the new,” Jen-min jih-pao, 10 February 1976, p. 6.

19. For the quadrennial listing of the member states in each of the four categories from UNCTAD-I to UNCTAD-IV, see the following: Proceedings of UNCTAD, Geneva, 23 March–16 June 1964, Vol. I: Final Acts and Report (1964), pp. 61–62; UNCTAD, Second Session, New Delhi, Vol. I: Report and Annexes, pp. 57–58; Proceedings of UNCTAD, Third Session, Santiago de Chile, 13 April to 21 May 1972, Vol. I: Report and Annexes, pp. 112–13; Report of the UNCTAD On Its Fourth Session, Nairobi, 5 to 31 May 1976, TD/217 (12 July 1976), pp. 82–83.

20. The bulk of TDB's work is carried out in its seven main committees. The Committee on Economic Co-operation Among Developing Countries is one of the main committees; it is also the youngest one established on 23 October 1976 at the 456th meeting of TDB during the first part of its 16th session.

21. GAOR, 26th Sess., 1996th plenary meeting (26 November 1971), para. 141.

22. Jen-min jih-pao editorial of 9 May 1971, in Peking Review, No. 20 (14 May 1971), p. 7.

23. New York Times, 21 November 1971, p. 14.

24. See, for example, Hua's, Huangstatement made during the Council debate on 15 December 1971, in Peking Review, No. 52 (24 12 1971), p. 11Google Scholar.

25. On 25 August 1972, the PRC cast her first veto on the Bangladesh membership question. However, when the Bangladesh membership question came up again in June 1974, China supported it without any qualifications or reservations, declaring that all the relevant UN resolutions had been fulfilled. On 10 September 1972 China cast her second veto on an amendment to a three-power draft resolution (S/10784) on the Middle East question. Given the absence of any post mortem explanation or justification, it is possible that the Chinese may not regard such a negative vote on an amendment to a draft resolution as tantamount to a veto. At any rate, the impact of the Chinese second veto was substantially diluted by three facts: (1) it was a non-solo veto: (2) it was on an amendment, not a draft resolution; and (3) the original draft resolution itself was vetoed by the United States.

26. UN Doc, S/PV.1748 (23 October 1973), p. 53.

27. UN Doc, S/PV.1747 (21 October 1973), p. 67; emphasis added.

28. UN Doc, S/PV.1748 (23 October 1973), p. 17; emphasis added.

29. UN Doc., S/PV.1751 (26 October 1973), pp. 78–80.

30. Lincoln Bloomfleld had argued, for example: “One has only to recall the bitter Soviet attacks on both Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold toward the end of the tenure of both to appreciate the excruciating difficulties involved in getting agreement on their successors without China – and on Mr Thant's replacement with China, if that is the prospect for 1971.” See “China, the United States, and the United Nations,” International Organization, Vol. XX (Autumn 1966), p. 663Google Scholar; emphasis in original.

31. Rule 51 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council states: “The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the secretary-general. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the secretary-general of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.” Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (January 1974, S/96/Rev. 6), p. 9.

32. UN Doc, S/PV.1620 (21 December 1971), p. 1.

33. Security Council Resolution 306 (1971).

34. The official communique of the 1978th meeting of the Security Council held in private on 7 December 1976 reads in part: “As a result of the voting on the candidates by secret ballot, the Security Council unanimously adopted the following resolution.” The resolution herein referred to is Resolution 400 (1976), which recommends to the General Assembly that Mr Kurt Waldheim be appointed secretary-general of the United Nations for a second term of office from 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1981. It should be noted in this connection that each of the permanent members receives a marked ballot so as to make a clear distinction between the ballots returned from permanent and non-permanent members in the secret balloting. See UN Doc, S/PV.1978 (7 December 1976), p. 1.

35. The scenario projected by many UN delegates as to how the Chinese would behave in private on the question of the secretary-general proved to be remarkably accurate. A few days before the actual balloting in the private Council meeting, David Anable, the Christian Science Monitor UN correspondent, after having interviewed UN delegates, wrote: “Delegates who have been trying to read the hints and winks emanating from the otherwise austere Chinese mission see a different way out: the Chinese may veto Mr Waldheim once or twice, simply to ensure that the ‘third world candidate’ (Mr Echeverria) has a chance to be considered. Thereafter they will let Mr Waldheim through.” See Anable, David, “UN Security Council faces secretary-general decision,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 12 1976, p. 38Google Scholar.

36. Diplomacy. 2nd edition. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 126Google Scholar.

37. Article 100 (1) of the UN Charter.

38. On this point, see my “The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: a preliminary analysis,” World Politics, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (04 1974), pp. 303–304Google Scholar.

39. For a pro forma approval of the consensus formula in the First Committee, see “Question of Korea: report of the First Committee,” in UN Doc, A/9341 (27 November 1973).

40. Keohane, Robert Owen, “Political influence in the General Assembly,” in Gregg, Robert W. and Barkun, Michael (eds.), The United Nations System and Its Functions: Selected Readings (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968), p. 38Google Scholar.

41. Ibid. p. 25.

42. See General Assembly Resolution 3189 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, adopted without objection. Likewise, the Security Council adopted without a vote at the 1761st meeting on 17 January 1974 a consensual resolution (Security Council Resolution 345), making Chinese one of its working languages.

43. For an elaboration of this theme, see my The Maoist Image of World Order (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1977), pp. 1–8Google Scholar.