Awakening to China's Rise fills the gap in scholarly understanding of how major European powers have adjusted and responded to the so-called “rise of China.” Anglophone academic literature on Sino-European relations of recent years has been predominantly focused on the supranational and regional levels in Europe, specifically the European Union and, following the establishment of the so-called 17+1 framework, also Central and Eastern Europe. As such, a study that aims to unpack the evolution of the national China policies of the three major European powers – France, Germany and the UK – is a timely addition to the academic literature on Sino-European ties. It is also exceptionally needed at a time when the three countries’ relations with China are in flux, as are the broader Sino-European relations within which they play the role of key actors and stakeholders.
The book situates the development of the European “big three's” policies toward China in the context of “rising” China's growing assertiveness, which is driven by “the ambition of the leadership in Beijing to expand the country's reach and influence globally” (p. 5). The analysis centres on the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively focusing primarily on the evolving security context in relation to the South China Sea and on Chinese investments in some of the key sectors in Europe. It explores and demonstrates how perceptions of China's “muscular and confrontational” behaviour in the Asia Pacific (p. 17) and “aggressive investments in sensitive technologies” (p. 4) in Europe triggered reassessments of the “rise” of China in the French, German and British capitals and changed their approach to China.
Meijer does not critically examine the key conceptual pillars of such perceptions – neither those concerned with the assumed Chinese growing leverage and assertiveness in Southeast Asia, nor those preoccupied with China's “inroads into Europe,” supposedly in pursuit of geopolitical and strategic goals via the tightly managed deployment of investments within a monolithic structure in which all economic actors work for the party. The book instead shows how such perceptions have informed European policy makers and helped bring about adjustments in the three countries’ assessments of the implications of China's growing international presence and relevance. It convincingly does so through an analysis informed by an impressive number of interviews with policy makers and a review of a substantial amount of relevant governmental documents and (de)classified materials.
By comparing the evolution of the three European powers’ foreign and security policies toward China from the 1990s onwards, Meijer identifies a pattern whereby, due to China's growing assertiveness, the perspective of high economic gains and low security threat that drove their approach to China throughout the 1990s and 2000s has been progressively replaced by one of economic competition and high threat perceptions. This in turn caused a significant change in policy goals and the development of policy tools in the second half of the 2010s to confront the perceived challenge that China poses.
While successful in evidencing how the views on China in France, Germany and the UK have evolved over time, the approach taken in the book obscures as much as it reveals and would have benefited from a more inclusive analytical framework. Despite a growing body of literature that has examined how internal dynamics in both China and the European Union shape their foreign policy objectives and policies, the domestic context is not factored into the analysis. Simultaneously, the changing broader geopolitical environment shaped by the US's rivalry with China hardly gets a mention in the book until its very end, and then only as a potential further avenue for research. Yet American policy evolved from the Asia Pivot and the identification of the South China Sea as the US's core interest under Obama, via relentlessly confrontational rhetoric, trade and diplomatic “wars” under Trump, to the consistent attempts under Biden to enlist Europeans in a variety of minilateral coalition-building efforts that target China. Although this has exerted well-documented structural, policy-specific and issue-specific pressures on the Europeans to reconfigure their relationship with China, it does not get adequate treatment in the book.
An analytical framework that took account of these variables and the broader context within which both the European powers and China operate would have provided for a more nuanced analysis of the dynamics shaping the three European countries’ approach to and relationship with China. Such a comprehensive context-setting would inevitably challenge the neat and linear narrative provided in the book of increasing assertiveness and increasing threat perceptions resulting in the hardening of the policy. Likewise, as it is, the analysis does not fully appreciate the engagement aspect of the European powers’ China policies and their attempts to balance the benefits and risks of the relationship with China.
Overall, however, the book offers an accessible overview of the change in the three major European powers’ approach to China and a well-informed view of the changing perceptions and assessments that contributed to that change. The book will appeal to both academic and policy audiences interested in Sino-European relations and is well-positioned to serve as supplementary reading material for undergraduate and postgraduate courses concerned with European foreign policy, “global” China, and the evolving global political and security landscape.
