Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2015
From 1960 until 1965, the People's Republic of China (PRC) built a remarkably cordial quasi alliance with the Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, however, the years between 1960 and 1965 were marked by two large waves of anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia. Although more than half a century has passed since these events, our understanding of Chinese foreign policy towards Indonesia during these turbulent years remains incomplete. In 2008, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives declassified for the first time documents produced during the years between 1961 and 1965. However, very recently in summer 2013, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives re-classified the main body of its collection. Through examining this body of fresh but currently inaccessible official records, this article aims to bridge the gap between scholarly works on the PRC's diplomatic history and overseas Chinese history. By tracing the processes by which Chinese diplomats dealt with Sukarno, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or the PKI), this article argues that the ambivalent Chinese alliance with Indonesia was shaped by three disparate pressures which interacted and competed with one another: the strategic need to befriend Third World countries, ethnic ties to the Chinese in Indonesia and ideological commitment to the international communist movement.
1960 年代初期, 对美苏主导的世界体制的不满和在既有国际关系框架外开辟新天地的愿望把中国与印尼紧密地联合在了一起。双方频繁的高层互访, 密切的党际交往以及经济、文化、教育和卫生等全方面的双边合作在 1965 年印尼 “九 • 三〇运动” 前夕达到高潮。但与此同时, 印尼社会曾分别在 1960 年和 1965 年两次爆发大规模排华浪潮。时至今日, 学界对这一段动荡时期内中国对印尼政策的形成和演变仍然缺乏全面的了解。本文是利用北京方面公开外交档案探索中国对印尼政策轨迹的首批学术论文之一。本文认为中国对印尼政策在三个向度上存在着不同的意义: 由于印尼是重要的亚非新兴民族国家, 苏加诺本人更是 “新兴力量” 这一概念的提出者, 中国对印尼政策是其建立国际统一战线战略的具体体现; 由于华人与原住民之间因经济地位、文化认同与政治忠诚感差异形成的、历史因袭而来的矛盾,华侨问题成为中国对印尼政策必不可缺少的组成部分; 由于印尼共产党在其国内政治中的特殊地位, 中国对印尼政策又不可避免地要承载国际共产主义运动动荡、分裂的冲击力。
The author would like to thank Chen Jian, Jack Meng-tat Chia, Sherman Cochran, Charles Kraus, Hong Liu, Hajimu Masuda, Andrew Mertha, Glen Peterson, Eric Tagliacozzo and Arne Westad for their comments on earlier drafts of this article; Jeffery Petersen and Liren Zheng for their help with materials; and the Cornell East Asia Program for financial support.